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Summary
This dissertation is concerned with conceptual innovation and dynamics in scientific 
research – specifically, in the practices used within scientific research. It constitutes an 
argument for how concepts are, and how they can be, formed and developed through such 
practices. These practices are varied, and include not only assorted kinds of 
experimentation, but also visual and diagrammatic practices, instrument-building, and 
practices of calibration, measuring and mapping, amongst others. These are generally taken 
to be material practices, because they involve the manipulation of physical things. 
Scientific research manifestly proceeds through variations on exactly these kinds of 
practices: what scientists do is experiment, construct instruments, map out results, etc. The 
problem is how we can go from these practices to what appear to be entirely non-material, 
mental entities – i.e., concepts. How, in other words, does all that manipulation of physical 
things produce new scientific concepts? And how do those concepts come to change with 
further such manipulation?
This problem has two components: (1) in what concrete ways do scientific practices affect 
the formation and development of our concepts about the natural world?; and (2) how is it 
possible to go from practices to concepts (and vice versa) in the first place? The 
dissertation’s ultimate proposal in answer to (2) is that a philosophy of scientific practices 
can only work if it adopts a metaphysics in which the conceptual and the material are not 
separated, but are instead continuous. (Such a metaphysics may well be tacit and implicit in 
studies that do not address the metaphysics of scientific practices explicitly, but it must 
nevertheless underpin them.) Its answer to (1) is multifarious, consisting in the analysis of 
various ways in which certain concrete concepts have come out of, and been mutated by, 
certain concrete practices.
ii SUMMARY
The dissertation is split into two parts, reflecting the two sub-problems. Part One is a 
diachronic analysis of investigative practices used within a particular episode in the history 
of science – the study of magnetism prior to electromagnetism. This covers a period from 
roughly the mid-sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century, with a particular 
emphasis on an especially productive period in the seventeenth century where, for a while, 
magnetism came to be at the centre of a tradition in natural philosophy, known as “the 
magnetical philosophy”. This is an illuminating episode to address in the context of our 
interests here: new concepts and new practices were being relatively rapidly generated and 
then promulgated, and they mutated quite substantially over the period. The development of 
the magnetical philosophy also coincided with a much wider shift in the conceptualisation 
of the natural world, and an explosion in the techniques and technologies available for 
investigating it. This episode, then, presents an especially varied and variegated wealth of 
examples of conceptual and practical innovation and development.
Since the magnetical philosophy is not too familiar an episode, Chapter 1 provides an 
overview of what is at stake within it. Chapter 2 then moves on to a case of conceptual 
innovation and change – in the form of the “disponent power” – and its subsequent 
development. This is the analysis of a reconceptualisation of what magnetism is: previously, 
magnetism had been understood primarily in terms of attraction; Gilbert’s De magnete 
(1600), the chapter argues, changed to a conceptualisation in terms of disposition (or 
organisation, in this context). The chapter shows how this change took place through 
Gilbert’s investigative practices, how the disponent conceptualisation was taken on by 
others, and how it, in turn, shaped future practices of investigation. Conceptual 
development is assessed on a larger scale in Chapter 3, which is a diachronic account of the 
ongoing mutations of the concept of spheres of activity (which, broadly speaking, are taken 
to surround magnets), focusing particularly on how investigative practices right at the 
beginning of this development continued to affect conceptualisations, explanations, and 
further investigative practices widely throughout the life of the concept.
In Chapter 4, I focus on the role of diagrammatic practices in conceptual innovation in the 
magnetical philosophy. The chapter argues that several of Gilbert’s laws for the behaviour 
of magnets, as well as significant parts of the conceptualisation of his version of a sphere of 
activity, could only have been formed in the way they were through a combination of 
diagrammatic practices developed through prior experimental practices, and then further 
experimental practices developed through those diagrammatic practices. Part One 
concludes with Chapter 5, which gives another diachronic analysis of the concrete 
development of a concept – in this case, magnetic inclination. It argues that it is not only 
laws or rules – or what might traditionally be thought of as theories – that are formed and 
changed through practices: the practices also form and change the phenomena themselves 
(in at least some cases). The chapter makes the case that magnetic inclination was never a 
single phenomenon with a consistent specification across investigations. Nevertheless, 
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investigators treated it as a continuous phenomenon over a wide period, despite not sharing 
phenomenal elements. I argue that this continuity was only possible on the basis of an 
underlying differentiation between planes of movement that was generated by the practices 
of construction and use of the compass.
Part Two applies the same diachronic, practice-based approach to the study of the 
relationship between scientific practices and scientific concepts. It analyses the issue of 
conceptual dynamics in the so-called “practice turn” in philosophy of science in terms of 
the practice turn’s own practices. Chapter 6 historicizes the practice turn itself, and, in 
doing so, makes a case both for the need to assess science in terms of its practices and for 
how such assessment can work. It concludes that a practice-based account of science will 
have to be reflexive: it has to understand its own activity in terms of its own practices. 
Chapter 7 then builds on this, to address practices of studying conceptual innovation and 
development. It is through its analysis of these practices in philosophy of science that it 
argues for the solution to sub-problem (2) – a new (either explicit or tacit) metaphysics in 
which the material and the conceptual are taken to be not distinct from but continuous with 
each other.

Samenvatting
Deze dissertatie handelt over conceptuele innovatie en dynamiek in wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek – meer bepaald in de praktijken die gehanteerd worden binnen wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek. Het vormt een argument voor de manier waarop concepten gevormd en 
ontwikkeld worden en kunnen worden door dergelijke praktijken. Deze praktijken zijn 
gevarieerd, en omvatten niet enkel allerhande soorten experimenten, maar ook, onder 
andere, visuele en diagrammatische praktijken, instrumentenbouw en praktijken van 
kalibreren, meten en afbeelden. Deze worden over het algemeen opgevat als materiële 
praktijken, omdat er manipulatie van fysieke dingen bij betrokken is. Wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek vindt plaats door variaties van precies deze soorten praktijken: wat 
wetenschappers doen is experimenteren, construeren, resultaten afbeelden, enz. Het 
probleem is dan hoe wij vanuit praktijken kunnen overgaan naar wat volstrekt niet-
materiële, mentale entiteiten lijken te zijn – namelijk concepten. Met andere woorden, hoe 
produceert al dit manipuleren van fysieke dingen nieuwe wetenschappelijke concepten? En 
hoe ondergaan deze concepten verandering onder invloed van verdere manipulatie?
Dit probleem heeft twee componenten: (1) op welke concrete wijzen beïnvloeden 
wetenschappelijke praktijken deze vorming en ontwikkeling van onze concepten van de 
natuurlijke wereld?; en (2) hoe is het überhaupt mogelijk om over te gaan van praktijken 
naar concepten (en omgekeerd)? Het uiteindelijke voorstel van deze verhandeling ter 
beantwoording van (2) is dat een filosofie van wetenschappelijke praktijken enkel kan 
werken als het een metafysica aanneemt waarbinnen het conceptuele en met materiële niet 
gescheiden, maar juist continu zijn. (Een dergelijke metafysica kan best stilzwijgend en 
impliciet aanwezig zijn in studies die het probleem van de metafysica van 
wetenschappelijke praktijken niet expliciet aankaarten, maar het moet ze niettemin 
onderbouwen) Het antwoord dat deze verhandeling biedt op (1) is velerlei, en bestaat uit de 
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analyse van de verschillende manieren waarop bepaalde concrete concepten voortgekomen 
zijn uit, en gemuteerd zijn door, bepaalde concrete praktijken.
De verhandeling valt uiteen in twee delen, die elk een van de twee eerdergenoemde sub-
problemen behandelen. Deel Een is een diachronische analyse van onderzoekspraktijken 
gehanteerd binnen een welbepaalde episode in de geschiedenis van de wetenschap – de 
studie van magnetisme voor de opkomst van elektromagnetisme. Ze beslaat een periode van 
ruwweg het midden van de Zestiende Eeuw tot de vroege Negentiende Eeuw, met een 
specifieke nadruk op de bijzonder productieve periode in de Zeventiende Eeuw waarin 
magnetisme gedurende enige tijd in het centrum kwam te staan van een traditie in 
natuurfilosofie die bekend staat als de “magnetical philosophy”. Deze episode is 
verhelderend binnen de context van wat dit onderzoek aanbelangt: nieuwe concepten en 
nieuwe praktijken werden betrekkelijk snel voortgebracht en verspreid, en muteerden vrij 
substantieel binnen deze periode. De ontwikkeling van de “magnetical philosophy” viel 
tevens samen met een veel bredere verschuiving in de conceptualisering van de natuurlijke 
wereld en een explosie van de technieken en technologieën die beschikbaar werden om haar 
te onderzoeken. Deze episode biedt dus een bijzonder gevarieerde en uiteenlopende schat 
aan voorbeelden van conceptuele en praktische innovatie en ontwikkeling.
Aangezien de “magnetical philosophy” geen bijster bekende episode uit de 
wetenschapsgeschiedenis is, biedt Hoofdstuk Een een overzicht van wat erin op het spel 
stond. Hoofdstuk Twee gaat dan over naar een geval van conceptuele innovatie en 
verandering in de vorm van “disponente kracht” – en haar verdere ontwikkeling. Dit vormt 
de analyse van een herconceptualisering van wat magnetisme is: daarvoor werd 
magnetisme voornamelijk begrepen in termen van aantrekking; Gilberts De Magnete 
(1600) veranderde echter – zo beargumenteert dit hoofdstuk – in een conceptualisering in 
termen van dispositie (ofwel, in deze context, organisatie). Het hoofdstuk toont hoe deze 
verandering plaatsvond doorheen Gilberts onderzoekspraktijken, hoe de disponente 
conceptualisering overgenomen werd door anderen en hoe zij, op haar beurt, latere 
onderzoekspraktijken vorm gaf. Conceptuele ontwikkeling wordt op grotere schaal 
onderzocht in Hoofdstuk Drie, dat een diachronische behandeling biedt van de 
voortdurende mutaties van het concept van “sferen van activiteit” (deze werden in brede zin 
opgevat als magneten omgevend). Hierbij wordt vooral gefocust op de manier waarop 
onderzoekspraktijken vanaf het begin van deze ontwikkeling en doorheen de hele 
levensduur van het concept conceptualiseringen, verklaringen, en andere onderzoeks-
praktijken verregaand bleven beïnvloeden.
In Hoofdstuk Vier focus ik op de rol van diagrammatische praktijken in conceptuele 
innovatie binnen de “magnetical philosophy”. Dit hoofdstuk beargumenteert dat 
verscheidene van Gilberts wetten voor het gedrag van magneten, alsook verscheidene 
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aspecten van de conceptualisering van zijn versie van een sfeer van activiteit, enkel zo 
gevormd hadden kunnen worden door een combinatie van diagrammatische praktijken die 
ontwikkeld werden door eerdere experimentele praktijken, en verdere experimentele 
praktijken die ontwikkeld werden door deze diagrammatische praktijken. Deel Een besluit 
met Hoofdstuk Vijf, dat een bijkomende diachronische analyse geeft van de concrete 
ontwikkeling van een concept – in dit geval magnetische inclinatie. Het beargumenteert dat 
niet enkel wetten of regels – of wat traditioneel beschouwd zou kunnen worden als 
theorieën – gevormd en veranderd worden door praktijken: de praktijken vormen en 
veranderen ook de fenomenen zelf (tenminste in bepaalde gevallen). Dit hoofdstuk bepleit 
dat magnetische inclinatie nooit een enkel fenomeen was dat consistent gespecificeerd werd 
over verschillende onderzoeken heen. Niettemin behandelden onderzoekers het over een 
lange periode als een continu fenomeen, ook al deelde het geen fenomenale elementen. Ik 
beargumenteer dat deze continuïteit enkel mogelijk was op basis van een onderliggende 
differentiatie tussen vlakken van beweging die voortgebracht werd door de 
constructiepraktijken en het gebruik van het kompas.
Deel Twee past dezelfde diachronische, op praktijken gebaseerde benadering toe op de 
studie van de verhouding tussen wetenschappelijke praktijken en wetenschappelijke 
concepten. Het analyseert de kwestie van conceptuele dynamiek in de zogenaamde 
“practice turn” in de wetenschapsfilosofie in termen van de praktijken van deze “practice 
turn” zelf. Hoofdstuk Zes historiseert de “practice turn” zelf, en pleit zodoende voor zowel 
de noodzaak om wetenschap te evalueren in termen van haar eigen praktijken en voor een 
manier waarop een dergelijke evaluatie zou kunnen verlopen. Het besluit dat een op 
praktijken gebaseerde benadering van wetenschap reflexief zal moeten zijn: het moet zijn 
eigen activiteit verstaan in termen van zijn eigen praktijken. Hoofdstuk Zeven bouwt hier 
dan op voort om de praktijken voor het bestuderen van conceptuele innovatie en 
ontwikkeling te bespreken. Het is aan de hand van een analyse van deze praktijken in de 
wetenschapsfilosofie dat het argumenteert voor de oplossing van sub-probleem (2) – een 
nieuwe (expliciete dan wel stilzwijgende) metafysica waarbinnen het materiële en het 
conceptuele niet als onderscheiden, maar als continu opgevat worden.
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Introduction
William Barlow – one of the so-called “magnetical philosophers”, working in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries – writes the following about Gilbert’s De magnete 
(1600), the foundational work of early research into magnetism:
[T]here are very few that understand his book, because they have not loadstones of 
divers forms, but especially round ones: also such versory needles fitly framed, and 
artificially placed upon their pins, and other such implements as he doth there prescribe, 
wherewith being furnished, as they read his propositions in words, they might still see 
the truth of them in the things themselves, according as himselfe forewarneth that these 
skills must be learned ex rebus ipsis non solum ex libris; out of the things themselves, 
and not out of books. […] there are divers words of art in the whole course of this booke 
proper to his subject, and fit to the explanation of his figures and diagrammes, which 
cannot be understood but by the help of the Mathematicks, and good travelling [i.e., 
experience] in the Magneticall practice. (Barlow 1616: xiii, my emphasis) 
Barlow’s claim here is that we can understand the account of magnetism in De magnete 
only if we have, and use, spherical lodestones and the other instruments and implements 
Gilbert employed – and only if we use them with skill. Put otherwise, we can understand it 
only through its practices of investigation. The statements that Gilbert sets down in the 
book will not, by themselves, be sufficient for us to grasp the concepts involved: we have to 
consider them in the context of the practices involved – that is, we also have to learn ex 
rebus ipsis. This dissertation is concerned with what it is to learn from the things 
themselves. It shows, in a variety of concrete ways, how investigative practices generate 
and alter scientific concepts (and vice versa). It also makes a case for how investigative 
practices can generate and alter scientific concepts.
2 INTRODUCTION
The relationship between practices used in investigating the natural world and concepts 
formed about the natural world is not a simple one. Imagine you have two magnets, one in 
your right hand and one in your left. Imagine that you know nothing about magnets. You 
are not familiar with the rule of polar attraction – that opposite magnetic poles attract is not 
something you already know. Indeed, you do not yet even have the concept of a magnetic 
pole. At some point in the past, this was not just an imagined scenario, but a de facto one. 
Imagine now that you put the two magnets on a smooth surface, at not too great distance 
from each other. Something will happen. The magnets will move, and will eventually come 
together. Imagine that you play around with them, and you also notice that, in some 
configurations, the magnets seem to move apart from each other only to then come 
together. Most of us have been in the situation of observing this behaviour of magnets. The 
question then becomes how, in our ignorant state, we describe the behaviour of the magnets 
such that it becomes transparent what accounts for this situation in which the magnets 
appear to come together or that situation in which they appear to repel.
How, in other words, does all this messing around with these strangely behaving little 
stones – or other such activities – lead us to concepts? This is the question behind this 
dissertation. It is concerned with how scientific research goes from apparently material 
practices (experimentation, observation, measuring, instrument building, etc.) to apparently 
non-material concepts. As such, it has one overarching presupposition: that practices do 
figure in the formation and development of concepts. This does not seem too implausible a 
presupposition – after all, in playing with the magnets, we do (at least seem to) start to form 
ideas about just what might be going on. Given this, my approach here is to analyse 
practices with respect to their contribution to conceptual dynamics, the formation of new 
concepts in particular.
The dissertation does this on two levels – or, put otherwise, it analyses two different kinds 
of practices. On one level, it analyses the practices of a concrete episode in the history of 
scientific research (early investigations of magnetism, prior to electromagnetism). On the 
other – in what we might think of as a second-order analysis – it analyses practices of 
studying scientific practices, as found in the “practice turn” in recent philosophy of science 
and science studies. The reason for this two-pronged approach is simple: if we do suppose 
that concepts are formed through practices, then this applies just as much to the study of 
science itself as it does to the study of, e.g., magnetism. This results in a first-order account 
of how scientific practices do form and develop concepts, along with a second-order 
account of how scientific practices can form and develop concepts.
These first- and second-order accounts are, respectively, the subjects of the two parts of this 
dissertation. The first part shows the various ways in which the practices of investigation 
produced new concepts in early modern research on magnetism, and how the practices 
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shaped the mutation of those concepts over time. The second part argues that, underlying 
many of the practices currently used to analyse scientific practices and concepts, there is an 
assumption of a differentiation between the material and the conceptual that takes the two 
to constitute separate, autonomous realms1. This differentiation shapes the possibilities for, 
and limitations of, those practices in ways that makes them inappropriate to apply to a 
practice-based account of conceptual dynamics. I ultimately argue that, if we want to 
develop a philosophy of scientific practices that are amenable to such an account, we need 
to adopt a new metaphysical framework in philosophy of science – one that will shape the 
possibilities for our practices in different ways. Specifically, we require a metaphysics in 
which the material and the conceptual are continuous, and in which the temporality of both 
practices and concepts is non-linear, but reticular and iterative (or recursive).2
A concern for both a practice-centric account of conceptual dynamics and, to an extent, a 
metaphysical shift in science is not new. In “The Trouble with the Historical Philosophy of 
Science”, the first lecture delivered at as part of the Rothschild Distinguished Lecture 
Series at Harvard, in 1991, Kuhn makes the following remark, 
The questions which led us to examine the historical record were products of a 
philosophical tradition that took science as a static body of knowledge and asked what 
rational warrant there was for taking one or another of its component beliefs to be true. 
Only gradually, as a by-product of our study of historical “facts”, did we learn to replace 
that static image with a dynamic one, an image that made science an ever-developing 
enterprise or practice. (Kuhn 2000: 111–2)
In this essay, Kuhn points to internal problems that traditional philosophy of science, the 
strong programme in sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), and the historical 
philosophy of science have. In pointing to these problems, Kuhn historicises the course of 
how his own considerations about science led him to the point at which he then found 
himself to be: that is, conceptualising science as practice. Kuhn admits that his project on 
paradigms and scientific revolutions, and also that of other “historically inclined 
philosophers of science” (Kuhn 2000: 108), was a response to the traditional philosophy of 
science, which took science to proceed “from facts given by observation”, and invented 
explanations (laws, theories) to account for them, to ultimately come back to those facts, 
which “were said to provide a court of final appeal” (Kuhn 2000: 107). Traditional 
philosophers of science did not deny that the acquiring of scientific facts was problematic, 
nor that producing such facts could have led to different interpretations, but what they did 
deny, on Kuhn’s account, was the relevance of fact-producing processes to the 
philosophical project of determining criteria of satisfaction for the scientific method.
1 On the concept of differentiation as is used in this dissertation, see Chapter 5. 
2 I discuss this in Chapter 7, sections 6–8.
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This is the context to which Kuhn responds. What became “urgent”, he states, was to 
account for the processes “by which the outcome of experiments is uniquely specified as 
fact and by which authoritative new beliefs—new scientific laws and theories—come to be 
based upon that outcome” (Kuhn 2000: 109). The answer came from the sociology of 
scientific knowledge: social negotiation, determined by personal and social interests. For 
Kuhn, the sociologist’s answer is inadequate, because it removes nature from the processes 
of acquiring beliefs about nature. The problem is, Kuhn claims, that SSK builds its account 
of science on a premise that “traditional philosophy was correct in its understanding of 
what knowledge must be” (Kuhn 2000: 111). At the same time, the historical philosophy of 
science – the project Kuhn took himself to participate in initially – also turned out to be 
unsatisfactory because, in criticising the traditional philosophy of science, it undermined 
the pillars “on which the authority of scientific knowledge was formerly thought to rest 
without supplying anything to replace them” (Kuhn 2000: 118). The solution, according to 
the later Kuhn, is a reconceptualisation of the philosophical account of science from a static 
image of science to a dynamic image – an image of science as practice.
A significant part of current philosophy of science and science studies is currently involved 
in precisely such a project: reconceptualising the sciences as research practices (Lynch 
1985; Chang 2012; Soler et al. 2014; Rouse 2002, 2015, etc.). Chapter 6 of this dissertation 
historicises the project of this “practice turn”, as a project in which what is at stake is 
precisely the articulation of an image of the sciences primarily in terms of their practices – 
and the chapter articulates what mutations in the philosophical understanding of the 
sciences are necessary for such a project to hope to be successful. Such reconceptualisation 
requires significant shifts. It matters little whether Kuhn’s assessment of the transition from 
a traditional philosophy of science, which conceived science as a body of statements, to the 
ongoing project of conceiving science as dynamic practices is accurate or not. Kuhn’s own 
philosophy of history in his later works denies objectivity to historical facts. What matters 
is that the self-understanding of the projects involved in the articulation of sciences as 
scientific practices defines itself against an image of science as a “static body of 
knowledge” (as Kuhn put it), or a body of representations, of theories, of models, and so on. 
It is this dynamic, practice-based image of science that is at stake in this dissertation.
A note about terminology
Throughout this dissertation, I tend to use the term “investigative practices”, in preference 
to “experimental practices”, “analogical practices”, and so on. This is because – as the 
analysis in Part 1 bears out – the devising of worldly facts is done not exclusively through 
experiments; it requires an entire context of investigation, which includes considerations 
about how prior metaphysical commitments, technological constraints, and other previous 
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results come together in an investigative research situation in which a new claim, a new 
regularity, or a reworked regularity shows itself. 
I also largely avoid talking about discovery. The idea of scientific discovery suggests that 
whatever has been discovered already existed in a single determinate form entirely 
independent of both the human researchers and the conditions of the discovery – it was 
merely awaiting discovery. As this dissertation (and Chapter 5 in particular) shows, the 
situation is not so clearcut: whatever is “discovered” is indeed of the world, but of the 
world when and if contrived in particular ways. There is, for example, electromagnetic 
induction, but its existence depends on there being an electrical conductor interacting with a 
magnetic field (and it is this setup that is accounted for conceptually and mathematised, and 
not some timeless, non-instantiated facts). The facts, then, are embedded in – and are not 
separable from – such contrivances (as shown repeatedly in this dissertation, but especially 
in Chapter 5). At the same time, and for the same reason, I also refrain from taking about 
“construction” of scientific facts. The point, which is argued for throughout the dissertation, 
is that there is no clear opposition between “independent” facts about the world and human-
dependent “constructions”.
I talk instead, at points, about the devising of facts. To devise is to contrive and plan, but 
also includes connotations related to material operations (e.g., mechanical contrivances). To 
devise is also to divide and separate – and this is partly what is at stake in this dissertation: 
the ways in which the complexity of the world gets formed into discrete objects through 
scientific practices. In short, I use “devising” as a concept caught between the world of 
interventions and the world of thinking about interventions: humans cannot intervene in 
infinite ways – nature will resist. How such resistance translates into conceptual content, 
and what is taken to be salient about these resistances, depends on the research context and 
what is at stake in it. Magnetic inclination, for instance, mattered as a genuine magnetic 
phenomenon in the early modern period (see Chapter 5). After the later devising of 
magnetic fields, the resistance for which the phenomenon and concept of magnetic 
inclination was devised is still present, but it is now re-clustered into a new physical 
arrangement, which displaces magnetic inclination as a genuine magnetic phenomenon; that 
resistance now matters within the “system of coordinates” of the magnetic field (a 
component by which local lines of magnetic flux are measured). The early moderns were 
not in error about magnetic inclination, and neither are we today.3 The phenomena 
themselves are wrapped up with the various practices of investigation through which they 
are devised. When these practices shift, the entrenchment of the resistance (and the 
articulation of that resistance) is simply reorganised in terms of why and how it is relevant.
3 This is not to deny the possibility of error as such, of course – but it is to assert that what counts as 
error is always indexed to some situation or another.
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Finally on terminology, while I do prefer to talk of “investigation” and “research”, it is 
evident that I have not entirely excised the term “science” from my discussion of pre-
nineteenth-century investigations of nature. In a very literal sense, of course, this is 
anachronistic. But it is also expedient – there does at least appear to be some fundamental 
continuity in the practices of investigating the world that stretches at least from early 
manipulations of magnets floated in water with little corks rafts to Faraday’s 
electromagnetic induction experiments. All of this is what we now call “science”, of course, 
and the presumption that these kinds of practices are what is at stake is a core part of why I 
am looking at these early investigations of magnetism. This is a part of the situation in 
which Norman, Gilbert, Bond, etc. become salient in this study. Consequently, I do not 
make an attempt to elide that salience through a change in terminology.
Overview of the dissertation
Chapter 1 introduces the episode in scientific research that is the focus of Part 1 – the early 
studies of magnetism, prior to electromagnetism, from the early modern period onwards. 
The chapter’s emphasis is on how these studies of magnetism (the seventeenth-century 
“magnetical philosophy” in particular) have been received in the literature of the history of 
science. The goal of the chapter is to show that existing accounts of the early investigations 
of magnetism were theoretically laden: the questions that mattered in the reconstruction of 
what had happened were not exclusively the questions of the historical actors, although 
they tend to be presented as such. Rather, they are questions whose relevance is determined 
within the perspective from which the scholarship is being written. The point here – a point 
repeated throughout the dissertation – is not to criticise the lack of absolute objectivity in 
such approaches, but to acknowledge it. The point (as set out at length in chapter 7) is that 
the saliences of the present perspective are not eliminable from a history and philosophy of 
scientific practices. 
Chapters 2 through 5 examine various forms of interaction between practices and concepts 
in early investigations of magnetism. Each chapter can be read independently. They do not 
amount to a linear narrative: the narrative here is reticular when seen in the context of the 
question of the interplay between investigative practices and conceptual dynamics. Each 
chapter addresses this question by focusing on a particular aspect of the practices, never 
letting out of sight that such practices are always complexes of multifarious activities, 
including activities of experimentation, instrument building, observation, visualisation, 
reasoning, and so on.
Chapter 2 argues that, in De magnete, Gilbert treats magnetism as primarily disponent (or 
organisational), rather than in terms of attraction. It shows, first, how matter-theoretical 
considerations, metaphysical considerations about causation, and experimental practices 
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interact to orient Gilbert’s understanding of magnetism. Second, it shows how the disponent 
model makes the practice of mapping of magnetic effects a suitable means of investigation. 
Chapter 3 focuses on how natural philosophical practices mutated and reconfigured the 
meaning and the role that the concept of “sphere of activity” played within systems of 
natural philosophy as disparate as the magnetical philosophy, the natural magic tradition, 
the mechanical philosophy, and Baconian philosophy.
Next, Chapter 4 moves on to how the interplay between experimental and diagrammatic 
practices (as well as spherical trigonometry) brought about conceptual innovation in the 
magnetical philosophy. The chapter focuses on a few of the diagrams that Gilbert presents 
in De magnete, and which were taken on and put to work by some of Gilbert’s followers, 
such as Mark Ridley and Edward Wright. These diagrams are not simply mediators between 
some experiments and their corresponding concepts; they instantiate concepts about 
magnetic inclination. Chapter 5, the final chapter of Part 1, goes beyond the kinds of 
concepts that might be thought of as, in some sense, merely theoretical to question the 
relation between practices and the phenomena themselves. It investigates the relation 
through the diachronic shifts in the phenomenon of magnetic inclination, ultimately arguing 
that changes in practices of investigation lead to real mutations of phenomena – the 
phenomenon of magnetic inclination itself changes with the shifts in practices.
Part 2 of the dissertation moves from studying practice–concept dynamics within history of 
science to studying it within the philosophical accounts of the relationship between 
scientific practices and scientific concepts, specifically within the practice turn. Chapter 6 
gives a diachronic analysis of the practice turn itself. That analysis sets out a case for why 
science needs to be assessed in terms of its practices; it also shows how it is that this 
assessment can work. I argue that what is at stake in the practice turn is reconceptualising 
theoretical, modelling and conceptual practices, such that the typical divide between 
experimental and observational practices, on the one side, and theory (as the product of 
science), on the other, collapses. The latter in itself is not wholly new: it has been an 
ongoing project since the turn to post-positivism in philosophy of science. But, when done 
from the perspective of reconceptualising the sciences as scientific practices, it takes on 
new dimensions. The chapter also shows that a practice-based history and philosophy of 
science entails reflexivity: the practice turn must understand itself in terms of its own 
practices. 
Chapter 7 builds on all of this to claim that the articulation of the interplay between 
investigative practices and the problem of conceptual formation is not independent of a 
more basic assumption about the nature of the relationship between the empirical (or its 
correlates: the natural, the material, and the non-human) and the conceptual. How the 
former will be addressed, and how a philosopher and/or historian of science will go about 
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answering it is not independent of the philosophical stance one has on the latter. Keeping 
with a practice-based account of science entails reworking the question of conceptual 
formation, but how such reworking is to be articulated will closely follow what 
philosophical resolution is given, ontologically, to the relation between the empirical and 
the conceptual.
A note about methodology
One way – presumably the most straightforward way – to approach the subject of this 
dissertation would be to set out a list of methodological precepts in advance, which would 
then be followed in the analysis of the historical cases. But, my approach here is an 
approach in terms of practices that takes those practices to be irreducible to propositional 
statements. If such an approach fails to understand that it itself also consists of practices 
that are also irreducible to propositional statements, then it has entirely failed to understand 
what it is doing. In other words, a commitment to a practice-based account of science is 
also a commitment to a practice-based account of the study of science. Consequently, the 
account of concept formation and development through practices that I give in this 
dissertation will need two components: it will need an analysis of some actual scientific 
practices, and of the ways in which concepts were formed and developed through them; and 
it will also need an analysis of actual science-studies practices, and of the ways in which 
concepts (i.e., concepts for the study of science) are formed and developed through them. 
Thus, the first part of this dissertation addresses the practices and concepts of a concrete 
episode in scientific research (early investigations of magnetism), while the second part 
addresses the practices and concepts of a concrete episode of the study of scientific research 
(the practice turn in philosophy of science). If the study of scientific practices is a first-
order study, then the study of the study of scientific practices is a second-order study – as 
such, while the first part of the dissertation aims to show how concepts are (or have been) 
created and changed through practices, the second part aims to show how scientific 
practices can create and change concepts.
The two parts of the dissertation are, then, two analyses of two distinct networks of 
practices.4 The two networks of practices are distinct in applying to two distinct areas of 
research – on the one hand, the study of scientific practices and conceptual dynamics; on 
the other, the study of the study of scientific practices and conceptual dynamics. Each part 
analyses how the practices of the research area it is concerned with work, how they interact, 
4 These two networks of practices are distinct; they are not autonomous. They are differentiated in that 
they have different subject matter (the natural world, in one case, and the investigation of the natural 
world, in the other) and involve different practices. They are, obviously, interconnected, though: the 
second-order practices are built on the analysis of the first-order practices, while also attempting to 
regulate them – philosophy of science tends to (attempt to) tell science what to do.
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and how they have developed over time. The research areas might be distinct, but they are, 
of course, related – one is the study of the other. As such, this dissertation is the study of a 
single problem – how scientific concepts are formed and how they develop – at two 
different levels. Put otherwise, Part 1 and Part 2 here are doing what amounts to the same 
thing, with each looking at one level of the problem.5
This dissertation is, then, an analysis of practices throughout. It is not concerned with 
offering a theory of what scientific concepts are. Machery (2009) argues that a close 
examination of theories about concepts in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and 
psychology shows that, in dealing with and attempting to account for concepts, these 
disciplines have still not reached an agreement about what they take their object of 
investigation to be. There is no agreement about what the concept of “concept” is and 
whether the propounded theories about concepts are actually attempting to explain the same 
thing. One might not agree with the details of Machery’s treatment of the details of the 
theories about concepts, and with his deflationist conclusion for the elimination of the 
concept of “concept” altogether – but the claim that there are divergent accounts of what a 
concept is and no general agreement seems a reasonable assessment. The dissertation does 
not propose yet another account to add to that list. Rather, its interest is in how concepts are 
formed and developed through investigative practices, whatever concepts as such might be.
There might appear to be a peculiarity in my approach here, at least in Part 1: how can a 
treatment of scientific practices build its argument on the basis of texts? If Barlow is right – 
if we cannot understand Gilbert, and, by extension, the rest of these early investigations of 
magnetism, ex libris – then to what extent do my reconstructions in the first part of this 
dissertation manage to grasp their subject matter? In part, we already are embedded in 
practices derived from (and somewhat continuous with) what was being done by the 
magnetical philosophers. Many of us will have conducted casual experiments with magnets 
in school. What is casual (in this particular case) for schoolchildren today was a strenuous 
process of research in the past. And yet, in part, we are very much not embedded in the 
same practices – some (modern) experience of magnetism is not at all sufficient to make 
one understand the reasoning behind seventeenth century practices of diagram construction, 
for instance. To this end, my approach in this dissertation did not entirely eschew Barlow’s 
call for us to understand through actually taking up the actual apparatuses and the actual 
practices. I did have a spherical magnet, and, while I had no versoria, I had crudely rigged-
5 One might ask whether there are not more of these levels to be studied, or indeed whether these 
levels would not go on forever. In which case, why stop at two? Presumably, in principle, the levels 
could certainly be infinite: after all, Part Two here is a study of the study of science, making it a third-
order study. But the object of study here is practices, and there are little to no further third-order 
practices of the study of scientific practices available to consider, let fourth-order and so on. If there 
were concrete practices beyond the second level, they would quite likely be worth studying – but 
there are not.
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up steel sewing needles – and I did use them (although I can hardly claim to have used 
them with much skill). Frankly, I would have been somewhat lost without messing around 
with these makeshift instruments. But I did not go much further. I certainly did not recreate 
every experiment. I most certainly did not go out on ships with dip compasses, or measure 
the earth’s magnetic inclination at a certain point over the course of a century.6 Just as 
certainly, my reconstructions here will have missed, or misconstrued, something at some 
point. That is to be expected. But, what I argue in Part 1 is that these early investigations of 
magnetism consisted of a shared set of practices, which, in some sense, begin7 with needle-
balancing in compass construction, and with the floating magnetic bodies technique, and 
then expand significantly with Gilbert’s innovations.8 These practices shape the 
conceptualisations throughout the development of the science of magnetism – and they are, 
for the most part, entirely inherited from its beginnings. Picking up and playing around with 
a spherical magnet and some sewing needles might not, then, tell us everything about the 
investigative practices of around two and a half centuries of research into magnetism – but 
it does take us a surprisingly long way.
6 See Chapter 5.
7 I do not mean to suggest that these practices appear from nowhere – they have undoubtedly 
developed from earlier practices.
8 See Chapter 1.
Part 1
Concepts and Practices
in the Magnetical Philosophy

Chapter 1
Historiographical Perspectives on
the “Magnetical Philosophy”
In this opening chapter, I will briefly outline both the magnetical philosophy itself and its 
treatment in the literature. The goal here is not so much to show what the scholarship has 
established about the magnetical philosophy – but instead to capture the situatedness of the 
existing treatments of the magnetical philosophy. By looking at how Bennett approached 
the magnetical philosophy for its significance to early modern cosmology (section 1), how 
Gilbert’s experimental method was approached as a historiographic category (section 2), 
and how Pumfrey accounted for the debate surrounding magnetic variation in the first half 
of the seventeenth century (section 3), I want to show that these approaches are not neutral 
– their descriptions of the history are not independent of the salience criteria of their own 
perspectives (or situatedness): underlying philosophical assumptions inform how the 
historical investigation is made. I will end the chapter by briefly discussing my own 
(situated) position (section 4). 
1. The historical relevance of the magnetical philosophy1
The labels “magnetical philosophy” and “magnetical philosopher” are used throughout the 
seventeenth century and the eighteenth century by a fairly wide-ranging group of natural 
philosophers (and, more generally, investigators of nature). Amongst historians of science, 
there is a tacit agreement that the category denotes more than just the study of magnets: it 
1 Actors and historians of science refer to the category magnetical philosophy also with the label 
magnetic philosophy. I use them interchangeably. 
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refers to a wider tradition of natural philosophy that starts with William Gilbert.2 In 1600, 
Gilbert published what swiftly became a well-received and well-known treatise titled 
Concerning the Magnet, Magnetic Bodies and this Great Magnet, the Earth; A New 
Philosophy, demonstrated by means of many arguments and experiments (De Magnete, 
Magneticisque Corporibus, et De Magno Magnete tellure; Physiologia Nova, plurimis & 
argumentis, & experimentis demonstrata – henceforth, De magnete).3 The treatise, as 
Gilbert tells us in its introduction, is the product of over fifteen years of work; it seems 
however that Gilbert was already working on it by 1582.
The title itself is informative: it announces the main finding of the treatise, namely that the 
earth is a magnet; it informs the reader that other bodies (iron and lodestone) are also 
magnetic the same way as the earth is; and it indicates that Gilbert’s project is not restricted 
to only the investigation of magnets and magnetic phenomena. It is instead a physiologia 
nova, or a natural philosophy4, constructed with the help of arguments and experiments. 
The text of De magnete articulates the core concepts and practices of the magnetical 
philosophy, and establishes the questions to be asked about magnetism, along with what 
counts as salient in the study of magnetism. De magnete was not written as one, but it 
became, in effect, a textbook for the magnetical philosophy. This is not to say that there 
were no investigations into magnetism and magnetic phenomena prior to De magnete, 
however (there were). What Gilbert (and his collaborators) managed to do was to 
reconfigure and systematise existing knowledge about magnets, and practices for 
investigating them, in such a way as to make the text particularly salient in its own 
historical context. It constituted a thorough defence of an experimental way of investigating 
the nature of matter itself, it formulated a single-element matter theory to replace the then-
prevalent Aristotelian matter theory – and it was compatible with, and supportive of, the 
Copernican conceptualisation of the universe.
Although Gilbert’s natural philosophy, as articulated in De magnete, has received some 
(albeit limited) attention from scholarship on the early modern period, the reception and 
promulgation of the magnetical philosophy has been largely passed over. There has, of 
2 See, e.g., Pumfrey 1987, 1989; Henry 2001; Westman 2011.
3 De magnete was published in one authorised edition, printed by Peter Shot in 1600. Due to its 
popularity, two bootleg editions followed in 1628 and 1633. There are two English translations of the 
text. The most widely available, published in 1893 (and republished in 1958), by P. Fleury Mottelay, 
is generally taken to be the weaker (Pumfrey calls it “stilted and inferior”). The other, from 1900, was 
translated by the physicist Silvanus P. Thompson. Unless specified otherwise, in this dissertation I use 
Thompson’s translation, labeled as DM. 
4 The term physiologia was used throughout seventeenth (and eighteenth century) to denote natural 
philosophy and/or natural science. 
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course, been some work on the magnetical philosophy, but, at least in the scholarship of the 
last few decades, the magnetical philosophy has, for the most part, been ignored as an 
alternative model to the mechanical philosophies of the seventeenth century. Over thirty 
years ago, the historian of science, Jim Bennett wrote the following:
The interaction between different natural philosophical systems is always complex and 
often confused. The magnetical philosophy in England has not been given the attention 
it deserves–deserves not only in its own right, but also for the crucial role it played in 
the history of cosmology. It is part of the explanatory background to the emergence of 
the Newtonian theory in the 1680s. It was not simply replaced or knocked out by the 
mechanical. A prolonged period of uneasy coexistence ensued from the mid-century 
onwards, the gap between the two uncertainly bridged by vague mechanical accounts, or 
simply masked by confusion. It seems that the concept of attraction was too useful to be 
given up lightly, an instinct which in time proved to be sound. (Bennett 1981: 176)
Bennett’s goal here is to show the significance that the magnetical philosophy had for 
developments in cosmology throughout the seventeenth century. According to Bennett, 
magnetic philosophy mattered for subsequent developments in astronomy, because the 
conceptual possibilities afforded by a non-material action between bodies were not simply 
replaced by mechanical action at the cosmic level. Given the Cartesian plenum and 
rectilinear inertia, in a mechanical account, orbital motions were expected to be explained 
in terms of the centrifugal tendencies of bodies moving in vortices of matter relative to 
other bodies. What Bennett shows is that, in order to accord their explanations to 
astronomical observations, Christopher Wren and Robert Hooke (amongst others) 
employed both mechanical and magnetic conceptual resources simultaneously, by 
developing accounts of orbital motions based on combining the rectilinear inertial motion 
of the body with the attractive force exerted by the sun.
What made the magnetical philosophy relevant for future developments, on Bennett’s 
interpretation, was not any commitment on Gilbert’s part to a Copernican universe, but the 
conservation of an account of motion akin to action at a distance. Bennett’s position is 
somewhat peculiar, as most historians overplay the Copernican card in the interpretation of 
Gilbert and end up subsuming the practices of the magnetical philosophy to their use in 
navigational and astronomical studies. I will not discuss the navigational aspects here.5 I 
will however discuss the historians’ approach to Gilbert’s importance for astronomy. 
The astronomical, or/and cosmological, aspects of De magnete relative to its supposed 
(implicit or explicit) Copernicanism have been studied in Pumfrey (1987b, 2011), Henry 
(2001), Miller (2014). There is close to unanimous agreement amongst historians of early 
modern natural philosophy and science that the Copernican image of the universe had 
5 Some aspects of the role magnetical philosophy played in navigation are discussed in chapters 4 and 
5. 
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significant roles to play in the internal development of the magnetical philosophy in 
Gilbert’s treatise, in its development within Gresham College in the first half of the 
seventeenth century, and in the way the magnetic philosophy was received outside Gresham 
College.
I do not wish to entirely deny the relevance of Copernicanism, but the interpretation does 
require some caveats. It is well known that, in Kepler’s celestial physics, as developed in 
the Astronomia nova (1609), the planets were understood to move by a magnetic force, 
which Kepler claims to have taken from Gilbert’s magnetical philosophy. Readers of 
Gilbert have often taken for granted the Keplerian model of magnetism as a universal 
cosmic force – and have tended to extend it to Gilbert as well (e.g., Bennett 1981, Henry 
2001, Miller 2014). Very rarely, however, is it noted that, for Gilbert, astral vigours, which 
he attributes to all celestial bodies, need not be magnetic. In chapter IV of Book 2, Gilbert 
claims:
for there is in the earth a magnetick vigour of its own, just as in the sun and moon there 
are forms of their own, and a small portion of the moon settles itself in moon-manner 
toward its termini and form; and a piece of the sun to the sun, just as a loadstone to the 
earth and to a second loadstone by inclining itself and alluring in accordance with its 
nature. (DM: 66)
Gilbert does not seem to be claiming here that all celestial bodies have magnetic vigour, but 
rather that, as celestial bodies, they have a vigour of some kind. It need not be magnetic. 
One thing particular to these vigours is that, whatever their specific natures, Gilbert seems 
to take them to be involved in phenomena of cohesion – the celestial vigour is what holds 
each celestial body together (I will discuss this point in greater detail in the next chapter). 
As I understand Gilbert’s position, it seems that the way Gilbert talks about the role of the 
sun in the universe reinforces an interpretation of Gilbert’s cosmology that restrains itself 
from claiming that cosmology as a whole works magnetically. When it comes to the 
mechanisms by which the celestial bodies operate in their movements, Gilbert’s position 
seems to be rather agnostic. The celestial bodies about whose operation we can talk are the 
moon and the sun, because they exert causal influence on the earth. The moon, for instance, 
is responsible for the movement of the tides – and about the sun, Gilbert claims the 
following:
The Sun (the chief agent in nature) as he forwards the courses of the Wanderers, so does 
he prompt this turning about of the Earth by the diffusion of the virtues of his orbes, and 
of light. (DM: 225) 
For the Sun himself being the agent and incitor of the universe in motion, other 
wandering globes set within the range of his forces, when acted on and stirred, also 
regulate each its own proper courses by its own forces; and they are turned about in 
periods corresponding to the extent of their greater rotation, and the differences of their 
effused forces, and their intelligence for higher good. (DM: 232)
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These  passages  make  it  clear  that  Gilbert  does  envisage  the  sun  to  be  the  principal 
cosmological agent: but they do not specify that its agency is magnetic. All celestial bodies 
are agents, but their independent manner of interaction with the sun’s agency depends on 
“the differences of their effused forces, and their intelligence for higher good”, about which 
not much can be said. The one effused force that we understand in its operation is that of 
the earth; we do not understand that of Venus, for instance. This does not mean, however, 
that  Gilbert  precludes  astronomical  investigations  from  accounting  for  the  planetary 
motions; the latter’s trajectories and paths can be accounted for, according to (my reading 
of) Gilbert, because the whole system is teleological, subordinated to the “higher good”, to 
a principle of universal order that ensures the celestial bodies do not deviate from their 
courses.6
Given these considerations, it seems that there is little reason to take magnetism to be the 
undergoing principle  of  operation at  a  cosmic  level.  Gilbert’s  universe  is  one  of  astral 
vigours, or active “intelligences”, whose activity is coordinated by a striving for conformity 
to a universal order.7 But it need not be the case that these active “intelligences” are all 
active and “intelligent” in the same way, that is, magnetically. It cannot be denied that, at 
least for some natural philosophers, Gilbert’s magnetic physics offered a promissory note as 
to furthering the evidential basis of the Copernican hypothesis. The extension of Gilbert’s 
magnetical  philosophy in  a  Keplerian  manner  is  certainly  possible,  but  whether  or  not 
Gilbert had similar views about the universal role of magnetism is open for debate. 
Recently, other subjects in Gilbert’s treatise have resurfaced in the scholarship. For 
instance, Jalobeanu (2016) investigates the role that orbs of virtue have played in Bacon’s 
philosophy via how the concept was formulated and dealt with by Gilbert and Della Porta.8 
Parigi (2015) has also looked at the concept of orbs of virtue in the context of Gilbert’s 
magnetical philosophy. On the other hand, no treatment of Gilbert’s account of motion as 
articulated through his analysis of magnetic movements is yet available, nor are there many 
6 I will delve a little more into Gilbert’s cosmology, his theory of gravitation, and the “rule of the 
whole” in the next chapter. 
7 This  striving  for  conformity  has  explanatory  (and  perhaps  even  ontological)  primacy  over  the 
individual bodies in the universe, since it is this that explains the local motions of bodies. For more 
discussion of this,  see Chapter 2. In addition, by proclaiming the relevance of something akin to 
universal order, against which the behaviour of all bodies is explained, Gilbert reasserts something 
like an Aristotelian principle. 
8 For discussions of these issues see Chapter 3.
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studies of the ways in which the magnetic effects of polarity, magnetic inclination and 
magnetic declination shaped the history of magnetism leading into electromagnetism. 
Understudied is also Gilbert’s reception amongst those who who continued in the 
magnetical philosophy tradition (such as William Barlow, Mark Ridley, and Nathanael 
Carpenter, amongst others). They have been almost entirely excised from the relevant 
historiographies, being, at best, only mentioned here and there in a cursory manner. This 
dissertation will begin to test the waters of their works. 
The magnetical philosophy is a tradition extensive in both scope and time. It is revealing 
that one of the few ways in which the scholarship has taken it to be salient is in terms of 
cosmology – that a discipline so specifically centred around magnetism should be 
remembered for heliocentricism is a testament to its breadth. It is also a testament to the 
situatedness of historical reconstruction: the dominance of the narrative as to what matters 
in the history of science, and its valorisation of the move from a Ptolemaic to a Copernican 
conceptualisation of the universe influences the reading of Gilbert’s treatise, such that a 
universal magnetic cosmology that does not seem to be present in the text is not only found 
there but also taken to be the source of Gilbert’s value today. This non-neutrality in the 
study of the magnetical philosophy is not specific to the cosmological reading – and it is 
not, in itself, a problem, as the following sections of this chapter set out to show.
2. The historiography of the experimental method of the magnetical 
philosophy
Another running theme in the scholarship on the (early) magnetical philosophy – Gilbert’s 
in particular – is its contribution to early modern experimentalism. In De magnete, the 
practice of experimentation enjoys methodological privilege, because experiments are “the 
true foundations of terrestrial magnetism” (DM: 40). For experiments to be reliable for 
knowledge production, Gilbert asserts, they ought to be carefully devised, and 
experimenters should “handle the substances, not negligently and carelessly, but prudently, 
deftly, and in the proper way” (DM: iij) – this is just one of many passages in which Gilbert 
makes his reader aware of the difficulty with which a good experiment is devised. He also 
does not shy away from encouraging his readers to repeat the experiments and be the 
witnesses of the results. He writes,
to you alone, true philosophizers, honest men, who seek knowledge not from books only 
but from things themselves, have I addressed these magnetical principles in this new 
sort of Philosophizing. (DM: ij)
The contact with the things themselves is done through experimentation and observation 
(DM: ij). Experiments are, then, not solely for evidentiary purposes: they are the vehicles of 
knowledge generation. Thus, Gilbert claims,
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Nor have we found this our labour idle or unfruitful; since daily during our 
experimenting, new and unexpected properties came to light; and our Philosophy hath 
grown so much from the things diligently observed, that we have attempted to expound 
the interior parts of the terrene globe, and its native substance, upon magnetick 
principles; and to reveal to men the earth (our common mother), and to point it out as if 
with the finger, by real demonstrations and by experiments manifestly apparent to the 
senses. (DM: ij)
Experiments allow the exploration of the unknown and moving the unknown and the 
unfamiliar into the known and the familiar.9 By experimenting, one can disprove false 
beliefs and formulate empirical regularities (such as, “magnetick substances are more 
sluggishly repelled than they are attracted” (DM: 100)), which can then can be used for 
purposes of classifying what was previously unknown, amongst many other things. Given 
the prevalence of experiments for the magnetical philosophy, finding the sources of 
Gilbert’s embrace of experimentalism – i.e., fitting him into an existing tradition – is an 
ongoing project in the history of science. Guillaume (2004) claims that Gilbert’s method of 
demonstration comes from the Galenistic medical tradition. Bennett (1986), on the other 
hand, argues that Gilbert’s approach was derived from the experimental practice that 
mathematicians developed for the practice of navigation, while Henry (2001) locates the 
experimental tradition of De magnete in the natural magic tradition. Meanwhile, Zilsel 
(1941) argues that the origins of Gilbert’s experimental method is to be found in the 
practices of artisans and the mechanical arts. 
In order to show that these discussions about Gilbert’s experimentalism are themselves 
situated in projects whose stakes go beyond Gilbert’s own treatise, in the following, I want 
to discuss Zilsel’s position. Zilsel’s treatment of Gilbert’s experimentation is an instance of 
the well-known “Zilsel thesis”, according to which what explains the emergence of modern 
science in seventeenth century Western Europe is the slow collapse of the distinctions 
between the artisanal workers and the humanist scholars, owing to the rise of capitalism. 
On this account, broadly speaking, the origins of modern science are to be looked for in the 
ways in which artisans, and modes of production of artefacts, influenced the scientific 
revolution.10 Zilsel’s project is ultimately to understand the rise of modernity through a 
Marxist lens. 
The Zilsel thesis has been recently revitalised in the work of Pamela Long, insofar as she 
suggests that the transition from the scholastic approach to empirically-inclined 
investigations into natural phenomena is explained (at least in part) by “trading zones” – 
9 For a short introduction to Gilbert’s experimental method, and the connection between his 
experiments and his hypothesis of a magnetic earth, see Crombie (632–636) and Pumfrey (2002: 98–
108).
10 On the Zilsel thesis, and the life and work of Edward Zilsel, see Long (2011). 
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that is, through increasing interactions between skilled individuals and the “learned” 
scholars educated in university contexts. I will not attempt here to evaluate whether this 
position is correct: mutations across disciplines are to be expected, such that whatever the 
story about the origin of one discipline (e.g, the magnetical philosophy discussed here), the 
case could very well be different for another (e.g., natural history or cartography) – just as 
intersections between various disciplines are also to be expected. Whether the artisans and 
their practices were the cause of the emergence of modern science (under the assumption 
that one holds “modern science” to be a stable and identifiable category) or simply one of 
the factors in this emergence, it is indubitable that Gilbert’s argument frequently relied on 
things that can be learned in, say, smithing or navigational contexts, and that these things 
featured in his arguments.
To say this is, however, far less than to claim that Gilbert’s experimental method (whatever 
form it might take) is lifted entirely from such artisanal contexts. There is little reason to 
suppose that Gilbert simply took over the experimental techniques that artisans (such 
Robert Norman, a compass-maker who will feature frequently in the following chapters), 
employed. The crux of Zilsel’s argument is ultimately that Gilbert’s experimentation and 
sparse quantitative considerations are lifted without recognition from, for instance, 
Norman’s treatise, which, as Zilsel puts it, “Gilbert himself does not emphasize […] at all, 
but rather hides” (Zilsel 1941: 19). Zilsel wants to push forward the claim that Gilbert 
simply takes Norman’s experiments and experimental results, and makes use of them to 
advance his own position:
Norman as well as Gilbert proceeds by experiment and, “not regarding the words but the 
matter,” bases his statements on experience rather than on books. Moreover, the 
measuring-instruments and the details of the experimental technique, the most exact 
experiments, and many single empirical statements of De magnete are already contained 
in his booklet. (Zilsel 1941: 24)
Henry (2001) gives a detailed response to Zilsel’s position by first showing that Norman’s 
experimental practice in The newe attractive was in no way common practice amongst 
artisans, but rather a peculiar case which is partly explained by the fact that Norman had 
asked for advice from his “learned and expert friends” (Norman 1581: 9) on how to proceed 
in dealing with the effect of magnetic dip that he had encountered, and partly by showing 
that Zilsel missed out the Copernican dimension of Gilbert’s treatise. Henry ultimately 
gives yet another attempt to provide a source for Gilbert’s experimental practice – on 
Henry's account, the natural magic tradition, in which forms of experimentation were 
common. Henry comes to this conclusion for two reasons. Firstly, the other major source 
for Gilbert besides Norman, Petrus Peregrinus was, according to Henry, himself a natural 
magician (Henry 2001: 114–7). And, secondly, Gilbert’s matter theory, as Freudenthal has 
shown, is heavily reliant on Paracelsian alchemical theory. This is not surprising: Henry has 
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a larger project for the revitalisation of the natural magic tradition, within which his 
evaluation of Gilbert’s experimental method is situated.
What seems under-motivated here is the drive to find a single source for Gilbert’s 
experimentalism – to locate him within a single tradition. There are good reasons, as we 
have seen above, to recognise influences of varying kinds from all of these sources. All 
these divergent interpretations of the roots of Gilbert’s experimentalism, then, speak, on the 
one hand, to Gilbert’s own situatedness in an environment of divergent traditions, which his 
work crossed and overlapped. But, not coincidentally, they also speak to the situatedness of 
our own “historical” narratives. One historian pushes one interpretation or another on the 
basis of what matters to them – of the saliences within their own approach to history. This is 
not a criticism. It is, rather, a way of recognising and making explicit the situatedness 
involved in the practices of doing history.
3. Pumfrey’s account of the magnetical philosophy, and the sociology 
of scientific knowledge
Probably the historian who devoted most attention to the magnetical philosophy and its 
trajectory throughout the seventeenth century is Stephen Pumfrey, who has been working 
on the subject since the mid-1980s. His approach is largely in continuation of the project for 
a sociology of scientific knowledge – his assessments of what was going on 
methodologically, evidentially, and theoretically within the magnetical philosophy are 
addressed through sociology of scientific knowledge practices. Perhaps the clearest 
example is Pumfrey’s discussion of the debates over secular magnetic variation (i.e., the 
local deviation of the compass needle from geographical north on the horizontal plane) in 
the first part of the seventeenth century (Pumfrey 1989). Pumfrey argues that Henry 
Gellibrand’s11 claim that variation itself varies with time had not been established 
empirically, but was nevertheless accepted in the English magnetic philosophy milieu 
precisely because the social-intellectual context in which Gellibrand was working had 
theoretical and practical commitments to Gilbert’s magnetical philosophy (Pumfrey 1989: 
182). Pumfrey situates his account as a correction of the historical story that takes 
Gellibrand’s claim that there appears to be a “sensible diminution”12 in the values of 
11 Henry Gellibrand was an English mathematician, and the professor of astronomy at Gresham 
College. He worked on navigational issues, as did many of the members of the College, and was also 
a supporter of Gilbert’s theories about magnetism. 
12 Here is Gellibrand’s report of secular variation: “whereas in the year 1580 Mr. Burrows ( a man of 
unquestionable abilities in the Mathematiques) found the variation at Limehouse near London to be 
11gr. 15 min. or neere one point of the compass; in the year 1622 Mr. Gunter […] found the variation 
in the same place to be but 6gr. 13 min. And myself this present yeare 1634 with some friends had 
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measurements of magnetic variation at the same place over time to amount to a discovery 
of the phenomenon of “variation of magnetic variation”. In this respect, I agree with 
Pumfrey’s conclusion: Gellibrand’s 1635 short treatise indeed does not establish the time 
variation of magnetic variation. In reality, however, Gellibrand does not claim to have 
discovered this.
Pumfrey is also right to point out that Gellibrand’s report of a small difference in variation 
over time in London cannot be interpreted as a discovery, because there was “significant 
interpretative flexibility” (Pumfrey 1989: 185). The claim to interpretative flexibility is a 
basic assumption of social constructivism. Pumfrey’s formulation is the following:
the meaning of observations is constructed from a network of theory-laden concepts is 
now taken for granted, and from it we must expect that scientific knowledge is 
underdetermined by nature. Knowledge, like the claim for particular patterns of 
magnetic variation, is the imposition of patterns on nature, not the extraction of patterns 
from her, and, therefore, any set of observations is open to interpretative flexibility. 
(Pumfrey 1989: 183)
The formulation of the interpretative flexibility here derives from the well-known and much 
disputed principle of the theory-ladenness of observation, according to which the content of 
an observational statement is not determined exclusively by the perceptual stimuli, but also 
by the conceptual content of a theoretical framework against which the terms of the 
description are meaningful – such that there can be no neutral observation language. Given 
theory-ladenness, Pumfrey (as a social constructivist) concludes that “any set of 
observations is open to interpretative flexibility”. And once interpretative flexibility is 
accepted, then social components enter in to decide (e.g., on matters of theory choice, or 
what counts as an anomaly within an experimental setup).
The seventeenth-century context of magnetic variation is quite amenable to historical 
reconstruction through this social-constructivist perspective: measurements of magnetic 
variation at sea were highly unreliable because the compass as a measurement instrument 
was not well understood, and neither were all of the possible variables that influenced the 
behaviour of the magnetised needles (for instance, the influence of iron onboard the ship). 
In addition, getting a measurement of variation is a skilled process, involving the 
astronomical determination of the meridian from which the needle deviates – all from a 
moving ship. Alongside such practical problems, the cause, nature, and operation of 
magnetism was a matter of considerable speculation, with different kinds of explanation 
making significant differences to the accounts of magnetic variation.
recourse to Dedpford (where mr. Gunter had therefore made the same observations with those at 
Limehouse) and found it not much to exceed 4 degrees” (Gellibrand 1635: 7).
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In this context, claims about interpretative flexibility – and hence also about the decisive 
influence of the social – seem reasonable. But, at this point, things get a little more 
complicated for a social constructivist position: indeed the terms of our descriptions are far 
from neutral, and they matter for explanations, since the latter depend on the former in such 
a way that there will always be room for “distinct” ways to accommodate the empirical 
data. Social constructivism goes further: it claims that we do not extract patterns from the 
world, but impose patterns on the world. Now a careful formulation of this latter point does 
not amount to relativism, but to the claim that the epistemological domain (i.e., the 
knowledge claims involved) is separable, in a non-trivial way, from the causal domain of 
the empirical world13. Here is why it should not be interpreted as relativistic. From the 
perspective of social constructivism, if two scientists perform the same experiment, they are 
in exactly the same causal situation, because they get exactly the same sort of output from 
the empirical domain, and yet they can interpret their experimental situation differently. 
This means that these potentially (more or less) different interpretations cannot be 
explained at the material level (so to speak). Social constructivism looks to the social world 
of interests, negotiation and shared forms of life to explain the assent to one interpretation 
rather than another. On this understanding, nature is removed from the equation as an 
arbiter of the research context.
It is because of this social constructivist perspective that Pumfrey is comfortable in 
claiming that there “was no consensus in late sixteenth and early seventeenth century 
Europe about what a variation measurement was a measurement of” (Pumfrey 1989: 185). 
When consensus is reached, on Pumfrey’s reading, it is because the social context favours 
it: given this conjecture, Pumfrey argues that (what we have labelled retrospectively as) 
Gellibrand’s variation of magnetic variation (or secular variation) was accepted in Britain 
because of the social context, and its pre-existing commitment to the Gilbertian 
programme, and not because there was sufficient evidential reason to accept it. It is the lack 
of consensus that made possible the simultaneous coexistence of various accounts of what 
magnetic variation is – and not, for instance, the different practices of investigation, 
different (often metaphysical) commitments as to what constitutes a good explanation, or 
simply different theories. 
Pumfrey’s account might strike the reader as correct, and for good reasons: Gellibrand’s 
claims about secular variation did operate as part of the research programme that Gilbert’s 
magnetical philosophy had set up, and Gilbert’s philosophy was far more widely accepted 
in Britain than on the continent. But why accept at this point an insight-driven account of 
what had happened and charge the community with assenting to secular variation without 
sufficient evidential support? Or, put otherwise, and pertinently, what is it that counts as 
sufficient evidence? Gellibrand’s measurement practice and explanation of secular variation 
13 For extended discussion of this point see chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
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is aligned with the research programme Gilbert had set up, such that evaluating 
Gellibrand’s practice as being adequate or inadequate ought to be done within the 
parameters of that research programme. The need for a practice of global-scale observations 
of magnetic variation is obvious to us now, given that we know that the alignment of the 
compass needle in magnetic variation (and inclination) is relative to the local lines of flux 
of the earth’s ever shifting magnetic field, but would not have been obvious to seventeenth 
century practitioners of the magnetical philosophy. Gilbert’s account of magnetic variation 
as a perverted magnetic movement caused not by magnetism, but by differences in the 
earth’s structure, accounted for the apparent local differences in the values of magnetic 
variation.14 What Gilbert’s explanation blocked (to some extent) was the time-dependency 
of magnetic variation. This was the “anomaly” that Gellibrand signalled, and which he was 
prepared to solve by connecting the variation to atmospheric influences. What matters here, 
however, is that Gellibrand and the magnetical philosophers were prepared to revise 
Gilbert’s account of variation if needed, and did not perceive the anomaly as a threat to the 
practices of the magnetic philosophy. 
Pumfrey’s account is not wrong in historical details, but his overall narrative reflects his 
philosophical account of science rather than the independent historical reality he takes it to 
be. As should be clear by now, my response to Pumfrey is not philosophically neutral itself: 
it is situated within a research programme that treats the production and explanation of 
natural knowledge primarily as research. Given this, the starting point are not the research 
products in their ahistorical dimension, but rather the ways by which such products were 
brought into existence. From this perspective, newly found variables – such as Gellibrand’s 
claim that there is a “small diminution” in measurements of variation in London over the 
span of a few years – are points for further research. On this approach, the possibility of 
explaining the newly salient variable through many divergent explanations (its 
“interpretative flexibility”) is not a weakness in the research itself, but is a feature of 
scientific research. It is, in no small sense, what makes research research – the instability of 
interpretation in empirical investigations is part and parcel of what it means to be within a 
research situation.15 What the magnetical philosophy secured, as I hope to show in the 
following chapters, was not stabilised explanations of the natural world, but ways of 
14 In De magnete, Gilbert claims that the local variation recorded by the compass needle is not a 
genuine magnetic movement, but is a mere accident caused by local irregularities in the geography of 
the earth; if the earth had been a perfect sphere, then there would have been no variation. To accept 
Gilbert’s account of variation, one has to accept his axial pole theory according to which the magnetic 
poles coincide with the geographical poles. The latter are not “real points” or limits of movements, 
while the magnetic poles are.
15 That is, lacks of consensus, states of contestation, and puzzlement are fundamental aspects of 
research, and not glitches to be corrected for or explained away. See Chapter 7.
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investigating phenomena, and a shared structure of intelligibility, through which what 
comes out of the investigations could be given conceptual content.
Pumfrey’s commitment to the social constructivist perspective also informs his account of 
what the magnetical philosophy, as a discipline, is, and of what led to its demise. Pumfrey 
locates the disciplinary identity of the magnetical philosophy in a structure of epistemic 
interests shared by those who worked within it: to use the discipline to improve navigation, 
to substantiate a Copernican universe, and so on. What happened, according to Pumfrey, 
was that 
Magnetic Philosophy quietly passed away in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. 
It remained as an actor's category used, occasionally, to refer to the study of magnets, 
but it was no longer in any sense a discipline. It had ceased to exist because it no longer 
furthered the interests that had supported it since Gilbert's creation in 1600. (Pumfrey 
1987a: 20)
Pumfrey notes that Gilbert had created the magnetical philosophy around the “unique 
universal property of magnetism” (Pumfrey 1987a: 8). Indeed, Gilbert took terrestrial 
matter to be made up of one– magnetic– element, as will be discussed in the next chapter – 
but, as outlined in section 1 here, I contend that he remained skeptical about the 
universalisation of magnetism. To Pumfrey, with the increasing institutionalised support 
that the mechanical philosophy (in its many versions) was enjoying, and the appropriation 
of magnetism by the mechanical philosophers, the magnetical philosophy quite rapidly fell 
out of fashion because it was constitutive of the latter’s disciplinary identity to secure 
magnetism as an autonomous object of research. This much is true: part of what the 
mechanical philosophy does is to get rid of the possibility of treating natural phenomena as 
autonomous research domains – from the perspective of its constitutive principles, all 
natural phenomena are not differentiated in kind, but only in degree. Add to this the 
ruptures within the magnetical philosophy that came about when many of its initial 
promises turned out to be illusory (finding of longitude and latitude by magnetic means, for 
instance), and the dissolution of the magnetical philosophy follows. Notice, however, that a 
mechanical philosopher has to isolate a phenomenon (or a regularity) in order to explain it. 
And, in doing this, for magnetical phenomena, the mechanical philosophers use the same 
techniques and practices as the magnetical philosophers did before them (as I briefly show 
in Chapter 3). This dimension of the magnetical philosophy continues to embed itself 
within the explanations of magnetism in mechanical philosophies.16
16 How this happens and the extent to which the mechanical philosophers are successful or not in 
incorporating magnetism within their framework is not an extensively studied subject. The 
sophisticated account of Schuster (2013) is one notable exception. 
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Pumfrey’s narrative about both the creation and the dissolution of the magnetical 
philosophy is one which treats the discipline through its propositional content – it is treated 
not as networks of practices within ongoing research, but as sets of arguments for stabilised 
conclusions. On this understanding, dissent from participation in the discipline comes from 
rejecting the claim that magnetism is an irreducible principle that individuated the class of 
magnetic bodies (Pumfrey 1987a: 10). If this axiom breaks down, the argument goes, then 
the beams of the castle of the magnetical philosophy begin to erode, and not long after the 
entire thing will collapse. In a nutshell, despite the rare moments when Pumfrey claims that 
practitioners of the magnetical philosophy shared some practices in common, his story 
about the making and the dissolution of the magnetical philosophy is one about theoretical 
collapse. 
The narrative I propose instead entails a displacement of the entry point of our historical 
analyses of the magnetical philosophy from the theoretical side to what we might call an 
instrumental–laboratory side. If we are to look for a disciplinary identity for the magnetical 
philosophy, we should look at the level of the shared knowledge its practitioners had about 
their experimental and observational practices, and the particular focus they placed on the 
use of certain instruments, such as the versorium or the dip circle, to the detriment of 
others. Through valorising a common repository of instruments and experimental situations 
as what is at stake in research into magnetism, those working within the magnetical 
philosophy discussed what the research situations showed about what magnetism is, what 
effects it brings about, and what are the best ways to understand how magnetism was 
relevant to the world they lived in. Ultimately, my position here is that what was at stake in 
the magnetical philosophy is a debate about what tools (be they instruments or experimental 
situations, conceptualisations, or otherwise) are appropriate for research into magnetism (in 
that context). If the identity of the magnetical philosophy is located at the level of its 
practices rather than its belief structure, this explains why and how competing groups of 
investigators could easily appropriate De magnete to advance their own agenda. What they 
were building on were ways to approach problems – modes of investigation – and not 
necessarily the interpreted consequence of these modes.
4. The practice-centred historical account of the magnetic philosophy
If we are to treat the investigations of magnetism of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries as conducted from within roughly the same discipline, then part of what is at stake 
in the next four chapters of this dissertation is to treat the practices of investigations in 
magnetism as the formation and dissemination of something like Kuhnian exemplars. 
Exemplars, together with symbolic generalisations, metaphysical paradigms and values, are 
part of what Kuhn calls a “disciplinary matrix”, his replacement for the term “theory” as 
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employed by philosophers of science.17 I bring up Kuhn’s concept of exemplars in order to 
point out that the historical tracking of the demise of the magnetical philosophy is not 
independent of one’s own interpretation of what one takes to be the salient aspects of the 
magnetical philosophy. If one were to track the stabilisation and destabilisation of the 
magnetical philosophy by following Kuhn’s disciplinary matrix, the situation would look 
somewhat different from Pumfrey’s proposal. While the content of Gilbert’s theories would 
have been eventually replaced by new theories, the ways of going about solving problems 
related to magnetism remained the same, in significant ways. It might be that, by the last 
quarter of the seventeenth century, Gilbert’s theories of magnetic variation and magnetic 
inclination ended up being replaced (as Pumfrey suggests), but the particular practices of 
measuring, representing and treating the movements of the compass needle, for example, 
continued the magnetical philosophy, at least to some extent. Concepts might change, or 
mutate, but there are still continuities in the practices.18
Kuhn defines an exemplar as,
the concrete problem-solutions that students encounter from the start of their scientific 
education, whether in laboratories, on examinations, or at the ends of chapters in science 
texts. All physicists, for example, begin by learning the same exemplars: problems such 
as the inclined plane, the conical pendulum, and Keplerian orbits; instruments such as 
the vernier, the calorimeter, and the Wheat-stone bridge. […] The paradigm as shared 
example is the central element of what I now take to be the most novel and least 
understood aspect of this book. (Kuhn 1970:187).
As we follow Kuhn’s discussion about exemplars, it becomes transparent that one of the 
things Kuhn denies is the reduction of the paradigm qua exemplar (and by extension of the 
disciplinary matrix) to the propositional content. For Kuhn, what matters in taking 
paradigms as exemplars is noticing that what is truly relevant for participation in a 
discipline (a paradigm) is not sharing the same set of beliefs, but sharing similar ways of 
doing and conceptualising things. This is what students of science are taught through 
exemplars. To put it metaphorically, they are taught to be embedded within research 
situations in a similar way. Seen from this perspective, the magnetical philosophy extended 
long after many of Gilbert’s local theories had been knocked down. Part of why this is the 
case is studied throughout the chapters that follow.
The magnetical philosophy is not a shared system of theoretical beliefs about the nature of 
magnetism and its cosmological place, but a repository of instruments, practices of using 
those instruments, practices of representation and practices of observing and experimenting. 
17 Kuhn points out that what is problematic is the notion of theory as it occurs in philosophy of 
science, and not as it occurs in scientists’ own use, which is more fluid and comprises more elements
18 On this, see especially Chapter 5.
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Seen from the perspective of the immediate followers of Gilbert, this means that the 
research into magnetism by Edward Wright, Mark Ridley, William Barlow and Thomas 
Blundeville amounts to extensions, refinements, and even displacements of Gilbertian 
claims, made through a continuation of the practices that De magnete had established as 
legitimate ways of going about dealing with magnetism.
Indeed De magnete rapidly achieved the status of orthodoxy in England, and a lot of its 
explanations were broadly accepted throughout Europe by 1640, but this was the case 
because Gilbert’s proposal for how to investigate magnetism (i.e., the practices) were what 
was accepted: Gilbert’s treatise did not simply provide a set of well-determined 
explanations of some unproblematic phenomena, but gave ways of establishing salience 
and means of investigation. The “exemplars” (in Kuhn’s sense) of the magnetical 
philosophy were presented and synthesised in De magnete. Investigators attempting to 
solve the problem of longitude focused on the implications of Gilbert’s theory of variation. 
More broadly the treatise proved itself of immense value to navigational studies since, as 
Edward Wright announces in his preface to De magnete, it offered a mathematical 
instrument with the help of which the latitude could be found at sea irrespective of weather 
conditions19, a way to find out the “distance of the place whither the voyage is made” (DM: 
xxxviii), and a promise to “discover” the longitude at sea (DM: xxxix). Copernicans tried to 
consolidate Gilbert’s proofs of terrestrial motion, and also to extend his account to the study 
of other celestial bodies (e.g., Kepler). Given Gilbert’s Neoplatonism, the natural magic 
tradition claimed De magnete to their camp, while the Jesuits preserved Gilbertian magnetic 
physics while recasting it in a geocentric model (e.g., Kitcher, Cabeo, Grandami). The 
discipline of magnetic philosophy that De magnete instituted was, then, widely practiced.
To further substantiate my point, the passage from William Barlow quoted in the 
introduction to the dissertation is worth addressing greater detail. Here it is again:
Many of our nation, both gentleman and others of excellent wits and lovers of these 
knowledges, not able to read Dr. Gilbert’s book in Latin, have been (ever since the first 
publishing thereof) exceeding desirous to have it translated into English, but hitherto no 
man hath done it, neither (to my knowledge) as yet goeth about any such matter, 
whereof one principal cause is, that there are very few that understand the book, 
because they have not loadstones of divers forms, but especially round ones: also such 
versory needles fitly framed, and artificially placed upon their pins, and other such 
implements as he doth there prescribe, whereith being furnished, as they read his 
propositions in words, they might still see the truth of them in the things themselves, 
according as himself forewarneth that these skills must be learned ex rebus ipsis non 
solum ex libris; out of the things themselves, and not out of books. (Barlow 1616: xiii, 
my emphasis) 
19 See Chapter 4, section 4.
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Barlow sees what is at stake in grasping the magnetical philosophy in terms of practices. 
His point here is that it requires some kind of embeddedness in the investigative practices 
themselves.20 It is not simply about witnessing experimental results with versoria and 
terrellae from afar, but about developing the skills to make use of such instruments, 
learning how to manipulate them – and from all that, being able to read off what they show. 
It is not sufficient to know what versoria and terrellae are: what is required for full 
comprehension is to engage with these instruments and the practices to which they belong 
in the appropriate way. What it means to engage with them in an appropriate manner will 
be regulated by various factors: the research context in which they are employed (if I take a 
terrella and let it slide down a slope at various angles, I am not, strictly speaking, using a 
terrella, an instrument embedded in the study of magnetism); the sociological factors that 
surround the practices to which the terrella belongs; what the engagement with it is taken to 
show; what is at stake in using this particular instrument; and so on. What matters is that 
there is a sense of appropriate and inappropriate engagement, which can be sanctioned or 
rewarded, and against which the results obtained can be judged. I take Barlow, in the 
passage above, to suggest a stronger relation between things and knowledge claims: the 
latter seem to acquire their meaningfulness and relevance in the context of the former. 
Embeddedness within the experimental context discloses certain variables as salient, as 
well as what makes them salient.
The reader might very well want to raise an objection here. If the dimension of 
embeddedness within practice is so important, why does Barlow (and, before him, Gilbert) 
emphasise the visual dimension and perceptual receptivity? The experimental practice of 
the magnetical philosophy is often aimed towards perceptual receptivity – towards making 
magnetism visible. Seeing magnetic effects is central to the approach, and an overarching 
goal is to make magnetism perceptible through its effects. However, the embeddedness 
involved is at least partially a bodily and perceptual embeddedness: what is at stake is 
learning how to see (in a certain way), and identifying what is salient in what one sees. On 
this approach, both the seeing and the salience are dictated by the embeddedness in the 
situation; they are not, and cannot be, neutral reports about what has been seen. Seeing and 
salience are both wrapped up with the local context, and with making use of it.
And once we are well embedded in a context, some perceptual activities come to appear so 
straightforward, and so easy, that we take ourselves to be passive spectators, although we 
are not – we start to believe that things just are this way, rather than being tied up with a set 
of practices which allow them to appear to us this way. This apparent easiness is 
presumably either due to the skill developed, or to having our attention focused in a pre-
determined direction – a certain blinkering introduced by the discipline. Why assume, for 
20 For a somewhat similar notion of “embodied empiricism”, cf. Salter and Wolfe (2009) and Wolfe 
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instance, that, in witnessing a situation in which two magnets are floating on water, what is 
noteworthy is that they come together – why assume as much if not for the practices, and 
the values that accompany them, that point us towards this aspect of what is going on? 
(Why, for that matter, float magnets in water in the first place, if not for certain established 
practices and values?) Moreover, familiarity with the situation and expectation of the result 
might very well lead to interpreting the experience through a new direction of interest and 
focus (especially if what you are being told to do is to report something noteworthy about 
the situation). Research situations (almost by conceptual necessity) are precisely such 
searches for noteworthiness. 
Barlow’s assessment as to why Gilbert’s treatise is both difficult to translate into English 
and little understood continues as follows:
a second cause [for why De magnete had not yet been translated] may be, that there are 
divers words of art in the whole course of the book proper to his subject, and fit to the 
explanation of his figures and diagrams, which cannot be understood but by the help of 
the mathematics, and good travelling in the magnetical practice. (Barlow 1616: xiii)
Barlow’s second cause is somewhat distinct from the first, but is perhaps even more 
important for my purposes in this dissertation. It claims that the “words of art” and their 
significance become meaningful through participation in the practice. Embeddedness in the 
practice is not only necessary for the development of skills for the manipulation of 
instruments, and for establishing salience within experimentation (as we have already seen), 
but also for the comprehension of “words of art”. According to Barlow, the significance of 
Gilbertian magnetical philosophy is practice dependent: it cannot be reduced to the 
reporting of the practical content (i.e., to descriptions of experimental setups and instrument 
construction), or to the description of experimental results. Barlow seems to take it that 
there is an ineffable element to the practical context of investigation that cannot be fully 
captured by its translation into propositional content, because the “words of art” themselves 
acquire their meaning by reference to the practical context. The relevant concepts are 
themselves embedded within contexts of practice, and are not separable from these 
contexts, but are instead instantiated by them.
To understand this claim, which will appear recurrently throughout the rest of this 
dissertation, let’s look at Barlow’s definition of magnetic inclination:
By the declination, or inclination, I mean the descending, and (as it were) the sinking 
motion of the needle under the horizon, in its proper azimuth, or magnetical meridian. 
(Barlow 1616: 45)
Barlow’s definition is operational: given the magnetical meridian and the horizon, magnetic 
inclination is measurable. But, this presumes that the determination of the horizon and the 
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magnetical meridian remain the same. It presumes that the system of reference in terms of 
magnetic meridians remains the same. They do not: for the determination of the magnetic 
meridian, it matters whether one takes the magnetic poles to be aligned with the 
geographical poles (as Gilbert and Barlow do), or whether the magnetic poles are tilted 
from the geographic poles, for instance. At the same time, the determination of magnetic 
inclination entails already being embedded in a practice of determination of magnetic 
meridians and horizons.
It is not just that the concept of magnetic inclination depends on the conceptual scheme that 
represents magnetic movement through a system of reference in terms of poles, equator, 
horizon, and meridians – but it is also embedded in a practice that allows for such 
representation to be both meaningful and technologically possible. Imagine if the only 
magnetic bodies you were familiar with were bar magnets and magnetic needles. In this 
scenario, is the concept of magnetic meridian still readily available? Would the system of 
representation from geography or astronomy transfer so naturally to magnetism? The 
physical structure of a bar magnet does not lend itself to this kind of conceptualisation in 
anything like the way that of a spherical magnet does. Such considerations show the extent 
to which the definition of magnetic inclination speaks to a practical situation that is 
necessarily context bound, and that does not lend itself to generalisation or to easy transfer 
across all possible scenarios. It is a definition that works only in those scenarios that 
already presuppose (at least) some aspects of certain practical contexts. Simply put, as 
Barlow sees it, it appears that understanding the concept of magnetic inclination has less to 
do with the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions for its use, and more to do 
with the continuation and iteration of a set of practices that allow the concepts of magnetic 
meridian, horizon, and so on to remain meaningful in contexts of investigation of 
magnetism.
The investigations into magnetic phenomena that I discuss in the following chapters share 
experimental setups, and other techniques and practices, and develop them in different 
directions. They work with a shared repertoire of instruments, which they try to improve in 
various ways, and they share similar means of describing magnetic phenomena. All of this 
is not, of course, to say that the research methodology does not change, or that the 
metaphysical principles involved remain the same. As the practices of investigation get 
reiterated, they are almost always reiterated with differences and mutations – by the time 
practices of systematic measurements across the globe become what is salient in the 
investigation of magnetic inclination, for example, Gilbert’s account of inclination through 
local research in a laboratory-based experimental setting becomes inappropriate. And yet, 
as we will see with Henry Bond21, amongst others, the ways in which magnetic inclination 
gets accounted for still share much in common with Gilbert’s proposals.
21 See Chapter 5, section 2.3.
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The same is the case for how diagrammatic practices matter: the representation of magnetic 
inclination through spherical trigonometry is a practice that extends well beyond De 
magnete. But, this practice nevertheless derives from Gilbert’s construction of the terrella 
as an instrument for the investigation of (what we might with hindsight call) geomagnetic 
properties. When the terrella is devised as an instrument with poles, equator and meridian, 
its construction drags with itself particular ways of being used, along with certain 
possibilities and limitations for the direction of research. At the same time, the very 
construction of the terrella is an extension, with mutations, of an already existing practice. 
Gilbert knew about the use of spherical magnets from the medieval philosopher Petrus 
Peregrinus, whose short work on magnetism, Letter on the Magnet (written in 1269), had 
been published for the first time in 155822.
Peregrinus made use of a spherical magnet and proposed a method for determining the 
magnetic poles, which involved floating a small round magnet (on a buoyancy raft) in water 
and marking as its north pole the part that oriented itself towards the north, and vice versa 
for its south magnetic pole.23 When Gilbert devises his terrella, in contrast to Peregrinus, he 
takes the polar law of attraction as basic, and subsequently identifies the north pole of the 
22 The letter was addressed to Sigerus de Foucaucourt, and was written in Lucera in August 1269. Not 
much is known about Peregrinus’ life and professional career, but it should be noted that he was 
praised by Roger Bacon as a mathematician and experimenter. Alongside the Letter, two other texts 
have been attributed to Peregrinus: De nova compositione astrolabii particularis and De operibus 
speculorum. Peregrinus refers to the latter in his Letter, but the text has so far not been found. See 
Radelet de Grave and Speiser (1975: 194). 
23 The rationale behind Peregrinus’ decision to name the part of the pole that orients itself northwards 
the north magnetic pole is his analogy between the magnet and the cosmos. As Steinle (2012: 109–
110) has argued, the analogy between the heavens and the magnet does most of the work in 
accounting for the behaviour of magnetised needles in Peregrinus’ Letter. The claim is that a magnetic 
stone shares similarities with the heavens, in that both have two prominent points (puncta): a north 
point and a south point (Peregrinus 1975: 205). The celestial poles were points around which the 
celestial spheres were taken to revolve, and a system of coordinates was built around them. These 
polar points of the heavens (the poli mundi) are transferred to the magnetic stone. With the transfer, 
the macrocosmos is directly transplanted to the microcosmos. Peregrinus pushes this association with 
the celestial sphere further, concluding that the virtue (or power) of the lodestone is directly derived 
from the virtue of the heavens (Peregrinus 1904: 20). There is thus a direct correspondence between 
the celestial poles and the poles of the lodestone (Peregrinus 1975: 217). The correspondence is not 
just analogical: Peregrinus attributes to the celestial sphere and the lodestone a sympathetic, tangible 
relation. This relation is what legitimises the transfer of the concept of pole from the astronomical to 
the magnetic, and this is what explains both the directive property of a magnet and Peregrinus’ 
proposal for constructing a perpetual motion machine using a giant magnet. For Peregrinus, it looks 
as though magnetic stones are endowed with poles because the stone itself is a mirror of the celestial 
heavens. A consequence of this picture is that whatever part of the body orients towards the northern 
regions is necessarily the north magnetic pole (and it remains thus).
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terrella as the point oriented towards the south pole of the earth and vice versa. We see here 
a continuation of a practice, but a continuation with mutations. Significant continuations are 
also to be found at the level of the conceptual structures involved in the use of explanations, 
many of which continue not only from Peregrinus to Gilbert and his followers, but also 
across natural-philosophical traditions.
This dissertation is about such continuations of practices, the mutations these continuations 
involve, and especially the ways in which such mutations bring about conceptual 
innovation and development. The first part of the dissertation is centred around Gilbert and 
his conceptual innovations (and mutations) in the magnetical philosophy. The analysis 
moves backwards and forwards in time, with De magnete as its anchor point, tracing the 
interplay between diverse investigative practices and concepts. It is by no means a complete 
account or neutral account of such continuations: it is selective about the history, and 
reconstructs it through saliences particular to its own aims and situation.24 
Conclusion
The object of interest of this chapter was not the magnetical philosophy itself. Its object 
was the study of magnetic philosophy. Section 1 showed that while Bennett’s call for a 
revival of the magnetical philosophy is welcome, the perspective from which he proposes 
this – the cosmological side of Gilbert – is not necessarily the best way to do so, or the best 
motivation for doing so. While it is indisputable that the magnetical philosophy had a role 
to play in the development of cosmology and the support for a Copernican universe, the 
extent to which these claims apply to De magnete is rather questionable. Then, section 2 
gave an overview of the emphasis on Gilbert’s experimentalism in the literature. It showed 
that how the question is asked, in the scholarship, depends more on previous philosophical 
commitments than it does on what Gilbert did or did not do with his experiments. This is 
not in itself, a problem – the point here (and more so in Chapters 6 and 7) is that non-
neutrality in historical reconstruction is inescapable, and needs to be made explicit. Section 
3, in the same vein, showed that Pumfrey’s perspective on the magnetical philosophy is also 
informed by his own philosophical situation (a version of social constructivism). Section 4 
made an argument for the practice-based approach I adopt in this dissertation in terms of 
Kuhnian exemplars. Overall, the goal of this chapter has been to situate my approach in the 
first part of this dissertation in the context of – and in contrast to – existing history-of-
science practices of addressing the magnetical philosophy (sections 1, 2 and 3) – as well as 
demonstrating the situatedness of my own studies (section 4). 
24 See Chapters 6 and 7.

Chapter 2
From Attraction to Disponent: 
The Reconceptualisation of Magnetism 
in De magnete1
In A Treatise of Artificial Magnets, John Michell observes that Gilbert
concluded from some experiments he had made, not very irationally [sic], that the 
Needle was not attracted by the magnet, but turned into its position by, what he calls, a 
disponent virtue. (1750: 17; my emphasis)
For Michell, the disponent virtue (Lat.: disponens vigor)2 is the underlying cause of 
magnetic phenomena in Gilbert’s treatment. He is not alone in this reading. Ridley (1613) 
and Carpenter (1635), amongst many others, also read Gilbert as conceiving of magnetism 
as “disponent”.3 In the scholarship, however, this reading has been lost – a relational–
1 Parts of this chapter are based on the article “The Disponent Power in Gilbert’s De Magnete: From 
Attraction to Alignment”, forthcoming in Perspectives on Science 25/2 (2017).
2 Disponens is the present participle of the verb dispōnō. Dispōnō means “to dispose,” “to place here 
and there,” “to arrange,” “to regulate,” “to distribute,” “to administer/manage/order.” Despite the 
various ways in which the verb can be translated, all of these meanings share seem to have the 
following in common: they seem to refer to situations of arranging for action or into place, or 
following into a system of order.
3 Gilbert’s followers systematised Gilbert’s magnetic philosophy, and in the process continuously 
transformed Gilbertian concepts. This is not too surprising: Gilbert’s text was far from being 
consistent enough not to allow for different interpretations or reworkings of the claims made in De 
magnete. Reworkings of arguments often lead to transformations of those arguments. This is precisely 
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organisational treatment of magnetism in Gilbert has been almost entirely neglected. The 
overall argument of this chapter is that Gilbert changes the primary conceptualisation of 
magnetism – rather than conceiving of magnetism as primarily attractional, Gilbert 
conceives of it as primarily disponent. To the extent that it is disponent, magnetism arranges 
and aligns magnetic bodies into place (where the place of each body is specified relative to 
a different magnetic body). This is not inconsequential: besides being a departure from the 
established conception of magnetism as attraction, conceiving magnetism as disponent 
informs both the way in which Gilbert accounts for magnetic phenomena (as specific 
movements into alignments) and the way he goes about investigating these phenomena 
(with a particular focus on mapping the relative positions and directions of magnetic 
bodies).
While the shift in conceptualisation has various motivations (detailed below), it takes place 
through the investigative practices – certain observations, experiments, and techniques 
make the disponent conceptualisation possible for Gilbert. Equally, that new 
conceptualisation opens up new possibilities for investigating magnetism. One significant 
upshot of this reading – i.e., the disponent conceptualisation and the forms of investigation 
it engenders – is that it allows us to make sense of what has hitherto seemed a rather strange 
and under-supported claim on Gilbert’s part: that the earth’s diurnal rotation occurs 
magnetically.
Gilbert’s argument goes as follows: the Earth is a magnet, and magnets rotate; therefore, the 
Earth rotates because it is a giant magnet. Historians have puzzled over the claim that 
magnets rotate, and have largely concluded that Gilbert has little evidence to offer in 
support of the claim (Henry (2001); Miller (2014)). I show that Gilbert's assent to magnetic 
rotation is (at least, partially) a consequence of both the treatment of magnetism as 
disponent and the manner of investigating this. If my interpretation holds, we need to 
consider the disponent conceptualisation of magnetism in order to understand further 
appropriations of the Gilbertian framework, both in the short-lived magnetic philosophy 
itself4 and in the work of others influenced by Gilbert, such as Stevin’s The Heavenly 
Motions (1608), Kepler’s The New Astronomy (1609) or even Descartes’ explanation of 
magnetism in the Principles of Philosophy (1644).
The concern of this chapter is not with the meanings that Gilbert attributes to the term 
disponens vigor (or its variations) itself, nor do I provide an intellectual-historical treatment 
of the term here. Instead, I take on Gilbert’s disponens vigor as an umbrella term for a 
what both Ridley (1613), Carpenter (1635), and others did. In the attempt to clarify Gilbert’s theory, 
they changed Gilbert’s theory. On the life of the concept of disponent virtue after Gilbert, see Section 
6.
4 On the discipline of magnetic philosophy, see Pumfrey (1987a). 
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conceptualisation of magnetism that (1) moves away from the formerly dominant treatment 
of magnetism as attraction, emphasising instead (2) the relationist/interactionist and 
organisational nature of magnetism. Gilbert captures this conceptualisation by showing that 
each magnetic body’s action manifests strictly relative to another magnetic body. 
Articulating what this entails and how it works epistemically and heuristically is the goal of 
the discussion here. There are thus two interrelated sides to my argument: (1) magnetism 
understood as disponent is central and (2) magnetism understood as disponent guides 
Gilbert’s theoretical and investigative practices. 
I begin by setting out the conceptual framework for understanding magnetism that Gilbert 
ends up replacing – that is, the conception of magnetism in terms of attraction – along with 
Gilbert’s motivations for rejecting it (Section 1). Next (Section 2), I show how the notion of 
attraction and the rejection thereof affects Gilbert’s general matter theory, which 
encompasses more than just magnetism. Section 3 establishes that conceptual reform in 
magnetism was an explicit goal of Gilbert’s De magnete, before showing how that reform 
came about, and what its consequences were for Gilbert’s ongoing investigation and 
explanation of magnetism (sections 4 and 5). In Section 6, I briefly assess how the 
disponent conceptualisation of magnetism continued to shape investigations not only of 
magnetism but also of other subjects after Gilbert. 
1. The problems of magnetism as attraction
The literature on early modern natural philosophy frequently notes that Gilbert disagreed 
with conceiving of magnetic movements as attraction between magnetic bodies, and that he 
explicitly replaced the notion of magnetic attraction with that of magnetic coition. It is also 
often noted that Gilbert’s rationale for rejecting magnetic attraction is tied up with a 
conceptualisation of it as asymmetrical: on Gilbert’s understanding, magnetic action is not 
the result of the attraction of one body alone, but of the harmonious “coming 
together” (DM: 100) of interacting magnetic bodies (e.g., Cunningham 2001, Wang 2016). 
Magnetic action, for Gilbert, is both mutual and non-violent, whereas attraction implies 
“imperious violence” (DM: 61) – this violence, as we will see here, is Gilbert’s conception 
of an asymmetrical, uni-directional causality. Beyond noting the attraction/coition 
distinction, however, the scholarship has so far done little to consider how the conceptual 
move from attraction qua forced motion to magnetic action qua non-violent action shifts 
both the wider conceptualisation and the investigation of magnetism. My purpose here is to 
address that shift: moving away from an attraction-based conceptualisation of magnetism 
moves the research away from certain magnetic phenomena in favour of others, while also 
changing the modus operandi of investigation into magnetism. I begin by briefly 
introducing the attraction-based model of magnetism (subsection 1.1) and then offer a 
reconstruction of the reasons Gilbert has for taking attraction to be a problematic 
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conceptual model for making sense of magnetic actions and magnetic phenomena 
(subsection 1.2.). 
1.1. Attraction and the localisation of magnetism 
In Book I, Gilbert shows discontent with previous attempts to explain magnetic action. He 
boldly claims the following. 
All these philosophizers of a previous age, philosophizing about attraction from a few 
vague and untrustworthy experiments […] are whole horizons wrong, and wander about 
blindly. (DM: 6)
The word attraction unfortunately crept into magnetick philosophy from the ignorance 
of the ancients; for there seems to be force applied where there is attraction and an 
imperious violence dominates. For, if ever there is talk about magnetick attraction, we 
understand thereby magnetick coition, or a primary running together. (DM: 60)
Gilbert’s issue is not with the term “attraction” itself, but with the concept it implies (or, at 
least, that he takes it to imply). According to Gilbert, attraction is tightly correlated with 
concepts such as force (Lat: vis) or violence (Gilbert’s Lat.: imperans violentia). What is at 
stake is the causal model behind the attraction based explanations: for a two-body system, 
the causal model is one of an active agent and a passive recipient.5 Gilbert’s problem is then 
with a certain kind of asymmetry in the concept of attraction – an asymmetry we can call 
“unidirectional causality”. Unidirectional causality works by localising the source of the 
causal action in a causal agent, e.g., in the case of magnetism, a lodestone. By some means 
or other, attraction (at least as Gilbert conceives it) takes the lodestone to bear the causal 
agency, while the iron (or the patient body) is considered to be causally irrelevant – it is 
merely the affected body. An analogical example is that of a cart being pulled by a horse: 
while the cart is equipped for being pulled, the causal agency for the action lies entirely 
with the horse.
Gilbert’s criticism of the attraction-based conception of magnetism also resonates with 
other causal accounts, specifically those in terms of sympathy or the likeness or identity of 
substance6. Gilbert explicitly rejects sympathy as a cause:
Others have lit upon sympathy as the cause. There may be fellow-feeling, and yet the 
cause is not fellow-feeling; for no passion can rightly be said to be an efficient cause. 
(DM: 64) 
Gilbert does not reject “sympathy” between magnetic bodies as such; what he rejects is that 
5 Gilbert develops this in more detail in the case of electrics. See Section 2.2. below.
6 For an overview of the history of the concept of sympathy, see Schliesser 2015. 
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sympathy can play the role of a causal term. He does take there to be a kind of sympathy, or 
rather “likeness of substance”, between iron and lodestone, in that both are bodies of the 
same kind.7 But what he denies is that the likeness or identity of substance can be a cause: 
Similarity also is not the cause; because all things around us placed on this globe of the 
earth, similar and dissimilar, are allured by amber and bodies of this kind; and on that 
account no cogent analogy is to be drawn either from similarity or identity of substance. 
But neither do similars mutually attract one another, as stone stone, flesh flesh, nor 
aught else outside the class of magneticks and electricks. (DM: 50)
Gilbert wants to move magnetism away from the attraction-based framework, and its 
unidirectional causality, which he takes to have been the dominant conceptual structure 
through which magnetism had hitherto been addressed:
All these philosophizers of a previous age, philosophizing about attraction from a few 
vague and untrustworthy experiments, drawing their arguments from the hidden causes 
of things; and then, seeking for the causes of magnetick directions in a quarter of the 
heavens, in the poles, the stars, constellations, or in mountains, or rocks, space, atoms, 
attractive or respective points beyond the heavens, and other such unproven paradoxes, 
are whole horizons wrong, and wander about blindly. (DM: 6)
Gilbert’s diagnosis is not unwarranted. The ancients frequently explained the direction of 
the compass needle by claiming that the Pole Star is the source of magnetism, an idea that 
we see reiterated in the sixteenth century by Cardano.8 In fact, in the sixteenth century it 
became somewhat fashionable to place the magnetic source somewhere on the surface of 
Earth, in a magnetic mountain (Fracastoro), or in a magnetic island (Mercator), and so on.9 
Yet another example is Petrus Peregrinus’ explanation of the magnetic attraction in his 
Letter of the magnet (1269), one of the first systematic investigations into magnetism 
published in Europe and one of the most important sources for Gilbert’s treatise10. 
7 The likeness of iron and lodestone are covered in depth in the next section.
8 On some accounts, like the one proposed by Martin Cortes, the Pole Star is the indirect source, 
influencing some magnetic mountain which in turn causes the movement of the magnetic needle. For 
an analysis of this and related examples, see Jonkers (2003), chapter 2. 
9 On pre-Gilbert theories of magnetism, see Smith (1968), Smith (1992), and Jonkers (2003), 
especially chapter 2.
10 Most historians agree that Robert Norman and Petrus Peregrinus are the principal sources for 
Gilbert. But other sources have recently been identified as well: Hilary Gatti (1999: 86–98) shows the 
connections between Bruno’s and Gilbert’s speculations on astronomy. Monica Ugaglia (2006) argues 
that a previously unrecognised source for Gilbert is Leonardo Garzoni’s treatise on magnetism. The 
first book of De magnete is a good place to start if one’s goal is to retrace Gilbert’s sources. It 
comprises a critical natural history of accounts of magnetism since antiquity. It is therefore to be 
40 CHAPTER TWO
According to Peregrinus, lodestone attracts iron because the nature of the iron is impressed 
with a new quality from the lodestone, such that the lodestone is an agent that transforms 
the iron into the same species as the stone, and thus attracts it11. While both the agent (the 
lodestone) and the passive recipient (the iron) are oriented towards the same definite end 
(the realisation of a particular state in the patient), the agent is the only source of the change 
(and, incidentally, is so without consumption of its substance or energy). In this case, the 
lodestone is the causal agent and the iron the patient (Peregrinus 1904: 13)12. The 
lodestone–lodestone interaction will be explained by differences in strength of agency with 
the stronger pulling the weaker towards itself. This conceptualisation, in terms of 
unidirectional causation, affects how Peregrinus goes about his investigation of magnetism: 
what he takes to be central to the study of magnetism is to establish the physical conditions 
by which the nature of the iron is altered (which, for him, amounts to an investigation of the 
polarisation of iron).
Taking the attractive model as the paradigm of explanation for magnetism, then, does not 
come without consequences. Because it dictates which criteria of the investigative practice 
are appropriate and which are not, treating magnetism as attraction affects both how one 
investigates magnetic phenomena and how one accounts for them. For instance, with this 
framework, the movement of a compass needle will be explained by the attraction of a 
passive needle towards an active source of magnetic power. And with this unidirectional 
conceptualisation guiding the explanations and investigations, the central investigative 
practice was, as we might expect, to search for the actual physical location of the magnetic 
causal power. Since the early study of magnetism was mostly concerned with 
geomagnetism, this meant a search at, or beyond, the terrestrial scale. 
Typically, because investigations of magnetism took measurements almost exclusively in 
the northern hemisphere, the magnetic source was claimed to be located in the north, which 
expected that many of the experiments Gilbert made use of had already been reported, or that some of 
his insights are retraceable back to his sources. I take it that, when it comes to sources, what is 
important is not so much determining whether texts like Peregrinus’, Norman’s or Garzoni’s 
influenced Gilbert’s modus operandi – after all, any novelty always has its own history – but what 
matters is clarifying what is at stake in retracing such influences. This is not, however, a battle that the 
dissertation steps into. What I am after is the interplay between the material and conceptual practices, 
and how this interplay allowed for local articulations of novelty (or knowledge advancement) with 
respect to magnetism and magnetic phenomena.
11 According to Radelet de Grave & Speiser (1975), Peregrinus employs the following four principles 
in his explanations: 1) intentio ad asimilare, through which the lodestone magnetizes iron; 2) intentio 
ad unire, which resides in bodies of the same species; 3) identitas, or the conservation of the nature of 
the magnetic poles; and 4) similitudo, the product of reuniting split magnets. See also Grant (2008).
12 I have consulted the following editions. Peregrinus (1904) and Radelet de Grave & Speiser (1975).
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in return made the south pole non-salient in the investigations. The alleged magnetic source 
was expected to be found by the use of cartographical methods, triangulation of 
observations or mere speculation. It should be noted that Gilbert is very much aware of the 
effect that the attraction-based conceptualisation of magnetism has on the investigative 
practices. In discussing Fracastoro’s hypothesis of magnetic mountains, Gilbert states,
The ingenious Fracastorio, a distinguished philosopher, in seeking the reason for the 
direction of the loadstone, feigns Hyperborean magnetick mountains attracting 
magnetical things of iron: this view, which has found acceptance in part by others, is 
followed by many authors and finds a place not in their writings only, but in 
geographical tables, marine charts, and maps of the globe: dreaming, as they do, of 
magnetick poles and huge rocks, different from the poles of the earth. (DM: 5)
In context, the criticism of attraction in De magnete might appear misplaced, coming as it 
does after the publication of Robert Norman’s The new attractive (1581) – a text that 
Gilbert acknowledges at multiple points. Norman had already offered a thorough 
experimental criticism of attraction-based accounts of magnetism. In a series of well-
controlled experiments, Norman showed that a magnetised iron needle attached to a piece 
of cork and floated below the surface of water in a vessel remains in equilibrium. It is not 
pulled in any direction. The conclusion of his series of experimental observations was that 
there is no source of attracting power. Had there been such a source in the heavens, the 
magnetised needle would have moved upwards; had there been one in the Earth, it would 
have moved downwards.13
Gilbert thought highly of Norman’s experimental proof (DM: 67, 125), but nevertheless 
considered Norman’s alternative explanation as belonging to the same general framework 
as the conceptualisation in terms of attraction. Having rejected attraction itself, Norman 
replaced the attraction approach with one that posited that the magnetised needle “respects” 
a “respective poynt” (Norman 1581: 26). For Gilbert, however, the respective point is 
equally problematic, and for the same reasons as explanations based on attraction. His 
dissatisfaction goes back to his understanding of the conceptual structure of attraction. On 
Gilbert’s understanding of Norman’s proposal, the notion of the respective point replicates 
the underlying conceptual structure of the attractive alternative – it localises magnetism to a 
particular source, and it is this source that remains the relevant causal agent. With Norman, 
the respective point that becomes the source of the magnetic action; magnetism still has a 
causal and physical source in some particular, privileged location, and is thus still 
understood in terms of unidirectional causality.
13 On Norman’s experimental practice see Chapter 5. 
42 CHAPTER TWO
1.2. De-localising magnetism
We have seen that Gilbert rejects the attraction-based conception of magnetism (and, by 
extension, Norman’s respect-based conception) because of its causal unidirectionality. That 
unidirectionality is closely linked with the localisation of magnetism. Aristotelian accounts 
of motion rely on the notion of a substantial “natural place”, relative to which the motion of 
bodies is explained – hence the recourse to both a physical location and a causal source 
(i.e., a “natural place”) in accounts of the motion of magnetic bodies within the Aristotelian 
tradition. Besides rejecting the causal component of this, Gilbert also explicitly rejects the 
localisation component. This rejection makes a conception of magnetism that relies on 
localisation impracticable for a Gilbertian approach.
In De mundo (published posthumously in 1651), Gilbert rejects substantive accounts of 
place14:
Place neither operates in nor rules over the nature of things in order to make bodies rest 
or move. […] [P]lace is neither a being nor an efficient cause: the power frequently 
flows into the contents from the surrounding bodies. (1651: 61; my translation)15
Similar statements are reiterated by Gilbert throughout the De mundo. In the passage just 
quoted, we see Gilbert rejecting the “natural place” ontologically (it is not a being) and 
causally (it is not an efficient cause). Given this, then a body’s direction of motion, or, 
indeed, whether or not it is in motion at all, cannot be judged relative to some posited 
“natural place”. The determination of a body’s motion, for Gilbert, is entirely relative to 
another body (or bodies). At the same time, the source of motion (or power) is the bodies 
themselves and them alone. The question remains exactly how this power is activated and 
to which conditions the power of a body responds. De magnete answers these questions in 
the case of two classes of bodies: electrics and magnetics. In the case of magnetism, an 
action occurs from the power of all the bodies involved in the magnetic action, and not 
merely from a single body. In magnetic movements, all bodies are causally active. This is 
the position that Gilbert aims to defend – one in which magnetic activity is not causally 
unidirectional, and is not localisable in any single source. For Gilbert, there is no “natural 
place” towards which magnetic bodies are drawn, and explanations that require one are 
doomed to failure.
14 De mundo is a thorough step-by-step rejection of Aristotelian cosmology and physics. There is 
currently no English translation of De mundo, although a translation by Stephen Pumfrey and Ian 
Stewart is in preparation. For a detailed study of De mundo, see Kelly (1965).
15 Lat: Ad locus non operatur, nec dominatur in rerum natura, ut sistat corpora, aut moveat. […] 
[L]ocus enim nec ens est, nec efficiens causa: ab ambientibus corporibus saepe vis influit in 
contentum.
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2. Gilbert’s two-layer matter theory
Gilbert’s dismantling of attraction as the central salient concept for magnetism is pursued 
further through his theory of matter and the classification of physical bodies he provides. To 
Gilbert, the bodies we observe can be separated out into magnetics and non-magnetics. The 
latter category is further divisible into bodies that act by attraction (the electrics) and the 
rest (the anelectrics). The distinction between magnetic bodies and electric bodies is one 
that turns on Gilbert’s reconceptualisation of attraction. As we have seen, Gilbert denies 
attraction in the case of magnetism. He does, however, conceive of the action of electrics in 
terms of attraction, in the form of a unidirectional causality that works on the basis of 
material effluvia (and is therefore a contact action).16 To substantiate his views, Gilbert 
proposes two strands of arguments from within his matter theory: the first goes back to the 
allegedly common genealogy of the lodestone and the iron (section 2.1.), and the second 
defends the separating out of the electrics as a class of bodies whose manner of causal 
operation is distinct from that of magnetic bodies (section 2.2.).
2.1. The genealogy of iron and lodestone
Gilbert’s matter theory is a rejection of the four-element Aristotelian theory. As well as 
defending the details of his matter theory in De mundo by directly challenging many 
Aristotelian tenets, Gilbert reiterates much of his argument in De magnete. Gilbert’s point 
of departure is that the earth consists of a solid homogeneous substance, firmly coherent, 
and endowed with activity: the pure earth.17 There is no other basic element to be found in 
the compositions of the other substances. The diversity of substances which appear on the 
surface of the earth are produced through the constant interactions between the pure 
element and the activity of the sun (DM: 41). The sun is the “chief agent in the 
world” (DM: 224), with its light and heat corrupting the pure earth.18 The Earth’s 
atmosphere and water are produced by the constant corrupting action of the sun from the 
elemental earth. The elemental earth itself cannot be found in its pure form on the upper 
layers of the Earth, although Gilbert reasons that there must be uncorrupted earth left in the 
depths below the levels that could be reached by human endeavour (DM: 40–41). Different 
degrees of corruption allow for a multitude of apparent substances to be produced by a very 
limited rang of causal factors. Through positing that ultimately all diversity bottoms out in 
the elemental earth and the influence of the sun, Gilbert secures the continuity between the 
substances we encounter on the earth’s surface. But he also complicates not only the 
16 Substantial natural place, of course, he denies entirely, as shown in the previous section.
17 On Gilbert’s matter theory, see Roller (1959), Freudenthal (1983), and Gaukroger (2006).
18 According to Gilbert’s cosmology, developed in De mundo, light can travel through empty space 
(see Chapter 25). 
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explanation of the diversity we encounter and the many specific commonalities between 
diverse substances, but, more importantly for his interests, that lodestone can only 
magnetise iron, and that iron and lodestone appear to display empirical effects which sets 
them apart from other bodies.
Gilbert, then, sees himself obliged to explain the fact that iron and lodestone are “one in 
kind” (DM: 39) under the parameters set out by his own matter theory. Gilbert’s solution is 
to claim that iron and lodestone are produced in the same way, namely from the elemental 
earth itself, such that in their constituency they contain the potency of the earth’s core. In 
other words, iron and lodestone, for Gilbert, are bodies of the same kind. They are, Gilbert 
will conclude, the only bodies on the surface of the earth that are formed from uncorrupted 
elemental earth. Non-magnetic bodies, formed through the action of the sun upon corrupted 
earth, are deprived of the prime qualities and the true nature of the elemental earth. 
Gilbert’s matter-theoretical account thus has the benefit of allowing for the possibility that 
other bodies unknown at the time could also possess the qualities of the elemental earth.19
As (Freudenthal 1984: 25) points out, Gilbert’s kinship between iron and lodestone went 
against all received classifications. Traditionally, iron is a metal, and lodestone (or 
magnetite) is a stone: the difference in kind was explained by the fact that, when subjected 
to the element of fire, the metals would liquefy, which showed that the element of water 
was predominant, whereas stones would turn brittle, showing their earthy make up. It is 
precisely this separate ontological classification of iron and lodestone which made the 
attraction of iron by lodestone puzzling. But if one could show, as Gilbert aims to, that iron 
and lodestone are cognate materials then the fact that iron can be magnetised by a 
lodestone, or that they attract each other, would not be as puzzling. In order to obtain this 
classification, Gilbert took himself to be obliged to introduce a new theory of the formation 
of metals. 
Gilbert follows Aristotle on the production of metals, but only up to a point. For Aristotle, 
metals consist entirely of exhalations, specifically of a mixture of exhalations from land and 
water, which condense and coalesce underground – “[r]ightly then in some measure does 
Aristotle make out the matter of metals to be that exhalation which in continuance thickens 
in the lodes of certain soils”, Gilbert writes, but, he continues, “it is not they alone which 
form ores, but they flow into and enter a more solid material, and so form metals” (DM: 20; 
19 Iron, lodestone and the earth itself are the magnetic bodies of which we know, according to Gilbert. 
His theory does not exclude the possibility that there are other magnetic bodies. As we have seen, iron 
and lodestone are magnetic because they are produced from pure elemental earth (subsection 2.1). Of 
course, all bodies generated on earth are made up of earthy matter, but that matter loses its magnetic 
power through corruption. This suggests that the earth itself could eventually have its magnetic power 
corrupted away.
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my emphasis). Because the earth is constantly subject to the actions of the sun, such that 
parts of it are always being heated or cooled to various degrees, Gilbert concludes that the 
earth gives forth “humours” or “exhalations”. These exhalations, then, are produced by the 
action of the sun from the pure matter of the earth (DM: 20). Some congeal into liquids 
under the surface (DM: 21), and these liquids flow into the matter of the earth, that matter 
being sometimes more corrupted, sometimes less (DM: 20, 21). On the Aristotelian 
account, exhalations constitute the material cause of a metal. For Gilbert, however, it is the 
solid matter that is the material cause of metals, with the exhalations being, as Freudenthal 
puts it, only “the cause of their metallic properties” (Freudenthal 1983: 25). Where the 
exhalations flow only into solid matter “suitable” for metallisation, they produce pure 
metals. But where they flow into various kinds of matter (where differences in kind amount 
to differences in corruption), they produce ores. The process of smelting is, then, a process 
of separating metal fused with “the true substance of the earth” from “earthy 
impurities” (DM: 20). Different types of metal are also produced thanks to differences in 
the corruption of the solid matter – that is, matter which is “deformed from the earth’s 
homogenic substance” (DM: 21). Crucially, iron is the metal generated from the pure, 
uncorrupted matter. Gilbert’s reasoning here seems to be from the ubiquity of iron – pure 
telluric matter is just more common than any of the few corruptions suitable for producing 
other metals, and so it must be the basis for the most common of the metals (Ibid.). In this 
way, he inverts the account of the alchemists: it is ubiquity that implies purity, while 
scarcity implies corruption.
Lodestone, which Gilbert claims is nothing but a noble iron ore (DM: 21), is also produced 
from the uncorrupted elemental earth. Whereas iron is elemental earth to which exhalations 
are added, though, lodestone is the same elemental earth concreted with stony matter 
(which is a form of corrupted elemental earth). Iron then does not necessarily need to be 
magnetised by a lodestone to become magnetic: wrought iron Gilbert observes, is already 
magnetic, as shown by the coming together of small pieces of iron floated in water on 
pieces of cork (DM: 29–30), and by the way that a piece of iron suspended on a silk thread 
will align itself in the north–south direction (DM: 30–1). Gilbert, then, does not claim that 
(non-lodestone) iron ore is already magnetic, but rather that it acquires magnetic properties 
after it is processed, presumably because the exposure to heat releases the humours trapped 
into the composition of iron, to some extent, such that the elemental earth becomes active. 
Moreover, Gilbert also explains various ways in which the magnetisation of iron can be 
sped up without the help of a lodestone in the manufacturing process: he knew that a strong 
magnetisation could be induced by heating an iron wire and aligning north–south while it 
cools20, with the polarity of the magnetisation reflecting its alignment.
20 This process is known today as themoremanent magnetisation. See Wilson 2000.
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2.2. Electric bodies and attraction
2.2.1. Electric bodies
That lodestone and iron (and iron ores) are cognate materials was something Gilbert also 
defended by looking into how iron and lodestone interact. The strategy here is to show that 
the actions of iron and lodestone operate by a different mechanism from the actions of other 
bodies. Most actions and changes in nature are, for Gilbert, through the action of some 
material effluvia. Iron and lodestone are an exception to this rule. Gilbert goes about 
showing that this is the case in Chapter 2 of Book 2 of De magnete entitled “On the 
magnetick coition, and first on the attraction of amber, or more truly, on the attaching of 
bodies to amber”. This chapter is a digression from magnetism, delving into the amber 
effect (Greek: elektron), namely that amber, when rubbed by a suitable material, attracts 
pieces of straw and chaff. The amber effect per se, however, is not what is at stake in the 
chapter. Rather, the goal is to ground, both matter theoretically and causally, Gilbert’s most 
salient classification of bodies: the magnetics versus the non-magnetics. Non-magnetics 
consist of electrics and anelectrics. Book 2, Chapter 2 explains what the electrics are, how 
they operate, and why they should be distinguished from the magnetics. Gilbert sees 
himself forced to defend the distinction because the amber effect and the coming together 
of magnetic bodies were frequently lumped together under the same causal story, and under 
the same conceptual label of “attraction”. Gilbert’s goal in this chapter and the remaining 
chapters of Book 2 is to reconceptualise the concept of attraction when applied to 
magnetism. To do this, he marshals empirical, matter-theoretical and philosophical 
arguments. The discussion of the amber effect is reserved for establishing the matter-
theoretical bases for the dismantling and reconceptualisation of the concept of attraction.
Gilbert’s first move is to determine whether the amber effect is particular to amber or is 
more widespread than believed. He had reasons to suspect that it might be more common 
than believed, since he knew from Fracastoro that diamond also attracted small bodies, if 
rubbed. To do this, Gilbert proceeded experimentally.21 He proposed the construction of a 
device to detect the amber effect: a variation on the versorium. The device consists of a 
light metal rod a few centimetres long, balanced on a pedestal in such a way that it can 
easily turn, on the horizontal, on the vertical, or on both axes, depending on the 
circumstances and what the instrument was being used for to detect.22 If the versorium was 
being used to detect the phenomenon of the amber effect, Gilbert allowed it to move on the 
21 Steinle (2002) lists Gilbert’s investigation of the amber effect and the separation of the electrics 
from the magnetics as an instantiation of what Steinle calls “exploratory experimentation”.
22 The instrument appears to be an electroscope, a detector of the electric charge. It could have also 
been used as an electrometer by measuring the speed of movement of the versorium, although Gilbert 
himself does not use it this way in his investigation into static electricity. 
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vertical axis.23 The instrument was particularly useful because its construction allowed it to 
be easily disturbed by a very weak electric charge, which, because of inertia and frictional 
resistance, would have shown no effect if tested by trying to lift pieces of straw or chaff. At 
its simplest, this instrument produced a classification of bodies, such that: 
1. if X substance, properly prepared, is brought near the versorium and the versorium 
changes position, then X is an “electric body”;
2. if Y substance, properly, prepared is brought near the versorium and the versorium 
does not change position, then Y is an “anelectric" body.
Whether or not something pertains to the class of electrics is first to be established by 
empirical test. Given that types of hard gemstone pertain either to electrics or to non-
electrics (Gilbert establishes that emerald, for instance, does not affect the versorium), he 
concludes that whatever causes their attractive capacities cannot be some physical 
similarities between the groups. Ultimately, what Gilbert does in his discussion of the 
amber effect is to propose a classification of bodies altogether different from the traditional 
classification, based not on some elemental makeup but on the manner of their operation.
Gilbert showed that membership in the class of electrics is more widespread than had been 
previously believed:
For it is not only amber and jet (as they suppose) which entice small bodies; but 
Diamond, Sapphire, Carbuncle, Iris gem, Opal, Amethyst, Vincentina, and Bristolla (an 
English gem or spar), Beryl, and Crystal do the same. Similar powers of attraction are 
seen also to be possessed by glass (especially when clear and lucid), as also by false 
gems made of glass or Crystal, by glass of antimony, and by many kinds of spars from 
the mines, and by Belemnites. Sulphur also attracts, and mastick, and hard sealing-wax 
compounded of lac tinctured of various colours. Rather hard resin entices, as does 
orpiment, but less strongly; with difficulty also and indistinctly under a suitable dry sky, 
Rock salt, muscovy stone, and rock alum. This one may see when the air is sharp and 
clear and rare in mid-winter, when the emanations from the earth hinder electricks less, 
and the electric bodies become more firmly indurated. (DM: 48)
Once such a diverse list of electrics is established, it was plain that the amber had no 
particular quality, but its action of attracting small bodies (chaff and straw, but also “woods, 
leaves, stones, earths, even water and oil, and everything which is subject to our senses, or 
is solid” (DM: 48)) depended upon some cause that was widely prevalent and was 
distributed across diverse bodies. Therefore, Gilbert’s next step was to determine whether 
23 Gilbert also used the versorium to detect magnetic phenomena either by magnetising the needle or 
by placing the apparatus near a magnetic body. See discussion below.
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any of the theories so far propounded were likely to hold or not. He rejects Plutarch’s 
theory that it is the ambient air that causes the approach of the attracted object to amber, as 
well as Cardano’s claim that amber attracts by the force of fire, along with Galen’s 
threefold theory of attractives, in order to conclude that the existing explanatory hypotheses 
break down once the amber effect is generalised across very diverse substances. 
Instead Gilbert’s ad-hoc explanation of why electrics attract goes back to his single-element 
matter theory: electric bodies derive their composition from the composite corrupted earth, 
which consists of “twofold material, namely, of fluid and humid matter, and of material of 
more consistency and dry” (DM: 51). The electrics are those bodies consisting of “a 
predominant moisture and are firmly concreted, and retain the appearance of spar and its 
resplendent nature in a firm and compact body, allure all bodies, whether humid or dry” 
because when rubbed, they release their moisture in an effluvium (DM: 51). The anelectrics 
were bodies of similar composition but whose humid matter is either too impure to cause 
attraction by rubbing, or because it is mixed with earth. For Gilbert, there is no non-
empirical determination for whether a body is electric or anelectric: the electric effect itself 
can only be detected with the help of the versorium, such that the membership to electrics 
of individual substances is necessarily empirically established.
Given Gilbert’s chemical-composition based explanation, he took the electric action to be a 
contact phenomenon: the electric body acts by releasing exhalations of “moisture”, which 
trap particles around them and drag the other body towards the electric body. The electric 
action, then, does not cause any change of chemical composition in the attracted body, but 
operates on the intervening medium, such that the attracted body is drawn towards the 
electric one. 
Gilbert brings several empirical findings in support of his causal explanation:
a. all electrics are hard bodies;
b. most bodies require rubbing before showing any kind of electric action;
c. interposed bodies between the attracting body and the attracted body impeded 
or even prevented the electric action;
d. a piece of silk placed directly on the rubbed electric will stop it from 
attracting, whereas if placed in between the electric and the attracted body the 
attraction will still occur;
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e. interposition of flame between the attracting and the attracted body can 
impede the attraction;
f. atmospheric qualities – whether the air was more or less humid, more or less 
dry – also affect the quality of the electric attraction, to the extent that too 
much moisture can annihilate the electric attraction altogether;
g. electric attraction reduces with distance;
h. electrics attract all bodies (if of appropriate sizes), irrespective of their 
composition. 
2.2.2. Attraction and causal unidirectionality
Note that, throughout this discussion of the electric bodes, I – and Gilbert – have been 
referring to “attraction” without qualification. Gilbert characterises electric attraction as 
both causally unidirectional and (in a non-Aristotelian sense) localisable. Both 
characteristics are tied up with electric attraction’s operation through material emission. 
Causally, in case of electric attraction, there is one body that emits effluvia, which is thus 
the cause of the attraction. The nature of the attracted bodies is taken to be irrelevant, while 
all salience for electric phenomena is taken to reside in the attracting body: as is clear from 
the list above, Gilbert treats the nature, and preparation, of the electric bodies as vital for 
the production of the effect, while the attracted body, or bodies, could be anything at all. 
Thus, electric attraction really is unidirectional (on Gilbert’s account). On the same basis, 
the power of electric attraction is always localisable in any single electric body – it is from 
that body that the effluvia are emitted.24
2.2.3. Gilbert’s theory of gravity
In the previous two sections, I examined Gilbert’s class of electrics and his account of 
electric action. We have seen that the electrics are those bodies which act by emission of 
material effluvia and that the electric action refers to an attractive action in which the 
electric attracts to itself small bodies by means of humid exhalations. Gilbert does not 
reserve the electric action simply for those bodies that he groups as electrics: the earth as a 
whole also acts electrically (although not exclusively –it, of course, also acts magnetically). 
Gilbert’s investigations into the amber effect culminate with the claim that “the globe of the 
earth is aggregated and coheres by itself electrically” because the electric action is “a 
24 Of course, this is not localisation in terms of an Aristotelian substantial natural place. Nevertheless, 
sources for electric effects can be localised, according to Gilbert, in a way that sources for magnetic 
effects simply cannot.
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motion of aggregation of matter” (DM: 60). The earth is not just a magnetic body: it is also 
an electric one. 
For Gilbert, motions of aggregation are magnetic or electrical (DM: 60, 109–110). Given 
these two options, historians of science such Butterfield and Boas, amongst others, 
following Bacon, hold the view that Gilbert explained gravity magnetically.25 But this 
would be a direct contradiction of Gilbert’s claim that magnetic action is given only 
between magnetic bodies. Gravity (or at least some of the phenomena that we would 
explain gravitationally today) are accounted for through the electric action of the earth. 
According to Gilbert, the electric action of the earth has to explain phenomena of free fall 
and phenomena of cohesion. For Gilbert, however, the phenomena of free fall and those of 
the cohesion of parts are not distinct explananda in themselves. What requires explanation 
for Gilbert is that matter is united with, or seeks to unite with, the body it originated from. 
The phenomenon to be explained is the latter, and not the free fall of bodies in itself. That 
bodies tend to unite to their original source is fundamental to Gilbert: it is a teleology 
governing the actions of all bodies – be they magnetic or electric (or anelectric). What is at 
stake is explaining the mechanism(s) by which this happens. Gilbert’s answer is tailored 
relative to the kinds of bodies involved. In magnetic bodies, the tendency to unification (or 
magnetic coition) is an action in which all bodies participate equally. In the non-magnetic 
bodies, the inclination to unification (gravitationally) is an attractive action (in the 
traditional sense): an action with a localised causal source, namely, the earth. Gilbert’s 
concept for the inclination of bodies to unite with their original source is gravity, which he 
discusses at length in De mundo. In Gilbert’s words:
Gravity is, therefore, the inclination of bodies to their origin, of that which came out of 
the earth to the earth. (1651: 47, my translation)26
25 Butterfield defends a magnetic reading of Gilbert’s theory of gravity thus: “The force of magnetic 
attraction was the real cause of gravity, said Gilbert, and it explained why the various parts of the 
earth could be held together […] That gravitational pull towards the centre affected not merely bodies 
on the earth, he said, but operated similarly with the sun, the moon, etc., and these also moved in 
circles for magnetic reasons. Magnetism, furthermore, was responsible for the rotation of the earth 
and the other heavenly bodies on their axes” (Butterfield 1980: 140–141). Butterfield commits here 
one of the mistakes that is still common amongst Gilbert’s interpreters, namely, the belief that Gilbert 
posited one magnetic universal force to explain most physical phenomena. The present chapter shows 
that not only is magnetism not the only power in the universe, but even that claims to its universality 
should be taken with a grain of salt. Hesse (1960) is one of the first to correctly point out that 
Gilbert’s gravitational theory should be read electrically. 
26 Lat: Est igitur gravitas corporum inclinatio ad suum principium, a tellure quae egressa sunt ad 
tellurem.
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Thus, the earth attracts everything magnetic, but also everything else, in which the 
primary magnetic power ceased by means of the material makeup; which inclination to 
the earth is called gravity. (1651: 116; my translation)27
Gravity, for Gilbert, is thus the “inclination” by which the bodies of the earth are attracted 
back to their origin (the earth itself). A body of the earth is one which has the earth’s matter 
in its composition – irrespective of its degree of corruption. An explanation of gravity has 
to provide the mechanism by which bits of the earth’s matter are drawn back to their 
original source. However, Gilbert’s matter theory is reserved for the terrestrial globe alone: 
it is not universal. Gilbert does not state this explicitly, but this is what I take him to be 
saying when he claims that each celestial globe has an “astral form” by which “lunar things 
tend to the moon, solar things to the sun, within the orbes of their own effluvia” (DM: 229). 
Gilbert’s treatment of the astronomical bodies suggests that while it can be affirmed the 
matter of each astral body is definitely active, how it is active – by what mechanisms it 
operates – is not known and consequently could very well be different from the magnetic 
and electric operation we find on earth. After all, while the earth operates magnetically, the 
sun operates also by way of the “vigour” of light. 
Whatever mechanism operates on earth, it will not be universal. What remains universal is 
the tendency to unity of bodies of the same origin, rather than the mechanisms by which 
this is accomplished. On earth, the mechanism by which bodies are drawn to “unition” is 
electrical, that is, by aggregation of matter through effluvia. According to Gilbert, the 
“exhalations” or “humours” emitted from the earth thanks to the effects of the sun, form the 
earth’s effluvium, or the air surrounding us. The earth’s effluvium radiates in all directions 
at limited distances, which means that only the bodies within that distance can be acted 
upon and drawn back to the earth. At the same time, given that the action is electrical – 
specifically, that it works by attraction conceptualised as unidirectional causation – the 
attracted body is not changed by the action of the earth’s effluvium, nor does it participate 
in any way in the motion: it is an entirely passive body. Now, if the earth’s effluvia explain 
falling bodies, and if those effluvia are produced by the heating of the sun, then one would 
expect that extreme temperatures (differences in heat) should affect the attraction of the 
respective bodies. As far as I can tell however, Gilbert does not go in this direction. Instead, 
he considers that the motion of a body, if placed within the earth’s effluvium, is the most 
direct path (as described mathematically) relative to the earth’s centre and that the body’s 
movement is accelerated as it comes nearer the source, just as he observed with electrics.
What we see from all this is that a conceptualisation of attraction, as causally unidirectional 
and localisable, lends itself to the explanation of certain kinds of phenomena (static 
electricity and terrestrial gravitation) addressed in certain kinds of ways (material effluvia). 
27 Lat: Ita tellus allicit magnetica omnia, tum alia omnia, in quibus vis magnetica primaria defiit 
materiae ratione; quae inclinatio in terrenis gravitas dicitur.
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That is, it limits itself to certain kinds of uses. It also limits the kinds of investigations to be 
made – electric effects are investigated through electric bodies, rather than through the 
straw and chaff they attract, and terrestrial gravitation is investigated through the material 
nature of the earth, rather than through falling bodies.
3. Gilbert’s magnetic philosophy and conceptual reform
De magnete deals extensively with what Gilbert calls magnetic movements, or “differences 
of motions” (DM: 45).28 He identifies (as a result of his empirical investigations) the 
following movements: (1) magnetic coition (the coming together of two magnetic bodies 
according to the rule that opposite poles unite and caused by an “impulsion to magnetic 
union”); (2) magnetic direction “towards the poles of the earth” (the movement into 
alignment of a compass needle with the magnetic poles); (3) magnetic variation (a 
deflection from the magnetic meridian, but not a “true” magnetic movement because it is 
caused by local irregularities in landmasses, and not by the magnetic power); (4) 
declination (the deviation of a magnetised needle on the vertical plane); and (5) rotation (or 
circular motion) around an axis (DM: 46). Although they are all called “movements” or 
“differences in motion” there is a slight difference between them: magnetic coition is the 
only movement that involves change in position (relative to the distance between the 
magnetic bodies), whilst the other four (direction, variation, declination and rotation) are 
movements of orientation in place, with no change in relative distance. The classification of 
these movements is made relative to what we as observers can, and do, distinguish as 
different magnetic phenomena. The magnetic movements are the ways in which magnetic 
bodies act upon and influence each other under determinate conditions. 
None of these motions is without precedent. Some (magnetic coition, magnetic variation) 
had already been known for quite some time, while (what Gilbert calls) magnetic 
declination had recently been discovered (by Norman – or rediscovered, if we count 
28 A systematic treatment of Gilbert’s theory of motion still awaits. This is especially necessary given 
that Gilbert appears to depart from the Aristotelian traditional conceptual categories of dealing with 
motion, such as the categories of “natural” and “violent” motion. In De magnete, he makes use of the 
label “violent motion” twice, and both times to suggest that the Aristotelian tenet that the circular 
motion of the earth goes against its nature is unwarranted. If we were, however, to treat Gilbert’s 
account of motion by transposing into these categories, we could conclude that a natural motion 
necessarily proceeds from a capacity or an inclination within the moving body or a motive quality that 
the body has from nature. The tendency to unity with its original source is an example of the latter 
case, whereas the magnetic movements are examples of the former. This means that, even in cases 
where a body is purely passive, the motion can still be classified as natural motion as long as the 
motion is compatible with the body’s inclination. A violent motion is the kind of motion that is 
imposed externally, to which the body’s powers do not contribute and is directed towards an end that 
goes against the body’s natural tendencies. 
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Hartmann’s initial discovery29). What Gilbert does, however, is to reconceptualise each of 
the five movements. De magnete is structured around their investigation, and making 
transparent what it entails to move away from a conceptualisation of magnetism as 
attractional to a disponent one. Exactly what such a shift involves is the concern of the 
remainder of the chapter. Gilbert is explicit about the need for such conceptual change in 
the investigation of magnetism. The following section argues as much, by showing that 
Gilbert’s methodological remarks indicate that conceptual choices matter in the articulation 
of previously unknown things and that not all conceptual choices are equal, with some 
being more appropriate than others ( see for these points Sections 3.1 and 3.2). The claim is 
not merely that some terms are replaced with others, but that Gilbert was explicit about the 
need to introduce new concepts into magnetism, in order to articulate the magnetic 
philosophy. 
3.1. The quest for “new and unusual” words
In the introduction to De magnete, Gilbert states,
Sometimes therefore we use new and unusual words, […] [so] that hidden things which 
have no name, never having been hitherto perceived, may be plainly and correctly 
enunciated. (DM: iii; my emphasis)
“New and unusual” words are introduced both to name something and to signpost its 
empirical disclosure.30 There are two sides to disclosing otherwise hidden things: procedural 
and descriptive. On the procedural side, by which the thing is made accessible in the 
investigative context, the disclosure of a new thing is fundamentally a process of 
differentiation, by which something is picked out as (at least) sufficiently regular and 
sufficiently significant to stand in a category of its own. The exact criteria for what 
constitutes something as novel will indubitably differ, but, in this case, Gilbert makes at 
least one such criterion clear: the thing needs to have been perceived (Lat.: perspecta) (DM: 
ij). Perceptual differentiation is necessary for disclosing something. The perceptual 
29 On why treating the account of magnetic declination (otherwise known as magnetic dip or magnetic 
inclination) in terms of original discovery is problematic, see Chapter 5.
30 “New” here is not to be read absolutely. It refers to the construction of a new word, but also to the 
appropriation of a word from a different domain, tailoring it for use with respect to magnetism. This 
latter strategy is very frequently put to use in De magnete. Vis disponens is not an absolutely new 
concept; it is reappropriated from, most likely, scholastic theories of the soul, as also Nathanael 
Carpenter’s account of the disponent power appears to suggest (1635: 48). I would like to thank an 
anonymous referee (for Georgescu 2017) for raising this important point. The wider intellectual 
origins of this concept would be a worthwhile contribution to the discussion, but it goes beyond the 
extent and interests of this dissertation.
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differentiation needs to be articulated, and to this articulation corresponds the descriptive 
side, an activity by which those aspects that matter and those that do not are accounted for.31
As a simple example, when magnets come together to unite, Gilbert considers that their 
sizes and shapes are salient and need to be accounted for, while their respective colours are 
not and do not. It might be warranted to bypass the variable of colour, but the process of 
establishing through investigation which variables matter and how to account for them is 
essential for establishing what a thing is. A case in point in De magnete is the separation 
between magnetic and electric bodies. As we have seen (Section 2.2), Gilbert establishes 
that electric bodies act through material exchange; magnetics, on the other hand, influence 
each other without any material exchange. In this way, Gilbert engineers a new 
classification of bodies relative to whether or not they act by material exchange. It is not 
incidental that the term “electrum” is the Latin for amber (amber being especially 
susceptible to the buildup of static charge), but Gilbert extends it to all bodies that show the 
kind of material attraction that amber does.
The procedural and descriptive sides go hand in hand, and they cannot be fully separated (at 
least not in the initial stages). What the “hidden thing” is, and how it is best described, is 
entrenched in the investigative situation: without much practical expertise with the 
investigative situation, what is being communicated about the hidden thing might turn out 
to be mysterious or at least difficult to grasp. It usually takes extended work to turn a 
“hidden thing” into an independent, self-standing thing that might eventually be dragged to 
a different domain in a non ad-hoc manner. Thus, although it might initially seem 
unproblematic, articulating a novel discovery through words is neither easy nor 
inconsequential. The descriptive choice matters.
The second passage where I take Gilbert to indicate that reconceptualisation is necessary 
reads,
afterward numerous subtleties, hitherto abstruse and unknown, hidden in obscurity, are 
to be laid open, and the causes of all these (by the unlocking of nature’s secrets) made 
evident, in their place, by fitting terms [verbis idoneis] and devices. (DM: 15; my 
emphasis).
The focus here is no longer on the novelty of terms, but rather on their appropriateness, 
their suitability. “Nature’s secrets” might be disclosed with the help of devices, but we also 
need “fitting words” to describe what was disclosed. We are not told what the criteria of 
“fittingness” are, but, given the commitment to experimentation32, it is not far fetched to 
31 As part of the perceptual disclosing, De magnete makes use of diagrams. See Chapter 4.
32 What, exactly, constitutes an experiment is philosophically controversial. This is certainly the case 
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take it that one such criterion is fit to (what are taken to be) the relevant experimental 
findings.33 Once a description is provided in such fitting terms, it directs the explanations 
one gives. For instance, Miller (2014, ch. 3) nicely shows the constitutive role of Gilbert’s 
description of magnetic bodies in terms of poles, meridians and equator in his explanations. 
I would add here that the conceptual choices also play a direct role in the investigative 
process: they afford certain possibilities of continuing the inquiry and set certain limits on 
how one is to think further about the phenomenon in question. Some possibilities of 
problematising the phenomenon are shut down, while others are opened up, to the extent 
that the very selection of terms legislates how to go about the investigation. Shifting from 
attraction to coition is again a case in point (explicit examples of this are discussed in 
section 3.2).
Reconceptualisation of magnetism is thus an explicit goal of De magnete. Gilbert is on the 
lookout both for “new and unheard-of” and “fitting” terms. The new and fitting terms 
influence the descriptions and explanations, but they also inform the investigation and drive 
it down certain paths, while closing off others. Of course, these are just some of the layers 
within the dynamic of the interaction between investigative practices, conceptualisations 
and research goals. Cases of how the disponent power shapes the trio of laboratory 
practices, descriptions, and explanations will be discussed in section 5, but not before 
showing how Gilbert replaces the attractional conception of magnetism and addressing in 
greater detail what the disponent power is, and how it is supposed to work. 
in scholarship on early modern experimentation. The historical evaluation of an event as experimental 
or not depends either on a prior commitment to what constitutes an experiment or on a commitment to 
actors’ conceptual categories. More often than not, the problem is settled through a prior commitment 
to a particular philosophical concept of experiment, and using it as a criterion against which to 
evaluate instances. The famous distinction between experience and experiment that Peter Dear (e.g., 
2008) introduces in the study of early modern science relies on Dear’s identification of experiments as 
involving (or, more strongly, being defined by) the historical description of a singular observation. 
Such a conceptualisation captures the idea of the experiment as test, or experiments as reported 
observational statements, and it is exclusive of many other forms of experimentation, e.g., exploratory 
experimentation (e.g., Steinle 1997). Anstey (2014) makes a similar move to Dear’s, although with 
different criteria.
The philosophical notion of experimentation that I make use of throughout this dissertation aims to be 
inclusive. It takes an experiment to be any kind of experiential situation purposefully constructed to 
address a given problem in a minimally controlled environment. 
33 Unwarranted distinctions at this level are prone to error. Whether something is unwarranted or not is 
a normative question, and it can only be set by norms of experimental practice or norms for what is 
taken to be a reliable knowledge claim at any given point. For an excellent treatment of how the 
spatial description of a magnetic body guides Gilbert’s inquiries see Miller (2014), chapter 3.
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3.2. From attraction to “coitio”
That what is at stake is not simply a terminological shift away from attraction, but a 
conceptual shift from a unidirectional, or asymmetrical, source-based conception of 
magnetism to a perfectly symmetrical and relational conception is evident in Gilbert’s 
notion of magnetic coition. To move away from attraction, Gilbert changes terms and 
describes the observation that magnetic bodies unite as magnetic “coition” (Lat.: coitio). 
Coition is a concept introduced to capture the causal symmetry, or (to put it in terms closer 
to Gilbert’s vocabulary) the mutuality of magnetic action. Coition is: “a primary running 
together”, a mutual action of “the loadstone and of the iron, not an action of one […] an 
action of each towards unity by the conjoint action and συνεντελέχεια of both” (DM: 62).34 
In magnetic interaction, then, iron does not receive the power from the lodestone; nor does 
it respond magnetically after the lodestone’s action, nor as a consequence of the lodestone’s 
action. The claim is thus not that it is empirically undecidable which object is the agent and 
which the patient, but that both lodestone and iron causally contribute to magnetic change 
(or motion). That this is so, Gilbert attempts to show experimentally, but his experiments, in 
themselves, do not definitively prove coition: the interpretation of the results corroborates 
the prior commitment that both magnetic bodies are agents. 
Accounts of magnetism as attraction are given up in favour of a symmetrical/mutual 
conceptualisation of magnetic change that distributes the causal contribution between all 
the magnetic bodies involved in the interaction. The interaction then has explanatory 
priority over its parts. And, in magnetism, it is such interactions that account for magnetic 
phenomena. These interactions are further accounted for by treating magnetism as 
disponent. 
4. Conceptualising magnetism as disponent
The previous section showed Gilbert’s commitment to the mutuality of magnetism. This 
section shows what it entails to conceive of magnetism as disponent. I first show that 
Gilbert prioritises magnetic interaction as a system over the individual magnetic bodies that 
contribute to the interaction. I use Gilbert’s disponent power to refer to the manifestation of 
magnetic power that aligns magnetic bodies relative to each other in magnetic interactions 
(section 4.1). I briefly show (section 4.3) that Gilbert accounts for the magnetic phenomena 
we observe precisely because magnetism is (primarily) disponent.35 
34 Gilbert seems to believe that the concept of sympathy does not capture his conception of mutuality 
because (1) sympathy is not explanatory and (2) the logic of sympathy makes sense only when 
conceptualised alongside antipathy, and the latter is not a proper action of magnets. 
35 Or, in the case of coition, initially through the disponent power.
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4.1. From magnetic power to the disponent power
Gilbert does not offer a systematic matter-theoretical treatment of the magnetic power. He 
begins from the metaphysical assumption that bodies have powers; what is at stake for 
Gilbert is describing how such powers operate. Determining how the magnetic power 
operates can only be done by empirically investigating the regularities in magnetic effects 
and then positing what sort of causal power might explain them. Thus, in accordance with 
his investigations, Gilbert concludes that the magnetic power manifests itself in at least two 
distinct ways: as a power of coition and as a power of arrangement (or disposition). The 
circumstances are what will determine how exactly the magnetic power manifests. 
The magnetic power is the innermost nature of magnetic bodies for Gilbert. He treats it as 
basic and incapable of being further explained. It is not a localisable part of the earth, nor is 
it superadded to the earth-matter, nor is it “the primary form of Aristotle”, but rather “that 
unique form, which preserves and disposes [disponit] its proper sphere” (DM: 65).36 Put 
simply, the magnetic power is the necessary and sufficient condition for a body to be a 
magnet.37 Bodies that have magnetic power have the capacity to be agents (produce 
change): whatever they bring about are magnetic effects. But having the capacity, does not 
entail that the body in question exercises that capacity. Quite the contrary: well-determined 
conditions have to be given for the bodies to exercise their capacities, and thus produce an 
observable effect. For magnetism, according to Gilbert, the key condition is mutuality (DM: 
62). All magnetic bodies involved co-participate to produce magnetic actions. It is only if 
all involved bodies are causally active that a magnetic effect is produced.
This mutuality might seem paradoxical, since, on Gilbert’s account, each magnetic body 
contains its own magnetic power. To reconcile this apparent paradox, we have to keep in 
mind that (a) having magnetic power does not entail manifesting it, and that it is in the 
manifestation that magnetic effects are produced; and (b) that it is precisely because each 
magnetic body has magnetic power that Gilbert imposes a requirement of mutual 
participation on the magnetic action. Given this, from the perspective of the empirical 
investigation of a magnetic phenomenon, it is the case that the production of the 
phenomenon depends on the interaction of magnetic bodies, rather than on the causal power 
of each. The salient information in determining why the effect produced is, for instance, 
36 Gilbert maintains the Aristotelian vocabulary of form, but seems to employ the concept in a 
different way. He frequently claims that in positing a magnetic form, or an astral form, of bodies he is 
departing from the Aristotelian conception. Given the way he makes use of it he seems to use “form” 
and “power” (vis, vigor) interchangeably, such that “form” refers to an efficient cause which does not 
operate by material exchange (or in any material way).
37 For treatments of Gilbert’s magnetic power see King (1959); Hesse (1960; I&II); Freudenthal 
(1983); Pumfrey (1987a, 2002). None of these treatments is exhaustive or conclusive. 
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magnetic direction and not magnetic coition is not that each body has magnetic power, but 
the exact ways in which the magnetic power manifests in specific interactions (under well-
determined conditions). Gilbert’s talk about the magnetic power slides easily into the 
description of how the magnetic power actually operates precisely because the relevant 
information from the perspective of the production of a physical, observable magnetic 
effect lies in describing how the magnetic power acts.
It is undeniable that, on Gilbert’s account, the magnetic power is inherent in each and every 
bit of magnetic matter (DM: 65–71). As such, a magnetic body’s agency ultimately rests on 
its magnetic power. However, other than positing its existence, Gilbert can do little with 
magnetic power in itself. A distinction is in place between the magnetic power as a power 
and its manifestation or expression in particular circumstances (i.e., that in which the action 
is regulated and limited). On my reading, the magnetic power can manifest itself in various 
ways: there is a qualitative difference between its manifestation in magnetic coition and its 
manifestation in declination or its manifestation as a celestial body.38 If so, then there is a 
distinction between the magnetic force itself and its expression as a disponent power.39 
Aided by empirical investigations, Gilbert concludes that magnetic power qua physical 
(i.e., as analysed through the magnetic phenomena) is (in some conditions) primarily 
disponent, in that it directs and aligns the magnetic bodies by turning them into relative 
positions.40 
The manifestation of the magnetic power as disponent is primarily the manifestation we 
encounter in magnetic phenomena. Given this, one has to go about analysing under what 
circumstances the magnetic power as a disponent power will be displayed. A large part of 
De magnete is devoted to specifying such circumstances. What seems to be at stake when 
Gilbert claims that magnetic bodies dispose themselves, given how he makes use of the 
notion of “disponent” (and its correlates), is that magnetic bodies fall into order. For 
magnetic phenomena the order is spatial and is specifiable relative to the surrounding 
bodies. In some cases, the spatial order is one of relative positioning, while, under some 
38 Reading it in this way makes sense of why Gilbert uses multiple terms when referring to magnetic 
power (“vigor”, “vis”, “potentia”): he can be more liberal with how he describes the magnetic power 
in its manifestation.
39 Neither Thompson nor De Mottelay, the two English translators of De magnete, are consistent in 
translating the verb dispōnō and its correlates. I have chosen to stick to Thompson’s translation 
throughout the text, as it is closer to the original text.
40 The treatment I offer might also explain why Gilbert’s talk about the magnetic power is 
metaphysical (in terms of intelligences or astral forms), while the investigation of the magnetic 
power’s manifestation as disponent is in terms of physical entities (meridians, poles, sizes, relative 
distances, orbs, etc.).
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circumstances (including shorter distances and higher magnetic strength), it is translational 
movement, such that the magnetic bodies unite. It is the process of arranging, and the 
arrangement itself, relative to the surrounding bodies that takes priority and makes 
magnetism fundamentally interactionist.41 For a single body, magnetic power makes no 
physical difference precisely because a single magnetic body in isolation cannot constitute a 
magnetic phenomenon for Gilbert: it is a given that magnetic effects are types of 
interactions of magnetic bodies. It thus makes no sense to talk about magnetic effects of a 
single body.42 Magnetic effects occur only in a system of magnetic bodies, and not in 
isolation: magnetism as a physical property is analysable only in the context of a system of 
(two or more) magnetic bodies.
Now, Gilbert likens magnetic power to a soul: magnetic power is “animate, or imitates 
life” (see especially DM: 208–210). This might make it seem as though animism about 
magnetism explains magnetic activity. However, whether or not we take Gilbert’s animism 
seriously, its mere positing would hardly constitute an argument.43 What matters is whether 
it makes any difference explanatorily and phenomenologically. The animism appears to be 
of very little use to that end, given that Gilbert is interested in how magnetic power 
operates. What makes an explanatory difference is that the magnetic power does not act 
randomly; rather, its action is “fixed and determinate” (DM: 208). Or, put differently, 
magnetic actions are regular and, it is because of this regularity that they are suited for 
experimental investigation.44 Consequently, the position I advocate for in this chapter is 
indifferent to how one might want to interpret the animist doctrine of magnetism. For 
Gilbert, magnetism is understood through its effects: it is an empirical domain of 
investigation. Gilbert takes the existence of the disponent power to be shown 
experimentally, since “we have found out at length, by many experiments and in many 
ways, that there is a disponent nature [disponentem naturam], moving them [the magnetic 
41 Notice also that what a surrounding body is can be expressed relative to the combined strengths of 
the magnetic bodies (i.e. the extent of their respective orbs of virtue). 
42 I suspect that the Latin, vigor/virtus disponens, supports my reading here. See n. 1. 
43 Gilbert’s animism has been a point of focus in the literature: it was a marker of his “pre-
scientificism” (King, 1959), an “emotional background” that does not affect the empirical content of 
the treatise (Zilsel, 1941, p.6), while Henry (2001) argues for complementarity between the 
experimentalism and what he calls the “critical” animism of the treatise. It is no easy task to settle the 
debate on Gibert’s animistic doctrine, especially when the arguments are used as subservient to other 
goals in the scholarship: for instance, showing that De magnete belongs to the natural magic tradition 
in Henry’s case, or showing that the craftsman played an essential role in the advent of modern 
science, in Zilsel’s case. 
44 For more on this, see Section 5 in the current chapter.
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bodies] together by reason of their various positions” (DM: 119). And the core of Gilbert’s 
empirical theory of magnetism is that magnetic bodies do not attract – they align; they 
orient in space relative to each other just because they are magnetic. They orient because 
the “magnetical motion is one of arrangement [dispositionis] and conformation 
[conformationis]” (DM: 60), and by this motion, “magneticks are disposed [disponuntur] 
and turned [convertuntur] and combine with magneticks in proportion as the parts facing 
and adjoined unite their forces together” (DM: 97). Observable magnetic effects are 
produced through the action of the magnetic power as disponent. Thus, magnetic direction 
arises “from the disponent and turning power which exists in the whole earth, not in the 
pole or some other attracting part of the stone” (DM: 162), the disponent power also brings 
about magnetic declination (DM: 196) and contributes to magnetic coition, as we will 
discuss below. 
Gilbert makes a distinction between two magnetic “orbs” (volumes within which 
magnetic power acts): the orb of virtue and the orb of coition.45 For Gilbert, magnetism 
acts at a distance, but not every relative distance between two magnetic bodies amounts 
to an interaction. Two magnetic bodies interact only when they are within an orb of 
virtue (Lat.: orbis virtutis). Somewhat paradoxically, however, Gilbert appears to 
introduce the orb of virtue as a property of a single individual magnetic body, since it is 
“all that space through which the Virtue [i.e. the magnetic power] of any loadstone 
extends” (DM: vj).
This sounds as though the magnetic power’s manifestation is being considered with respect 
to an individual magnetic body. Notice, however, that beyond its definition, the orb of 
virtue only has the properties it does (its strength, shape, etc.) in the presence of a second 
body. That a second body is necessary for the empirical analysis of the orb of virtue 
becomes even clearer if we consider the distinction between the orb of virtue and the orb of 
coition. The orb of coition is “all that space through which the smallest magnetick is moved 
by the loadstone” (DM: vi). Unlike the magnetic motions accounted for exclusively by the 
disponent power, coition presupposes displacement of the magnetic bodies not only relative 
to their respective positions, but also in their relative distances, since coition is effectuated 
by the actual coming together of the magnetic bodies involved. The displacement in relative 
distances takes place within the orb of coition, whereas the alignment of bodies takes place 
within the orb of virtue (which contains the orb of coition). Moreover, relative alignment is 
a precondition for coition, since the effectuation of coition is possible only after north–
south alignment; that is, in order for bodies to unite, they first need to align, or dispose.
45 Such orbs are dealt with at length in Chapter 3. Note that, although Gilbert uses the term 
“orb”/“sphere” [orbis], the orb of virtue need not be spherical; since it extends equally in all 
directions from the centre of the magnetic body, its shape will be related to the body’s shape (DM: 9–
13).
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4.2. The rule of the whole
Before delving into how Gilbert accounts for the magnetic movements through the 
disponent power, I want to discuss another, sometimes overlooked, concept in Gilbert’s 
cosmology: the rule of the whole. This might seem like something of a detour at first – but 
my aim, in this section, is to show that the disponent conceptualisation of magnetism makes 
a difference to far more than just the study of magnetism itself: it also plays a role in 
cosmological matters. 
I claimed above that Gilbert takes the magnetic movements to be regular because the 
magnetic power acts in a “fixed and determinate” way. But I did not go into detail about 
this “fixed and determinate” way. I do so in this section. In the last chapter of Book I, 
Gilbert casually notes,
every magnetick homogenic substance […] possesses the actions peculiar to the globe 
of attracting, directing, disposing, rotating, stationing itself in the universe, according to 
the rule of the whole [Lat: totius norman], and it contains and regulates the dominant 
powers of the globe. (DM: 41)
Although Gilbert talks about magnetic behaviour as acting according to a rule, the term 
“rule of the whole” is rarely mentioned in his treatise.46 It plays a crucial role in Gilbert’s 
cosmology, however. In the passage above, the rule of the whole appears to refer not to the 
relation of magnetic bodies to the earth, but to the relation of the earth to the universe. That 
is, there is a privileged order of the universe, according to which the movements of the 
astral bodies are regulated, and towards which the astral bodies tend. In other words, the 
“rule of the whole” appears to denote the universal order. This universal order is a final 
cause: it is against it and in relation to it that the motions of astral bodies have to be 
accounted for. Just as the magnetic movements of magnetised bodies involve the relation 
between a magnetised body and the body of the earth (in an ideal system, where no other 
magnetic bodies interfere), or the terrella in Gilbert’s experiments, the earth itself moves 
such that it conforms to the rule of the whole:
if the earth were to deviate from its natural direction and its true position in the universe, 
or if its poles were to be drawn aside (if this were possible) toward the sun-rising or the 
sun-setting or toward any other points whatsoever in the visible firmament, they would 
return again to the north and south by magnetical motion, and would settle at the same 
points at which they are now fixed. (DM: 118)
Now, it remains to make sense of what this rule of the whole is and what order of the 
universe is being maintained. The earth has a “natural direction” and “a true position in the 
universe,” both of which are given in relation to the position of the earth’s poles relative to 
the sun. If the poles of the earth were moved away from their position, “they would return 
46 Miller 2014 (81–87) discusses discusses the rule of the whole. 
62 CHAPTER TWO
to the north or south by magnetical motion”. The north and south that Gilbert refers to here 
are the north and south of the universe as a whole. As Miller (2014: 83-4) shows, unlike 
Copernicus and Aristotle, the directions in Gilbert’s universe are not determined relative to 
a centre, but relative to north and south points of the heavens. The north–south axis of the 
universe is the frame of reference for the movement of the earth (or at least one such frame 
of reference), such that, even if it were possible for the earth to deviate from this alignment 
(although it is not), it would always return to it. But what would constitute a deflection? A 
shift – to the east or west – of the position of the earth’s poles. In which case, the north–
south axis of the universe is either a continuation of the earth’s north–south axis or an axis 
collateral with it. That is, irrespective of whether or not the earth rotates annually, the 
direction of the rotation will always remain parallel to the north–south axis of the universe, 
which also means parallel to the earth’s north–south axis. The line connecting the north and 
the south points of the universe is “the null direction to which direction at all other 
positions is referred” (Miller 2014: 84). This is my reading of the rule of the whole.
Gilbert does allow for some wobbling of the earth, but, by and large (on average, so to 
speak), the “true position” and the “natural direction” of the earth remains the same. Any 
slight variation is corrected through realignment to the cosmic axis. And the same is true of 
the other celestial bodies:
In the universe of nature that marvellous provision of its Maker should be noticed, 
whereby the principal bodies are restrained within certain habitations and fenced in, as it 
were (nature controlling them). For this reason the stars, though they move and advance, 
are not thrown into confusion. (DM: 195)
In my reading of Gilbert’s proposal, the world is not at all chaotic, but has a well 
determined structure and is perfectly ordered. This much, it has in common with 
Aristotelian cosmology, from which it differs in allowing that astral bodies “move and 
advance”. Miller (2014: 85) and Jalobeanu (2015a: 122) claim that ultimately what explains 
the order of the universe and the trajectory of the stars is the magnetic nature; they take it 
that the latter organises the space by determining any astral body's axis of rotation and 
poles. Now, it is clear that this definitely is the case when it comes to the earth. The earth’s 
magnetic nature is indeed the reason it keeps its position in the universe. It is less clear, 
however, that this is the case for all the other astral bodies. Gilbert repeatedly states that, in 
the same way as the earth has a particular astral form (and its astral form is magnetic), the 
sun has an astral form of its own, as does the moon, and so on. There is little to suggest that 
Gilbert takes the forms of all astral bodies to be magnetic. We can speculate about the 
mechanisms by which the other celestial bodies maintain their positions within the order of 
the universe, but we cannot be sure that they are magnetic. 
As mentioned above, Gilbert maintains that the directions and orientations of astral bodies 
are stipulated relative to the rule of the whole, and any deviation from this order would 
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mean being “brought to confusion” (DM: 224). The order is already organised according to 
the rule of the whole. This suggests that the order of the universe has priority over the 
bodies in the universe: the order is certainly prior in the order of explanation, and it might 
be even prior metaphysically. Cosmologically, the order is given, and bodies have to 
conform to it: which are the trajectories of astral bodies, and which are deviations from 
these trajectories is established relative to the rule of the whole – and not the other way 
around. Thus, whether or not the universe as a whole is magnetic, we can see the same 
privileging of order specifically through alignment as Gilbert sees in systems of magnetic 
bodies ordered through the disponent power.
4.3. Magnetic movements through the disponent power 
Understanding magnetism as disponent guides the way in which Gilbert identifies magnetic 
effects, insofar as each is an effect of different relative alignments of magnetic bodies. As 
an example, let’s compare magnetic direction to magnetic declination. A case of magnetic 
direction is the movement of the magnetic compass needle so as to align its poles with the 
magnetic poles of the earth: the north–south axis of the needle lines itself up with the 
north–south axis of the earth. Any magnetic body has an inherent tendency to align its poles 
with the poles of another magnetic body, along a magnetic meridian. The movement of the 
magnetic body in magnetic direction is on the horizontal plane, along an axis perpendicular 
to both the horizon and the north–south axis of the moving body, and it is governed by the 
north–south axes of both magnetic bodies.47
Magnetic declination, on the other hand, involves a different alignment. In magnetic 
declination, a magnetic body turns along an axis perpendicular to its north–south axis and 
horizontal to the plane of the horizon to align with the other magnetic body. The particular 
alignment changes depending on the latitudinal position of the one body relative to the 
47 It might seem as though Gilbert’s notion of verticity is more relevant than that of the disponent 
power here, given that he explicitly states that magnetic direction is caused by verticity (DM: 119). I 
take it that verticity is secondary to the disponent power, at least in this case. Verticity is what gives 
polarity to a magnet; it orients the magnet in a north–south position (DM: vj, 119–122). This makes it 
seem like a directive, aligning force. And, to an extent, it is. But, on Gilbert’s account, poles (in 
magnetic bodies) are established and can change only relative to interaction within a system of 
magnetic bodies: a magnetic body gets its poles with respect to its alignment with another magnetic 
body (this is true of the magnetisation of iron as well as of lodestones in their initial locations in the 
earth). So, while verticity indeed describes the magnetic force in respect of producing poles, its 
manifestation is still ultimately one of disponens, as it directs and organises. In addition, the north–
south orientation is only specifiable relative to a system of bodies (this applies to all magnets, 
including the earth, although, admittedly in the earth’s case this orientation in the universe is 
unchanged). Gilbert also makes explicit reference to magnets disposing themselves in the case of 
verticity (DM: 124, 125, 127, 131, etc.). 
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other. Just as we see magnetic direction in a compass’s north–south alignment, we see 
magnetic declination when the compass needle dips from the horizontal. In this way, the 
movements of direction and declination are distinguished by their different types of 
alignment.
If an observable magnetic movement is not ultimately fully explained by the relative 
alignment of magnetic bodies, but by some other external cause, then Gilbert classifies it as 
a “perverted movement”, that is a motion caused by factors external to the system of the 
magnetic bodies. Magnetic variation exemplifies this. For Gilbert, magnetic variation (at 
any particular location) is the degree of angular movement that a magnetized needle makes 
to the east or to the west of the magnetic meridian. It is a deviation from magnetic direction. 
Gilbert’s account of magnetism assumes an axial dipole, with no tilt: he takes earth’s axis of 
rotation to be the same as its magnetic axis.48 Now, his study of the magnetic power around 
a terrella indicated a regular pattern of action. Measurements taken with respect to the poles 
of the earth itself, however, indicated that the compass needle always deviates from the 
magnetic meridian. For Gilbert, the only plausible explanation to be found for this is the 
distribution of continental landmasses (plus the local effects that deposits of iron and/or 
lodestone would have). Hence, variation is a perverted movement. A perfectly 
homogeneous magnetic sphere would display only magnetic direction (i.e. alignment with 
the magnetic pole).49
Given the centrality of the relative alignments to his account, mapping exact alignment 
around magnetic bodies becomes an overarching goal of Gilbert’s investigation. That 
mapping is a reliable practice is guaranteed by the regular, non-arbitrary nature of magnetic 
48 This is a direct consequence of his extrapolation of the distribution of magnetism on the terrella to 
the earth itself.
49 Magnetic direction is mostly treated as a given, unproblematic fact throughout the seventeenth 
century (and eighteenth century). There is an underlying assumption that the magnetic needle aligns 
itself with a magnetic meridian of the earth, pointing towards the magnetic (usually north) pole, and 
not (as we would say now) with the local lines of flux in the earth’s magnetic field. Jonkers (2008: 
257) qualifies this as a mistaken belief. But, given the practices for investigating magnetism in use at 
the time, the belief cannot straightforwardly be qualified, even from our vantage point, as mistaken. 
As Rouse puts it, “Yet in many areas of scientific work, the very phenomena at issue were previously 
inaccessible. Earlier generations could not be in error about these matters, because they never 
encountered them and thus could have little or nothing to say about them” (2011: 246). The standards 
of evaluation for correctness or incorrectness have to take into account the practices involved in the 
conceptualisation in question, and not what can be said about it in relation to other (modern) 
practices. 
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alignment.50 The mapping practice leads Gilbert to argue for magnetic rotation, as the next 
section will show.
4.4. Objection: the disponent power as an occult quality?
There might seem to be an obvious objection to Gilbert’s position as I reconstruct it here: 
the disponent power might appear to be an occult quality; it might appear to offer no 
explanatory value. My reply is not independent of what one takes an occult quality to be. 
For Gilbert, an occult quality is an insensible – it is a quality that cannot be made to appear 
to the senses DM: 162, 207). If we follow Gilbert in this interpretation of an occult quality, 
the disponent power is no occult quality. Here is why. Gilbert’s frequent use of analogies 
between his inquiry and the passage from darkness to light suggests that one of the 
overarching goals of the treatise is to show that the magnetic power should not be classified 
as an occult quality exactly because it is made manifest (accessible to the senses) in its 
effects. Its manifestation is made accessible to the senses (through experimental 
observations, but also through diagrams) through practices of mapping (see section 5). 
Gilbert is also explicit about this:
While some assign occult and hidden virtues of substances […] as the causes of the 
wonderful magnetical effects […] we have laid hold of the true efficient cause, as from 
many other demonstrations, so also from this most certain diagram of magnetick forces 
effused by the form. Though this (the form) has not been brought under any of our 
senses, and on that account is the less perceived by the intellect, it now appears manifest 
and conspicuous even to the eyes through this essential activity which proceeds from it 
as light from a lamp. (DM: 207)
If the disponent power is what aligns magnetic bodies, showing how they align (at every 
location) within the orb of virtue seems to be the way to make it manifest, i.e. to make it 
visible to the senses. One might rebut this by claiming that this is not a direct manifestation 
of the disponent power. But that would be an unwarranted move, since the (various 
possible) alignments between magnetic bodies are all that the disponent power is. There is 
nothing more to it. In short: since Gilbert provides procedures for making the disponent 
power manifest and also mentions the circumstantial conditions necessary, the disponent 
power is (or, at least, can) be made visible and should therefore not be qualified as an occult 
quality. 
Finally, to the extent that the criteria for successful accounts can be settled by the actors 
themselves, Gilbert takes himself to have succeeded in making the magnetic power 
50 The assumption that magnetic bodies align according to an order is a consequence of an overall 
teleology of the law of the whole that ultimately governs Gilbert’s version of a system of the world. I 
will not develop this point further, but in my interpretation the order of the universe acts as a final 
cause for local orders. 
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manifest and not transforming it into another occult quality. If Gilbert takes himself to have 
rendered the magnetic power itself manifest, then its manifestation through the disponent 
power certainly cannot be an occult quality in this sense.
If, on the other hand, one holds the view that an occult quality is some vis or vigor with no 
explanatory power, one can still argue that the disponent power is not such a quality. First, 
Gilbert seems to take the disponent power to be something akin to the efficient agent of 
change and as such to have explanatory power (DM: 65).51 Second, the disponent power is 
explanatorily productive: it is used in, for instance, the devising of a nomograph for 
calculating latitude at sea (see Chapter 4). And third, the disponent power is not posited as 
one occult quality to explain this or that particular effect, but rather as at least one of the 
basic manifestations of the magnetic power present in each magnetic effect, thus unifying 
the magnetic effects under the same account.
5. From magnetism as alignment to magnetic rotation
In this section, I show that magnetism as disponent is the result of the investigative practice 
and that Gilbert’s conceptualisation of the magnetic movements depends on taking 
magnetism to be disponent. The focus of the section is the movement of magnetic rotation – 
which is especially significant for Gilbert’s cosmology.
5.1. Magnetic rotation
The “circular motion, or revolution” is one of the five magnetic movements we observe 
(DM: 46). It is a motion around an axis, for which magnetic bodies are “fitted” because 
they are bodies with poles, equator and meridians – natural bounds that are proper to 
circular motion. If the earth is a magnet, and if magnets rotate, then magnetism explains the 
earth’s diurnal rotation. At times, Gilbert’s claims about magnetic rotation can seem 
tenuous; the literature tends to take it that Gilbert does not have strong evidence for these 
claims (see, for instance, Miller 2014: 79). Seen through the lens of the disponent power, 
however, it becomes clear that Gilbert did have reasons to claim magnetic rotation. Many 
experiments suggest partial rotation, and the investigation of magnetic declination shows 
full continuous rotation. It is in this latter context that Gilbert considers himself to have 
shown that, when one magnetic body orbits another, continuous axial rotation follows.
51 Efficient causation for Gilbert is not the efficient causation that the mechanists would propound a 
few decades later: if the latter take an efficient cause to be external to the subject of change, Gilbert 
takes efficient causation to be internal to the subject of change. This might be characterised as a form 
of immanent causation.
FROM ATTRACTION TO DISPONENT 67
5.2. Magnetic declination as rotation
The universe of Mark Ridley, one of Gilbert’s close collaborators, agrees in major points 
with Gilbert’s cosmological model. Gilbert presents an ordered universe endowed with 
orientations. The orientations are of the north–south axes of the globes, and the order is that 
of the relative positions between the celestial bodies.52 It is the universe’s order and 
orientation that explains the positions of the globes, but the universe’s order is sustained by 
the astral nature of the globes (the earth’s being magnetic), with the sun taking a privileged 
position. The sun seems to be the only source of causal asymmetry in Gilbert’s cosmology 
(DM: 224). Gilbert does not take a definite position on what sorts of alignments and 
distances are involved in the planetary system such that the planets are carried in their 
movements by their interaction with the sun, but he does suggest that, whatever they might 
be, in the case of earth (at least) magnetism can explain at least some planetary motions, 
since magnetic bodies in declination show circular motion. 
This section is concerned with showing that Gilbert had cogent arguments for plausibly 
attributing circular motion to magnets, and thus for maintaining that the earth spins on its 
axis. These were arguments drawn from his investigation of declination or dip. Ridley 
appears to read Gilbert in the same way:
the Earth having parts very fit for motion, as her Globious bodies with equator and 
parallels ready and apt to obey all internal virtue and power, […] which we have called 
elsewhere Magneticall, […] which kind of vertue is also demonstrated in the Earth, 
passing by the Meridians to the poles, as also experimentally the Inclinatory ring with 
his needle carried about the Earth upon a meridian circle, maketh this circular motion 
from the equator to the poles, and so back again. (Ridley 1917: 43)
As covered in Chapter 5, “declination” is Gilbert’s term for what we know today as 
magnetic dip, and it is a rotational movement:
Declination is seen to be a motion of a needle, […] that motion arises in truth not from 
any motion from the horizon toward the centre of the earth, but from the turning of the 
whole magnetick body toward the whole of the earth. (DM: 185; my emphasis)
52 So far, the literature has not much discussed the extent to which teleology and the system of the 
world play a role in Gilbert’s cosmology specifically, and to his overall arguments more generally. I 
take Miller’s discussion of the law of the whole (2014: 81–6) and my discussion above to be 
exceptions. 
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Every angular measurement of declination is a part of a rotation. This interpretation is 
supported by the investigation aimed at mapping out the declination at the surface and 
within the orb of virtue of a terrella.53
Of Gilbert’s many experiments on magnetic declination, one is especially relevant here. The 
experiment proceeds as follows. Gilbert places a versorium at various points of latitude 
around the circumference of a terrella, starting at 0° (which he marks on the terrella’s 
equator) and moving it in a complete circuit.54 As the versorium changes latitude, it rotates. 
At any given point of latitude, the versorium “makes always one kind of angle”55, and thus 
a declination–latitude correlation can be established. At the equator, the versorium will be 
horizontal (with respect to a tangent from the surface of the terrella), but by the time it has 
been moved to 45° latitude (from the equator), it will have dipped by around 100°. The 
movement will continue, reaching 180° at 90° latitude, and then 360° at 180° latitude.
In this way, the versorium will make two complete rotations for every complete circuit of 
the terrella:
a magnetick needle, moved on the top of the earth or of a terrella or of the effused orbes, 
makes two complete rotations in one circuit of its centre, like some epicycle about its 
orbit. (DM: 208)
Given this, then, magnetic declination is not a movement of deviation from the horizontal 
but is rather “in reality a motion of rotation” (DM: 197; my emphasis). The conclusion that 
declination is a rotation is not extracted out of one particular observation. It is rather 
prompted by a series of observations, when (and only when) taken together. 
I do not want to claim that Gilbert’s conclusion that declination is “in reality a motion of 
rotation” is fully constrained or determined by the investigative practices. Rather, given the 
mapping of declination, the claim that rotation is shown in declination is a cogent reading 
off of the experimental situation.56 If Gilbert had stopped at measuring the magnetic 
53 Gilbert mentions some experimental setups in Book 5, all of which are directed towards the 
mapping of dip: for instance, Gilbert details an experimental setup in which a magnetised needle is 
suspended in air, with a marked terrella underneath; the terrella is moved in various positions relative 
to the N–S axis of the poles, and the deviation of the needle is observed.
54 In fact, in Gilbert’s experimental setup, the terrella is placed in a bowl-shaped hollow, which allows 
it to be rotated in place while the versorium stays put (see Chapter 4 for more on the setup itself). This 
makes for simpler, more reliable experimental manipulation, but the effect is that, relative to the 
terrella, the versorium changes latitude.
55 This is Ridley’s formulation of the declination–latitude correlation (Ridley 1617: 21).
56 I am using a conceptual distinction between investigative and laboratory/experimental practices. 
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declination in a single location, for instance, it would have been quite difficult to conclude 
that the movement of declination is part of a rotation. The practice of mapping out 
declination around the terrella, however, made this conception likely. The experimental 
setup itself, the relative inadequacy of the instruments and an abiding assumption of order, 
all conjoined, suggested that, in orbiting the terrella, the needle rotates.
The conclusion from the investigation of declination, then, is that if one magnetic body 
orbits another, it will rotate around an axis as well. This serves to suggest that an orbiting 
earth is a diurnally rotating earth. However, the earth’s axial rotation and its magnetic axis 
coincide, but magnets, as shown in Gilbert’s investigation of declination, rotate around axes 
perpendicular to their magnetic axes.57 Because of this (alongside the general omission of 
the declination experiments and their relevance for magnetic rotation in the literature), 
some of Gilbert’s readers (such as Henry (2001), or Miller (2014) who calls Gilbert’s 
argument a “blind alley” (Miller, 2014: 79)) take it that Gilbert has no satisfactory argument 
for terrestrial axial rotation as a specifically magnetic rotation.58 There are two reasons for 
the dissatisfaction.
First, there is an assumption that rotation has to be not only continuous, but also 
spontaneous. Or, put differently, it is assumed that the kind of rotation under discussion is a 
self-generating rotation of a magnetic body taken in isolation. This is not Gilbert’s claim. 
First, continuous rotation of a single magnetic body in isolation is not possible under his 
account of magnetism as disponent (because all motion is only in relation to alignment with 
the surrounding bodies). Second, Gilbert explicitly rejects the possibility of any magnetic 
perpetual motion machine (DM: 107). Continuous full axial rotation requires the rotating 
body to be orbiting another celestial body. Rotation thus presupposes relationality, and, 
Laboratory or experimental practices refer to the material interventions, whereas the investigative 
practices include the laboratory practices, but also the various procedures and techniques in one’s 
repertoire for translating the laboratory findings into results; that is, the diagrammatic, analogical, etc. 
reasonings that inform the reading off of the result from the experimental situation. The distinction is 
artificial: there is no recorded experimental situation that is not already filtered by background 
knowledge and techniques of translation since any recorded experimental result is a retrospective and 
idealised account. 
57 The axial and magnetic rotation coincide because of the geometry of the magnetic power’s 
distribution on the surface of the terrella by appeal to magnetic poles, a magnetic equator and 
magnetic meridians. On these points see Gilbert, DM, Book 2 and Miller (2014).
58 The debate on these issues seems to me to come down to what one takes a satisfactory argument to 
be. Gilbert does not seem to operate with clear-cut criteria. In this chapter, I have therefore proposed a 
reconstruction, which attempts to make explicit what sort of findings might have presented 
themselves as showing magnetic axial rotation, or at least as rendering it plausible. It is by no means a 
final answer to the debate. 
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additionally, it is specific to the precise order of nature, an order from which celestial 
bodies cannot deviate (too much) without disrupting and collapsing the universe (DM: 220–
5; Miller 2014: 80–6).
Second, the dissatisfaction also comes from taking a strong Copernican reading of De 
magnete, that is, a reading that assumes the goal of the treatise is to show that magnetism 
provides a complete “model” of terrestrial axial rotation. If that were Gilbert’s aim, he 
would need to show how magnetism causes rotation around the north–south magnetic axis. 
And he fails to show this. But this is an unnecessarily strong reading. I think Gilbert’s 
claims should be taken modally: magnetism might explain the earth's rotation because 
magnets can (given the appropriate conditions) rotate around an axis. Under this 
interpretation, De magnete does indeed show that magnetism can in principle produce the 
kinds of movements we see in celestial bodies; it just does not provide a full account of how 
magnetism causes the earth’s axial rotation.
Moreover, it is also equally possible that magnetism as disponent is not, by itself, causally 
sufficient to bring about full sustained rotation around the axis; something else might be 
necessary, as is the case for magnetic coition and its requirement for the “double vigour” of 
disposition and coition. That is, Gilbert might be establishing one of the necessary elements 
of the diurnal rotation of the earth, but not aiming for causal sufficiency. This interpretation 
fits with Gilbert’s overall project: if one does not have an account of the circumstances that 
bring about a given phenomenon (the north–south axial rotation of the earth, for instance), 
one does not yet have a complete explanation – whilst the disponent power is necessary for 
the explanation, it might very well not be sufficient. This is not a problem for Gilbert if all 
he intends is to show the plausibility of axial rotation. The project for a fully-worked-out 
Gilbertian magnetic cosmology might be precisely the identification of the exact 
circumstantial conditions that would explain continuous rotation around the north–south 
axis.
Gilbert is aware of this: he takes his observations of magnetic effects to provide new 
support for the Copernican model, but not to prove beyond doubt the “probable 
assertion” (Lat.: probabilis assertio) of the earth’s diurnal rotation (DM: 215). The final 
book of De magnete, in which Gilbert tackles the plausible extension of his magnetic 
philosophy to Copernicanism, is more concerned with showing the plausibility of the daily 
axial rotation against primum mobile accounts than it is with showing how magnetism is 
supposed to fully explain the rotation.59 
59 The claim is not that Gilbert is not committed to the diurnal motion of the earth. Book 6 makes it 
clear that Gilbert takes Copernicus’s astronomical model to be more likely than the Primum Mobile 
model. He also considers that his magnetical philosophy could contribute to explaining why this is the 
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Taken as a full physical explanation of the earth’s diurnal rotation, then, magnetic rotation 
fails. But as an assertion of the plausibility of magnetism causing effects of the same kind 
as those witnessed celestially, it works. And the rotation Gilbert sees in the declination 
experiments is the best indication that this is so.
5.3. The incompatibility between mapping and the attractional framework
If Gilbert had understood magnetism as purely attractional, the mapping of magnetic 
declination around a terrella would not have been an available means of investigation. In 
fact, none of the previous models would have facilitated or favoured an investigative 
practice with this goal. The attractional model, with its posited sources of magnetism at 
various locations either in the earth or in the heavens, could not have accommodated the 
phenomenon of declination, as Norman had already suggested experimentally. Norman’s 
alternative conception, the respective point, did open up the investigative path of taking 
measurements at various geographical locations, with the intention of triangulating the 
position of the respective point. But Norman’s respective point is a source of magnetism 
that is specifically “a point along a line that passes through the Centre of the 
Earth” (Norman 1581: 28, my emphasis), and thus mapping of declination around a 
lodestone experimentally would not have been a viable investigative path for studying the 
effect: for Norman, dip (his term for declination) was a specifically (exo)geomagnetic 
phenomenon; it had nothing to do with lodestones. For Gilbert, on the other hand, any two 
magnetic bodies could show declination, given the appropriate relative arrangement. Hence, 
as the next section shows in detail, the possibilities for the investigative practices change 
with the conceptualisation.
5.4. Magnetism as disponent affords mapping practices
I have shown that Gilbert took rotation to be a magnetic motion, fully manifest in the 
investigation of declination through the mapping practices. The question is why mapping is 
a viable path of investigation. One answer could be that the use of a terrella as a model of 
the earth is itself afforded by Gilbert’s matter theory. While this explains the use of the 
terrella, it does not address why Gilbert takes mapping to be the appropriate investigative 
case, since the Earth’s magnetism shows it to be “sufficiently furnished with peculiar forces for 
diurnal circular motion” (DM: 223). The claim here is just that Gilbert does not fully subordinate his 
magnetic theories to showing that the diurnal rotation of the earth is caused by magnetic rotation. 
Book 6 of De magnete does not discuss how or why magnetic rotation accounts for the earth’s diurnal 
rotation; it only overviews reasons (some drawn out of his magnetic philosophy, some not) for why he 
takes the earth to rotate axially.
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path. My position is that the mapping of magnetic phenomena in investigations60 becomes 
appropriate because Gilbert treats magnetism as primarily disponent, i.e. as ordering 
magnetic bodies. That is, there is an order to be mapped, and this order is fundamentally 
revealing of magnetic power. This treatment of magnetism as disponent, I argue here, was 
afforded by Gilbert’s studies of magnetic attraction. 
Whilst studying magnetic coition, Gilbert makes a conceptual distinction between (a) the 
power of coition (coitio vigor/vis) and (b) the disponent power. For the phenomenon of 
coition to occur, the magnetic bodies must first align; once aligned, if within the orb of 
coition, and not just within the orb of virtue, they unite. One can reasonably ask if there is 
anything empirical that prompted this distinction between the two. My best reconstruction 
is that the distinction resulted out of Gilbert’s investigations of magnetic repulsion. 
When treating repulsion, Gilbert concludes that “magnetick substances are more sluggishly 
repelled than they are attracted” (DM: 100). This is not the result of a specific experiment, 
but a generalisation over several experiments: 
[it] is manifest in all magnetical experiments in the case of stones floating on water in 
suitable skiffs; also in the case of iron wires or rodes swimming (transfixed through 
corks) and well excited by a loadstone, and in the case of versoria (DM: 100). 
In other words, irrespective of the experimental setup, the repulsion is always slower than 
the coition of the magnetic bodies. This is an empirical regularity that needs to be 
accounted for. Gilbert accounts for it thus:
repulsion and aversion is caused merely by something disponent; on the other hand, the 
coming together is by a mutual alluring to contact and a disponent, that is, by a double 
vigour (DM: 100; my emphasis). 
What we observe as repulsion is for Gilbert a mere arrangement of magnetic bodies – that 
is, an aligning of their poles – so as to be able to unite.
In a strict sense, then, for Gilbert, magnets do not repel (as we would have it today): what 
looks like repulsion is arrangement so that coition is possible. This is not such a forced 
interpretation on Gilbert’s part: after all, if you place two magnets at appropriate distances 
they will eventually unite, even if they appear to repel at first. Repulsion in itself is never a 
stable event, but it always leads to the opposing poles’ coming together (unless prevented 
by distance or external forces). And this is the reason behind Gilbert’s explaining away 
repulsion as a magnetic phenomenon as such, and merely treating it as an effect of the 
60 I prefer to use the term “investigative” in preference to “experimental”, because Gilbert’s practice 
includes more than mere the activity of experiments. For instance, as I discuss further in Chapter 4, 
Gilbert’s articulation of his account of magnetism also makes use of diagrammatic practices.
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disponent power, which arranges, or organises, the magnetic bodies before their coming 
together.
Gilbert breaks down an observational situation previously taken to be a single event, the 
attraction between magnetic bodies, into two distinct events: one is the coming together of 
magnetic bodies,61 and the other is the aligning (disposing) of magnetic bodies in such a 
way that their coming together is possible (the north–south alignment). He thus takes the 
alignment to be an independent event to be accounted for. The “mutual alluring to 
contact” (the power of coition) is what explains the empirical law of coition: that the north 
pole always attracts the south pole, and vice versa, and can only take place when magnetic 
bodies are placed within the “orb of coition”. The disponent power, on the other hand, 
explains how magnetic bodies organise themselves so as to eventuate the unition of 
magnetic bodies (under suitable conditions). There are then (at least) two possible 
manifestations (or expressions) of the magnetic power: as disposing magnetic bodies and as 
bringing together magnetic bodies – as disponens vigor and as coitio vigor.
As we have seen in the case of the experimental observations of the sluggishness of 
repulsion, the disponent power is a precondition for coition. First, magnetic bodies arrange 
(in their proper relative positions), and then they unite so that “a disponent vigour [power] 
is often only the precursor of coition, in order that the bodies may stand conveniently for 
one another before conjunction; wherefore also they are turned around to the corresponding 
ends, if they cannot reach them through hindrances” (DM: 101).
The sluggishness of magnetic repulsion is doubly important for Gilbert: not only because it 
gives an impetus to explain magnetic repulsion away, but also because it allows him to 
show that the disponent power is truly a basic manifestation of the magnetic power. Had 
Gilbert concluded that attraction and repulsion are exactly equal, then he probably would 
have had more pressure to account for both events through coition.62 But his identification 
of the sluggishness of repulsion led him to differentiate a disponent power as the 
manifestation of the magnetic power, in the context of the laboratory study of magnetic 
attraction. 
61 The first instance we know of in which the law of attraction is formulated is in Peter Peregrinus’s 
Letter on the magnet (1269). For treatments of Peregrinus, see Radelet et all (1975) and Steinle 
(2012).
62 How much epistemic warrant there is for Gilbert’s reading of the sluggishness of repulsion is a 
different question, whose answer is independent of the point I am trying to make here.
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5.5. Full circle: from attraction to rotation. 
As we have seen, the relation between Gilbert’s investigative practices and his treatment of 
magnetism as disponent is as follows. Following the order of presentation of the arguments 
in De magnete, one first begins with a pattern of investigation that is congruent with the 
attraction framework of studying magnetism (the experiments involving magnets floating 
on water), which boils down to tinkering with magnetic attraction (and repulsion) to 
establish claims about these effects, or about what they show. In this context, the disponent 
power is introduced as a result of a phenomenal differentiation between the movement to 
unition of two magnetic bodies and a quite distinct movement to disposition. This 
conceptualisation of magnetic phenomena as relative alignments of magnetic bodies guides 
the local investigation and the further theorisation of magnetism – one that supplants the 
attractional model.
By treating magnetism as disponent, new directions for investigating magnetism are opened 
up in the form of an added epistemic goal: to map out the spatial arrangements of observed 
magnetic phenomena. Heuristics aimed at spatial mapping take centre stage: to account for 
declination is to give a model of the spatial relations it forms, and then to draw regularities 
out of this model (in the form of a diagram that calculates the declination–latitude relation). 
What is taken to be appropriate or inappropriate as an investigative path is judged against a 
conception of magnetic phenomena as primarily phenomena of relative arrangements. 
In De magnete, the mapping heuristics are substantiated through versorium-based 
experiments. The versorium detects the motion, while specific apparatuses produce the 
appropriate conditions for the detection to be readable. It is in this context, and through the 
investigation aimed at mapping out the magnetic motions of declination, that the 
phenomenon of magnetic rotation is afforded. The specification of magnetic rotation 
presupposed conceptualising magnetism as disponent. Moreover, it is through the mapping 
experiments that magnetic rotation is made apparent. But Gilbert would have no mapping 
experiments without treating and conceiving of magnetism as alignment; and the latter was 
facilitated by the floating magnet experiments that show a disponent power separate from 
and prior to the power of coition. If one does not accept the versorium-based mapping 
practice of investigating magnetic declination (as well as direction and variation) as 
legitimately detecting the magnetic phenomena, then one does not accept the claim about 
magnetic rotation.
6. Disponent magnetism 
I have argued that Gilbert conceptualises magnetism as disponent, aligning bodies into 
position. I have also argued that this conceptualisation affected not only how to go about 
investigating magnetism, but also which magnetic phenomena are salient and how they 
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should be classified. I have also suggested that the literature on Gilbert has, to a large 
extent, missed the relevance of the disponent power. While his conception of magnetism as 
disponent is lost in the modern literature, buried beneath attempts to make sense of 
Gilbert’s animistic theories, many readers of Gilbert in the seventeenth and even eighteenth 
centuries did not fail to see the central role he gave the disponent power in his account. In 
this section, I give an overview of a few such interpretations of magnetism as disponent. 
It is worth repeating the passage from Michell cited in the introduction to this chapter:
[Gilbert] concluded from some experiments he had made, not very irationally [sic], that 
the Needle was not attracted by the magnet, but turned into its position by, what he calls, 
a disponent virtue. (Michell 1750: 17; my emphasis)
Michell saw that Gilbert understood magnetism as fundamentally disponent. What is 
curious is that he does not discuss Gilbert’s account of the disponent virtue in any detail, 
almost as if it were commonplace knowledge (at least amongst those interested in 
magnetism). Michell’s casual attitude towards Gilbert’s concept of disponent power, also 
shown, for instance, by William Whiston, is no surprise if we look back at how Gilbert’s De 
magnete was received in the seventeenth century in the Anglo-Saxon context. For those 
who read and followed Gilbert’s work at the time, it was a well-established fact, and a 
guiding principle of their investigation, that magnets do not primarily attract, but dispose or 
turn into position. Throughout the seventeenth century one can find many references to the 
disponent virtue of magnets. Wilkins (1640: 161), Power (1664: 159), and Cavendish 
(1666: 19) all admit that the power by which magnets are oriented into place is specific to 
magnets, but disagree on how precisely to account for it from a matter-theoretical 
perspective. Or, to put it differently, they appropriate the concept with the goal of making it 
compatible with the local matter-theoretical system they developed or adopted.
When these later natural philosophers appeal to the disponent power, they frequently also 
equate it with the “directive power”, by which the needle positions itself in the north–south 
direction. The synonymity drags the concept of a disponent power away from Gilbert’s own 
conceptual structure: for Gilbert, “direction” (and “verticity”) are terms designating the 
phenomenon itself (that is, the north–south orientation itself), and not the mechanism by 
which the phenomenon is brought about. For Gilbert, the disponent power is the underlying 
cause by which a magnetic body is turned to or towards its “natural” position. When Power 
aims to show that the magnetic direction can be explained atomistically, without appealing 
to an internal source for the motion of bodies, and when Cavendish aims to show the 
contrary, they miss what is as stake for Gilbert in analysing the disponent power: that is, the 
way in which it acts to produce magnetic effects and the salient aspects of the respective 
effects. 
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Those whose interests were more concerned with the investigation of magnetism as such or 
with magnetic cosmology kept closer to Gilbert’s conception of the disponent power. 
Perhaps the best example here is Nathanael Carpenter, probably one of Gilbert’s most 
attentive and systematic readers. In his work on geography, Geography Delineated Forth in 
Two Books (1625), Carpenter systematically discusses magnetism and the earth’s magnetic 
nature, closely following Gilbert. For Carpenter, Gilbert had 
troden out a new path to Philosophy […] after many experiments, and long inquiry, 
found the causes of most magneticall motions and proprieties hid in the magneticall 
temper and constitution of the Earth, and that the Earth it selfe was a meere Magneticall 
body challenging all those proprieties, and more then haue expressed themselues in the 
Load-stone. […] This new Philosophie I dare not commend as euerywhere perfect and 
absolute, being but of late yeeres inuented, and not yet brought to mature perfection: yet 
would it sauour of little ingenuity or iudgement in any man, peruersely to deny all such 
Magneticall affections in the Earth as are grounded on plaine experiments and 
obseruation, sith no Philosophie was euery way so exact, but required experience dayly 
to correct it. I intend not here an absolute discourse of Magneticall Bobies and Motions, 
but leaue it to their search whose experimentall industrie is more suteable to such a 
subiect. (Carpenter 1625: 45)
Carpenter’s analysis of Gilbert’s magnetic philosophy is very much in line with Gilbert’s 
own diagnoses and results. He points out that both the constitution of the earth and the 
earth’s magnetic nature are salient explanatory structures for magnetic phenomena, that the 
natural philosopher should proceed experimentally, but also be diligent in his 
investigations, and that the status of magnetic-philosophical knowledge is fallibilistic, as 
new investigations can correct its conclusions or assumptions. Carpenter’s chosen 
vocabulary differs in important ways from Gilbert’s, but much of Gilbert’s conceptual 
structure is still in place. One of the clearest examples is the way in which Carpenter 
explains why Gilbert moves away from attraction to coition: 
1. Because Attraction seemes to suppose an externall force or violence, by which one 
thing is carryed and moued vnto another: but the Coition is meerely naturall, as 
proceeding from the internall forme of both the bodies. 2 Attraction supposeth the force 
of mouing to bee onely in the one party, and the other to bee meerely passiue, and not 
actiuely concurring to this motion; whereas in the magneticall coition, both parts are 
mutually inclined by nature to meet and ioyne themselues one to the other. (Carpenter 
1625: 54)
Carpenter succinctly systematises Gilbert’s conceptual move away from attraction, and then 
goes on to explain why electrical attraction cannot be confused with the magnetic, very 
much on the Gilbertian lines of argument set out in section 2.2 of the present chapter. 
Carpenter’s careful reading of Gilbert is also in place when it comes to the disponent power. 
While giving an introduction to the operation of the earth, Carpenter introduces some 
“teorems”:
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The Magneticall affection of the Earth is twofold, either Radicall or Deriued. The 
Radicall disposition we call that which is the first root and ground of all other 
magneticall motions. The Radicall vertue or inclination is againe twofold, either Motiue 
or Disponent. (Carpenter 1625: 47)
Given Carpenter’s definition of the radical virtue, it seems safe to assume that it plays a 
similar conceptual role to Gilbert’s magnetical power. The radical virtue is, for Carpenter, 
divisible into motive and disponent aspects. The motive “inclination” is that by which 
magnetic bodies are “stirred vp to the motion”, whereas the disponent is that which 
“regulates, conforms, and directs it [i.e. the motive power]” (Carpenter 1625: 48). 
According to Carpenter, this distinction is not however reserved only for magnetic bodies: 
it applies to all “Naturall agents”, such that
a Philosopher ought to distinguish betwixt that which giues them a power to moue, and 
that which limits, determines, and […] modificates the action (Carpenter 1625: 48). 
The distinction Carpenter makes here is between having the capacity to act and the act 
itself. To have the capacity is not, by itself, sufficient to exercise it. Exercising that capacity, 
on his account, presupposes limiting it and “modifying” it. It is the disponent power that 
accomplishes this.
How such limitation and modification looks depends on the sort of natural agent a body is. 
In the case of magnets, the disponent power is “that facultie by which magneticall Bodies 
are disposed or directed to a certaine site or position” (Carpenter 1625: 52). These positions 
are not random, but are “conformed to certain bounds” (Carpenter 1625: 52), which bounds 
are stable magnetic phenomena, namely magnetic inclination (defined by Carpenter as that 
“which […] useth the magneticall needle to moue out of its place”) and magnetic direction 
(“by which it is apt to conforme it selfe North and South”) (Carpenter 1625: 48–9) The 
polarisation of iron (relative to its corresponding situation) is also accounted for by 
Carpenter by invoking “the disponent faculty of the Earth's Magneticall 
Spheare” (Carpenter 1625: 47), since “magneticall bodies are neuer found to moue 
vncertainly, and at all adventures, but conforme themselues to certaine Poles” (Carpenter 
1625: 52). 
Carpenter’s treatment of the causal stories of magnetic phenomena follows Gilbert in that 
he explains the disponent power as a manifestation in concrete magnetic phenomena. The 
determination of the magnetic phenomena – by empirical investigation – is how the 
“modifications” of the disponent power are accounted for. Carpenter’s philosophical 
analysis of an action here commits one to empirical investigation, as the latter seems to be 
the way in which the determination of the action can be done.
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In the course of the same discussion, Carpenter also ventures to account for Gilbert’s 
analogy of magnets to a “soul”. A man, Carpenter reasons, is a natural agent and so will 
also be equipped with a motive and a disponent power. According to Carpenter, in the case 
of men, the former is the Will and the latter is the “Discourse and Iudgement” (Carpenter 
1625: 47). Given all of this, in Carpenter’s understanding of Gilbert, Gilbert’s analogy 
between the magnet and the soul of man goes back to a generalised philosophical theory of 
agency based on a distinction between that which gives the power to act and that by which 
the action is exercised: 
Amongst others the magnet-stone seemes most to partake of these two powers, as that 
which amongst all naturall agents (in Gilberts opinion) seemes most to haue 
resemblance with the soule of a man: so that by an apt Trope it hath been called of 
many, the Magneticall soule of the Earth. (Carpenter 1625: 48)
Yet another re-systematisation of the Gilbertian principles of the magnetic philosophy 
comes from Sir Matthew Hale, in his Magnetismus magnus, or, Metaphysical and divine 
contemplations on the magnet, or loadstone (1695). Just like Carpenter’s Geographie 
delineated, Hale’s treatise is severely understudied. Its goal is to show that the principles by 
which the magnetic power operate show that God is the generative cause of the magnetic 
power in the earth, such that even though the earth’s motions are effects of the magnetic 
power, the power itself has to be the effect of something else. Hale’s conclusion is that this 
something else can only be God63: the earth’s magnetic power is “derived” from the 
“efficiency, ordination and institution of the […] architect of the world” (Hale 1695: 15) 
and is constantly sustained by the same. This is not true for those bodies whose power 
originates in a physical cause, as is the case for the lodestone and iron produced within the 
earth. In the case of such bodies, Hale argues, 
once produced and perfected, they act, and move, and operate immediately from 
themselves, and independently upon the Immediate Cause of their Production (Hale 
1695: 16). 
Given this, then, according to Hale, a magnetic body would keep its properties even if the 
earth were annihilated – its magnetic power is not sustained by the earth’s.
Hale’s move allows one to argue that each magnetic body is a self-sufficient agent, but it 
also raises the question of whether such a body is a proxy for the earth itself. Hale’s account 
of the specific ways in which magnetic bodies are self-moving (i.e., agents) goes back to 
63 Gilbert’s answer to the same question is the astral form, a form that is particular for each celestial 
body and whose source remains unknown. It seems then that Gilbert might have accepted Hale’s 
proposal according to which the source of the astral form is not another natural agent, but God 
himself. This being said, however, for Gilbert, the natural-philosophical enquiry bottoms out in the 
astral form (or power). The goal from there is to account for how the power works and what limits it 
has. 
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Carpenter’s own account of natural agency. Hale points out that the self-moving bodies 
differ from each other on the basis of “their several specifical Bounds and Limits of their 
Kinds and Natures” (Hale 1695: 24), such that what is at stake is to establish what these 
bounds and limits are for each kind of self-mover. Since the ultimate origin of any power is 
God, what matters from the perspective of the physical investigation is the determination of 
the limits and bounds of such powers, which is ultimately done by specification of which 
observable phenomena pertain to which powers:
If it were in the Body of Matter before, how came it thither? If it were not there before, 
it is impossible that it should be educible out of it by the force of any bare natural Agent: 
Indeed the Agent may modifie and dispose the Matter, so as to be a convenient 
Instrument for the Vis or Virtus that before resided in it, to act and exert its Activity; but 
it can never give it a Being, but either it must find it there, or bring it thither; for dull 
inactive Matter, that seems to be purely Passive, can never yield it. (Hale 1695: 25)
The conceptualisation of magnetism as disponent, then, had a life after De magnete. It 
became, for a time at least, a common part of the conceptual framework for understanding 
and investigating magnetism – and not just magnetism, but geography, cosmology, and 
even, as with Carpenter, human action.
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that Gilbert moves away from the conception of magnetism as 
fundamentally attractional to a conception of magnetism as disponent. The latter accounts 
for the observed magnetic phenomena. (In the case of magnetic coition, the disponent 
power is a co-cause, and takes temporal priority.) It has also shown that magnetism as 
disponent was a conceptual move afforded by Gilbert’s treatment of magnetic action as 
symmetrical (as opposed to the causal unidirectionality of the attractional conception), with 
every magnetic body in an interaction contributing. Once major consequence of seeing that 
and how Gilbert changed the fundamental conceptualisation of magnetism from attraction 
to disponent is that we can make better sense of his claim that magnets rotate and that, 
consequently, the earth’s diurnal rotation is due to its magnetic nature (however that may 
work in detail). This is because the disponent model makes the mapping of magnetic effects 
a suitable means of investigation. And it is in the mapping of declination around a terrella 
that Gilbert finds an experimental manifestation of complete, continuous magnetic rotation. 
It is ultimately through understanding Gilbert’s conception of magnetism as fundamentally 
disponent that we can see the warrant of magnetic terrestrial rotation.

Chapter 3
Magnetical philosophy and Spheres of Activity: 
Competing Conceptualisations
The natural-philosophical terms “sphere of activity”, “sphere of virtue”, “orb of virtue”, 
“orb of effluvia”, and similar, appear frequently in explanations of natural phenomena 
throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.1 Without exception, these terms are 
taken to be various names for the same concept – that is, they are taken to denote the same 
conceptual content, and that content is taken to have suffered little alteration over time, 
throughout its use. Usually, these terms are associated with the emanationist theory of 
bodies. On this presumption, Giambattista Della Porta, Francis Bacon, William Gilbert, 
Mark Ridley, William Barlow, and Kenelm Digby, among others, are assumed to have 
conceptualised spheres of activity along very much the same lines. According to the 
standard narrative, despite a few differences in details, both the meaning and use of the 
concept have always remained unchanged.2
In this chapter, I propose a different narrative: one in which the concept does alter in both 
use and meaning, and in which these alterations matter. It is a narrative about how, in 
making the sphere of activity relevant to magnetism, the salient questions about both 
magnetism in general and the sphere of activity in particular change. In such investigations, 
the sphere of activity itself was at stake. It was not a straightforward, unproblematic 
concept to be made use of in order to account for magnetism. On the contrary. The 
1 Except where specified otherwise, I will use these terms interchangeably. 
2 On linear readings of the conceptual content of “sphere of activity”, see Chalmers 1937a&b, Krafft 
1970, Parigi 2015, Ugaglia 2006. 
82 CHAPTER THREE
examination of several accounts of spheres of activity shows that the term encapsulated 
divergent views of both what it denoted and how it mattered to magnetism.
In their uses of the concept of the sphere of activity, natural philosophers gave differing 
conceptualisations of what its relevant physical and geometrical properties are. How to 
determine the boundaries of the sphere of activity, whether or not it is a medium (and if it 
is, then what sort of medium it is), what affects the sphere of activity, and ultimately what 
the sphere of activity is are questions that had to be addressed within each approach, and 
which received various answers. The answers, however, did not come without 
consequences. The articulation of solutions to either direct or indirect questions about the 
sphere of activity had an impact on what phenomena were considered to be relevant, and on 
what variables mattered. It also made a difference to how one went about deciding which 
moves in the research were justified or not. A different way of making this point is to say 
that, despite the sphere of activity itself being firmly part of the explanans side of the 
investigation of magnetic phenomena, it itself is also an explanandum. It is thus misleading 
to presume that simply because many natural philosophers use the term “sphere of 
activity” (or correlates), the term denotes the same thing.
By looking at how spheres of activity are used in the context of investigations into 
magnetism, this chapter also argues that there is no unique determination of the concept 
(neither from the external world nor from background knowledge or theoretical 
considerations). The sphere of virtue is a not-yet-determined explanans: accounting for 
magnetic interaction (in the early modern period) requires developing a concept of the 
sphere of activity. Different criteria of what an intelligible explanation is influence one’s 
account of what the sphere of activity is and how it operates. It is relative to such criteria of 
intelligible and relevant explanation that we can make sense of the ways in which various 
natural philosophers work out how to deal with the sphere of activity. Answers to the 
question of the sphere of activity took three broad forms: for some, the sphere of activity is 
(1) a property of a body; for others, it is (2) a medium; while for others still, it is (3) a 
property of a system of bodies. 
The approach here is diachronic, but it is not strictly chronological – it traces developments 
in the concept of the sphere of activity thematically, jumping about somewhat in the history 
to do so. The first section deals with the conceptualisation of the sphere of activity under 
the umbrella of the emanationist theory of causation, according to which bodies emit 
emanations beyond their physical limits within a sphere of activity. This is what historians 
of early modern philosophy and science take to be the typical conception of the sphere of 
activity (Krafft 1970, Parigi 2015). I show here, however, that proponents of emanationist 
theories offer disparate accounts of what the relevant features of the sphere of activity are. 
The second section shows that, despite its modifications in order to fit the particular 
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strictures of the mechanical philosophy, the sphere of activity was still a central concept in 
mechanical accounts of magnetism, such as those proposed by Digby and Descartes. This 
entails that some of the functions that the sphere of activity plays in the explanation of 
magnetism are still retained, not being successfully reduced to the elements of the 
mechanical approach. In the third part of the chapter, I set out another approach to spheres 
of activity, which I label “interactionism”, as it considers the magnetic sphere of activity to 
be a property of magnetic interaction rather than of the bodies themselves. Even within this 
account, however, there are significant differences between conceptualisations of the sphere 
of activity. My focus, with respect to interactionist accounts, is on Gilbert and Barlow.
1. The emanationist conception of spheres of activity
I deal here with emanationist theories of bodies and how the sphere of activity plays a role 
in them. According to the emanationist account of bodies, either all or some bodies in the 
universe have the capacity to emit something at a distance – be it material, immaterial or 
spiritual. The causal power of such bodies is taken to lie precisely in such emanations. In 
this context, the term “sphere of activity” is used to describe these emanations relative to 
their causal power; that is, the extent to which they affect other bodies and the manner in 
which they do so. The literature on spheres of activity frequently treats this concept as 
integral to the emanationist theory of bodies. Consequently, I begin by briefly examining 
how the concept of the sphere of activity was discussed in the literature. 
1.1. The historiography of the emanationist theories
A significant part of the literature on the subject takes the emanationist theory of bodies to 
be what explains magnetism for, and thus to be what is accepted and made use of by, most 
magnetical philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In light of this, the 
discussion in the scholarship turns to exactly how the magnetical philosophers articulated 
the details and significance of (emanationist) spheres of activity (and, by extension, of the 
emanationist theory itself). Moreover, this usually entails treating the problem of the role 
and significance of spheres of virtue in natural philosophical terms: that is, as an 
examination of the underlying nature of these emanations. What matters, on this 
interpretation, is whether these emanations are material, immaterial or spiritual (and if so, 
in what sense). It should be noted that one should not take for granted the synonymity 
between the immaterial and spiritual. It is not always treated this way in emanationist 
theories. For instance, immaterial (in some cases) refers to something incorporeal, whereas 
spiritual could mean either of the spiritus mundi, or of spirits, that is of something that is 
subtle, and so on. What these concepts refer to and what roles they play will have to be 
determined from case to case. Their meaning has hardly remained stable. 
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Chalmers (1937a) was probably the first to guide the scholarship in the natural 
philosophical direction. He offered a comprehensive treatment of how the “metaphor” of 
effluvia was used and abused from ancient to modern philosophy. Chalmers claimed that 
many natural–philosophical categories occupied the functional role of effluvia: from 
pneuma to the spiritus mundi, to the alchemical spirits contained within bodies, to the 
Galenic vital spirit, to Fracastoro’s emanation of a material yet spiritual flow, to even 
Cartesian particles and Boyle’s corpuscular effluvia. If so, then the historians’ job was to 
track the various ways in which effluvia were accommodated to different natural 
philosophical programs. Krafft (1970) and Parigi (2015) present histories of effluvia and 
their corresponding spheres of activity on very much these lines. For example, Parigi 
(2015) takes the effluvia-based account to form a homogeneous explanatory class. On her 
reading, explanations in terms of spheres of activity are introduced to circumvent the 
limitations of collision-based explanations, while still upholding the Aristotelian rejection 
of the possibility of action at a distance. What remains undisputed in the scholarship is that 
the sphere of activity itself is a stable concept with a well-determined content specifiable 
under the strictures of the emanationist theory of bodies. This is the view that I challenge in 
the next section. 
1.2. Questioning spheres of activity in the emanationist theory
In this section I show that, for early modern proponents of the emanationist theory of 
bodies, the sphere of activity itself is at stake. It is not only the nature of effluvia that 
matters (as the historical narratives suggest). Rather, what is crucial to the discussion is how 
to precisely specify what the sphere of activity is and what properties it has such that it can 
account for how the effluvia operate. 
What characterises the sphere of activity in an emanationist theory are the following claims:
1. that the sphere of activity is a property of an individual body;
2. that the reach of these emissions is limited, so the sphere is finite.
Beyond these tenets, which, as we shall see below, are themselves challenged in competing 
articulations and uses of the concept of the sphere of activity, little else is shared by the 
proponents of emanationist (non-mechanical) accounts of the nature of bodies.3 The details 
of how these tenets are articulated matter; their articulation alters one’s concept of the 
3 I specify “non-mechanical” because, as we shall see in the next section, spheres of activity are 
present also in the mechanical philosophy where the causal explanatory model is different, and this 
puts pressure on a reconceptualisation of the sphere of activity despite its being integral to the 
explanations. 
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sphere of activity. Despite the commonalities of terminological use, terms are dragged 
through specifications in different directions by its users. This chapter argues that radical 
“draggings” of this kind happened to the concept of a sphere of activity in early modern 
studies of magnetism.4 This section shows that the articulation of different directions of 
conceptual relevance happened even amongst those who were committed to the 
emanationist account of bodies. To defend my position I will first analyse how the sphere of 
activity features first in Della Porta’s theory of magnetism and then in perhaps one of the 
most developed emanationist accounts: Francis Bacon’s. The discussion of Della Porta 
deals with the question of how the nature of emissions influences the conceptualisation of 
the sphere of activity, while the discussion of Bacon’s account deals with the question of 
limits of the sphere of activity– that is, how the determination of the limits of a sphere of 
activity can shift the relevance of the concept. 
1.3. Della Porta’s account of a sphere of activity
The standard view in the history of early modern science is that the concept of the sphere of 
activity was introduced to the study of magnetism by Della Porta in the treatise Natural 
magick.5 The claim there is not that Della Porta invented the concept, but rather that he is 
the one who imports it from other fields into that of magnetism.6 On this account, once 
Della Porta introduced the term, proponents of the magnetical philosophy built on it 
uncritically (see, e.g., King 1959). By looking at Della Porta’s use of the concept of the orb 
of virtue, this section concludes that the magnetical philosophers departed from Della 
Porta’s conceptualisation. 
It is undeniable that Della Porta does posit a sphere of activity around a magnet. After all, 
chapter XXVI of the book on magnetism within Natural magick is entitled “The loadstone 
within the sphere of its vertue, sends it forth without touching” (Della Porta 1658: 203). 
4 “Dragging” is used here in line with Wilson (2005). Wilson talks about “property dragging” in cases 
in which the predicate shifts to a new context (or to an altered context). Simply put, for Wilson, 
concepts are subjected to more or less subtle changes in the ways in which they are used and the 
contexts to which they are applied. Such conceptual “draggings” are a common phenomenon of our 
conceptual practices and have to be accounted for (not only philosophically, as part of our philosophy 
of language, but also in the actual employment of concepts). Given such draggings (and the instability 
they entail), histories of concepts and conceptual practices will need to be diachronic. 
5 I am using the first English translation, from 1658, here. The first Latin edition of Magia naturalis 
was published in 1558. The second expanded edition – on which the English translation is based – 
was published in 1589. The second edition comprises 20 books, and it is in this edition that Della 
Porta offers an extended treatment of magnetism in Book VII. 
6 Ugaglia (2006) challenges this claim. On her reading, it was Garzoni who first posited a sphere of 
activity around a magnet.
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Della Porta also uses the term “the compass of virtue” as a synonym for the sphere of 
activity. But, despite his use of the concept, he says very little about it. We are told that each 
magnet has a sphere of activity because bodies emit “beams of virtue”, and that it is through 
such emissions that they interact. To this extent, then, Della Porta adheres to the 
emanationist theory of bodies. Now, whatever these “beams of virtue” are, they do not 
appear to be the actual cause. Instead, they seem to be the facilitators of the interaction. The 
cause appears to be more basic: it is the universal law of sympathy and antipathy, also 
described as “discord and concord”, or “love and hatred”. It is this law that explains all of 
the “natural magical” phenomena Della Porta sets out to account for. Magnetism is one of 
them: on his account, magnetic bodies attract because they are sympathetic to one another, 
and they repel when they are in an antipathetic relation. The sympathetic relation is 
manifested through the emission of magnetic virtue by magnetic bodies. 
Going back to the sphere of activity, Della Porta also notices that interposing bodies 
between a magnet and a lodestone does not interfere with their interaction; thus, the sphere 
of activity is unaffected by obstructions in the intervening medium. The final point that 
Della Porta brings up is that the sphere of activity can be likened to the light of a candle, 
such that the magnetic virtue decreases proportionally with distance: 
so the force flies forth at that point; and the neerer it is, the more forcibly it attracts; and 
the further off, the more faintly: and if it be set too far off, it vanisheth quite, and doth 
nothing (Della Porta 1658: 199). 
Della Porta specifies “neerer” and “further”, but, at this point, we are not told nearer and 
further from what. His answer comes a few pages later: 
Yet we must not think that the Loadstone draws the iron with every part, but at a set and 
certain point; which is to be searched out, with great reason, care, and diligence. You 
shall find it thus: either hang up the iron, or balance it on a Table, that it may presently 
leap to be embraced from them: then carry your Loadstone round about it; and when you 
see the iron tremble, and run toward the Loadstone, touching it, that is the very point of 
attraction, and the beams of its vertue are sent round about from that point: wherefore, 
the farther from that point the iron is, the more faintly and weakly will it move; for the 
more forcible vertue nests in the Centre. (Della Porta 1658: 202–3; my emphases)
It is here that Della Porta’s take on the sphere of activity differs in significant ways from 
other natural-philosophical accounts. The passage above indicates that Della Porta’s 
account of magnetism is one in which the magnetic virtue is always locatable in a part of 
the lodestone (or in a part of another magnetic body). In case of magnetic attraction, a given 
pole becomes “the point of attraction”, such that “the beams of its vertue are sent round 
about from that point”. The sphere of activity then is given around a magnetic pole rather 
than around the whole visible body of the magnet. Correspondingly, the magnetic poles are 
located on a polar line which 
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always runs through the middle of the stone, like a King that has always his court or fort 
in the midst of his country. For consisting in the center from where the extreme parts are 
as it were the circumference, it can easily send its forces to all parts (Della Porta 1658: 
193). 
In this way, three parts of a body – its center and the two poles – become the salient 
positions with respect to the magnetic virtue. The sphere of activity, then, is the extension 
of the magnetic virtue beyond the poles of the magnetic body. It is not, for Della Porta, an 
extension in relation to the physical limits of the whole body itself. Although Della Porta 
does not state as much explicitly, it is the pole that becomes a reference point for the 
determination of the range of the sphere of activity, and not the shape of the magnetic body, 
its centre or some other privileged part within the lodestone. 
According to the reconstruction given here, Della Porta’s take on how to determine the 
sphere of activity is different than, for instance, Gilbert’s proposal. For Gilbert, magnetism 
is not locatable in any given part. Gilbert’s theory is developed as an explicit alternative to 
such attraction-based theories that posit points of location of the magnetic energy.7 Della 
Porta’s concept of the magnetic sphere of activity is also ultimately more underdeveloped 
than Bacon’s who is interested precisely in determining the limits of the sphere of activity. 
1.4. Spheres of activity and internal limits
If one posits spheres of activity in order to explain natural phenomena, the limits of the 
sphere of activity have to be specified. If the spatial extent of the sphere of activity is what 
determines the causal power of a body – which it should under an emanationist theory – 
then an account of how to determine such limits seems needed. To begin with: proponents 
of the emanationist theory (and historians of the concept) generally agree that there is an 
outer limit of the sphere – bodies do not emit at indefinite distances. However, just how to 
determine this outer limit is an open question. What is even more challenging is to 
determine the internal limit (i.e. the point, axis or surface from which the sphere is taken to 
extend outwards). If the extension of the sphere of activity is to be a relevant variable as a 
measurement instrument (for instance), then one needs to determine not only where it ends 
through observing the limit at which external bodies are affected by the sphere of activity, 
but also where it starts, that is, to determine the internal limit. If the latter is missing, then 
explanations in terms of spheres of activity can only do so much.
There are multiple open possibilities for determining the internal limit. It can be: (1) the 
external surface of the physical body; (2) its centre; (3) a privileged axis or (4) 
indeterminate. It also has to be determined how the body emits its effluvia: (a) at equal 
distances from the internal limit outwards, (b) random distances around the body, (c) 
7 For the argument, see Chapter 2.
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complex geometrical pattern or (d) a dynamic pattern around the body.8 These are questions 
to which even those who hold the emanationist position answer differently. Different 
answers do not merely point to some minor distinctions between otherwise homogeneous 
positions; rather, they reshape the research program around what Gilbert in his De magnete 
ultimately aptly called a “science of the orbs” (Gilbert 1600: 305 (Book 5, chapter xi)). One 
natural philosopher who appears to be especially interested in spheres of activity (or orbs of 
virtue) and especially in determining its limits is Francis Bacon. 
In the Abecedarium novum naturae (ANN)9, Bacon defines the sphere of activity (in his 
terminology here ,“the orb of virtue”10) thus:
the measure of distance or the orb of virtue […] is the distance which the powers of 
bodies may travel to, stop at, build up to and die down from—whether the operation 
occur by contact alone, or at a [greater or] lesser distance, whether it be not excited well 
over the shortest distance, or slacken off over the longest and the like. (OFB XIII: 211–
3)
The orb of virtue is the distance at which a body’s power acts. Bacon here unequivocally 
equates the enactment of a body’s power with the “orb of virtue”, such that, even when 
action happens by contact alone, the latter is classified under the range of the orb of virtue, 
or the measure of space. There are not many places in which Bacon deals with such spheres 
or orbs of virtue. It is thus difficult, as is usually the case for Bacon’s natural-philosophical 
system, to claim that Bacon was unequivocally committed to the doctrine of orbs of virtue. 
But even if he was not, he offers a few considerations on how to approach the subject. 
These considerations went all but unnoticed in the scholarship until Jalobeanu (2016, 
manuscript) provided a thorough treatment of Bacon’s take on the orb of virtue.
The crux of Jalobeanu’s argument is that Bacon’s take on spheres of activity is radically 
new, and that he is the first natural philosopher to shift the investigation of the orbs of 
8 A further variable, which is only tangential here, is the intensity of the emissions: it has to be 
established whether the emissions are equally strong throughout the sphere of activity, or whether 
there are privileged positions to be considered, and so on.
9 The Abecedarium novum naturae was never published. It was only recently discovered by Graham 
Rees, and subsequently presented and translated from Latin in the Oxford edition of Bacon’s works, 
vol. XIII (171–225) The book appears to build on the well-known Baconian idea that nature is like an 
alphabet and that the goal of investigation is to find the letters of nature’s alphabet. The ANN 
provides a provisional list of such letters and their potential compositions (schematisms) and the rules 
of composition (simple and compound motions). For treatments of the place that the ANN occupies in 
the Baconian corpus, see Rusu (2013) and Weeks (2007).
10 Bacon uses “orbs of virtue” and “spheres of activity” interchangeably, not just from one text to 
another, but also within the same text. 
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virtue from questions about the nature of the emissions from a body – that is, whether it 
emits effluvia, spirits, corpuscles and so on – to questions about the limits at which bodies 
act.11 Under this interpretation, what matters is mapping and measuring the sphere in 
question – in other words, determining its limits.12 In what follows, I challenge this 
interpretation mainly by showing that Bacon’s proposal is ultimately not developed enough 
to support what Jalobeanu calls the “operationalisation of Bacon’s theory of the orbs of 
virtue. (Jalobeanu manuscript: 19, but also Jalobeanu 2016: 244, 251).13 Put otherwise, even 
if we grant that Bacon’s goal was to provide operational definitions of the orb of virtue, his 
account is not specific enough to make orbs of virtues unproblematic variables in a program 
for an experimental physics. 
Bacon’s claims about orbs of virtue are sparse. What is clear is that he takes the orbs of 
virtue to be the spatial range of virtues. It is also clear that, for Bacon, the orbs are not 
restricted to a few bodies in the universe: instead, all bodies are causal agents endowed with 
virtues, and, as such, all bodies have orbs of virtue. He offers a comprehensive list of the 
virtues of bodies in Sylva, Century X. Virtues are: first, “the transmission or emission of the 
thinner and more airy parts of bodies”, which are the most corporeal and are found in 
infections, odours, etc; second, “the emission of those things that we call spiritual species: 
as visibles and sounds”; third, “emissions which cause attraction of certain bodies at 
distance”, which include the “drawing of electric bodies” and other such effects; fourth, 
“emission of spirits, and immateriate powers and virtues, in those things which work by the 
universal configuration and sympathy of the world”, a category in which Bacon places the 
workings of lodestones14; fifth, the emissions of spirits in imagination; sixth, the “influxes 
11 I disagree to some extent with Jalobeanu’s claim in Chapter 4 here, where I show that Gilbert's 
diagrammatic conceptualisation of the orb of virtue is ultimately concerned with what Jalobeanu 
terms “operationalisation”. For an emanationist interpretation of Bacon’s cosmology and natural 
philosophy, see Rees (1975a&b) and Jalobeanu (2016, manuscript).
12 According to Jalobeanu, Bacon thus drags the concept of a sphere of activity from the natural 
philosophical realm into the physical realm.
13 Jalobeanu does not explain explicitly what she takes an operational definition to be here. In the 
context, however, it seems that what she has in mind is a definition that can be used in an 
experimental program, and more specifically, in an attempt to develop standards of measurement. 
14 To Bacon, the action of a lodestone works by “consent”: “Of this kind […] are the working of the 
load-stone, which is by consent with the globe of the earth: of this kind is the motion of gravity, which 
is by consent of dense bodies to the globe of the earth: of this kind is some disposition of bodies to 
rotation […] These immateriate virtues have this property differing from others; that the diversity of 
the medium hindered them not; but they pass through all mediums; yet at determinate 
distances” (SEH II 644; my emphasis).
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of the heavenly bodies”; seventh, the “operation of sympathy”; and eighth, the “emission of 
immateriate virtues in an individual” (SS X: 644–5).
This intriguing list of virtues is not to be taken as a division to which Bacon is irrevocably 
committed, but rather as a division that is useful for further investigation of these virtues 
and their properties. What becomes clear from the way in which Bacon discusses them here 
is that the operation of virtues is by means of emissions of “spirituals” (or pneumatic 
matter). The operation of “sympathy”, then, would have to be further reduced to emissions 
of matter. Either way, the apparent action of virtues at a distance (from the perspective of 
our perceptual capacities) entails some transmission of spirits. It is important to note that 
the ways in which such transmission of spirits is done is not by means of collisions, and, 
consequently, Baconian pneumatic matter cannot be translated into atomistic or 
corpuscularian terms. 
The examination of the classification of virtues that Bacon proposes in Sylva also suggests 
that Bacon makes a distinction between more “materiate” and more “immateriate” virtues, 
with the latter being not strictly immaterial, but subtler, finer material bodies – that is, the 
distinction between materiate and immateriate is a distinction between grosser and subtler 
(another Baconian terminology for degrees of materiality).15 From the perspective of how 
virtues produce effects, however, this is a distinction of kind: the immateriate virtues 
operate without being affected by the intervening medium, while, in the case of the 
materiate virtues, the medium does affect their operation – either inhibiting or amplifying 
their action. If orbs of virtue are the space in which virtues operate, then, given Bacon’s 
division of virtues into materiate and immateriate, it appears that the investigation of the 
orbs of virtue ought to be divided as well. If what we are dealing with are the immateriate 
virtues, then the range of action of the virtue is the only thing that appears to matter. If, 
however, what is at stake is a materiate virtue, then an account of a body’s virtue will have 
to depend equally on its own intrinsic virtue and the intervening media. If what is at stake is 
a body’s intrinsic power, then the investigation has to be centred on the body’s virtue acting 
through different media. The latter raises a difficulty for treating the sphere of virtue as 
synonymous with the distance at which a body acts, since the determination of the distance 
15 As I understand Bacon’s natural philosophy, he proposes a fully materialist system. Bacon 
distinguishes between tangible and pneumatic matter, but this distinction is not one between 
something material and something immaterial. Tangible and pneumatic are concepts denoting a 
spectrum of materiality, with the tangible being more material than the pneumatic. The tangible and 
the pneumatic are also distinguished relative to their activity, with the tangible being inactive (or less 
active) and the pneumatic being active. For discussions of Bacon’s matter theory see Rees (1996), 
Manzo (2006), Weeks (2007), Giglioni (2010, 2012), Rusu (2013). On how Bacon’s matter theory 
connects back to his experimentalism and methodological concerns see Georgescu (2011), Schwartz 
(2014), Jalobeanu (2015). On a hypothetico-deductive interpretation of Bacon’s scientific method see 
Urbach (1987). 
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in question is no longer simply determinable, but is also circumstantially bound (to the 
intervening medium).
Even with such considerations in place, it is indeed quite clear that Bacon seems to have 
thought about the sphere of activity through its limits. It is a tenet of any account that aims 
to make the sphere of activity a relevant physical concept (that is, a concept that can be 
sustainedly used as an explanans, for instance), that such distances are determinable and 
finite. Bacon makes this point explicit. In the Novum Organum (1620), in the discussion of 
the instances of measuring rod or rules, also called the instances of stopping off or thus far 
and no further, Bacon reminds his readers that 
the virtues and motions of things operate and work over distances which are neither 
indefinite nor random, but finite and certain, so that in the particular natures under 
investigation to grasp and take these distances into account, is of the greatest importance 
for practice; not only to stop it failing but also to extend its reach and power. (OFB XI: 
369)16
First, notice here the goal of the endeavour: one accounts for the distances in order to 
manipulate the virtues of bodies. This of course does not entail simply registering to what 
extent “virtue and motion” acts, but rather providing an account of the factors influencing 
the actions. The limit to how each virtue act is simultaneously treated as an object of 
investigation and as an instrument necessary in making sense of such virtues. We see here 
at work the Baconian principle that “human knowledge and power come to the same thing, 
for ignorance of the cause puts the effect beyond reach” (OFB XI: 65). Knowing the 
distance at which the body operates and what it influences amounts to knowing how to 
control said virtue. Bacon provides a list of factors that influence these distances: 
the mass or quantity of bodies, or the strength and weakness of virtues, or the helps and 
hindrances of the media all of which ought to come into reckoning and be noted down 
(OFB XI: 371).
16 Whether Bacon is committed to all of the claims of the New Organon from a natural-philosophical 
perspective  is debatable. It is debatable because Bacon often seems to shift between natural 
philosophical vocabularies: at times, it appears that he accommodates mechanistic explanations (as in 
the treatment of colours), while at other times it seems he does not. It is thus possible to read the New 
Organon strictly as a treatise of method which aims to regulate all investigations into natural 
phenomena independently of the natural philosophical commitments one might have. This would 
entail that the treatise is only concerned with questions about the logic of invention (and discovery). 
On this interpretation, one need not attribute to Bacon all of the doctrines he mentions and discusses 
under the headings of the Instances of the special power. But even if this were the case, then Bacon’s 
considerations about spheres of activity can be taken as good indications of how his contemporaries 
(even if not necessarily Bacon himself) thought about spheres of activity. Either way, the 
considerations of the New Organon are relevant the overall goal of this chapter.
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Irrespective of whether one takes the claim that virtues operate “over distances which are 
neither indefinite nor random, but finite and certain” to be a physical, metaphysical or 
natural-philosophical claim, it will also have an impact on the working methodology. 
Randomness – be it in an action or in the effect of that action – is not amenable to 
reiteration or experimental control. The assent to the claim that the operations of bodies 
follow some determinate rules (in this case, determinable ranges of action) makes the 
phenomena tractable in an experimental–observational program, such as the one Bacon 
proposes.17 This being said, notice, however, that if the medium can influence the causal 
efficacy of the sphere of activity, this can make a body’s actions intractable (unless 
simplifications and idealisations are already at work).18 If the atmospheric conditions affect 
a body’s action, then that respective action becomes hard to track as there are multiple 
factors constantly varying at work.19
Despite identifying the sphere of activity with the distance of action of a body’s virtue(s), 
Bacon does not propose a genuine model of causation at a distance because the emanation 
of the virtue acts as a material medium connecting the bodies in question. Genuine action at 
a distance presupposes that the virtue in question acts without inhering in a substance. 
Bacon’s model is one in which qualities act through and by means of their material 
substrata.20 At the same time, however, by reducing the sphere of activity to measures of 
distances, he makes it compatible with distinct emanationist models. Unlike many of his 
contemporaries, Bacon’s account of the sphere of virtue is indifferent to the nature of the 
emissions: whether they are powers, virtues, corpuscles, or something else, what matters is 
that the properties of the sphere are tractable in a research program dedicated to 
experimenting on the virtue itself (by increasing or decreasing it) and measuring its range 
17 One might object to my claim that this is a principle of methodology rather than of metaphysics by 
bringing into discussion some considerations about general principles of order. When discussing these 
issues, Bacon, however, does not make use of such principles. 
18 I build on this point in Chapter 5, in order to show that the phenomenon cannot be treated as given. 
The phenomenon is “devised” by the specificities of the practice and the simplifications at work. 
19 Bacon is not unaware of this – and this partly motivates his claims to the provisional status of 
explanations. On my reading, the provisionality of explanations is posited to allow for new relevant 
variables to finesse the explanation. 
20 How these material substrata look for Bacon is a different question, although not one that is 
especially relevant when the object of study is the sphere of activity (as we will see). Bacon talks 
about such substrata by using multiple vocabularies, one of spirits and appetites, one of tangibles and 
pneumatics, but also one of forms and schematisms of motions, and so on. Whether these 
vocabularies are competing accounts or can be put together in a coherent matter theory is one of the 
thorniest questions in Bacon scholarship. 
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of action. Given this, a physics of spheres of virtue entails a specification of such limits and 
how such limits are affected by definite circumstances. 
Jalobeanu (manuscript: 18) argues that in order to operationalise the orb of virtue, Bacon 
makes use of a correlated concept: perception. In the unfinished ANN, Bacon connects the 
orb of virtue with perception, as he defines the former as the distance “that perception 
reaches to” (OFB XIII: 195, but also OFB XIII: 211). Jalobeanu’s treatment of perception is 
restricted to analysing the functions that perception plays in experimental physics: she 
argues that Bacon is not so much interested in discussing the mechanisms of how 
perception works or the natural-philosophical reasons for positing it, but is rather interested 
in an experimental investigation of the range of perceptive responses that different bodies 
have (Jalobeanu 2016: 244). But perception is a low-level foundational concept in Bacon’s 
natural philosophy (at least the natural-philosophical programme developed in some of his 
later writings), and the metaphysics of Baconian perception still awaits deciphering. 
I take perception to be foundational for Bacon because he does not hesitate to attribute 
perception to all bodies. This view is clearly stated by Bacon in De augmentis scientiarum 
(1622):
For we see that all natural bodies have a manifest power of perception, and also a kind 
of choice in receiving what is agreeable, and avoiding what is hostile and foreign. […] 
[N]o body when placed near another either changes it or is changed by it, unless a 
reciprocal perception precedes the operation […] in short there is Perception 
everywhere. (SEH IV: 402)21
And again reiterated in Sylva sylvarum:
It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, yet they have 
perception: for when one body is applied to another, there is a kind of election to 
embrace that which is agreeable, and to exclude or expel that which is ingrate […]. (SS 
X: 602).
We notice, then, that perception is different from sense, and not reducible to it. Perception is 
more basic since even the bodies that lack sense have perception. Graham Rees defines 
Baconian perception (perceptio) as “mere reactions to local stimuli, but these reactions are 
coordinated by the vital spirit” (Rees in OFB VI: lviii). Rees’ account is misleading in 
significant ways. To begin with, perception is not a reaction to stimuli, but rather that which 
grounds the possibility of a reaction in each body, since perception “precedes operation”, 
that is, changes in bodies presuppose the perceptive power of bodies. Second, what matters 
is that perception is an intrinsic property of the body, not brought about (or causally 
determined) by something external, but only occasioned by some other body. If this is the 
21 Here Bacon also calls for a science that distinguishes between senses and perception. 
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case, then, by positing perception in bodies, Bacon seems to deny that the effect is 
ultimately caused by a different body. Instead, Bacon suggests that – at least to some extent 
– each body “chooses” how to react to the causal circumstance it is in. The “choice” is not 
arbitrary, but regulated by a teleology of “receiving what is agreeable, and avoiding what is 
hostile and foreign”. Thus, perception is posited for two correlated reasons: 1) to account 
for the causal agency of bodies (a body has the power to produce change by itself, and not 
just as a reaction to a given circumstance) and 2) to explain how body–body interactions 
happen in a world of such causal agents.
A distinction ought to be made between that which makes the body causally active in a 
specific manner (its virtue)22 and that which gives a body the capacity to respond (or not to 
respond) to a causal circumstance (a body’s perception). In which case, on my reading, 
when Bacon defines the sphere of activity as “the distance that perception reaches to” (OFB 
XIII: 195), it is not the body that extends the virtue (i.e., the “active” body) that perceives, 
but the body that is apt to respond (the passive body, as it were). What Bacon seems to 
suggest is that a body is passive (non-reactive) only if it is outside of an orb of virtue (or 
sphere of activity). But not any orb of virtue will do: any given body responds to only a 
limited range of virtues (and orbs of virtues) – those with which it is co-natural. Also, at the 
same time, more than one virtue is acting on each and every single body. By correlating a 
body’s perception with another body’s virtue, Bacon leaves open for further research the list 
of bodies that could be used to detect the properties of the sphere of activity and of a body’s 
virtue.23 In Bacon’s natural-philosophical system, there is no predetermination of what 
bodies respond to what virtues. The determination of both the virtues that are and which 
bodies respond to what virtues has to be, and can only be, determined empirically.24 
This brings us to one significant way in which Bacon’s proposal is different from Gilbert’s 
(which will be discussed below). When it comes to the list of bodies that can react to the 
magnetic virtue, Bacon’s list is open. What effects the magnetic virtue can produce is also 
an open question. In Gilbert’s magnetical philosophy (whose treatment of the sphere of 
activity will be considered at length in section 3.1. below), the list of magnetic bodies is 
pre-determined by natural-philosophical considerations: the earth, lodestones, and iron are 
magnetic bodies; nothing else is. Thus, for Gilbert, the science of magnetism is reduced to 
22 A virtue which is presumably further grounded in the theory of the pneumatic active (or spiritual) 
matter. 
23 In which case, it is clear that the perceptive capacity of bodies can be used in developing 
instruments for detecting the limits and properties of the sphere of activity. See Jalobeanu 
(manuscript). 
24 If this is right, it can explain why Bacon so frequently shifts between the lists of simple motions, 
appetites, virtues, etc.
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these bodies and the effects that these bodies will detect (inclination, declination, variation, 
attraction and rotation). In Baconian terms, we might say that, for Gilbert, no other body 
“perceives” the magnetic virtue. Gilbert's assent to this view is, however, too hasty. Today, 
we know that all sorts of other bodies respond to what Gilbert called the magnetic virtue: 
birds, for instance, respond to the magnetic field of the earth.25 The development of 
detection techniques, then, should be not pre-determined theoretically, but open to further 
empirical determination and refinements of the technique. If an initial early theory is too 
stringently spelled out, and does not allow for accommodation of diverse empirical findings 
it can be easily overthrown by new data.26
In Bacon’s treatment, there is no predetermination of the detection techniques, and I take 
this to be a strength of his proposal. In discussing the development of a measurement scale 
for hot and cold, Bacon is quick in claiming that the “weather glass” is a better instrument 
than human perception because it picks up “subtle differences and degrees” that remain 
imperceptible to us (OFB XI: 107). He goes further, allowing for the possibility of refining 
the instrument even more. He also allows for the use of more than one instrument of 
detection. An open methodology in which practitioners are prepared to internalise the need 
for constant improvement of the techniques they use is good practice, especially in the 
absence of standardised units of measurement (or technologies of detection), not least 
because it allows for constant revision of both data and the relevant phenomena.27 In 
correlating spheres of activity (and by extension the virtues of bodies) with the capacity of 
bodies to respond or not (perception), Bacon proposes a research programme of the 
determination of the relevant limits and properties of spheres, and not an explanation of 
effects by appeal to spheres of activity.
Without denying the value of Bacon’s struggle to devise ways of determining the outer 
limits, we should note that, irrespective of any particular conceptualisation of the sphere of 
activity, most natural philosophers have ways of detecting the outer limit. Regardless of 
whether one holds that the magnetic virtues resides in both lodstone and iron or just in the 
lodestone, one can still determine the extent of the sphere of activity because there is no 
magnetic effect outside that sphere. What makes Bacon’s approach particularly interesting 
25 Exactly how they do is still a partially open question. On one proposal, avian magnetoception does 
involve magnetite; on the other main proposal, it is a protein (cryptochrome) in the eye that is 
responsible.
26 Part of what brings about the demise of Gilbert’s theory of variation is precisely the fact that it is not 
flexible enough to accommodate all sorts of empirical data. When Gellibrand argues for the secular 
variation of magnetic variation, Gilbert’s theory, which concluded that magnetic variation is caused 
by irregular topology alone, is seriously threatened. See Chapter 1, section 3.
27 On this point, see, e.g., Chang (2004). 
96 CHAPTER THREE
is that he does not start with a determinate concept of the sphere of activity. Given that all 
bodies have spheres of activity, he explicitly raises the status of the concept to an object of 
research, rather than simply a well-determined explanans. 
To do so, Bacon opens up the possibility of instrumentalising a body’s perceptive capacity. 
Perception is used to detect the structure and outer limits of the sphere of activity. Changes 
in the behaviour of the perceptive body are indications of changes within the structure of 
the sphere of activity which, in return, says something about the virtue to which the body 
responds. A body’s perceptive capacity is used for two distinct purposes: it is the detector of 
the outer limits of the sphere of activity and the detector of potential changes in the sphere’s 
“internal” structure. Once such changes are detected, one can go about investigating 
whether the changes are genuine (i.e., are aspects of the body’s virtue) or are caused by 
external influences of the sphere’s structure (e.g., changes in the surrounding medium). 
However, if the sphere of activity is the range of action of a body, that is, if it is defined in 
terms of distance, as Bacon proposes, a further variable needs to be accounted for: the 
internal limit of the sphere also has to be determined. 
The internal limit makes a difference. Mapping the sphere of activity entails knowing from 
where and to where whatever is being mapped extends. A first way out of this is to claim 
that spheres of activity do not have internal limits. Even in this case, however, the 
determination of the distance entails a measurement of the outer limits from one side to the 
other. By removing the internal limit, one removes the difference between the material body 
and its emanations. Some interpreters (both modern historians and Gilbert’s 
contemporaries) read Gilbert as proposing something along these lines: at several points in 
De magnete, Gilbert claims that the sphere of activity spreads equidistantly from the 
surface of the body such that it respects the shape of the body.28 This is indeed a 
conceptualisation of the sphere’s limits in which the only thing that matters is the external 
limit (the internal limit is already determined by the body’s shape). But, even if we accept 
this reading of Gilbert, we still notice that this description of the sphere of activity is not 
constrained empirically. It is an ad hoc proposal. For Gilbert, however, what matters about 
the sphere of activity is to show the alignments of magnetic bodies in relation to each other, 
rather than the distance at which such alignments occur.29 The distance is irrelevant. 
Additionally, a magnet’s sphere of activity is indifferent to the medium, an assumption that 
Bacon cannot and does not generalise to all bodies. 
If Bacon proposes a methodological programme for a science of orbs based on the 
conceptualisation of the orb in terms of ranges of actions or distances, then the internal 
28 Ridley 1613; Pumfrey 1987, 2002. 
29 For more clarification on this, see section 3.1. here.
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limit will matter. It does matter that bodies fall because they are in the gravitational orb, but 
it also matters whether they fall towards the centre of the earth or towards the earth’s 
surface. This is even more true given that Bacon proposes a correlation between a body’s 
weight and its position within the gravitational sphere of activity. But he remains silent on 
the question of the internal limit. He does not dwell on asking how an internal limit can be 
determined, nor on whether or not it can be determined empirically. Contrary to Bacon, 
many natural philosophers are quick to take a stance on this issue (the centre of the body in 
Wilkins, the orb of virtue itself with Gilbert according to complex rules of symmetry, and 
others). Depending on matter-theoretical considerations, they posit the internal limit to be 
either the centre of the body, from which effluvia are emitted radially, or the surface of the 
body.
Bacon’s proposal is a full departure from a focus on the nature of the emissions – whether 
effluvia, spirits, corpuscles or so on – to a focus on the relevant variables of the sphere. 
What matters is the mapping and measurement of the sphere of activity. These practices 
involve the determination of the limits of spheres of activity. A Baconian science of the orbs 
is concerned with precisely such determinations, but it remains unspecified insofar as it 
remains unclear how exactly the internal limit of the sphere of activity (if there is one) will 
be specified. What matters however is that Bacon drags the concept of a sphere of activity 
into the physical realm.
2: Spheres of activity in mechanistic magnetism 
In section 1, I discussed the different ways in which spheres of activity feature in 
emanationist theories. We have seen that the conceptualisation of spheres of activity in 
these accounts is not as straightforwardly clear and unproblematic as might appear. Despite 
significant differences, however, positing spheres of activity is not peculiar. Given the 
stringencies of their natural philosophical explanations, what would be peculiar is if early 
modern mechanical philosophers would make use, in relevant ways, of spheres of activity. 
In this section, I argue that they (or, at least, some of them) do. 
The mechanical philosopher holds the view that natural phenomena are explainable in 
terms of the motion, basic properties (size, shape and so on – the list varies somewhat 
between mechanists) and arrangement of minute, insensible corpuscles (or particles) of 
matter. This entails that observable phenomena are reducible to causal local interactions 
between corpuscles of different sizes and shapes that are moving in different directions at 
different speeds (or in terms of whichever are the basic properties in play). On this 
understanding, phenomena are nothing but effects of systems of interconnected mechanical 
objects. In the mechanical picture there is no room for explanations in terms of action at a 
distance, occult qualities, sympathy and antipathy. If so, one might conclude that spheres of 
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activity also become redundant. In this section I show that this is not the case. Some 
mechanical accounts of magnetism make use of spheres of activity. The latter is an integral 
and irreducible part of the explanation of (at least) magnetic effects. Mechanical 
philosophers take spheres of activity to be nothing more than streams of particles, but it is 
the particular conceptualisations of the sphere of activity that do the explanatory work: 
magnetic effects happen within spheres of activity, and the properties of such spheres of 
activity themselves are integral in how magnetic effects are accounted for.
My claim about the indispensability of the sphere of activity is not that an account in terms 
of the properties of the sphere (and its corresponding emanations) could not be reduced 
further, to the level of the corpuscles’ interactions (be they thought of in terms of collisions 
or percussions), but rather that what is relevant about the account qua an account of 
magnetic effects happens at the level of the emanations and their acting specifically through 
the sphere of activity. In support of this claim, I examine how Kenelm Digby, in Of bodies 
(1644), and Descartes, in his Principles (1644), accounted for magnetism. Descartes’ 
speculations on magnetism are often treated as the most plausible mechanical account of 
magnetism in the early modern period. Consequently, Descartes is an obvious, and 
necessary, choice for analysis here.
Yet another obvious choice would have been Boyle. Whilst an open defender of both 
corpuscularianism and mechanical explanation, in his mature mechanical philosophy, Boyle 
also openly posited that each body emits, beyond its bodily limits, imperceptible 
corpuscular effluvia in a sphere of activity. Boyle’s treatment of effluvia has however 
already received some attention in the literature.30 Kenelm Digby’s magnetic theory did not: 
it went almost unnoticed by historians of science and early modern scholars. It is however a 
good candidate for my purposes here since: 1) Digby appears to be a defender of a form of 
mechanistic explanation, because: “all the actions of sensible bodies may be reduced to 
locall motion, and to materiall application of one body vnto an other’ (TT: 306); and 2) 
despite his mechanistic goals, Digby still makes explicit use of spheres of activity. 
30 For treatments of Boyle’s account of effluvia see for example Parigi (2015). For Boyle’s treatment 
of effluvia and spheres of activity see his Essays of the Strange Subtilty, Great Efficacy, Determinate 
Nature of Effluviums (1673) and An Experimental History of Cold (1665). Boyle takes effluvia (or 
exhalations) to refer to entities that are material but imperceptible (in principle). What remains 
somewhat debatable in Boyle’s account of effluvia is whether the latter should be treated 
mechanistically– by collision laws, and if so whether such laws are to be formulated only at the limits 
of extension of such effluvia, or whether they can only be interpreted qualitatively and thus formulate 
qualitative rather than quantitative laws for the interactions between such effluvia. 
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2.1. Digby’s atomistic magnetism
This section is divided into two subsections. The first discusses Digby’s account of 
magnetism.31 This step is needed because the scholarship has so far almost completely 
overlooked Digby’s magnetic theory. On the rare occasions it gets mentioned, we are told 
that Digby simply accommodated Gilbert’s experimental results in his own natural 
philosophical program. As I show here, this is not the case. Digby is more critical of 
Gilbert’s claims and results than is usually assumed. In the second part of the section, I 
show that, despite Digby’s commitments to explaining natural phenomena mechanically, 
there is still room in his natural philosophical program for the commitment that each body 
is surrounded by a sphere of activity. The section deals with Digby’s account of a sphere of 
activity in the context of his account of magnetism. 
2.1.1 Atmospherical dynamics and Digby’s magnetic theory
In the Two treatises (1644) (hereafter, TT)32 Kenelm Digby presents a fully worked out 
natural-philosophical system. TT sets out to show that in nature there are two types of 
bodies: physical bodies and souls. The strategy for defending this is to show that these two 
kinds of bodies are governed by very distinct principles. Physical bodies work 
mechanically, that is, they obey (some) laws of motion. It is these physical bodies that we 
will touch upon here, which are discussed in the first part of the TT. It is Digby's account in 
this part of the book that determines Henry to claim that Digby “was the first English 
natural philosopher to publish a fully worked out system of mechanical philosophy” (Henry 
2010: 43). Specifically, of course, we will focus on Digby’s account of magnetic bodies. 
The goal of the first part of the TT is thus to set out the rules (laws) that physical bodies 
obey and to establish how one can explain all natural phenomena on the basis of such rules.
Characterising the matter theory that informs Digby’s mechanical philosophy is difficult, as 
it has a profoundly eclectic character. Digby frequently uses the language of atoms (and, 
very occasionally, of corpuscles), but he explicitly denies atomism (both in its Epicurean 
and Gassendian flavours). He also seems to build on Paracelsian medicine, alchemy, and 
the Renaissance Aristotelian natural philosophies that take density and rarity as 
fundamental categories of their system. But, despite its eclecticism, Digby’s matter theory 
can be taken to be broadly corpuscularian (although it is, admittedly, a peculiar version of 
31 Kenelm Digby was member of the Royal Society, had spent a few years around Gresham College 
and corresponded with Mersenne, Descartes and others. He was undoubtedly well acquainted with the 
magnetical philosophy, with the new experimental philosophy and with Cartesian principles. For an 
account of Digby’s intellectual and political context see Henry (2010).
32 Full title: Two Treatises. In the one of which the nature of bodies; in the other the nature of mans 
soule is looked into: in way of the discovery of the immortality of reasonable soules.
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corpuscularianism).33 It is corpuscularian insofar as the central principle of Digby’s 
philosophy is the divisibility of matter. For Digby, matter is infinitely divisible. And, in line 
with the Aristotelian doctrine, divisibility is essentially quantity. According to Digby, there 
are six kinds of quantity: magnitude, place, motion, time, number and weight. 
Digby distinguishes quantity from substance, such that what is divided is the substance or 
weight (by which he means bulk). If more “quantity” is added to a given weight (or 
substance) – that is, if the weight is more divided – then the thing is rarer; if less “quantity” 
is present, the thing is denser. Furthermore, if we consider two bodies of the same weight, 
the denser body is the one of lesser quantity and the rarer the one of more “quantity”. Rarer 
bodies are more easily divided than denser bodies, but denser bodies, which are more 
compact and heavier, can sustain more divisions than rarer bodies. Ultimately, what is at 
stake for rarity and density is the number of divisions a body can undertake. This is a 
number that, although in principle “infinite”, is actually limited to a point from which the 
body cannot be further divided, such that rarer bodies are closer to this minimum than 
denser and by consequence have more quantity (Digby 1644: 21).
Exactly how these paradoxical views hang together in Digby’s system cannot be 
disentangled here. What matters for our purposes is to show that density and rarity are the 
“chief properties” of bodies (TT 1644: 122–3). Moreover, it seems that the determination of 
whether a body is dense or rare is not absolute but relative. It is only in relation to other 
bodies that one can establish whether a body is denser or rarer. Also, such determinations 
appear to be constantly in flux. Rarity and density are properties of bodies also connected to 
two other properties, hot and cold: Digby associates rarity with the emission of heat, 
whereas he takes denser bodies to emit cold. On earth, bodies are constantly submitted to 
the action of the sun, such that they are constantly exposed to changing ratios of heat and 
cold. The dynamics of the atmosphere is an integral part of Digby’s explanatory repertoire. 
Once he establishes that rarer bodies are hotter and denser bodies colder, he uses these 
correlations to account for the formation of the elements: fire is hot and dry, air is humid 
and hot, water is cold and wet, and earth is cold and dry (Digby 1644: 37–8). Moistness and 
dryness are effects of gravitation as follows: in rare bodies, if rareness “overcomes” gravity, 
dryness results, if gravity overcomes rarity, moistness results; in dense bodies, if density 
overcomes gravity, we obtain dryness, and when the reverse happens, we get moistness 
(Digby 1644: 33). All other bodies are mixtures of the elements, but the elements 
themselves are further explainable by the rarity and density of bodies.
For Digby, all magnetic bodies are formed by the same processes: the dynamic motions of 
heat and cold working on rare and dense bodies. The sun’s heat rarifies the air in the torrid 
33 On Digby’s natural philosophy, see Dobbs (1971–4), Blank (2007), Newman (2001), Holden 
(2004).
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zone and displaces it away from the earth’s surface, where it is replaced by colder air from 
the poles, which, being denser, presses closer to the earth’s surface, such that “the more 
those subtler parts are rarefied, and thereby happen to be carried up, the stronger and the 
thicker the heavier atoms must descend” (Digby 1644: 176). Because of the different 
“complexions” of the two hemispheres (the northern being drier than the southern), the 
earth’s emanations of atoms (which constitute its atmosphere) have different qualities: we 
can talk about two different streams of atoms moving from the two poles towards the 
equator and, as they meet at the equator, some will continue into the other hemisphere 
whereas other will return to their own (Digby 1644: 177-8). The circulation of the 
atmospheric air is the circulation of streams of atoms of different ratios of dryness and 
moisture. These streams of atmospheric atoms circulate not only high in the atmosphere 
(where by necessity the streams are rarer), but also in the upper parts of the earth and the 
earth’s surface. As they circulate through the upper layers of the earth some of them 
“incorporate themselves in” a body of “convenient density” (Digby 1644: 180); through a 
process that takes many years, the body in question, which is now filled with atmospheric 
atoms that are mostly “cold and dry” because they were drawn from the poles, will 
eventually become a stone.
Once removed from the earth, such a stone is submitted to the processes of cooling and 
heating, thus constantly emitting streams of emanations, but emanations which carry in 
themselves the polar qualities it acquires in its formation. In short, the lodestone is formed 
by a process of “concretion” of atmospheric atoms coming from the two poles. More 
generally, due to the constant heating and cooling of the atmosphere there is a constant flow 
of atomic motions, which leads to the formation of magnetic and gravitational (that is, 
heavier) things (Digby 1644: 194). This speculative model of the lodestone’s formation 
cannot be proved, but Digby claims that experimental evidence in its support can be gained. 
Firstly, he claims, iron can be magnetised, under specific conditions, by a similar process: 
through heating, it opens up its pores and makes itself susceptible to receive “such atomes 
as are conuenient to their nature, that flow vnto them whiles they are cooling” (Digby 1644: 
181). Secondly, a lodestone loses its magnetic properties if heated to a very high 
temperature (which entails the consumption of its emanations). Thirdly, the ways in which a 
lodestone acquires verticity (or magnetic direction) also shows the likelihood of this 
generative process.
Digby holds that there are no genuine magnetic bodies: there are no bodies that are 
essentially (or intrinsically) magnetic. Ultimately, for Digby, the capacity of a body to 
perform magnetic effects is not intrinsic to the body but is an accidental property, derived 
from another body: “this virtue comes to a magnetic body from another body, as the nature 
of bodies is to require being moved, that they move” (Digby 1644: 186). Strictly put, a 
magnetic effect is a higher-level phenomenon fully reducible to properties of lower-level 
bodies that are not in any way distinct from, for instance, the bodies that enter into the 
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formation of minerals. The visible bodies are formed through the same processes and from 
the same kind of corpuscles (parts of matter). All that differs is the ratio in which dryness 
and moisture and their correlated heat and cold are present in the bodies. Particles that form 
magnetic bodies permeate the atmosphere at all times; they circulate through and around 
the earth, and are received by bodies appropriately organised (lodestones). The particles in 
question are simply on the colder and dryer ends of the spectrum and are bodies that 
originated in the poles.
Since these streams of lodestone-forming particles flow only at the surface and upper layers 
of the earth, Digby takes the “main globe of the earth” not to be a lodestone (Digby 1644: 
263), as Gilbert would have it. If it is not a lodestone, then the earth will not display the 
same sort of magnetic motions the lodestone does. Moreover, without explicitly denying 
that the earth is a magnet, Digby is prepared to accept only that whatever makes a visible 
body magnetic (the polar emanations) is to be found solely at the earth’s surface and not in 
its whole body. There is no particular, specific quality or property that makes the earth 
magnetic.34 More than that, the magnetic virtue is “accidental to the earth”, as it is a 
consequence of “the sun’s drawing the northern and southern exhalations to the 
equator” (Digby 1644: 193). Without the sun’s activity, there would be no such exhalations 
that can produce magnetic bodies. For Digby, magnetism is not generalised, or even 
generalisable; it is not a force, nor an essential property of the earth, nor a quality. It is not 
even a set of effects produced as a consequence of the formation of a particular kind of 
particle. It is merely a property of parts of the upper layers of the earth caused by a 
conjunction of the dynamics of the earth’s atmosphere due to the sun’s agency. 
The magnetic “virtue” is substantial to the lodestone (Digby 1644: 193) because of the 
latter’s internal structure and composition, and is best understood as the property of having 
poles. Usually, for magnetical philosophers, a magnet has two distinctive poles only in 
relation to another magnet, but, for Digby, the polar qualities are accounted for by the 
genealogical story of the stone’s formation. The polar determinations are inherent to each 
individual magnetic body; they are in no way relative to any other body, and they are fixed 
determinations. To Digby, a lodestone’s north–south orientation respects the hemisphere 
one is in. In the northern hemisphere, a lodestone orients its north pole towards the earth’s 
north pole, while the reverse goes for the southern hemisphere. This position is contrary to 
Gilbert’s position. Gilbert uses the law of the opposite poles as an explanatory principle of a 
magnet’s orientation towards the poles of the earth. Digby denies it. What guides the polar 
34 Digby’s mechanical account of magnetism is unlike Descartes’ in this respect, as we shall see in 
more detail in the next section. For Descartes, magnetic bodies are identifiable by their screw-shaped 
particles: such particles are to be found throughout the whole universe, and definitely within the body 
of the earth. Descartes’ account is one that ultimately does not make magnetism a derived aspect of 
the universe. The formation of the screw-shaped particles is a logical consequence of spherical 
particles closely packed and moving in vortices. 
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orientation for Digby is the stream of particles which tend towards their respective poles. 
That this is Digby’s position is exemplified by how he explains the apparently stronger 
attraction between lodestone and iron than between two lodestones. According to Digby, 
this happens because 
iron is indifferent in all its parts to receive the impression of a lodestone, whereas 
another lodestone receives it only in a determinate part. And therefore, a lodestone 
draws iron more easily than it can another lodestone, because it finds repugnance in the 
parts of another lodestone, unless it be exactly situated in a right position (Digby 1644: 
195).35
In this natural–historical account of both how the lodestone is formed and what the 
properties of its sphere of activity are, Digby makes an assumption about the stone’s 
constituent parts. The polar atoms, despite being constantly under the influence of heating 
and cooling processes (as is everything, at all times, for Digby) do not lose their “polarity”: 
in a sense, the atmospheric atoms coming from the southern hemisphere “concreated” in the 
stone are still orienting towards the south pole; and the same goes for the northern atoms. 
Although this is supposedly explainable by the atoms’ distinctive elemental qualities, it is 
somewhat surprising given the constant flux the streams of particles are in. Irrespective of 
how much Digby attempts to reduce this polarity to its genealogy, because it maintains its 
nature through the various transformations that bodies are submitted to, it seems to function 
in the explanation in the manner that a quality would. And that is because the shifting and 
consuming nature of the polar emanations are taken to be irrelevant in explaining each 
individual magnetic effect. At most, it becomes relevant if one is interested in accounting 
for why a lodestone loses its magnetic quality or how it shifts its poles. 
2.1.2. Digby’s spheres of activity. 
Digby is committed to the view that bodies are surrounded by spheres of activity. As he 
puts it, 
no particular body can be exempt from the lawes of all bodies: and we haue aboue 
declared that euery physicall body must of necessity haue an orbe of fluours, or a sphere 
of actiuity about it (Digby 1644: 189).
These spheres of activity are spheres of material emanations “of the same nature which that 
body is of” (Digby 1644: 138). It is by such emanations that bodies are causally efficient, 
but this causal potency extends only as far as the body’s sphere of activity extends. Digby 
makes use of an agent–patient account of causation here:
35 Notice here that Digby accepts Gilbert’s claim that repulsion is not a genuine magnetic property, but 
only a transitional state for the magnetic bodies to arrange themselves in the proper positions so they 
can attract. For a discussion of this see chapter 2. 
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Within the compasse of which orbe, when any other body cometh that receiueth an 
immutation by the little atomes whereof that orbe is composed, the aduenient body 
seemeth to be affected and as it were replenished with the qualities of the body from 
whence they issue (Digby 1644: 138). 
The “advenient” body receives the emanations of the agent, with which it shares the same 
property. In this section, I look at how Digby’s commitments to spheres of activity is 
articulated in the context of magnetism. I show that (1) the sphere of activity plays an 
integral role in Digby’s explanation and (2) that Digby does not start with a well-
determined characterisation of what the sphere of activity is; instead, he takes the 
determination of the properties of such spheres of activity – its limits, how it operates, and 
so on – to be in need of explanation.
Given Digby’s natural-philosophical system, he takes the lodestone to operate by 
emanations. The emanations are of “two kinds, proportionable to the polar emanations, and 
that the greater force of each sort of them is in that hemisphere where the pole is, at which 
they make their chief issue” (Digby 1644: 189). The polar emanations have the properties 
either of the south or the north pole, with each stream of emanations tending to its 
respective pole. This does not mean, however, that the emanations flow only from the 
poles; rather, they flow from all sides of the magnetic body “round about the whole body, 
and in an orbe from all partes of the superficies of it; in such sort as happeneth in all other 
bodies” (Digby 1644: 188). Digby proposes a series of experiments (which are drawn out of 
magnetic experiments as well as from other processes that Digby takes to be structurally 
similar) in order to support this claim. The polar axis of the body determines the “two 
kinds” of “sphericall emanations”, such that,
because the polar emanations do tend wholy towardes the poles (each of them to their 
proper pole) it followeth that in euery hemisphere both those which come from the 
contrary hemisphere, and those which are bred in the hemisphere they go out att, are all 
assembled in that hemisphere: and therefore, of necessity it must be stronger in that kind 
of fluours, then the opposite end is. (Digby 1644: 189)
Although emanations flow from all sides, Digby objects to those who posit that a 
lodestone’s sphere of activity circumscribes the body at equal distances on all sides. The 
principle by which he explains the extension of a sphere of activity is the following: 
nature having so ordered all her agents that where the strength is greatest, there the 
action must (generally speaking) extend it selfe furthest off (Digby 1644: 192). 
Empirically, others had established that magnetic attraction is strongest at the poles and 
weakest at the equator, which means, for Digby, that the sphere of activity “of necessity 
[…] works further by its poles than by its equator” (Digby 1644: 192). To those who take 
the sphere of activity to extend at equal distances from a body’s surface, the determination 
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of the geometry of the sphere of activity is not particularly difficult: the distance at which a 
magnetic needle ceases to be attracted is the limit of the extent in which the magnetic force 
operates. But the case is more complicated for Digby. The determination of the sphere of 
activity of each magnetic body entails a full mapping of the streams of emanations at all 
points around the sphere of activity, because the distances from the surface of the body to 
the limits of the sphere are variable. The extent and shape of the sphere of activity of any 
given magnetic body are questions to be determined by sustained empirical measurements.
These considerations lead us to yet another distinction between traditional conceptions of 
spheres of activity and Digby’s proposal. On the standard conception, spheres of activity 
are posited as extending in straight lines outwards from the centres of the bodies.36 Digby’s 
proposal is different. For him, a lodestone’s centre is an irrelevant variable. The streams of 
particles are distributed linearly “almost parallel to the axis” and not from the centre 
outwards, nor from all parts of a lodestone towards the poles. An empirical reason adduced 
in support of this view is that “a lodestone whose poles lie broadways, not longways the 
stone, is more imperfect and draws more weakly than is the poles lay longways” (Digby 
1644: 191).
As we have seen, the magnetical philosophers generally take the sphere of activity to be 
unaffected by its surroundings.37 It does not act as a medium. Only the bodies susceptible to 
them are responsive to such emanations. Digby does not assent to this view. The 
emanations of the lodestone affect and are affected by their surroundings. A piece of 
lodestone will become stronger when aligned with the poles of the earth, but weaker 
(because its strength is consumed) if placed in an east–west alignment; if aligned with a 
stronger lodestone, it might shift polarity (Digby 1644: 187). Such data indicates to Digby 
that we can talk either about addition or consumption with respect to a lodestone’s stream 
of emanations. The strength of a lodestone varies with the position it is in, with atmospheric 
changes (the exposure to hot and cold). Given this, the strength of a magnet and the 
properties of a lodestone’s sphere of activity are time-dependent, such that a physical 
description of Digbian magnetic sphere of activity cannot be diagrammatical (as Gilbert 
proposes in De magnete, Book 5, Chapter XI); it has to be processual and dynamic (since it 
is constantly shifting). Either way, what matters is that, on Digby’s account, there are many 
variables to be accounted for such that a full description of a magnetic sphere of activity – 
under the available techniques – is unlikely.
36 See Chapter 4 for Gilbert’s diagrammatic representation of spheres of activity (or orbs of virtue, in 
his terms) around a terrella.
37 Gilbert separates (non-emanative) magnetic bodies from (emanative) electric bodies on the basis of 
the latter's disruption by other bodies. See chapter 2, section 2.2.
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2.1.3. Conclusion
Although magnetic effects are ultimately reducible to the percussions of particles, for 
Digby, it is the streams of particles, flowing around a lodestone that are salient to the 
explanations of such effects. The reduction from the streams of particles to individual 
percussions makes no difference to the magnetic effects themselves, nor to their 
explanation. And the flow of the stream of particles around a body is what forms its sphere 
of activity. In which case, it is the sphere of activity that explains magnetic effects such as 
magnetic direction and attraction – and the explanation never takes place at the level of 
particle percussions. In line with the emanationist tradition, Digby takes the sphere to be of 
a body, but there is nothing distinguishing about the body itself that gives it its magnetism: 
magnetism, for Digby, is not an inherent property of any body. A lodestone is magnetic 
simply because of the conditions it was subject to in the upper layers of the earth. 
Moreover, and consequently, the geometry and limits of a magnet’s sphere of activity are 
always at stake, because they are determined by the magnetic flow, which in turn is 
determined by the environment (rather than magnetism being inherent to the stone): 
submitted to atmospheric changes, the sphere of activity is constantly changing. Thus, 
Digby’s mechanisation of magnetism is not, as we might expect, in terms of the percussions 
of particles, but in terms of spheres of activity determined through more or less complex 
environmental systems.
2.2. Descartes’ sphere of activity
In the Principles of Philosophy (1644), Descartes took on the challenge of explaining 
magnetism. He offered a mechanical account of magnetic effects which appeared to fully 
satisfy the mechanical stringencies, whilst also saving all the relevant phenomena. In what 
follows, I briefly outline Descartes’ account and then point to what I take to be a couple of 
weak points of the explanation. Given the reconstruction proposed here I claim that (1) the 
Cartesian explanation will not be found satisfactory by the proponents of the magnetical 
philosophy and (2) that Descartes does not in the end fully avoid the positing of a magnetic 
sphere of activity. The sphere of activity remains part of the explanatory vocabulary of 
magnetism in the mechanical framework, be it based on corpuscles or atoms. And the 
sphere of activity does not simply remain merely as residual vocabulary, but is a functional 
part of the explanation.
2.2.1. Descartes’ mechanistic magnetism. 
Descartes grapples with magnetism both in the Regulae and the Principles, but it is in the 
latter that he provides a complete and thorough mechanical explanation of magnetism (in 
particular, a detailed account of magnetic attraction).38 At its core, Descartes’ account relies 
38 For Descartes’s articles on magnetism see Principles of Philosophy, Part IV aa. 133–183, in AT 
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on treating magnetic bodies as endowed with a system of long, threaded pores (or 
channels), through which screw shaped-particles (the particulae striatae) – ultimately the 
distinctive particle of magnetism – flow. Descartes’ account of magnetism is part of his 
cosmogonical story: the screw-shaped particles are formed in the early universe from 
matter of the first kind (fast moving matter).39 In a vortices universe, without void, while 
passing between (spherical) particles of the second element, the larger particles of the first 
element get carved into grooved cylinders with triangular cross sections. Because this 
happens within vortices, which are spinning, the grooves are cut rotationally along the 
cylinder and the result of this are particles of different shapes, amongst which also the 
screw-shaped ones. The magnetic particles then are matter of the first element carved out 
into a specific shape because of its being in constant collisions within vortices. Given this 
genealogy of the magnetic particles, Descartes makes magnetism a universal phenomenon, 
not purely a terrestrial one. This entails that the sun, other planets and so on are in principle 
structurally capable of producing magnetic phenomena. 
The magnetic effects are produced by interactions between such screw-shared particles and 
the presence of screw-shaped pores in bodies. If so, then what explains is not properly 
speaking the collisions of such screw-shaped particles, but a structural compatibility 
between kinds of particles–kinds of pores. The pore channels are aligned along the north–
south axis of a magnetic body (be it the earth or a lodestone), and it is this alignment that 
guides which particles will go where. The screw-shaped particles constantly permeate the 
environment around the magnetic body created by the turning of the vortices entering from 
one pole and pushing the ones already present outside the body. Now because the vortex is 
spinning on its axis, screw-shaped particles entering through the northern pole will be 
spinning in the opposite direction from particles entering through the southern pole, and the 
reverse happens in the case of the ones entering through the southern pole. In this way, 
particles with opposite-shaped screws are obtained: the north and south magnetic poles 
refer then simply to channels that allow either left-handed or right-handed screw shaped 
particles to pass. This entails that there has to be a perfect compatibility between the size 
and shape of the pore channels and the particles if the latter are to pass through such 
channels. When the screw-shaped particles exit the body, many are deflected by the more 
VIIIA: 275-313, CSM I 275-279 (abridged in CSM). In this short discussion of Descartes’ treatment 
of magnetism, I will completely ignore his methodological treatment of the magnetic science in the 
Regulae. For a thorough analysis of this, see Schuster 2013, esp. 277–86 and 334–9. Nor will I 
discuss here the role that magnetism plays in the Cartesian theory of vortices or in explaining the 
formation of sunspots.
39 I will not discuss here Descartes’ rationale about how such screw-shaped particles might be formed. 
It is presented in great detail in the Principles, Part III. I only note that this account was famously 
made use of by Bernoulli and Euler as an example of a successful mechanistic account. See Heilbron 
(1979: 31, f.4) 
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turbulent matter outside, in the absence of stable pores there. This deflection causes their 
paths to curve around, eventually re-entering the body at the other side, and thus forming a 
sort of vortex around a body (PP III: 108)40.
Despite the ad-hocness of Descartes’ explanation of magnetism appear to “save the 
phenomena”, while respecting his stringencies for what a good explanation consists in, 
namely its reduction to a system of micro-corpuscular interactions.41 This is especially 
visible in his account of magnetic attraction. When we observe magnetic attraction, what 
happens at the microlevel, according to Descartes, is that the magnetic bodies involved, 
each surrounded by the screw-shaped particles within their respective spheres of activity, 
interact such that the particles of one, continuing along the path of the least resistance, enter 
the channels of the other body and twist and turn through these channels in repeated 
streams, pushing out the air between the bodies, which, in turn, forces air behind each body, 
pushing the two together. What explains the magnetic effects is thus the circuits (vortices) 
of screw-shaped particles that pass from and through the suitable channels in bodies. Given 
this, the mechanism of magnetism is already somewhat more than basic mechanism, at least 
insofar as the magnetic effects seem hardly reducible to collisions between particles.42 
The explanatory resources that Descartes makes use of in accounting for magnetic 
attraction are not, however, enough to explain the other magnetic effects – such as magnetic 
variation and dip. Prima facie, such magnetic effects might appear harder to account for 
from within the mechanical framework. Descartes’s explanation is that, as the screw-shaped 
40 Since the CSM edition is significantly abridged, I have used the Miller & Miller (1982) translation 
(see bibliography), marked as PP. 
41 In his treatment of magnetism, Descartes is not interested in generating new experimental results or 
grappling with unsolved puzzles within the magnetical philosophy. Instead, he takes over many of 
Gilbert’s experimental findings and shows that they can be accounted for in a mechanical 
corpuscularian framework. The reliability and significance of the experimental result cannot always 
be decoupled from both its experimental and its corresponding conceptual and theoretical framework 
without a loss. This is not Descartes’ concern, and it does not seem very problematic in the context of 
the selective experiments presented in the Principles, but it becomes so in an exchange with 
Mersenne where Descartes learns about Gellibrand’s discovery of the secular magnetic variation. His 
reaction is to simply dismiss Gellibrand’s claims to an alleged variation of magnetic variation based 
on the fact that Gellibrand had not given sufficient measurements. See, e.g., AT III: 7. 
42 Notice here that it is only within a system of interactions between the system that the screw-shaped 
particles form in their interaction with the channels that the phenomenon is given. No unique 
interaction is isolatable as the explanation of the phenomenon. On systemic mechanical explanations 
in Descartes see Hutchins (2015). Hutchins argues his case with examples from biology, but the 
reconstruction of Descartes’ account of magnetism argued for here seems to suggest that Hutchins’ 
argument can be extended to at least some physical processes. 
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particles exit a magnetic body through the channels, they are deflected by the air, since the 
air cannot accommodate them; it is this deflection that produces the dip and the variation.43 
If the circulation of air is, however, a relevant parameter, then one cannot have much hope 
in finding regularities behind the movements of the compass. Descartes’ conceptualisation 
makes the search for such a regularity futile.
An important tenet of the magnetical philosophy is that either both magnetic variation and 
magnetic inclination, or at least magnetic inclination, are magnetic motions. In a nutshell, 
this entails that these effects follow a particular pattern. Measuring magnetic variation and 
magnetic inclination gives important information about how magnetism works. At best, the 
intractability of such effects needs to be proven, but it is neither given, nor accepted as 
unproblematic. By explaining them relative to how screw-shaped particles are deflected by 
the surrounding medium, Descartes ultimately attributes randomness to such effects: 
inclination (or dip) and magnetic variation are only side effects of the media, and not 
genuine phenomena. The deflection of the magnetic particles is not per se the result of the 
interaction with particles of air. The medium is filled with particles of air, water, light, dust 
and so on in different concentrations. There are so many constantly changing variables in 
the medium that the deflection can hardly be predictable or regular. If screw-shaped 
particles move towards the channels via the path of the least distance, what this path is in 
such an unstable environment as the surrounding air will be constantly shifting.44 The 
(epistemically intractable) complexity that I take to be constitutive of the Cartesian account 
of magnetic variation or inclination is a variable that magnetical philosophers would not be 
willing to take on board.
Descartes requires the magnetic particles to be unaffected by the interposition of other 
bodies, as earlier experiments had shown magnetic power to be. But if there is a deflection 
at the interaction between the particles of air and the magnetic particles, shouldn’t we 
expect similar deflection to occur at the interposition of all types of bodies between two 
magnets? It is reasonable to expect that very dense bodies (which in a Cartesian world 
43 A thorough examination of Descartes’ accounts of dip and variation is still needed in the literature. 
44 The assumption that the atmosphere might affect the magnetic variation and ultimately explain its 
time variation is also accepted by Gellibrand. But, for Gellibrand, it is only the light rays of the sun 
that can affect the movement of the needle, and his considerations for this are to a significant extent 
still Gilbertian in nature, building on the assumptions that bodies are surrounded by effluvia to which 
other bodies respond. By taking this route, Gellibrand can still hope to secure some predictability of 
the magnetic variation by taking the daily position of the sun and the annual position of the earth in 
consideration. See Gellibrand (1635). Descartes’ account has much more inbuilt randomness than 
Gellibrand’s, since, if he accepts any influence from the surrounding medium, that surrounding 
medium is nothing more than an indeterminate number of collisions between an indeterminate 
number of particles of indeterminate shapes. 
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would mean a large quantity of matter of the third element for the volume of the body 
(Principles III: 151–2)) would in some way deflect the paths of the grooved particles. 
Following Gilbert, however, Descartes denies the interposition of bodies as affecting 
magnetic action. 
Additionally, Descartes’ account is irreducibly qualitative. There is nothing about his views 
on magnetism that could be expressed mathematically or is amenable to being expressed so. 
For magnetical philosophers such as Henry Bond, William Whiston, and even Henry 
Gellibrand and Gilbert, positing a magnetic orb of virtue (or sphere of virtue) with limited 
extension allows for the possibility of mathematising the magnitude of magnetic force – the 
magnitude can be quantified in terms of size of the radius of an orb of virtue plus whatever 
other variables are taken to matter about the orb of virtue (if any). Given these 
considerations, it seems that, in non-trivial ways, Cartesian magnetism, despite saving the 
magnetic phenomena, misses out some important goals of the magnetical philosophy. 
2.2.2. The Cartesian sphere of activity
This section shows that, from an explanatory perspective, the sphere of activity is still 
relevant in Descartes’ account. While, on a micro-corpuscular level, the sphere of activity is 
done away with, as it is fully reduced to the stream of screw-shaped particles, on the 
phenomenal level, it has to be retained in order for the explanation to work. 
In article 171 of the Principles of Philosophy Part IV, while accounting for how magnets 
attract iron, Descartes writes,
[b]esides, the magnet attracts iron, or rather, a magnet and a piece of iron approach each 
other: for in fact there is no attraction there: rather, as soon the iron is within the sphere 
of activity of the magnet, it borrows force from the magnet, and the grooved particles 
which emerge from both the magnet and the piece of iron expel the air between the two 
bodies: as a result, the two approach each other in the same way as two magnets do. 
(PP: 265)45
Given the way Descartes makes use of the concept of a sphere of activity in the above 
example, it is not far fetched to claim that he takes a sphere of activity to refer to all of the 
space around a magnet’s body through which the path of the screw-shaped particles of the 
body extends. It is the sphere of activity that explains the attraction between iron and a 
45 As translated in Miller & Miller (1982). Latin: Praeterea magnes trahit ferrum, five potiùs magnes 
& ferrum ad invicem accedunt; neque enim ulla ibi tractio est, sed statim atque ferrum est intra 
sphaeram activitatis magnetis, vim ab eo mutuatur, & particule striatae, ab utroque egredientes, 
aerem intermedium expullunt: quo fit. ut ambo ad invincem non aliter quam duo magnetes accédant. 
Imô etiam ferrum liberiùs movetur quàm magnes, quia confiât iis tantùm ramentis, in quibus particule 
ftriatae fuos habent mea tus, magnes autem multâ materiâ lapideâ gravatur. (AT VIII: 302)
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magnet. It explains it because 1) magnetic attraction is only possible within the sphere of 
activity and 2) the presence of iron in the sphere of activity determines it to “borrow force 
from the magnet”. (1) tells us that attraction happens within the limits of a magnet’s sphere 
of activity. (2) tells us that it is as a consequence of the “borrowing of force” that the iron 
starts emitting grooved particles. For Descartes, the difference between iron and a lodestone 
seems to be precisely this: whereas a lodestone continuously emits screw-shaped particles 
outside its body in vortices, iron does not.46 Iron only emits streams of screw-shaped 
particles that it previously received from the lodestone as a consequence of being within the 
sphere of activity of the lodestone. If so, then in effect neither iron nor lodestone are the 
active agents: it is the flux of particles that ultimately brings about the macroscopic 
magnetic effects. 
This being said, though, it should be observed that, in order for the streams of particles to 
be effective, the lodestone and iron have to be equipped with the appropriate pore 
structures. What we denote as a sphere of activity macroscopically (that is, relative to the 
observed effects) is, at the corpuscular level, the stream of particles when causally efficient 
(that is, passing either partially or untroubled through pores of bodies). In the passage just 
quoted, then, Descartes starts off from the Gilbertian account of magnetic attraction as 
produced by a causal co-participation of both iron and lodestone, only to ultimately deny 
that the actual relevant causality lies here. Lodestone and iron are only occasional causes – 
by having the appropriate structure of a channel – but what produces the magnetic 
approaching of lodestone and iron is the stream (flux) of screw-shaped particles. This is 
undeniably a successful mechanical explanatory move. However, its success depends on 
accepting that a magnetic sphere of activity needs to be posited in order to determine that a 
magnetic effect happens. In other words, the sphere of activity is what determines whether 
an event is magnetic or not. 
There is a further example of how the sphere of activity matters for Descartes. He argues 
that moisture and rust (and other similar properties and/or processes) affect magnetic action 
because they block the channels (PP: 272). In doing so, the quality of the magnetic body is 
diminished: it does not have as much attractive force, as it were. But this is not because of a 
change in the internal quality of the body, but because of a change in the quality of the 
sphere of activity: there are fewer channels of entering and exiting at the surface of the 
body and thus a diminished quantity of screw-shaped particles in the surrounding medium. 
In this way, the sphere of activity has an interior limit, at the surface of the magnetic body 
46 Descartes claims a qualitative difference between the flow inside the body, where the particles move 
more swiftly, being unimpeded, and the flow of particles outside the body, which can be affected by 
the surrounding medium. It is on the basis of this likely disruption by the medium that he ultimately 
explains some magnetic effects beyond attraction.
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on the polar axis where the screw-shaped particles enter and an outside limit at which it can 
affect the channels and particles of a different magnetic body.
That Descartes’ mechanical account of magnetism can be reconstructed in terms of effluvia 
emanating from a body is also claimed by Glanvill. In his Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661), 
Glanvill reconstructs Descartes’ mechanical corpuscularian explanations in terms of 
effluvia emitted by objects, effluvia which have particular properties (such as their size and 
shape) that make them compatible with some types of pores (or channels) and not others. 
Despite its seemingly violating the Cartesian terminology, Glanville’s is a cogent 
reconstruction since, at least in the case of magnetism, what matters for the explanation is 
not so much the laws of collision (which are entirely irrelevant for the activity of screw-like 
particles), but the perfect compatibility between the shape of the channels and the shape of 
the particles. It is this compatibility, or the lack thereof, that does the explaining, plus the 
determination of the distances at which the compatibility (or the incompatibility) can be 
determined – that is, the spheres of activity. 
2.2.3 Conclusion
Like Digby, Descartes still relies on the sphere of activity to explain magnetic phenomena. 
Indeed, the explanation of the phenomena themselves does not seem to be Descartes’ main 
goal; rather, he indirectly attempts to mechanise the Gilbertian sphere of activity, and 
thereby save the phenomena as described by the magnetical philosophers. Unlike Digby, 
Descartes ontologises the nature of magnetism: it consists precisely in certain screw-shaped 
particles. However, it is not those screw-shaped particles in themselves that provide the 
explanation, but their interactions with channels in other magnetic bodies. These 
interactions only take place at or within the outer limits of the sphere of activity. Again, 
what is relevant for a magnetic effect to obtain is the presence of one magnetic body within 
the sphere of activity of another.
3. The orb of virtue as a property of an interaction
In this section, I analyse a conception of the sphere of activity, as a property of the 
interaction between two (or more) magnetic bodies.47 I argue that this is the conception 
favoured by William Gilbert and William Barlow (a contemporary and correspondent of 
Gilbert’s), who both use the term “orb of virtue” in place of "sphere of activity”. Gilbert is 
addressed here because of his influence on the magnetical philosophy; Barlow is addressed 
47 In this section, I will shift the terminology from “spheres of activity” to “orbs of virtue”. Gilbert 
uses the latter to talk about the magnetism. So does Barlow. The distinction between “orbs of virtue” 
and “spheres of activity” is important in Gilbert's natural philosophy, as the latter refers exclusively to 
electric effluvia, while the former refers to magnetic interactions. 
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because he is usefully explicit about the interactionist account. The two share a general 
approach, but differ somewhat significantly in the details. I first argue that, for Gilbert, the 
orb of virtue is ultimately the empirical manifestation of the causal capacity48 – i.e., the 
magnetic power – residing in each and every magnetic body. The manifestation of the 
magnetic power depends on there being an interaction between magnetic bodies. An orb of 
virtue is a particular effect of the manifestation of the magnetic power. The specific 
properties of the orb of virtue, then, are indicators of properties of the magnetic power. 
Gilbert’s account is a genuine causal-power account. Barlow, however, who is interested in 
denying the diurnal rotation of the earth, conceptualises the orb of virtue slightly 
differently. If, for Gilbert, the causal agency ultimately resides in each magnetic body, for 
Barlow, it is the orb itself – i.e., the interaction between two bodies – that is causal. 
Magnetic causality, for Barlow, resides in magnetic interactions and not in certain 
properties that bodies might have. For Gilbert, a magnet remains a magnet outside its 
interactions (even though we cannot prove this empirically, as any empirical proof requires 
interactions between magnets); but for Barlow, it is the interaction itself that makes bodies 
magnetic, just because it is the interaction itself that gives them polarity.49 Therefore, while 
Gilbertian magnetism is a real property of some bodies (it is the essential property of 
magnetic bodies), for Barlow, magnetism is only an accidental property that (some) bodies 
can have by means of their interactions. 
3.1. Gilbert’s account of the magnetic force within the orb of virtue50
This section gives an interactionist reading of the orb of virtue in Gilbert's De magnete 
(1600). I take my reading to be compatible with Nathaniel Carpenter’s treatment of Gilbert 
48 One could of course use here an analysis also in terms of dispositions. Harre & Madden (1975: 165) 
suggest a reading of Gilbert in these terms, because they take the talk on causal powers to be a 
precursor to discussions about capacities and dispositions.
49 My treatment of Barlow and Gilbert has some similarities with Schliesser’s (2011) reading of 
Newton on gravity. Schliesser argues that, for Newton, gravity is an accidental, relational property of 
matter caused by (or brought forth by) the shared action of bodies. This is also how Gilbert and 
Barlow appear to think about magnetism: shared action of bodies is necessary for bringing about 
magnetic effects. What remains somewhat unclear is the specific metaphysics underpinning these 
claims. The present section is an attempt to (at least partially) remedy that. It suggests (although more 
research is needed) that, for Gilbert, and even more so for Barlow, the system of magnetic bodies (i.e., 
magnetic bodies in interaction) has ontological priority over the individual bodies, such that 
magnetism is not accidental, but inherent to the bodies qua magnetic.
50 This section reiterates in greater detail some of the points already discussed in Chapter 2. 
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in his Geographie Delineated (1639)51. The specific interactionist reading I argue for is the 
following: each magnetic body has an inherent magnetic power (vis, vigor), but while that 
magnetic power is necessary in order to have an orb of virtue, it is not sufficient. A second 
magnetic body (i.e., a body endowed with magnetic power) has to be in close proximity. If 
the interaction between two such magnetic bodies obtains, then the orb of virtue obtains. If 
there is no interaction, no orb of virtue obtains. Each orb of virtue, then, is (as it were) a 
specific physical manifestation of the magnetic power. My reading introduces a distinction 
between having magnetic power and effecting this magnetic power. While each magnetic 
body has magnetic power (as this power is what secures the magnetic nature of the body in 
question), it is only the interaction of bodies that allows the magnetic power to become 
causally active – that is, to bring about (in principle, observable) magnetic effects. Without 
the interaction, a magnetic body is only potentially causal, not actually causal. 
The magnetic power (vis, vigor, potentia magnetica) does not require a medium to be 
propagated; it is transmitted between magnetic bodies without material contact. It is also 
inherent in each and every bit of magnetic matter (DM: 65–71). To be a magnet is to have 
magnetic power. This has led historians to conclude that each magnetic body is causally 
efficacious by and in itself.52 On my reading, however, this is not quite Gilbert’s position. It 
seems to me that Gilbert’s position is that a magnetic body can be causally efficacious: it 
can be an agent. But in order to be one, specific conditions have to be met; specifically, a 
magnetic body has to be in an interaction with another magnetic body. By itself, it cannot 
be an agent, despite its having the capacity.53 Moreover, while each magnetic body is 
intrinsically equipped with polarity – as polarity seems to be yet another description of the 
magnetic power – the locations of a magnet's poles in each case, as well as the magnet’s 
spatial directions (that is, directions away from or towards another magnet), are determined 
only through interactions. The claim is not that it is only through interaction that we have 
access to a magnet’s properties, but rather that through interaction magnetic bodies acquire 
further properties. In other words, the magnetic power and the polarity are essential to a 
magnetic body, but a magnetic meridian, or the location of, e.g, the south pole, are only 
accidental properties, dependent on the interaction. On this interpretation, magnetic orbs 
will be effects of the interaction. From the perspective of each body in the interaction, one 
can describe its orb of virtue. In doing so, the other body is treated as an instrument for 
determining the orb of virtue. But this is so only because, as epistemic agents, we are 
obliged to investigate the properties of the orb of virtue in this manner – in order for us to 
gain knowledge about an orb of virtue, we need to instrumentalize another magnetic body. 
51 See the discussion of Carpenter’s account in Chapter 2. 
52 Pumfrey 1987, 2002; Miller 2014; Jalobeanu 2016. 
53 I have discussed more on this in Chapter 2, when addressing Gilbert’s disponens vigor. Somewhat 
relatedly, Gilbert’s alleged animistic theory of magnetism is cursorily discussed in the same chapter.
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Strictly speaking, though, the orb of virtue is not a property of any singular magnetic body, 
although each magnetic body contributes to the bringing about of an orb of virtue. An orb’s 
structure is consequently determined by the relative positioning of one magnetic body with 
respect to another. 
In Book 2, Chapter VII Gilbert claims,
there exists in nature no orbe or permanent or essential virtue spread through the air, but 
a magnet only excites magneticks at a convenient distance from it. (DM: 76–77)54
And again in Book 5 chapter XI,
And we do not mean that the magnetick forms and orbes exist in air or water or in any 
medium that is not magnetical; as if the air or the water were susceptible of them, or 
were induced by them; for the forms are only effused and really subsist when magnetick 
substances are there; whence a magnetick body is laid hold of within the forces and 
limits of the orbes; and within the orbes magneticks dispose magneticks and incite them, 
as if the orbes of virtue were solid and material loadstones. For the magnetick force does 
not pass through the whole medium or really exist as in a continuous body; so the orbes 
are magnetick, and yet not real orbes nor existent by themselves. (DM: 205–6; my 
emphasis)
Orbs of virtue are, then, not “permanent” but exist only insofar as magnetic bodies are “at a 
convenient distance”; they “really subsist” only “when magnetick substances are there”. 
Even though, in principle, the ability to create an orb of virtue resides within every magnet, 
its realisation depends on the presence of another magnet at an appropriate distance for the 
magnetic power to be “activated”. A lone magnet expresses no orb of virtue. Two magnets 
interact if their respective magnetic powers are “awakened” (in Gilbert’s vocabulary). How 
precisely this is supposed to work, Gilbert does not specify. The sole condition is that the 
bodies have to be within the orb. Magnetic orbs of virtue do not operate indefinitely. Each 
magnet contributes (relative to its strength, shape, volume, quantity) to determining the 
limits of the orb of virtue. If two magnets of unequal strengths interact, the weaker one 
follows the orb of virtue of the stronger. This is established empirically (DM: 93–5). Gilbert 
does not address the speculative case in which two magnets of equal strength and quality 
interact. But he does investigate interactions between three magnetic bodies and describes 
how a third body affects the orb of virtue (DM: 84–7). 
I take Gilbert’s claim that there are two magnetic orbs – the “orb of virtue” and the “orb of 
coition” – to provide further support for the interactionist reading. As we have seen, the orb 
of virtue is nothing but the interaction between magnets. What the distinction between the 
54 Latin: Nec tamen in rerum natura subsistit orbis, aut virtus per aerem fusa permanens, aut 
essentialis; sed magnes nes tantum excitat magnetica conuenienti interuallo distantia.
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orbs of coition and virtue shows is that describing the interaction also entails accounting for 
what the properties of the orb are. The latter cannot be given without the former. 
As we have already seen in the previous chapter, the orb of coition is “all that space through 
which the smallest magnetick is moved by the loadstone” (DM: vi). Coition involves the 
displacement of magnetic bodies not only relative to their respective positions, but also in 
their relative distances, since it is effectuated by the actual coming together of the magnetic 
bodies involved. This displacement in relative distances takes place within the orb of 
coition whereas the relative alignment of the magnetic bodies happens within the orb of 
virtue (which is larger than, and contains, the orb of coition). Moreover, relative alignment 
is a precondition for coition, since the effectuation of coition is possible only after north–
south alignment; that is, in order for bodies to unite, they first need to align. The orb of 
virtue is all that space in which magnetic power can spread. (DM: vi) In the orb of coition, 
magnets necessarily align relative to each other by the rule of opposite poles. Their relative 
activity towards one another is to get into this position and then, by following the path of 
least distance, unite. When the interaction starts off in the different poles alignment, the 
movement of the magnetic bodies is to come together. This is magnetic attraction. If the 
interaction starts off in the same pole alignment, then the respective bodies seem to repel in 
the first instance in order to position themselves in the different poles position and then they 
unite again. These descriptions, presented by Gilbert as results of several experiments with 
magnets on water or suspended in air, exhaust what appears (to us) to happen within an orb 
of coition. Within the orb of virtue, the dynamics of the relative alignments of bodies is 
more complex, and it requires the development of techniques of mapping.55 
Magnetic order (which is a dynamic order) is only specifiable in relation to other bodies. In 
some cases, the spatial order is one of relative positioning, while, under some 
circumstances (i.e. shorter distances and higher magnetic strength), it is translational 
movement such that the magnetic bodies unite. It is the process of arranging, and the 
arrangement itself, relative to the surrounding bodies that takes priority and makes 
magnetism fundamentally interactionist. For a single body, magnetic power makes no 
physical difference precisely because a single magnetic body in isolation cannot constitute a 
magnetic phenomenon: magnetic phenomena are types of interactions of magnetic bodies. 
The most relevant property of an orb of virtue is how magnetic bodies align in relation to 
each other within it, because it is through this that magnetic phenomena are accounted for, 
that magnetic motions are distinguished between, and that it is established which motions 
55 I have argued for this in Georgescu 2014, and in some detail in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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are genuine magnetic effects, and which simply accidental motions, caused by external 
conditions.56 
3.2. Barlow’s prioritisation of the interaction
In the Magneticall Advertisements or diverse pertinent observations and approved 
experiments, concerning the nature and property of the loadstone (1616), William Barlow 
offers a treatment of the lodestone’s properties very much in line with the Gilbertian 
principles of the magnetical philosophy, whilst avoiding the Copernican implications that 
many of Gilbert’s followers saw in De magnete.57 The goal of Barlow’s treatise is to 
articulate an account of magnetism that conserves Gilbert’s conclusion that the earth is a 
magnetic body, while rejecting the further conclusion, which most readers of Gilbert 
accepted, that the earth rotates because of its magnetic nature. To do this, Barlow proposes 
a peculiar and unique interpretation of magnetism which will be the subject of this section. 
Barlow had started his investigations of magnetism at least twenty years before the 
publication of De magnete. According to his own testimony, he had even written a short 
treatise on magnetic experiments that he had shared with Gilbert himself. We do not know 
what this treatise contained, or how much of Barlow’s views changed after his encounter 
with Gilbert in 1597, and following his reading of De magnete. What we do know from the 
only letter written by Gilbert that still survives (which was annexed at the end of the 
Magneticall Advertisements) is that Gilbert supported Barlow’s theory of magnetism.58 
The same cannot be said of Mark Ridley, who charged Barlow with having simply parroted 
Gilbert, and with having brought nothing new to the discussion. Barlow responded with a 
pamphlet entitled A brief discovery of the Idle Animadversions of Marke Ridley Doctor in 
56 This claim is also discussed at length in Chapter 2. 
57 Barlow’s treatment of magnetism is rarely the focus of histories of magnetism (Pumfrey 1984 is an 
exception). Barlow’s The navigator’s supply (1597) is mostly discussed in the context of the history of 
navigation (e.g., Waters 1958, 217–221). The navigator’s supply, however, is very much a treatise of 
magnetism as well, dealing at length with the compass and variation (which is, of course, magnetic) 
alongside other navigational instruments, such as the traverse board, the Traveller’s Jewel, the 
pentameter and so on. Regarding the compass, Barlow's goal was to improve the instrument such that 
it would give more reliable readings; his proposal was to do so by reducing the influence of other 
magnetic bodies and improving the stability of the magnetic needle on its pivot, which also meant 
compensating for magnetic inclination in the actual construction of the instrument. Barlow’s mariner's 
compass was considered a great improvement on those made by Borough and Norman, and it was still 
in use in the 19th century. 
58 Barlow circulated his Magnetical  Advertisements  as a manuscript in 1609. On this basis, he later 
(1618) accused Ridley of having plagiarised him. 
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Physicke upon a Treatise entitled Magneticall Advertisements (1618) (hereafter, A brief 
discovery). The dispute was nasty and personal from the start, but these sociological aspects 
are not our concern here. In non-trivial ways, however, Barlow was right to be offended by 
Ridley’s charges. Not only had Barlow offered a reading of Gilbert stripped of 
cosmological implications, but he had also noted a few experimental results regarding the 
arming of magnets and their polarisation that were not to be found in De magnete. Barlow 
also denied Gilbert’s claim according to which the shape of the magnetic body is a relevant 
parameter for establishing the spatial extension of the magnetic power (Barlow 1616: 5). 
But Barlow is, however, a peculiar case in the English context: he is an anti-Copernican 
who accepts the Gilbertian magnetical philosophy, but without its (alleged) cosmological 
implications. This means that Barlow had to defend the claim that the earth is a magnet, and 
that magnets can rotate, while denying that the earth itself rotates, despite its magnetic 
nature. He explicitly denies the earth’s magnetic motion:
[…] self-motion (p.6) of the Globe of the earth circularly, by Magneticall vigour, in the 
which he [Ridley] doth so gallantly triumph; is but an idle figment, and a meere 
Chimera (Barlow 1618: 7)
I argue below that Barlow defends the denial of the earth’s magnetic rotation by showing 
that magnetic motions (including magnetic rotations) are in no way intrinsic to magnetic 
bodies, but describe magnetic interactions (that is, pertain to system of bodies). However, in 
its specific formulation, Barlow’s interactionist position differs significantly from Gilbert’s. 
Early on in the Magneticall Advertisements, Barlow accepts the Gilbertian distinction 
between “electrical” and “magnetical” bodies. In a succinct summary of Gilbert’s treatment 
of the distinction between electrical and magnetic bodies, Barlow notes the following: (1) 
that the interposition of extra bodies does not affect magnetic interaction, but does prevent 
the action of electrical bodies; and (2) that while a magnetic body always respects the 
contrary pole of another magnetic body, the “Electricall body hath no manner of respect 
unto any one point of the Electricall body, more than another” (Barlow 1616: 2). Given 
these observations, Barlow concludes that “Attraction pertaineth only to Electricall bodies, 
because the whole attractive vertue is only in the Electricall body it selfe, and nothing at all 
in the thing that is attracted” (Barlow 1616: 2). This means that, for Barlow, the 
“vertue” (or power) of the electrical body is an intrinsic property of that body, and that it 
alone causes the effect of attracting another body. The second body in no way contributes 
causally to the electrical action. It is acted upon: it remains a purely passive body.
Magnetic attraction does not work in the same way. According to Barlow,
The Attraction (commonly so called) of the Loadstone is rightly to be termed, 
concursion, constuence, or coition, because it is the running or vigorous meeting 
together of two Magneticall bodies having a mutuall inclination the one to join with the 
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other, or by any other name, bearing like sense. […] So that Magneticall Concursion is 
never but betweene two bodies, such as both of them are Magneticall; As of one 
Loadstone with another, or of a Loadstone with iron or steele, or iron ore if it be 
prepared, or between two peeces of yron or steele that are reniued with a Loadstone […] 
(Barlow, 1617: 2–3).
Magnetic attraction does not entail one individual body causing something in the other 
body; rather, it is a “running”, a “mutual inclination”, of both bodies to come together. Not 
all bodies will do, but only those that are “magneticall”. This position squares very well 
with Gilbert’s own claims; the language itself gets close to Gilbert’s own (Latin) 
terminology. We see here Barlow fully endorsing Gilbert’s account of coition. 
This is not the whole story, however. In A Brief Discovery Barlow makes the following 
specification: 
the Magneticall motion is a naturall inclination of two Magnets or Magneticall bodies, 
that may freely move, respecting the one the other within the Orbe of their forces with 
their convenient ends, that is to say, the North end of the one alwaies respecting the 
South of the other. […] Now forasmuch as all Magneticall motions are alwaies 
respective of the one Magnet to Magneticall bodie towards another, it followeth by 
necessary consequent, that no Magnet or Magneticall body, can either move, or be 
moved of it selfe, but is utterly voide of all intrinsecall or self-motion, the true and onely 
cause of his Motion being evermore without it selfe. (Barlow 1618: 6, my emphasis)
It should be noted that both in the Magneticall Advertisements and A brief discovery, 
Barlow makes sparse use of the orb of virtue in his explanations. But the text above gives 
good indication of how Barlow had to conceptualise the orb of virtue in order to deny the 
daily rotation of the earth while accepting its magnetic nature (both being direct 
consequences of applying the Gilbertian magnetic theory to cosmology). To begin with, 
notice the singular: the orb of their [i.e., the magnets’] forces. The orb is not given for each 
body, but it is brought about by the forces of both bodies. (In the previous section I argued 
that Gilbert’s conceptualisation follows very much the same approach.) 
For Barlow, no magnetic body “can either move, or be moved of it self” (Barlow 1618: 6). 
This means that an individual magnetic body is not an agent; purely by itself, we could say 
that it is acausal. If so, then a universe with only one magnetic body is an universe without 
change. To effect magnetic causation, (at least) two magnets are necessary. And it is not 
only that at least two are required: both must also be “within the orbe of their forces”. If 
they are within the “orbe of their forces”, then there is a “mutual inclination of the one to 
join the other” (Barlow 1616: 3). Even with these specifications in place, there are, 
however, several ways to make sense of the claim that “magnetical motion is a natural 
inclination of two magnets” (Barlow 1618: 6).
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It appears that Barlow’s claim is that both bodies participate causally. One does not cause 
anything in the other, nor is one the causal source and the other the causal receiver; rather, 
both bodies are causally active. Such causal symmetry is hard to swallow and also difficult 
to grasp. Typically, at the time, causal sources were either bodies themselves or a source 
external to the bodies. One way to make sense of such causal symmetry it to treat it in terms 
of capacities and the exercise of those capacities59, as we saw above in Gilbert. Again, if 
this is the case, then the claim would be that a magnetic body has the capacity to move 
(itself and/or other bodies), but actualising that capacity requires an interaction with a 
second body, also having the said capacity – as a result of their common magnetic nature, 
for instance. Merely having the capacity is not sufficient for the exercise of that capacity; 
the interaction is also necessary. This reconstruction seems to fit fairly well with Barlow’s 
considerations. But this reconstruction cannot, I think, accommodate Barlow’s daring claim 
that “the true and onely cause of his [a magnet’s] motion being evermore without it 
selfe” (Barlow 1618: 6; my emphasis). If we take Barlow’s claim here seriously, the cause 
of a magnet’s motion is somehow outside itself. It is not a latent cause to be “awakened” by 
the presence of another like body. This final observation of Barlow leads me to a second 
possible interpretation of Barlow’s position, which I take to be more in line with Barlow’s 
own claims. 
For Barlow, then, magnetic bodies are neither actual nor potential causes. The source of 
motion of a magnet’s body is outside the magnet itself. The source is not, however, in some 
surrounding external medium, but is in one magnet’s being in a particular relation to 
another magnetic body. This position is subtly different than the one set out in the previous 
paragraph, in which the causal source is ultimately located – as a capacity, or a causal 
power – within the bodies themselves, irrespective of whether the conditions necessary to 
activate it are met or not. In this second, more radical interpretation, the interaction itself 
between two magnetic bodies is the carrier of causal efficacy. For Barlow, in magnetism it 
is the relations that are the causal agents, not the bodies. We generally assume that 
individual bodies have ontological and causal priority over their relations, and that such 
bodies, secondarily, enter in relations with each other. I take Barlow to have been 
compelled to conclude something different: namely, that it is the relation that is causally 
prior (and ontologically too).60
Not just any kind of interaction between the magnets will do, however. Quite the contrary! 
Barlow repeatedly reminds us that one magnetic body respects another via their respective 
59 One could, of course, also analyse this in terms of dispositions. I use the term “capacity” here in line 
with Harre & Madden (1975). 
60 The philosophical cogency of this position (or any of its implications) is not discussed by Barlow, 
but it appears to be an intriguing view to have, which might have been explored further in the natural 
philosophy of the seventeenth century. 
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contrary poles. Magnets that move freely interact in a unique (i.e., both singular and 
special) way: through the poles. A magnetic body does not simply respect another magnetic 
body as a whole – that is, in the entirety of their parts. Rather, the “respect” here involves 
one magnet’s pole in relation to the other magnet’s contrary pole. As Barlow puts it:
Because all Magnets and all Magneticall bodies, do naturally affect, the one the contrary 
end of the other, and doe auoide and flie from their ends of like denomination. (Barlow 
1618: 14) 
A magnetic interaction entails that the bodies interacting position themselves such that they 
“respect” the rules of the poles: contrary poles attract; like poles repel. The latter (as with 
Gilbert) is not a stable position, but a transitional one into the true magnetic position of 
contrary poles attracting. The attraction of the contrary poles acts as something like a final 
cause of the magnetic interaction.61 
What is at stake here is the interaction of the poles rather than of the bodies themselves. For 
Barlow, the magnetic force lies not in the body of a magnet, but in a magnet’s poles. It is 
having poles that makes a body a magnet. But a body does not have poles intrinsically: it 
acquires poles as a result of interaction. This is the irreducible quality of magnetic bodies 
that allows for magnetic motion; magnetic motion follows, causally, from magnetic 
polarity. Given this, it is not far fetched to say that magnetic motion has priority over the 
magnetic body: it is the magnetic interaction that gives a body its magnetic quality, that is 
its polarity. This is the necessary connection between Barlow's claim that “all Magneticall 
motions are alwaies respective of the one Magnet to Magneticall bodie towards 
another” (Barlow 1618: 6) and his denial that a magnetic body can move by itself: for 
Barlow, no body considered purely in itself is or can be a magnetic body; magnetism, 
properly speaking, exists only in relations. The magnetic nature of a body is obtained and 
maintained by its interactions. It subsists only within such interactions. It is this reading 
which allows Barlow to deny that the earth moves because of its magnetic nature: the earth 
cannot move because it does not interact with another magnet. 
Barlow breaks with the tradition that attributes the orb of virtue to an individual body. 
When explaining what he takes a magnetic motion to be, Barlow uses the following 
formulation: “the orbe of their forces.” Notice the singular and plural here! There is one 
orb, and more than one force: the orb is not a property of each individual body, nor is it a 
medium, but is the product of an interaction between magnets, magnets which acquire their 
forces only because of and for as long as they interact.
61 Barlow provides no indication as to whether he works within a particular theory of causality or not. 
But I suspect he commits himself to a teleological account of magnetism, as Gilbert does. I will not 
address here what role teleology plays in the conceptual and explanatory practices of the magnetic 
philosophers. This is a topic for further research. 
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4. Concluding remarks
This chapter has argued that, throughout the seventeenth century, there were multiple co-
existing conceptualisations of what a sphere of activity (orb of virtue, etc.) is, and why it 
matters to magnetism (or to natural phenomena more generally). The sphere of activity was 
never an unproblematic concept to be employed in order to explain a particular aspect of 
magnetism: what it explains about magnetism is tied into how it is conceptualised. The 
chapter began with an examination of how the concept had been used by proponents of the 
emanationist theory of bodies in order to show that, even under the same natural 
philosophical constraints (with respect to the nature of a body), how the sphere of activity 
matters was at stake. In contrast to the established picture in the scholarship, spheres of 
activity did not matter mainly as descriptions of the sort of emissions (or effluvia) that 
bodies put out, but rather as a way to determine the limits of a body’s causal power (e.g., 
Bacon). Next, the chapter went on to show that spheres of activity – despite being 
reconceptualised accordingly – could not be eliminated as a salient explanatory category 
within mechanical corpuscularian natural philosophies. Finally, the third section argued for 
an interactionist conceptualisation of spheres of activity, which drags the concept from 
being a property of a body’s causal power to being a property of an interaction of magnetic 
bodies. Thus, the concept of a sphere of activity is both endemic within treatments of 
magnetism (over a long period) and surprisingly heterogeneous, varying significantly 
through its differing uses and contexts.
Chapter 4
From Experiments to Diagrams to Concepts, 
via Spherical Trigonometry
The chapter argues that investigations into magnetism involved (in at least some cases) 
practices that transpose experimentation into diagrams, such that conceptual content can be 
specified. It makes this argument through an analysis of certain diagrams used by Gilbert 
and Edward Wright. While significant information about magnetic phenomena does get 
carved out through experimentation, it is left to the transposition of such information into 
diagrammatical representations to uncover the means of specification of the salient 
information. My claim is that by transposing experimentally obtained information into a 
diagrammatic format, aspects of the phenomenon (or object, or effect) in question are 
identified and made salient in their context of use.
My claim here is not in terms of temporal succession – it is not that the experimentally 
salient aspects of a magnetic phenomenon get carved out and then, as a second event, get 
translated into a diagrammatical representation for either communication or visualisation 
purposes. The claim is that the transposition into a diagram is needed in order to establish 
and understand what is claimed – to establish what is salient about the experimental context 
in the first place. The translation is required to “extract” the relevant experimental results 
out of the experimental situation. In the case of the magnetical philosophy, (at least some 
of) its conceptual content comes into being through diagrammatic practices – it relies 
(again, at least in part) on an articulation of experimental results through diagrams to form 
its concepts. In such cases, there is no straightforward move from experimentation to 
concepts and theories; instead, making the move entails transposing experimentation into 
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diagrammatic structures, such that the specification of what is being shown by the former is 
articulated through the latter.1 
In such cases, the epistemic relevance of a diagram is not – at least, not only, or not 
primarily – in its (more or less accurate) representational capacities, or its being a proxy for 
whatever is represented, or its providing schematic structures for discursive content. Rather, 
the epistemic relevance of a diagram is in its actively being used in establishing claims. 
Diagrams, then, play a role in establishing what is claimed. That is not their only function, 
of course. It is not just that such diagrams are used in the determination of concepts; the 
particular specification of the concept will depend on the specifics of the diagram – that is, 
differences in the production of the diagram produce differences in the concept. Invoking a 
particular concept entails invoking a particular “interpretation” of its diagrammatical 
context. Beyond this, the diagrammatical context will continue to have a role to play in 
further employments and uses of the concept. Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter show in detail 
just how diagrams can influence the determination and use of concepts, through concrete 
examples of diagrams used in the determination of concepts of magnetic inclination. 
1. Studying visualisation in sciences
Investigations of nature make use of a wide range of visual practices, aids, and devices to 
reason about phenomena, to represent theories, and to form explanations. If so, then it is 
unsurprising that visual reasoning, images, pictures, drawings, and diagrams caught the 
attention of philosophers and historians of science.2 Historians of art as well as historians of 
science have shown that imagery was used in the most diverse areas of research: from 
natural history to the mixed-mathematics disciplines, and from mechanics to natural 
1 This might strike the reader as sharing much in common with Morgan and Morrison’s (1999) 
account of models as mediators. Their claim is that theories do not directly confront the world, but 
instead confront models. The locus of the connection between the conceptual content and its 
accountability to the world is in the model, not within the theory. What is specific to their account is 
the idea that, somehow, models are partially autonomous, as their content is not fully reducible to the 
theoretical content. My approach departs from such model-based accounts in that it focuses on the 
relation between the world (as experimentally disclosed) and the construction of the diagram (which I 
do not take to be quite the same thing as a model) – specifically, on how conceptual content gets 
formed and specified, rather than focusing, as Morgan and Morrison do, on the relation between the 
theory and the model. Insofar as my interest is how diagrams themselves are integral parts of concept 
formation, my approach is closer to the position that Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2012), for instance, 
articulate. 
2 On the role of diagrams in scientific reasoning see: Barker-Plummer (2002), Perini (2005a, 2005b, 
2012), Gooding (2010). On how diagrams were used as aids in reasoned arguments in medieval 
science, see, e.g., North (2004).
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philosophy.3 It is widely accepted that visual imagery–be they images, diagrams, schemes, 
and so on– was an important instrument for knowledge communication (e.g., Kusukawa 
2006). What remains still somewhat controversial is claiming that visual media are not 
simply instrumental to knowledge production, but have substantial, non-trivial, a 
irreducible role to play in knowledge production. 
Explicating what this role would be and doing it convincingly turns out to be quite 
challenging. In her work, Laura Perini (2005a, 2005b, 2012) tried to do so working with the 
conceptual resources of the analytic philosophy of science. Philosophy of science has, for a 
long time, been dominated by accounts of scientific explanation and theory-making in 
terms of the logical relations among scientific claims, the latter being delivered (mostly) 
linguistically or in mathematical variables. Its long tradition of theory-centrism made it so 
that philosophy of science has had a limited number of resources for making sense of, and 
locating the relevance of, visualisation in scientific disciplines. In the last few decades, 
things have changed, and new philosophical tools for dealing with visualisation in science 
have been articulated. Giere (1996) and Goodman (2006) propose a model-based picture of 
science in which images provide grounds for model-based judgments, while Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen (2012) and Sheredos et al. (2013) argue that diagrams are used to delineate the 
phenomena under study, because they elucidate parameters or properties of the studied 
phenomena. Nersessian (2008) deals with how conceptual innovation is done by means of 
analogical and visual reasoning. Perini (2012) works in this more recent tradition and 
argues that images are truth-bearers in themselves. If this is so, then images can be genuine 
components of arguments. If her argument goes through, then those for whom scientific 
explanations necessarily have truth values will have to expand their linguistic basis of truth 
allocation to images. Despite the fact that visual content is not completely transferable to 
propositional content, Perini would argue that one can still attach a truth value to the visual 
content.4 She makes the case that figures are drawn from symbol systems which support the 
capacity to bear truth without the mediation of other representational structures (i.e., 
language). Symbol systems that have this capacity are, for instance, those which represent 
spatial relations that refer back to the referent.
In the early modern period, visualisation played a significant role in promoting diverse 
conceptions of the universe: in Sidereus nuncius (1610), Galileo built his astronomical 
3 For a survey of the historiography dealing with the role images played during the so-called Scientific 
Revolution, see Baldasso (2006); also Topper (1996), pp. 215–49. For examinations of the epistemic 
dimensions of diagrams (and images) more generally in the early modern context, see for example 
Hunter (2010), Kusukawa and Maclean (2006), Mahoney (2004), pp. 281–309. For methodological 
problems associated with the study of visual images in the early modern context, see Lüthy and Smets 
(2009). 
4 See, e.g., Perini 2005b.
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claims through a combination of arguments and visual images, with some of the latter 
aimed at (accurately) depicting the topography of the moon. He used the moon’s 
topography as an argument for its imperfection, and by extension for the possibility of lunar 
motion. Gilbert had already started a similar project decades earlier. In De mundo 
(published posthumously in 1651), Gilbert includes an image of the moon, built up from 
ocular observations, accompanied by text describing the moon, or, as he puts it 
“Selenography”. Pumfrey (2011) devotes great attention to the image, and shows that what 
was at stake in Gilbert’s sustained practice of taking systematic observations of the moon 
with the naked eye was,
to perceive whether the Moon absolutely does not revolve (as was argued by Aristotle, 
and accepted) or whether to some extent it does turn itself. Then it is required to 
perceive how it inclines in its monthly motion, with its poles (that is, its body’s poles) 
[inclined] towards some fixed parts of the heavens. (Pumfrey 2011: 197, quoting De 
mundo 1651: f. 74r)
In other words, as Pumfrey puts it, “Gilbert was investigating whether or not the Moon 
exhibits the phenomenon we call libration” (Pumfrey 2011: 197). If the moon was 
established to show libration, this would have raised serious problems to Aristotelian 
cosmology, which does not allow for such phenomena, taking, as it does, the celestial 
bodies not to revolve. For Pumfrey, then, it was Gilbert (and not Galileo) who discovered 
libration (Pumfrey 2011: 200–1). Either way, given the technology and techniques available 
to them, neither Gilbert nor Galileo could have determined whether or not lunar libration 
was real without the aid of drawings, since its determination requires noting shifts in the 
position of some reference points. Gilbert’s drawing of the lunar map is not, then, a proof of 
libration in itself, but an instrument for doing so: astronomers were supposed to use it as a 
reference frame for shifts in the positions of certain lunar craters relative to the observer. 
Seen from this perspective, both Gilbert’s and Galileo’s use of visual means amounts to 
more than the mere use of visual media as heuristic devices that aid the investigators’ 
reasoning process, or that help in facilitating communication of knowledge amongst both 
peers and non-specialists. The lunar drawings have a constructive role to play in knowledge 
production. 
Another example of the constructive role that images have played in natural philosophy is 
to be found in Descartes’ corpuscularian accounts of natural phenomena. Descartes is, of 
course, suspicious of images, as potential sources of error5 in natural investigations, but this 
by no means precludes him from frequently employing visual reasoning in his natural 
philosophy. The cosmological narrative of The World (published posthumously in 1667, but 
written in the 1630s) is packed with visual imagery about what happens at the corpuscular 
level. This strategy also extends to the Principles of Philosophy (1644), and to the 
5 See, e.g., the Third Meditation.
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Meteorology (1637), where many accounts of phenomena depend on the posited image of 
what might happen at the lowest level: the shape of particles and their interactions are not 
primarily determined quantitatively, or in terms of physical laws, but by reasoning upon 
what would happen in interactions of particles of particular shapes. Such visual reasoning is 
grounded in Descartes’ metaphysics and his theory of imagination – indeed, for Descartes, 
because the mechanisms that underlie the natural world are physical, explanations of them 
can only be constructed in the imagination (which is itself physical), and hence can only be 
images.6
I have already touched a little on why what is at stake in the scientific use of images briefly 
introduced above is not the faithful representation of a physical object. For Gilbert and 
Galileo, what matters is not the accuracy of the lunar map in relation to the whole body of 
the moon, but the construction of an instrument to be used as reference frame for future 
observation. Its function has more in common with the construction of standard points of 
reference when measuring, such that the measurement become meaningful against those 
reference points. As already suggested, what matters about the images of the moon is the 
establishment of a scale for the lunar craters such that the latter can be used as points of 
reference for future observation. When it comes to libration, what matters is the east–west 
wobbling of the moon, which can be determined by an acute observer through charting the 
displacements of position of pre-established points. This is what Gilbert (and, to some 
extent, Galileo) were after. In some ways, the case of Descartes shows even more forcefully 
that faithful representation is not what matters here. Instead, for Descartes, what counts is 
the conceivability, or the possibility, of the microcorpuscular mechanisms – the 
construction of images of mechanisms shows that the natural world can be fully material, 
and, moreover, provides at least “moral certainty” about the particularities of how it works.7 
One might expect that the conceivability of Descartes’ mechanisms is determined and 
constrained mathematically. But Descartes’ treatment of natural phenomena such as 
magnetism, the formation of salt, or the formation of winds shows that the visual, image-
based dimension plays an equally relevant – in some ways, more relevant – role. 
Because I have talked above about systems of reference, I want to continue the discussion 
by briefly looking at what the devising of a terrella (the spherical magnet so widely used, at 
least within the earlier stages of the magnetical philosophy) involves. Recall that the 
devising of the terrella works by marking the body with poles, an equator, and magnetic 
meridians. As already suggested in (Chapter 1, section 4), the terrella (in a sense) was 
already known to Peregrinus. Peregrinus uses the magnetic meridian as a reference frame in 
order to detect some magnetic properties and to make them visible. Notice, however, that 
making magnetic properties visible means more than simply visualising them: it entails 
6 See especially Galison 1984. See also Baigrie 1996 and Lüthy 2006.
7 See Principles of Philosophy 4:205.
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visualising them in an already meaningful context. And the already meaningful context is 
secured by concepts such as magnetic poles, magnetic meridians, etc. It is by placing a 
magnetic effect within this meaningful context that it gets to be separated out from its 
surroundings and made into a self-standing entity about which questions can be asked, and 
with which research can be pursued.
One does not visualise the magnetic north pole: one simply visualises that an iron needle is 
attracted by a magnetic stone to a part of its surface. How the magnetic needle is attracted 
will depend on many variables: the length and depth of the needle, the strength of the 
magnetic stone, the shape of the magnet, and so on. But, simplification of the visualised 
situation separates out what is salient. Thus, the area of the lodestone at which it attracts is 
treated as a (salient) geometrical point (a pole) – while whether the magnetic needle is 
attracted at its end, or on its side, etc. is treated as non-salient (at least, initially). 
In addition, the treatment of a surface of the terrella by marking it with poles, meridians, 
etc. is not without consequences: it transforms the object of research from a concrete 
physical object with a somewhat irregular shape, with no smooth surfaces, with impurities 
in its constitution, and so on, into an object that can be conceptualised through its 
geometrical properties. That this is so is particularly clear in the case of the magnetic 
meridian: a magnetic meridian is a line on the surface of a physical body (a spherical 
magnet, in this case), carved into the body itself, from one pole to the other. 
Mathematically, there is an indefinite number of such lines on the surface of the sphere, 
and, as mathematical objects, these lines do not, of course, have depth or width. The 
physical carving of a meridian on a sphere does have depth and width: it is three 
dimensional. Additionally, only a limited number of such carvings can, practically, be made 
on any given surface. These simple considerations indicate that the concept of magnetic 
pole or magnetic meridian entails some construction, or devising. It does not denote a 
purely physical object, nor does it denote a purely mathematical object. It is more accurate 
to say that the magnetic pole denotes a physical part of the stone treated geometrically. But 
it is only by being placed in this physical–geometrical context that it is meaningful or 
salient, and that it has conceptual content. These are, then, different ways in which (a 
different sort of) visualisation contributes to and shapes the knowledge production 
activities.
These are just some examples in which images have a constructive role in early modern 
knowledge production. Visualisation itself is conducive to knowledge: it is by no means a 
redundant detour in the route to propositional knowledge, or to a propositional argument – 
it cannot be discarded without epistemic loss. But these examples also show that there is no 
single, unitary story to be told about how images function in contexts of knowledge 
production. This is not to say that no typology of image use and function can be given, but 
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it is likely that such a typology would not exhaust the ways in which images might 
contribute to knowledge production (complete typologies are after all always threatened 
simply by future uses and entrenchments into new practices). Given this, it seems that much 
can be gained from reconstructions of particular cases – it is in doing so that we will see the 
manifold ways in which images are epistemically productive.
It is to this end that the present chapter addresses how visualisation shaped the early 
investigations of magnetism, a subject that has so far received little attention from 
philosophers and historians of science. Gooding (1990, 2006) considered the role of images 
in later studies of magnetism, arguing that Faraday’s process of theorising about magnetism 
and his conceptualisation of magnetic phenomena in terms of lines of force were driven by 
how he manipulated images of distributions of magnetic lines.8 For Gooding, the specific 
ways in which Faraday manipulated images generated new knowledge. This, however, is 
not novel with Faraday. A diachronic approach to the subject indicates that Faraday’s 
practice continues earlier treatments of magnetism, for which magnetic phenomena are 
visual par excellence. Often, the experimental context is translated into an image (a 
drawing or a diagram) in order that the experimental context be made available, and 
specifiable, conceptually. 
In this chapter, I make a case for the above claims through analysing a handful of images 
for early investigations of magnetism. I show how a particular visual format – the diagram 
– plays a genuine role in the activities of conceptual determination. The role it plays is to 
determine concepts. Concepts do not come pre-made and tailored for their local contexts, 
the questions for which they are posited to answer and the phenomena they are supposed to 
carve out. It takes work to “make” a concept (or cluster of concepts) to be that concept and 
not another, to tailor a concept such that it responds to local problems, to be tuned to the 
other relevant concepts, and so on.
2. Images in the magnetical philosophy
In early treatises of magnetism, images are widely used. Petrus Peregrinus’ Letter on the 
magnet (1269) contains images of Peregrinus’ instruments, such as an azimuth compass, a 
pivoted compass (with a double-pivoted needle), as well as an illustration of what 
Peregrinus claims to be a perpetual motion wheel, operating magnetically. Peregrinus 
accompanies these images with detailed descriptions of how such instruments should be 
constructed and be made use of. The practice of including drawings of magnetic 
instruments is commonplace in the treatises dealing with magnetic phenomena. Usually, 
these illustrations are idealised images of the instruments, presented de-contextualized, and 
8 Nerssessian (2008) addresses the visual practices in Maxwell’s work on electromagnetism.
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sometimes showing the principles of their operation within an image of the exterior of the 
instrument. 
Robert Norman’s drawing of the dip needle in the Newe Attractive, for instance, does not 
represent the instrument as such (it is not a picture of what we see if a dip needle were in 
front of us); rather, it shows by what principles the instrument operates. The image below 
shows that the dip measurement is given relative to the line of the horizon, and this can be 
achieved in the devising of the dipping needle only if the needle is perfectly balanced on its 
pivot. But images of the dipping needle can serve to more than this. They can be used as a 
proxy for visualisation of the magnetical cause. In a chapter explaining his theory of the 
respective point as the cause of magnetic phenomena, Norman makes use of an image of a 
dipping needle showing the dip position at London with a horizontal compass needle, by 
which London’s latitude is shown, superimposed on top. What the image is supposed to 
show makes sense only if one is already familiar with Norman’s conceptualisation of the 
dip and of magnetism in general. The image to the left has the following elements: a needle 
is mounted on a vertical pivot, which suggests that it is a dipping needle. The image shows 
the line of the horizon, the poles, and two other lines. One line is labelled “the axeltre” and 
points to 51° latitude (roughly the latitude of London), whereas the line entitled “the line 
respective” points to 71° 50 min, which we know to be the dip value at London from 
Norman’s own measurements. The horizontal compass is, somewhat confusingly, drawn as 
if it were oriented vertically, on top of the dipping needle. We see, then, that the drawings of 
instruments are not aimed at being faithful representations of said instruments or at 
providing step-by-step visual instructions for how to build these instruments. 
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Experimental setups and experimental results are also presented visually. The goal of such 
images is not accurate representation of the experimental situation. The images 
simultaneously simplify and idealise the results. To begin with, the visual presentation of 
the experimental content entails decontextualisation: whatever is taken to be relevant is 
presented, while whatever is not is left out. This decontextualisation removes all 
practicalities involved in the construction of a reliable experimental setup, as well as 
removing the errors related to how robust empirical results are usually obtained. Note that 
any decontextualisation is already an interpretation, of some kind, in that identifying the 
(removable) context involves identifying something else as salient.9 In this way, de-
contextualisation and the visual establishment of what is salient, results in an image that 
contributes directly to the particular determination of some result or concept. Somewhat 
circularly, then, this is how the image will constitute evidence for that result or concept. 
Fig. 2 is reproduced from Cabeo’s Philosophia magnetica (1629: 51), but it is a standard 
image repeated in seventeenth-century treatises of magnetism. It describes the behaviour of 
a perfectly balanced needle suspended by a thread when positioned relative to a second 
magnetic body (ACDB), which is a terrella. Variations of this image are used for different 
purposes: to illustrate how the needle behaves, to show magnetic variation and magnetic 
declination, and to show how the needle changes its orientation with position. When Cabeo 
uses it, the image is introduced as yet another example of magnetised needles orienting 
themselves towards the poles of the terrella. Cabeo does not appeal to the experimental 
context (or experiential situation) that the image is supposed to instantiate, but merely 
displays, and then describes, the image, leaving it to act as a sort of proof. By itself the 
figure does not prove anything, though. But, somewhat surreptitiously, it performs other 
functions, including the following: (1) through decontextualisation, it treats physical 
variables that one could reasonably assume to influence the needle’s motion, such as the 
motion of the air, the atmospheric pressure10, and so on, as non-salient; (2) it presents the 
9 While not visualisations of experimental setups, Gilbert’s and Galileo’s investigations of lunar 
libration provide a nicely lucid example of this. One way of mapping the moon would be to treat any 
wobble as non-salient context to be removed, providing a single image of a stable lunar surface, 
which is thus productive of a more Aristotelian conception of a stable moon. Gilbert and Galileo, on 
the other hand, treat the wobble itself as what is salient, leading to a conceptualisation of the moon as 
librating.
10 Atmospheric pressure was, of course, an unknown variable at the time, although talk about quality 
of air was part of the discourse.
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needle as deviating from the horizontal through magnetism (rather than, for instance, being 
simply unbalanced11); 3) it gives a visual representation to the magnetic power; and so on.
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Many of the images used to depict the magnetic motion of (one or more) needles compress 
multiple actions into a single instance such that the connection between distinct individual 
actions is made. It takes many trials to keep the needle in position and to notice whether or 
not its positioning is stable: additionally, it is very hard to specify the needle’s position 
within the experiential context alone. But once transposed into an image, the needle’s 
position gains stability and “evidentness”, attributes which it lacks in the experiential 
context. If one wants to argue against Cabeo’s position and claim that it is not the pole that 
the needle follows but, for the sake of argument, the centre of the terrella (which is not even 
represented in the figure – the centre is treated as non-salient), then the most natural forum 
for such an argument is an image of the same sort.
In such diagrams, the motion of the needle is specified by its visual representation, in a 
form that eliminates the position of the observer. In an experimental context in which a 
magnetised needle placed on pivot is moved around a magnet, the specification of the 
orientation of the needle depends on the observer’s line of sight: in the visual 
representations, the latter is eliminated in such a way that the needle’s orientation in the 
image becomes the only orientation possible. The experimental result and its description 
also depend on the content of the figure. A needle’s motion around another magnet, which 
might appear chaotic when seen in the experiential context, becomes patterned in the 
11 This is in contrast to Norman, in whose investigation balance was very much taken to be salient. See 
Chapter 5.
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image12. Once the pattern is determined visually, it then becomes easier to identify in the 
experiential context as well.13 We see how the determination of a phenomenon requires 
visual techniques in those drawings which are introduced as illustrating experimental 
results. 
In this chapter I am not tracing all of these types of uses of visual images. I restrict myself 
to investigating diagrams that allow for conceptual specification. These are schematic 
images which specify the interactions between magnetic bodies diagrammatically and from 
there on geometrically. I will discuss how these diagrams are constructed and how they play 
a role in conceptual specification by examining some such diagrams from Gilbert’s De 
magnete and their subsequent use by others. Gilbert appears to recognise that diagrams are 
important vehicles for magnetical explanations. In the last chapter of book 1 of De 
magnete, he claims,
Magneticks are conformable to and are regulated by the earth, and are subject to the 
earth in all their motions. All its movements harmonize with, and strictly wait upon, the 
geometry and form of the earth, as we shall afterwards prove [demonstrabimus] by most 
conclusive experiments [certissimis experimentis] and diagrams [diagramatibus]. (DM: 
42)14 
Gilbert often claims that the method for obtaining reliable knowledge should be 
experimental because experiments are “the true foundations of terrestrial magnetism” (DM: 
40). What might seem somewhat odd is to suggest, as Gilbert does in the passage quoted 
above, a similar demonstrative power for diagrams.15 Diagrams, however, have a role to 
12 For how this is construed in Michael Faraday’s work with magnetised needles see Gooding 1990. 
13 Gooding (1990: chapter 2) considers how Faraday analysed the behaviour of a needle next to a 
current in a similar fashion. By transposing the needle’s movement near a wire into distinct images 
aimed at presenting the needle’s position Faraday, according to Gooding, was “led directly to the 
discovery of his ‘new magnetic motions’—the continuous, unassisted ‘rotation’ of a wire about a pole 
of a magnet” (Gooding 1990: 59).
14 Lat: Magnetica a tellure conformatur & ordinatur & telluri in omnibus motionibus obtemperant. 
Terrae geometriae & formae omnes eius motiones consentiunt, & iuste tamulantr, sicut postea 
certissimis experimentis & diagramatibus demonstrabimus.
15 What Gilbert takes a demonstration (demonstratio) to be is difficult to pin down, and goes beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. Gilbert ties the method of demonstration to experimental practices 
aimed at discovering previously unknown knowledge, clearing out mistakenly held beliefs, showing 
true conclusions, making observable the effects of magnetic motions that cannot purely be detected by 
the senses but instead have to be inferred from experimental situations, and so on. Guillaumin (2004) 
suggests that Gilbert’s concept of demonstration is akin to the Galenic method of discovery, and, 
given Gilbert’s training, alongside his distaste for the method of syllogism, and his systematic 
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play in demonstration because they visually articulate experimental findings, and they 
supplement experimental observation in order to delineate aspects of what is investigated. 
For example, by representing the results of experiments with iron filings diagrammatically, 
Gilbert concludes that there is a specific way in which magnetic force acts within the body: 
no [magnetic] force rises from the internal parts, from the lines parallel to the Axis 
above those parallels, but always inwards from the parallels to the pole. (DM: 76)
Here, Gilbert attempts to come to grips with how magnetic force operates, since its manner 
of action cannot be shown experimentally. Instead, it is inferred via a diagram (the 
“Diagram of Magnetic Vigour transmitted from the plane of the Æquator to the peripherery 
of the terella or of the earth”), whose devising is constrained by experimental input.16 In 
this context, then, experiments and diagrams are vehicles both for pinning down the 
magnetic properties and motions, and for giving them conceptual content. To theorize about 
magnetic declination, for example, one first has to have a conceptual framework to make a 
discourse on magnetic declination intelligible, and this is what De magnete, through its 
experiments and their diagrammatical translation, seems (at least at times) to offer.
3. The Diagram of the movements in the magnetic orbes17 
I show that it is through the “diagram of the movements in the magnetic orbes” (hereafter, 
the “Diagram of Orbes”; see Fig. 3) that the rule of alignment is specified. The Diagram of 
Orbes specifies the spatial relations given between magnetic bodies and the orb of virtue. 
Once the representational specification is made, it is this that is carried further as relevant 
content into future research. It is through this diagram that one understands the behaviour of 
magnetised bodies within an orb of virtue. The diagram carries salient conceptual content. 
Had the diagram been drawn differently, the precise formulation of the rule would have 
been different. What is at stake is not why the Diagram of Orbes represents the relation 
between the physical bodies and the orb of virtue, but why it represents that relation in the 
specific way it does (and not otherwise). The Diagram is a standard part of magnetic 
treatises throughout the seventeenth century: it is usually accepted as the standard 
insistence that experiments are the true source of knowledge, this line of interpretation seems 
plausible. I do not yet have a definite opinion on these matters.
16 It should be noted that whether or not the diagrammatic moves here are reliable or robust is a 
different question from that which concerns us here. What is important for the argument I make here 
is that Gilbert counteracts the occultism previously associated with concepts like magnetic attraction 
and magnetic force/power not just experimentally, but also diagrammatically, and that it is in this new 
methodological context that these notions are given new conceptual content.
17 A version of section 3 of this chapter was published as “The Diagrammatic Dimension of William 
Gilbert’s De magnete” in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47: 18–25.
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representation for the dip behavior of magnetic bodies. The Diagram is reprinted in Thomas 
Ridley’s A short treatise of Magneticall Bodies and Motions (1613), in Niccolo Cabeo’s 
Philosophia magnetica in qua magnetis natura pentus explicatur (1629), in Vincent 
Leotaud’s Magnetologia (1668), and so on. Along with the Diagram, Gilbert’s related 
theoretical position was also taken on by his successors.
The answer, I argue, is that the construction of the diagram is a two-step process: first, an 
experimental setup is used to measure the dip (angles of declination, in Gilbert’s 
terminology) around a terrella for certain positions and, second, the experimental setup and 
dip values are transferred into a diagrammatic representation. By doing this, the diagram 
supplements information unspecified in the experimental context: it depicts the relation 
between the dip values and the orb of virtue. It also specifies the orientation (direction) of a 
magnetic needle in the dip position. The Diagram of Orbes is therefore taken to be a 
necessary step in articulating how bodies align within the orb of virtue, while the 
experiments provide the relevant parameters for the construction of the diagram. At the 
same time, however, the construction of the diagram depended on prior, experimentally 
obtained, measurements of the dip angle, along with experimental results that showed that 
the angle of dip remains the same, at a given latitude, at any distance from the body of the 
magnet itself—facts that were previously unreported and could not have been known 
without prior experimentation. I conclude then that the experimentation step is necessary in 
order to construct the Diagram of Orbes. Consequently, I take the argument for (a) the rule 
of alignment of bodies in the orb of virtue to be a conjunction between (b) experimental 
results and (c) the translation of these experimental results into a diagrammatic format: (b) 
is necessary to construct (c), and (c) is necessary and sufficient to obtain (a). The practice 
by which the rule of alignment gets its conceptual content entails translation of the relevant 
details of the experimental context into a diagram. 
3.1. The content of the Diagram of Orbes 
The Diagram of Orbes (Fig. 3) is introduced in chapter XI of Book V, which is titled “Of 
the essential magnetick activity spherically effused”. The chapter claims that Gilbert “by 
good fortune found out a new and admirable (beyond the marvels of all virtues magnetical) 
science of the orbes themselves” (DM: 205). The orb that Gilbert talks about here is, of 
course, the orb of virtue of magnets, which, as covered above, is “all that space through 
which the virtue of any loadstone extends” (DM: vi), “in all directions around the body”, 
equidistant from the centre of the body (DM: 77–8), whose extension depends on the 
strength of the lodestone, its size and its mass (moles) (DM: 99). Orbs of virtue are not 
permanent media surrounding magnetic bodies, but are the physical manifestation of an 
active magnetic power (vis magnetica); in Gilbertian language, orbs of virtue exist when 
the magnetic power is “awakened”. The relevant point here is that, on Gilbert’s conception, 
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the magnetic power is never detectable in itself, but only through (the physical 
manifestation within) the orb of virtue.18
The Diagram of Orbes is intended to show that, if a magnetic needle is placed within the 
range of the orb of virtue of a lodestone, the needle does not align relative to the lodestone, 
but relative to the corresponding orb of virtue, such that it respects its geometrical 
magnitudes (DM: 206). In Gilbert’s own words, when a magnetic body is placed within the 
orb of virtue it,
conforms to its own orbe in which it is located, and to its diameter and poles and 
æquator, not to those of the terrella; and it is by them and according to the magnitude of 
their orbes that the magnetick body is governed, rotated, and directed, in any arc of that 
orbe, both while the centre of the magnetick body stands still, and also while it moves 
along. (DM: 206; my italics)
To align relative to one’s own respective orb of virtue is to align according to the 
dimensions of a circle whose radius is the distance between the centre point of the magnet 
and the (geometrical) centre of the magnetic bodies placed within the orb. I call this (for 
reasons of simplicity) the “rule of alignment”. It does not only specify that magnetic bodies 
align relative to orbs of virtue; it is also supposed to show how they align. This is also taken 
18 For this point, see chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation. 
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to be evidence that the magnetic power extends beyond the physical limits of the magnetic 
body (into an orb of virtue).
The rule of alignment involves the following three distinct claims.
1. Bodies align relative to the orb itself, and not relative to the physical body of the 
terrella.
2. A magnetic body aligns not in relation to the orb of virtue as a whole, but in 
relation to the orb of virtue “in which it is located”. The latter is the orb of virtue 
designated by a circle whose radius is between the centre of the magnetic body 
and the centre of the terrella.
3. Given 2, the alignment is expressed (and explained) as a relation between two 
magnetic bodies.
The rule of alignment is presented in visual form as the Diagram of the Orbes. But the 
diagram is not, however, a simple visual specification of the rule. The reverse is the case: 
the rule of alignment gets articulated as a result of the diagram’s construction, because, 
through its construction, the diagram allows the specification of the orientation of the 
magnetic needle in the dip position. What is at stake is identifying why and how the 
diagram expresses the relation between the physical bodies and the orb of virtue in the 
particular way it does (and not otherwise).
3.2. The depiction of the rule of alignment in the Diagram of Orbes
The issue currently at hand is how the Diagram of Orbes conceptualises the orb of virtue 
through the rule of alignment. My claim is that the particularities of the construction of the 
diagram determine, at least in part, the particularities of the rule. To see why, and 
understand how, we need to look at how the diagram is actually put together, and how it 
depicts the alignment of magnetic bodies. Now, diagrams convey information via the 
spatial relations they describe; this much seems trivial. What is represented is what are 
taken to be the salient features of the subject of the diagram: everything else is usually 
discarded. To cogently read a diagram, shared “interpretative practices” have to be in place: 
e.g., if we do not know that an arrow indicates, for example, a direction of flow, we will not 
be able to understand a diagram that includes an arrow.19 As a first step in assessing the 
epistemic role the Diagram of Orbes plays, I analyse what the elements of the diagram 
stand for, and what place they occupy in Gilbert’s theoretical matrix. In the later part of the 
19 On the requirements for interpreting diagrams in scientific treatises, see Perini (2005a; 2012).
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section, I show which elements of the Diagram of Orbes are explained by its very 
construction.
The Diagram of Orbes depicts both observable physical objects and unobservables, as well 
as relations between them. The observable objects are: 1) the smallest circle (LF) which 
stands for the terrella, and 2) the versoria in the declination position, as indicated by 
arrows.20 The outer circles represent the orb of virtue. The choice of representation of the 
orb is theoretically driven: it depends on the assumption that the magnetic force extends 
equidistantly from the centre, and consequently gives the orb of virtue the same shape as 
the body itself (DM: 78), which Gilbert takes to have already been shown experimentally in 
many other contexts. The lines CD and AB represent the axis of the magnetic equator and 
of the magnetic poles respectively; these are not simple geometrical imaginary conventions, 
but real “bounds” that were found to be “fixed by nature” (DM: 79).21 The dotted lines ED, 
GH depict the relation between the orb of virtue and the magnetic bodies, and are what the 
diagram is supposed to establish. They stand as evidence for the rule of alignment. To 
understand how ED and GH are constructed, we first need to understand what magnetic 
declination is for Gilbert, since the positions of the versoria placed at E and G are simply 
their declination position at 45º. Observe however that, in the Diagram of Orbes, the 
direction of dip at 45º at the surface of the terrella is not represented by dotted lines (the 
missing line is LF). In chapter VI of Book V, it had already been specified that the dip 
position at 45º on the surface of the terrella points “toward the aequator at F, midway 
between the two poles” (DM: 198). Gilbert does not specify how this conclusion is 
formulated, but, given that he had an instrument to measure the dip around the terrella, it 
seems reasonable to infer that angular measurements of dip were gathered, and then 
translated in a diagram (chapter III, book V).22
The diagram also makes use of Gilbert’s theory of “declination” (dip, or magnetic 
inclination).23 Magnetic declination can observationally be described as the deviation from 
the horizontal that a compass needle makes at any location on earth. To Gilbert, however, 
declination is not a movement of deviation from the horizontal, “but it is in reality a motion 
of rotation” (DM: 198). It would be showed by any magnetic body were it free from other 
20 Recall that the versorium is an instrument that allows a (ferrous) metal needle to move freely on the 
horizontal axis and/or the vertical axis, due to its being suspended on a fulcrum.
21 On Gilbert’s appeal to the Mercatorian system of representations, and the theoretical implications of 
this particular choice, see Miller (2006, ch. 3).
22 I assume here that the same type of procedure is involved in establishing both how the versorium is 
oriented at the surface of the terrella and how it is orientated within the orb of virtue. 
23 For a lengthier discussion of this see chapter 5.
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forces acting on it. The rotational motion of declination is not “a motion of centre to centre, 
but a natural turning of a magnetick body to a magnetick body, and of the axis of the body 
to the axis” (DM: 197). No dip movement is however a complete rotation—it is rather an 
arc of rotation which needs to be determined. Part of doing this entails also determining the 
direction (or orientation) of the dipping needle: that is, what the magnetic needle (or a 
magnetic body, more generally) points towards. The angular value is an instrument for 
determining this direction and the arc of rotation.24
By experimenting with versoria placed at different points on the surface of the terrella, or 
hung in the air above it (e.g., DM: 189), Gilbert found the “fixed and unchangeable” 
positions of declination, since 
in whatever way the iron has been excited or rubbed, it settles in the declination 
instrument precisely along the plane of the horizon, if it were properly balanced before 
(DM: 188).
The positions are: 1) perpendicular at the magnetic poles; 2) the null (horizontal) position at 
the equator; 3) in between the poles and the equator, an oblique position that ranges from 0º 
to 90º. Such findings prompted Gilbert to conclude that there is a correlation between 
declination and latitude. 
These experimental findings of stable declination positions explain the distribution of the 
versoria in the Diagram of Orbes, and the ways in which they are oriented. In the diagram, 
the orientation of the arrows shows that Gilbert knew that the value of declination is 
inverted between the two hemispheres (that is, positive in the northern hemisphere and 
negative in the southern). The orientation of the arrows shows how Gilbert’s knowledge 
about declination behavior prompts particular choices of construction in the diagram.
What remains unexplained is why the arrows in the declination position at E and G point to 
D and H respectively. The precondition for drawing the versoria at L, G and E as pointing 
towards F, H and D respectively is that the angles formed at L, G and E with the respective 
tangents to the circumference of the sphere should be equal to each other. This is 
presupposed in the construction of the diagram, rather than illustrated by the diagram: the 
diagram’s visual format has the particular structure it does as a consequence of the equality 
of the angles L, G, and E.
Via the diagram, Gilbert discovers that:
24 As we have already discussed at length in chapter 2, declination, for Gilbert, is caused by neither 
attractive forces from the poles, nor by any “respective point” (Norman), but rather by “the disposing 
and turning power which exists in the whole earth, not in the pole or in some other attracting part of 
the stone” (DM: 163).
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in the intermediate spaces E looks toward D; and G looks toward H, not toward F, as the 
versorium L does on the surface of the terrella. But as is the relation of L to F on the 
surface of the terrella, so is that of G to H on its orbe and of E to D on its orbe. (DM: 
207)
Given that E regards D and G regards H, and not F, Gilbert concludes that the versorium 
aligns itself relative to the orb of virtue. Had the versorium been oriented towards the body 
of terrella, then the arrows E and G should have faced the same point as L does (i.e., F), and 
not H and D, since E and G are placed at the same latitude (but further away from the body 
of the terrella). The rule is general: any magnetic body placed within the orb of virtue will 
orient relative to the orb of virtue it is in. Moreover, it will orient relative to the dimensions 
of the particular orb of virtue in which it is placed, which, on the Diagram, is the circle 
whose radius is formed from the geometrical centre of the terrella (or any magnet in its 
place) and the geometrical centre of the needle.25 From the Diagram, Gilbert also concludes 
that “the proportion of L to F on the terrella’s superficies, such is that of G to H in its own 
sphere, and E to D in its own sphere” (DM: 207), since (if we note the intersection of AB 
and CD with M) LMF, GMH and EMD are similar triangles.26
This, then, is how Gilbert constructs the Diagram of Orbes. Not at all coincidentally, it is 
also how Gilbert understands declination as alignment with the orb of virtue. The 
specificities of the diagram give the specificities of the conceptualisation – it is only when 
considered diagrammatically that declination becomes alignment, and only when 
considered through the particular geometric construction of the Diagram of Orbes that it 
becomes the particular geometric alignment that Gilbert takes it to be. The 
conceptualisation is, however, multifaceted, and does not take place through the diagram 
alone. Other practices are both involved and required. In what follows, I show that Gilbert 
used experimental practices to find angular measurements needed to obtain the points F, D 
and H – and, thus, that his concept of declination is devised through an interaction of 
practices. 
3.3. Angular measurements of declination: missing links in the Diagram
Here, I show (a) that the question of how magnetic bodies orient themselves within the orb 
of virtue is posited by experiments and (b) that the experiments provide angular 
measurements that were needed in order to construct the Diagram of Orbes. I contend that 
the angular measurements constrain the construction of the Diagram of Orbes insofar as the 
orientations of the versoria depend on the values of the declination angles. Given the angle 
25 On the orb of virtue as an extension of the magnet itself, see Roller (1959) and Pumfrey (2002). 
26 I mark the point at which the axis of the magnetic poles and the equatorial axis intersect with “M” 
for reasons of clarity in referring to the patterns in the Diagram.
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of declination, the orientation of the declination can be represented in the diagram, and in 
this way the geometrical point with which the versorium is aligned is found. In its 
construction, the Diagram translates experimental information about the angles of 
declination.27 28
Given that, for Gilbert, the magnetic movements of the terrella can safely be extrapolated to 
the earth itself (a move justified on the basis of his matter theory), he investigates the 
magnetic declination around the terrella, and does not attempt to obtain declination 
measurements at different points around the globe. He measures the declination angle with 
an instrument, described in detail in Chapter 3 of Book V. The instrument is a perfectly 
spherical terrella of “six or seven digits” placed in a “squared block of wood” with a length 
of “one foot” that has in its middle a “hemispherical hollow” in which to place the terrella. 
The hollow is precisely deep enough that “exactly one half of the stone shall project above 
the face of the block.” In a circle around the cavity, four quadrants are drawn (as seen in 
Fig. 4) so as to be able to measure relative to the “indicatory instrument” where a versorium 
is placed in order to measure the declination angle (DM: 194).
27 Given the diagram’s apparent regularity, its construction might be explained by invoking some 
principle of symmetry: the behavior of the versoria further out in the orb of virtue is a simple 
geometrical enlargement of the behavior at the surface of the terrella (Hackman 1989, pp. 57–58). 
While it is certainly possible that this could have been this case, this section shows there is more 
plausible evidence that Gilbert actually took the relevant measurements. 
28 Given the diagram’s apparent regularity, its construction might be explained by invoking some 
principle of symmetry: the behavior of the versoria further out in the orb of virtue is a simple 
geometrical enlargement of the behavior at the surface of the terrella (Hackman 1989, pp. 57–58). 
While it is certainly possible that this could have been this case, this section shows there is more 
plausible evidence that Gilbert actually took the relevant measurements. 
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The baseline is a tangent to the circumference of the terrella. A versorium placed against the 
quadrant dips, and, by rotating the terrella relative to the quadrant, the angle of declination 
in relation to latitude can be measured, since “on the quadrant described on the flat surface 
of the wood, the degree of its turning or of the declination is shown by the 
versorium” (DM: 194). The perpendicular and horizontal positions are already inscribed in 
the construction of the instrument (as 0º and 90º) so what is being measured are the 
declination values at different points between the poles and the equator. In the same 
chapter, Gilbert specifies that the instrument can also be used to investigate the declination 
further out within the orb of virtue (DM: 194).
The rule of alignment gets addressed in the context of the Diagram of Orbes. Given that, as 
we have seen, De magnete describes an instrument for measuring declination around the 
terrella, it seems likely that this is the experimental context in which the problem of how 
bodies behave within the orb of virtue is addressed. The same experimental situation is 
described again in a sub-section of Chapter XI, where we are told that the findings from the 
Diagram of Orbes can become visible in precisely this way (DM: 208). Even if we directly 
observe that versoria placed in the orb of virtue do not point toward the terrella itself, and 
that there is no parallax change with a change in distance, what we could not see is that the 
versorium “will always pay regard to the dimensions of that orbe, not to those of the stone; 
as is shown in the diagram of the effused magnetick forms” (DM: 208).
Even if Gilbert had measured the declination angle at various points of latitude around the 
terrella, these measurements would not have been enough by themselves to provide an 
account of whether or not the magnetic bodies in the orb of virtue align consistently with 
anything in particular (they could show consistency of angle, but not whether the alignment 
involved any definite point). What Gilbert is interested in is the spatial relation a magnetic 
body forms with the orb of virtue: the experiments provide the angle, but the point towards 
which the body orients itself is still missing. To make the topological relation visible, it is 
translated into a diagram. Without a diagram, the most that can be obtained is a negative 
conclusion: that a body at a distance from the terrella does not align in relation to the 
terrella. A positive rule of alignment (alignment with the orb of virtue) will require the 
drawing of a diagram. The experimental context that gives Gilbert access to the angular 
measurement at 45º is a necessary condition for formulating the rule of alignment. And, 
even though De magnete itself does not include tables of angular measurements, as we have 
seen, Gilbert did have the apparatus and techniques to record measurements of the 
declination around the terrella.29
29 For the most part, De magnete is a treatise of qualitative physics. This, however, does not 
automatically mean that Gilbert entirely adheres to that tradition. For example, Johnston (2004) 
argues that Book V of De magnete mirrors the practical mathematics tradition. 
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So, Gilbert himself does not make explicit that he uses the instrument in the construction of 
the Diagram of Orbes, but it is quite clear both that this instrument is available to him, and 
that it produces exactly the measurements needed for the diagram. In addition, there is 
some supporting evidence via one of Gilbert’s collaborators. Mark Ridley was a member of 
Gresham College, where work on magnetism centred around Gilbert’s research. His A short 
treatise of magneticall bodies and motions (1613) was published a little after De magnete, 
and presented a continuation of the latter’s research. Ridley describes the exact same 
instrument as Gilbert had (Ridley’s image of the instrument is reproduced in Fig. 5), using 
it as part of a proof for “how the Magneticall needles and wiers doe conforme themselves to 
the meridian of the round Magnet, whether it be a Terrella, or a Semiterrella” (Ridley 1613: 
37). He describes the instrument as “of most necessary use for to find out the angles of the 
inclinatory needle” (Ridley 1618: 43) and “from hence Tables may be made and collected 
what degrees of the Inclinatory needle will be answerable to every elevation of the 
pole” (Ridley 1618: 46–7). Immediately following this, Ridley includes a chapter entitled 
“Of the distance and orbe of the magnes vertue” (Ridley 1613: 47), where the Diagram of 
Orbes is again used to show the rule of alignment. Unlike the Diagram of Orbes in De 
magnete, Ridley also includes the points of direction of the versoria at 34°. In Ridley’s 
reworking of Gilbert’s magnetical philosophy, it becomes more obvious that the articulation 
of declination as a motion of rotation is done by experimenting with the versoria and the 
above-mentioned instrument, and then diagrammatically representing the findings (see 
Ridley 1613: 37–52). It is not much of a jump to suggest that Ridley was using the 
instrument in the same way as Gilbert did.
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4. Gilbert’s dip–latitude correlation
4.1. The dip–latitude relation geometrically determined
There is another, twofold, aspect of Gilbert’s conceptualisation of magnetism that comes 
out of the experimental and diagrammatic practices described above: declination and 
latitude are correlated, and magnetism is rotational. I deal with the latter at length in 
Chapter 2. The declination–latitude correlation, and its conceptualisation through diagrams, 
is the subject of the following section. Gilbert claims that if a magnetised needle were to 
move freely in a circuit around a terrella, it would also make two complete rotations around 
its own centre (since the dip is 0° at the equator and perpendicular at both poles). In 
between the poles and the equator, the rotation would be “in a certain proportion to the 
latitude” (DM: 187). The relation between dip and latitude is not directly proportional:
the magnetick needle does not, however, in proportion to any number of degrees or any 
arc of latitude fall below the horizon that number of degrees or a similar arc, but by a 
very different one. (DM: 198)
This very different proportion is, for Gilbert, a matter to be determined. Part of what 
complicates the proportion is that the rate of change in dip value also varies relative to 
latitude, being faster closer the equator and slower closer to the poles (DM: 198–9). The 
practical relevance of the claim that there is a correlation between latitude and dip is that, if 
true, it could be used to find the latitude at sea by the angular measurement of the dip (DM: 
202). If the dip values around the terrella depend in some way on the latitude at which it is 
taken, then, Gilbert believes, those values can be safely used with respect to the earth itself. 
The problem, however, is that it would have been very difficult to take measurements 
around the terrella for each point of latitude, given the available instrumentation. 
Consequently, the proposal is to find out the correlation mathematically, from just a few 
values, and use the mathematical instrument to generate the values for each point of 
latitude. To determine the rule by which dip is correlated with latitude, one would need to 
determine the arcs of rotation of magnetised needles for every point of latitude. In the 
following, I show that Gilbert reasoned about such issues using the same practice of 
translating experimentation diagrammatically, and then reasoning on the diagram to amplify 
the conceptual content.
Gilbert’s diagrammatic account of a dip–latitude correlation has received some attention 
from scholarship dealing with his magnetical philosophy, or with mathematical instruments 
more generally. Bennett (2003) takes Gilbert’s diagram to be a theoric, that is a 
mathematical/geometrical construction used for solving practical problems. In doing so, he 
rejects the conventional reading according to which mathematical theorics are geometrical 
instruments used in astronomy for determining a planet’s position, by arguing that theorics 
were instead used across the spectrum of mixed mathematical disciplines as an instrument 
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“to encapsulate a relationship between appearances, from which information could be 
extracted by the use of certain protocols” (Bennett 2003: 142). In talking about “certain 
protocols”, Bennett seems to be referring to certain mathematical techniques by which 
measurements are generalised (Bennett 2003: 142).
Given that, according to Bennett, the practice of theoric construction can be found across 
disciplines, and not just in astronomy, he uses Gilbert’s dip–latitude relation as an 
instantiation of a theoric, because it is expressed as “a geometrical pattern that yields the 
dip everywhere from the equator to the pole, and so by symmetry, everywhere on the 
globe” (Bennett 2003: 145). Bennett shows that, by understanding the role that the 
mathematical theoric plays in De magnete, we can correct a misreading of Gilbert’s visual 
representation of the universe in De mundo as presenting planetary motions rather than 
effused spheres.30 What Bennett does not do is to explain either how the dip theoric was 
constructed or what the grounds for its construction were. On the contrary, Bennett sees the 
construction as underspecified and physically unconstrained. The reconstruction I offer 
goes beyond Bennett’s assessment, by providing a reading of the grounds informing the dip 
theoric and by explaining the geometrical reasoning with which the theoric was 
constructed. 
A different point of discussion in the literature is the theoric’s authorship. Pumfrey (2002: 
175–181) claims that the diagram that Bennett calls a “theoric” and Pumfrey himself calls a 
“nomograph” is not Gilbert’s work, but Edward Wright’s. (I discuss Wright’s treatment of 
the dip-latitude below.) To defend the claim, Pumfrey quotes an exchange between Mark 
Ridley and William Barlow in which Ridley claims that Wright himself admitted that he 
had authored chapter XII of Book IV, which presents a method for finding the variation at 
sea by means of an azimuth compass. Indeed, a large part of the content of this chapter of 
De magnete can also be found in Wright’s Certaine errors of navigation. Ridley makes no 
claims, however, about Wright’s contribution to Gilbert’s dip theory or the construction of 
the theoric. Pumfrey nevertheless suggests that, given the level of mathematics entailed by 
the construction, it was probably Wright who “quantified the relationship [i.e. the dip–
latitude relationship], invented the nomograph and designed the inclinometer [i.e. dipping 
needle]” (Pumfrey 2002: 179). Wright himself challenges Pumfrey’s conclusion, though. In 
the appendix to Blundeville’s Theorique of the seven planets (1602), Wright states:
it was thought meet by my worshipfull friend M. Doctor Gilbert, that […] this Table [of 
the dip–latitude correlation] following should be hereunto adjoined; which M. Henri 
Briggs (professor of geometry in Gresham College at London) calculated and made out 
of the doctrine and tables of triangles, according to the Geometricall grounds and reason 
30 A critic might object to this particular example since magnetic motions were used as an analogy for 
planetary motions, thus undermining Bennett’s generalisation. 
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of this instrument, appearing in the 7 and 8 chapter of M. Doctor Gilberts fifthe booke 
of the Loadstone. (Wright in Blundeville 1602: 293)31
Bludeville’s book appeared when Gilbert was still alive, so it seems reasonably safe to 
conclude that Gilbert both knew of it and never intended to hide that parts of De magnete 
were the result of a collaborative enterprise. Taking Wright’s words seriously, we can 
probably also safely conclude that Briggs was the one who calculated the theoric, but did so 
by following the “Geometricall grounds and reason of this instrument” from De magnete, to 
which I turn next. 
According to Wright, Gilbert’s exposition of the dip–latitude relation is formulated in 
chapters VII and VIII of the book on magnetic dip (declination). Sonar claims that “it is not 
possible to understand the construction [of the diagram/theoric/nomograph] from Gilbert’s 
writings in De Magnete” (Sonar 2010:7). That is, the information Gilbert gives in chapters 
VII and VIII is not sufficient to understand how the diagram was calculated. Sonar is (in a 
sense right) right. But explaining the construction of the diagram was never Gilbert’s goal 
here. Chapter VIII already presupposes and describes the diagram, and describes and 
explains how it should be used as an instrument for determination of latitude at sea, while 
chapter VII, entitled Account of the diagram of the rotation of a magnetick iron32, gives a 
geometrical conceptualisation of a needle’s rotation and dip. What Gilbert is after in this 
latter chapter is the specification of the relevant geometrical variables that need to be taken 
into consideration when one is explaining what happens when a needle dips (declines), 
provided that the declination movement is in reality a motion of rotation, as discussed in the 
previous section. The diagram of rotation is therefore constructed so that the relevant 
variables of the rotation of magnetic dip (such as the horizon, the direction of the needle, 
the axis of declination and the axis of rotation) are determined geometrically. This allows 
them to be made use of instrumentally, and this is what Briggs does, by generating the dip 
values through the application of spherical trigonometry to Gilbert’s principles of the 
declination and rotation of the magnetised needle. If this is so, then what needs to be 
unpacked from Gilbert’s treatise are (to use Wright’s formulation) the geometrical grounds 
and rationale behind the construction of the theoric, which, as Sonar points out, is described 
31 Wright reiterates this position in the 1610 edition of his Certain errors of navigation, where he 
admits again to Briggs’ contribution to the calculation of tables of latitude determination, but also for 
the table determining the height of the pole star, that of the sun’s declination, and others. We read: 
“Which tables, together with some others in the former treatise; as namely, that of the declination of 
every minute of the Eclipticke in the 17 chapter, together with those of the sunnes Prosthaphæreses, 
and Ephemerides in the 22 and 25 chapters, as also that of the suns declination chapter 27: I could not 
by reason of my many distractions intend to make my selfe: but was enforced to procure my kind 
friend M. Henry Briggs to undertake that labour for me.”
32 Lat: Diagrammatis conversionis magnetici ferri ratio. 
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in detail in both Blundeville’s Theorique (1561: 279–82) and Chapter XIV of Wright’s 
Certaine Errors in Navigation (1610: 82–5). 
4.2. The diagram of rotation of the magnetised needle
Gilbert’s account of what the diagram below (Fig. 6) stands for and what it is supposed to 
show is utterly unclear. Sonar (2010) takes Gilbert’s description to be so confusing as to be 
incomprehensible. Its description is indeed confusing, and raises questions about the role it 
is taken to play. Pumfrey (2002: 154–6) believes that what was at stake in the construction 
of the diagram was determining the magnetic direction when the needle is in the dip 
position at 45° (that is, ND on the diagram). If Pumfrey is right about the role of the 
diagram, then Sonar is right too. Based on the diagram and Gilbert’s account, any 
geometrical basis for finding the latitude or dip is entirely inscrutable. However, this is not 
what is at stake in the diagram. Showing as much is the purpose of this section. Rather than 
the dip–latitude relation, what the diagram is supposed to establish, on my reading here, is 
the relevant geometrical variables for the movement of the declining needle. This entails 
specification of the variables for declination alone, but also for declination as part of a 
rotation. 
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With the diagram of rotation, Gilbert aims to establish what the geometrical grounds behind 
the dip rotation are – that is, on what points of references and axis of rotation the needle 
moves. With these variables in place, the inst umentalisation of declination (dip) to 
determine latitude will be possible. It turns out that Gilbert introduces a new concept to the 
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treatment of declination, in the form of an “arc of rotation”, which determines the limits of 
possible declination for a particular degree of latitude. It is through the geometrically, 
diagrammatically established arc of rotation that Gilbert conceptualises declination itself in 
terms of “arcs of declination”. Furthermore, I want to show that, for the construction of the 
diagram of rotation, Gilbert makes use of the same practice by which he articulates both the 
rule of alignment and the claim that magnetised needles align themselves relative to the orb 
of virtue, as shown in the previous section – that is, through a practice of translating 
experimental findings diagrammatically in order to establish relevant conceptual content. 
The construction of the diagram of rotation is based on the following points.
1. That dip is “in reality a motion of rotation” (DM: 197).
2. That the arc of rotation is proportional to the arc of latitude. (DM: 199)
3. That if a declinatory needle were to circle the earth, it would make two complete 
rotations about its centre. (DM: 207)
4. The stable inclination values: 0° at the equator, perpendicular in one polar 
direction at one pole, and perpendicular in the other polar direction at the other 
pole. (DM: 186–7)
5. That, at 45° lat., the needle points to the opposed equatorial point (in the diagram, 
point D). (DM: 197)
6. That the needle rotates faster from A to N than from N to C. In Gilbert’s words:
Much more quickly, therefore, must the versorium rotate than its centre advances, in 
order that by rotating it may face straight toward the point F. Wherefore the motion of 
this rotation is rapid in the first degrees from the æquator, namely, from A to L; but more 
tardy in the later degrees from L to B, when facing from the æquator at F to C. (DM: 
197)
Given (1) to (6) (that is, the theory of declination), the global pattern of dip distribution was 
sought. What is at stake first, then, is to determine the principles by which the arcs of 
rotation can be established. This is what the diagram (Fig. 6) shows: how to determine the 
declinatory arcs of rotation of magnetised needles in the dip position in the quadrant of the 
globe’s circumference from the equator towards the pole. Knowing how to determine the 
arcs of rotation would allow one to determine the dip values for each point of latitude and 
to tabulate them such that they can be used at sea to determine the latitude. The 
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construction of the diagram makes use of a further conceptual distinction, that between the 
arc of declination and the arc of rotation. The arc of declination at a given point position is 
constructed differently from the arc of rotation at the same position. Conflating these two 
concepts obscures what is at stake in the diagram and its construction. 
The arc of declination corresponds to an angular value between the horizon and the 
magnetic direction (which is a component determined as part of the arc of rotation), 
referenced to the centre of the needle. The line of the horizon is not, however, a magnetic 
variable, which entails that the angular value of dip does not correspond to the arc of 
rotation that the needle had actually made while dipping. It is the geometrical determination 
of this latter value that is at stake in the construction of the diagram of rotation, while 
taking into account that the declination motion is not a “motion of centre to centre, but a 
natural turning of a magnetick body to a magnetick body, and of the axis of the body to the 
axis” (DM: 197). Gilbert makes this claim before going on to explain how this works, 
through the diagram of rotation – explaining this circular movement geometrically is what 
the diagram is supposed to show. 
To defend this claim, let’s unpack, step by step, what each of the elements of the diagram 
stands for. This is particularly necessary because the description itself hardly makes them 
transparent. 
4.2.1 The Diagram
The diagram (Fig. 6) contains the following elements.
 ACDL: described as the “body of the earth or of a terrella”.
 AD: equatorial line 
 CL: polar line (the axis)
 M: the centre
 N: 45° latitude. Given previous diagrams Gilbert made use of, we know that N stands 
for the centre of a magnetised needle in the dip position.
 ND: the direction of the needle in the dipping position if placed at 45°, according to the 
rule of alignment. That N points at D on the equatorial line had already been 
established in chapter VI, book 5, since a magnetised needle “halfway on the progress 
of its centre from the equator to the pole […] is pointing toward the equator [i.e. the 
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other equatorial point], midway between the two poles” (DM: 197). This claim 
constrains the construction of the diagram; it is not derived from the diagram.33 
The other elements of the diagram, and what they are supposed to show, are described as 
follows:
From the point F on a Horizon distant from the æquator A by the length of C M, the 
semi-diameter of the earth or terrella, an arc is described to H as the limit of the 
quadrants of declination; for all the quadrants of declination serving the parts from A to 
C begin from that arc, and terminate at M, the centre of the earth. The semi-diameter of 
this arc is a chord drawn from the æquator A to the pole C; and a line produced along 
the horizon from A to B, equal to that chord, gives the beginning of the arc of the limits 
of arcs of rotation and revolution, which is continued as far as G. For just as a quadrant 
of a circle about the centre of the earth (whose beginning is on the horizon, at a distance 
from the æquator equal to the earth’s semi-diameter) is the limit of all quadrants of 
declination drawn from each several horizon to the centre; so a circle about the centre 
from B, the beginning of the first arc of rotation, to G is the limit of the arcs of rotation. 
The arcs of rotation and revolution of the magnetick needle are intermediate between the 
arcs of rotation B L and G L. The centre of the arc is the region itself or place in which 
the observation is being made; the beginning of the arc is taken from the circle which is 
the limit of rotations, and it stops at the opposite pole; as, for example, from O to L, in a 
latitude of 45 degrees. (DM: 199–200)
Admittedly, the description is confusing and packed with concepts which remain 
unexplained. A close reading of the text tells us that both the motion of declination and the 
motion of rotation have beginning points and limits (termini). It does not explain how these 
reference points are determined. We are also told that, although there is a relation between 
the arcs of declination and the arcs of rotation, the two kinds of arcs are taken to be 
distinct.34 In order to explain the distinction between the arcs of rotation and declination, 
and also their corresponding beginnings and limits, let’s look further at each of the elements 
of the diagram and how they are obtained (in line with Gilbert’s own description).
To represent declination in a two-dimensional space, some dimensions need to be 
established first: the horizon and the magnetic direction. The determination of the horizon is 
easy: it will be a tangent to the surface relative to the position at which the needle is placed. 
33 According to Pumfrey 2002, the diagram of rotation is intended to determine the magnetic direction 
at 45°. This seems fairly unlikely. Given the information Gilbert has about the magnetic direction at 
45° and the determination of how the arcs of rotation are determined, this is what allows him to 
establish how magnetic direction can be obtained. 
34 I refer to the movement of declination as an arc of declination, which is a segment of what Gilbert 
calls a “quadrants of declination” – that is, the quadrant in which the movement of declination takes 
place, given the arc of rotation it is in.
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In the diagram, AF is the line of the horizon for a magnetised needle placed at A. What 
needs to be explained, however, is why the F point is constructed by drawing a circle with 
centre in A and semidiameter AM, such that AM = CM = AF ( “point F on a Horizon 
distant from the æquator A by the length of C M, the semi-diameter of the earth or 
terrella”). The rationale behind the construction is not specified. However, given how 
Gilbert theorises about dip, it seems that what motivates the construction of point F is that, 
if the magnetised needle were fixed at A, and the terrella were to be rotated around its 
centre (as suggested by the instrument discussed in section 3.3 above), the rotation of the 
needle would start on AF and would be determined on the arc FH, since the latter is “the 
limit of the quadrants of declination.” That FH provides the limit of the arcs of declination 
is only the case for the points between A and C, and not for any declination position around 
the terrella ACDL: 
all the quadrants of declination serving the parts from A to C begin from that arc [i.e. 
FH], and terminate at M, the centre of the earth (DM: 199–200).
To begin on FH means that the relevant horizon point is on the arc FH and to terminate at 
M means that M is taken to be the point of reference for the construction of FH, because M 
remains unmoved. Now, the point H is determined first by the construction of a circle with 
centre at C and having CM = CH as semi-diameter. Second, the point H is the intersection 
of the circle with centre C and semidiameter CM with the circle with centre M and semi-
diameter is FM. This entails that, if the dip instrument is at C, the horizon will be at H.
If the magnetised needle were at A (which, in the current construction, happens to be the 
equator) and the terrella ACDL is moved such that now A represents, e.g., 5° lat., the claim 
is that the quadrant of declination will be determined by a line of the horizon which 
intersects FH at a point we can call Q and by AM because ∠QAM would be 90°. 
Determining the angle of declination at this new A (lat 5° with respect to the terrella) would 
entail finding the magnetic direction for 5°, which means first establishing the arc of 
rotation. The rationale Gilbert uses here is based on taking the dip values between the 
equator and the pole as arcs of rotation which have two termini – the line of the horizon and 
the centre of the terrella (or, from a different perspective, the polar line. That this is how the 
arcs of rotation have to be considered depends on the claims that the dip is 0° at the equator 
and that the dip is perpendicular at the poles. To understand that this is the rationale that 
Gilbert has in mind, let’s take the example N (45° lat.) presented in the diagram. According 
to Gilbert, one can determine the arc of declination at N in the following manner:
Take away the arc of the quadrant of declination drawn from the centre to the line of 
direction; that which is left is the arc of declination below the horizon. As, for example, 
in the rotation of the versorium N, whose line respective proceeds to D, from the 
quadrant of declination, S M, take away its arc R M; that which is left is the arc of 
declination: how much, that is, the needle dips in the latitude of 45 degrees. (DM: 200)
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The rationale here goes as follows.
1. The relevant line of the horizon for N is SN because S is the intersection of a circle 
with centre at N and semidiameter NM = AM with the arc HF (i.e. the quadrant of 
rotation). This means that SN is the line of the horizon if the dip instrument were 
at N.
2. SN would be the beginning of the quadrant of declination for a magnetised needle 
at N.
3. The terminus of the arc of declination would be NM.
4. ∠SNM = 90° (because SM is a quadrant of declination).
5. ND: magnetic direction when the needle at N is in the dip position.
6. ND intersects the arc SM at R.
7. SM − RM = SR, the arc of declination 
8. The value of the SR is determined by the value of the angle ∠SNR.
The corresponding angle of dip not represented in the diagram is ∠SNR. One could go as 
far as to suggest that the dip angle is not represented in the diagram because it itself is not at 
stake. In my interpretation, what is at stake in the construction of the diagram is not 
illustrating the arcs of declination, but a generalisation of the arcs of rotation, as these give 
the magnetic direction for dip. What matters is understanding by what rationale the 
beginnings and the termini of the arcs of rotation are obtained for every position. 
To  understand  this,  we  have  to  return  to  the  elements  of  the  diagram.  Point B is the 
intersection of the line of the horizon of a circle with centre A and semidiameter AC (the 
“chord drawn from the æquator A to the pole C”), such that AB = AC. A circle with these 
specifications intersects the line of the horizon at B and passes through the pole L because 
AC = AL. This is how we determine the arcs of rotation for a needle positioned at A. For C, 
the  determination  is  similar:  we know that, at the pole C, the dip is 90° (or -90° at the 
opposite pole). If a needle were positioned at C, and the terrella ACDL were to be moved, 
while the magnetised needle stood still, the rotation of the needle would be determined on 
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an arc of rotation that starts at L and is part of a circle with C as centre and CL as semi-
diameter. 
Point G is a terminus of an arc of circle whose centre is M and whose semi-diameter is BM, 
such that BM = MG = MO (had they been represented on the diagram). The intersection 
between the circle described with centre M and semidiameter MB and the circle with centre 
C and semi-diameter CL is G. Thus, if the magnetised needle is at A, the arc of rotation is 
BL. If the needle were at C, its quadrant of declination would be GL, with G being the 
intersection  of  the  quadrant  of  declination  at  C  and  the  circle  with  centre  in  M  and 
semidiameter  BM,  such  that  BM   =   MG.  We  have  established  how  we  geometrically 
describe  the  quadrants  of  declination  for  points  A  and  C  (if  the  needle  were  in  these 
positions). Similar reasoning will be used for any point of latitude between A and C, as 
exemplified also by the example at N.
Given all of this, it appears that the arcs of rotation are determined on circles with centres at 
the position where the needle is placed (and where the observation is taken) and with 
semidiameters whose value is determined by the opposite pole from the needle. For A (and 
any point between A and C), the arc of rotation is determined by a circle with diameter CL; 
for C (and any point between C and D), an arc of a circle with radius CL, for N a circle with 
radius ND. The radius then is the magnetic direction. Given these considerations, Gilbert 
claims: 
The arcs of rotation and revolution of the magnetick needle are intermediate between the 
arcs of rotation B L [i.e. the arc of rotation for the point A] and G L [i.e. the arc of 
rotation for point C]) (DM: 200). 
Thus, whereas the arcs of declination of a magnetised needle have, as points of reference, 
the centre of the body, the line of the horizon relative to the centre of the body, the magnetic 
direction and the centre of the terrella (or the earth), the arcs of rotation of a magnetised 
needle have as relevant variables the centre of the body and the opposite pole to the body 
(such that the axis of the needle orients itself towards the polar axis of the other body). In 
this way, we have a grasp of what Gilbert had in view when claiming that the motion of the 
needle is not a “motion of centre to centre, but a natural turning of a magnetick body to a a 
magnetick body, and of the axis of the body to the axis” (DM: 197). The arc of rotation 
becomes a base measurement for this natural turning. 
The conceptual distinction between arcs of declination and arcs of rotation is introduced 
because the arc of declination is specified in relation to the arc of rotation. Given this, what 
is at stake for the magnetical philosophy here is not the angular determination of dip, but 
the determination of the arcs of rotation of magnetised bodies. The diagram of rotation is 
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constructed for this latter purpose: as was the case with the rule of alignment, the diagram 
gives a geometrical reality to how the vis magnetica operates. Indeed, the diagram does 
more than this: it introduces the concept of the arc of rotation, and makes it fundamental to 
the determination of the arc of declination. Indeed, it is only through being conceptualised 
geometrically, through the diagram, that the rotation of the declining needle gets to be 
conceived as an arc at all. That is, the freshly minted arc of rotation sets limits to the 
rotation of a needle at any particular point, such that its rotation is conceptualised as an arc. 
And the arc of rotation, in turn, has its own limits set purely geometrically, through the 
specificities of the construction of the diagram. The further use of these newly 
conceptualised arcs, as we will see in the next section, is through their diagrammatic 
conceptualisation. 
4.2.2 The computation of the dip table and the diagram of the theoric
Edward Wright, a member of Gilbert’s circle and of Gresham College, is best known for his 
treatise on navigation, Certaine Errors in Navigation (published in 1599 and republished 
with revisions in 1610)35. The treatise was widely read by natural philosophers and those 
interested in navigation as it explained the mathematical principles behind the Mercatorian 
projection: what was at stake was the problem of how to accurately depict the globe on a 
two-dimensional map according to the projection that Mercator had used in 1569 and then 
how to explain the principles behind it such that any navigator could generate a map on her 
own.36 The treatise included also a discussion of the variation of the compass and the errors 
arising from the then known methods for determination of latitude: from astronomical 
tables to the use of the cross staff. Consequently, Wright devoted much of his work to 
improving and constructing mathematical instruments, such as an armillary sphere, an 
35 Full title: Certaine Errors in Navigation, Arising either of the ordinarie erroneous making or vsing 
of the sea Chart, Compasse, Crosse staffe, and Tables of declination of the Sunne, and fixed Starrs 
detected and corrected. Edward Wright was a Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge from 
1587 until 1596. In 1589, Wright obtained royal permission to join the expedition to the Azores led by 
the Earl of Cumberland as a consultant in navigational practice. It was as a result of this voyage that 
Wright published his treatise, Certain errors in navigation (1599), in which he reports on the 
navigational problems incurred during the voyage. After 1596, Wright served Prince Henry as 
navigation expert. Wright is also the translator of Simon Stevin’s Havenfinding into English (also 
1599), and of John Napier’s work on logarithms Mirifici Logarithmorum (1614), edited posthumously 
by Henry Briggs. Despite his many contributions, Wright’s work is severely understudied today. 
Some exceptions to be noted: Pumfrey and Frances (2004); an article which deals tangentially with 
Wright’s patrons. 
36 On Mercator’s map and Wright’s mathematics used to explain the Mercatorian projection see 
Gaspar & Leitao (2013). 
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astrolabe, and also a sea-ring (presented in the 1610 edition).37 The sea-ring was used to 
map a relation between latitude and the magnetic variation of the compass, such that if the 
latitude of a place and the sun’s altitude is given, the magnetic variation can be found.
In his treatise, Wright described other means for finding the latitude, amongst which is a 
theoric which made use of Gilbert’s magnetic principles and the geometrical principles of 
the magnetic motion of declination and rotation (as specified in the diagram of rotation 
discussed above). As I have already shown above, we know (from Wright) that the theoric 
was calculated first by Henry Briggs, but since we do not have Briggs’ computations in 
print, in order to understand how the computations were made and how Gilbert’s theories 
were incorporated, we are restricted to examining Wright’s account of how the theoric 
presented in Chapter XIV of the second edition of Certain errors in navigation, entitled “To 
find the inclination or dipping of the magnetical needle under the horizon” (Wright 1610: 
82–5). In the analysis of the diagram, I will closely follow Sonar’s (2010) reconstruction.
Wright’s diagram (Fig. 7) consists of the following elements.
 OBR: the meridian of the earth
 O: pole
 B: equator
37 The sea-ring consists of a universal ring dial mounted over a magnetic compass. 
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 R: latitude 60°, such that OBR as an arc = 150°
 AR: complete sine = 10,000,000
 BD: line of the horizon (perpendicular to BA at B)
 BD = OB (given the conventions for the construction of the horizon)
 DSV: arc of a circle with centre at A and semidiameter AD = AS
 OR = RS: radius of a circle with centre R (on which the arc of rotation of the point R is 
given – according to Gilbert’s account set out above)
 OS: arc segment of the circle with centre R and semidiameter OR
 ST: 60/90 parts of the arc STO
 ∠ART: the complement of the “Magnetical Needle’s Inclination under the 
Horizon” (not represented on the diagram, but the dip at R)
 The salient triangles, for which variables are given and calculations can be made are 
thus OAR and ASR. For OAR, ∠OAR = arc OBR = 150°
 ∠ARO = ∠ROA = 15° (because triangle OAR is isosceles).
For the values of the sides of the triangle ASR, Wright tells us,
Secondly, in the triangle ARS all the sides are given AR the Radius or semidiameter 
10,000,000: RS equal to RO the subtense of 150 deg. 19,318,516: and AS equall to AD 
triple in power to AB, because it is equal in power to AB and BD, that is BO, which is 
double in power to AB. (Wright 1610: 83; my emphases)
Now Wright does not explain any further how he obtained these values, but given the 
information he gives, we can reconstruct the reasoning that informed them as follows.
 RO = AR × sin 150°/sin 15°. Wright does not state that this is how the subtense should 
be calculated, but in developing his calculations, he uses Bartholomew Pitiscus’ 
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Trigonometria: sive de solutione triangulorum tractatus brevis et perspicuus (1595), 
which employs this method for the calculation of a subtense.38
The reasoning behind the value AD, which is “triple in power to AB, because it is equal in 
power to AB and BD, that is BO, which is double in power to AB”, is also in need of 
explanation. AD = 3AB2 because AD2 = AB2 + BD2 (Pythagoras), but BD = OB (radii on the 
same circle) and OB2 = AB2 + OA2 = 2AB2, which means that AD2 = AB2 + 2AB2 = 3AB2. 
Given that AB = 10,000,000, we also have the value of AD, and therefore also the value of 
AS. The calculations determine that AS=17320508(.0757…).
With these values found, Wright continues:
Now then by 4 Axiom of the 2 booke of Pitiscus. As the base or greatest side SR 
19,318,516 is to the sum of the two other two sides SA and AR 27, 320, 508; so is the 
difference of them SX 7, 320, 508 to the segment of the greatest side SY 10,352,762; 
which being taken out of SR 19,318,516, there remaineth YR 8,965,754, the halfe 
whereof RZ 4, 482, 877, is the Sine of the angle RAZ 26 degr. 38 min. 2 sec., the 
complement whereof 63 degr. 21 min. 58 sec. is the angle ARZ, which added to the 
angle ARO 15 degr. maketh the whole angle ORS, 78 degr. 21 min. 58 sec. wherof 
60/90 make 52 degr. 14 min. 38 90 sec. which taken out of ARZ 63 degrees 21 minutes 
58 seconds there remaineth the angle TRA 11 deg. 7 min. 20 sec. the complement 
whereof is the inclination sought for 78 degrees, 52 minutes, 40 seconds. (Wright 
1610: ?)
Wright refers here to what we now know as the intersecting chord theorem (or the secant–
tangent theorem), which states that when two chords intersect each other inside a circle, the 
products of their segments are equal.39 
This, then, is the theorem informing Wright’s calculations above, such that: 
38 Wright is explicit about the fact that he made use of Pitiscus’ treatise. The trigonometrical principles 
that Wright makes use of are directly taken out of this treatise. Pitiscus’ treatise was first published in 
1595 in Frankfurt, but was republished in 1599, 1608, 1612. In 1614, the treatise was translated into 
English by Ralph Handson with the title Trigonometry: Or the doctrine of triangles.
39 The theorem is not the invention of Pitiscus. It is already stated in Euclid’s Elements Book III, 
proposition 35: “If in a circle two right lines cut the one the other, the rectangle parallelogram 
comprehended under the segments or parts of the one line is equal to the rectangle parallelogram 
comprehended under the segment or partes of the other line.” (Euclid Elements, translated by John 
Dee 1570: fol.106)
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 (AS +AB (or MB)) × SX= SR × SY. This is the formula on the basis of which Wright’s 
calculations are made. The value of AS, AB, and SR are already known. That AX = AB 
is also known, as is SR= OR. Therefore:
 SX = AS – AX = 7,320,508 (because AS and AX are known values. AS had been 
calculated in the previous step).
 At this point, the only value missing is SY, which is extracted out of the above formula: 
(AS +AB) × SX = SR × SY
After the determination of SY, YR is determined by triangular calculations in the isosceles 
triangle ARY. Given the value determination of YR (8,965,754), it follows that ZR is 4, 
482, 877, because Z is constructed midway through the segment YR. 
 Now, sin ∠RAZ = RZ/AR = 4482877/10.000.000 = 0.4482877. According to the table 
of sine (as used by Wright), this value corresponds to the angular value of ∠RAZ= 
26◦38′2′′. 
 The angular value of ∠ARZ = 90◦ − 26◦38′2′′ = 63◦21′58′′, because ARZ is a right-angled 
triangle.
 ∠ARZ + ∠ARO = 63◦21′58′′ + 15° = 78◦21′58′′ = ∠ ORZ= ∠ ORS. This, then, is how 
the angular value of ORS is obtained.
 Given ORS and ARS, the value of TRO can be calculated: ∠TRA = ∠ARZ − ∠TRA.
 Now, ∠TRA is given because we know that ST = 60/90 parts of the arc STO, 
calculated to 52◦14′38′′, which gives ∠TRA = 11◦7′20′′.
 Since the angle of inclination is the complement to ∠TRA, the angle of dip is 90° – 
∠TRA = 78◦52′40′′.
Wright mentions yet another way of computing the angle of dip and then includes in the 
text the table of dip–latitude values that the members of Gresham College accepted and 
made use of for the determination of latitude by magnetic dip (see Fig. 8 below).
As we have seen in Wright’s demonstration, the table is calculated by making use of 
trigonometry and considerations about angular and side measurements in right-angled 
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triangles. What matters for our purposes is however that the use of geometry is grounded by 
taking on board Gilbert’s conceptual distinction between arcs of rotation and arcs of 
declination, and by accepting that the identification of the relevant magnetic variables for 
declination is determined diagrammatically on the bases explained in the previous section. 
Additionally, in extending Gilbert’s diagrammatic construction to determine his geometrical 
calculations, we also notice that Wright accepts Gilbert’s axial dipole. By positing an axial 
dipole, Gilbert breaks down the distinction between geographical latitude and longitude and 
geomagnetic latitude and longitude. It is only under the assumption that the earth’s axis 
coincides with the magnetical polar axis (i.e. positing an axial dipole) that both the 
diagrammatical representation and the calculations that Wright (and Gilbert) provided could 
hold.
160 CHAPTER FOUR
Fig. 8
FROM EXPERIMENTS TO DIAGRAMS TO CONCEPTS 161
5. Conclusion 
This chapter argued that (some) salient conceptual content of magnetical philosophy is 
specified through a practice in which experimentation is translated diagrammatically, such 
that the experimental results are articulated through the diagram. Diagrams become tools of 
scientific reasoning and determination of conceptual content. I have shown that both De 
magnete and the magnetical philosophy–more generally– have a diagrammatic dimension 
that has not previously been identified or investigated: (some) diagrams are tools in 
Gilbert’s scientific reasoning process. To defend my position section 3 claimed that the 
Diagram of Orbes (Fig. 3), introduced in Chapter XI, Book V of De magnete, was 
constructed in order to formulate the rule of alignment. By translating diagrammatically 
what was established in the experimental investigation of magnetic declination (dip, 
inclination), Gilbert concludes that a magnetic body placed within the orb of virtue of a 
terrella aligns with its corresponding orb, according to certain patterns, and not relative to 
the terrella. Measurements of dip were needed to constrain the construction of the diagram, 
and the diagram’s construction was necessary to specify the spatial relation (the magnetic 
direction, or orientation) that Gilbert was after.
Section 4 discussed the Diagram of rotations (Fig. 6) in order to show how the conceptual 
distinction between arcs of declination and arcs of rotation is specified through its 
construction. Through the diagram, the salient geometrical values of the arcs/quadrants of 
declination and arcs of rotation were determined. These then were used in order to provide 
a basis for calculations within the proposed theory of a dip–latitude correlation, according 
to principles of spherical geometry. We then considered these calculations, and their 
diagrammatic specification, in section 4.1.2, through Wright’s theoric. The reconstruction I 
have given here suggests that whether or not a diagram can be taken to play a genuine role 
in scientific invocation is determinable only after (1) showing what the diagram shows and 
what function it fulfils (since the relations between the elements of the diagram are not 
always expressible prior to the diagram’s construction) and 2) determining the relation (if 
any) between the diagram and what prompted its construction. As the treatises on 
magnetism show, in some cases, diagrammatic reasoning proceeds from experiments 
through diagrams to conceptual specification. In these cases, the concepts in question come 
into being only through such a process.

Chapter 5
Magnetic Inclination: Diachronic Change and 
Underlying Differentiation
Magnetic inclination (hereafter, MI) was noted by the compass maker Robert Norman, in 
1581. He came to notice that a compass needle balanced by weight would dip below the 
horizontal once magnetised, as if suddenly unbalanced. MI subsequently became a central 
part of investigations into magnetism over the next few hundred years. MI, however, is not 
a single thing: this chapter argues that MI itself changes throughout the history of its 
investigation.1 I do not entertain here the weaker – and unsurprising – claim that historical 
actors gave different descriptions of the same effect, but the stronger claim that MI changed 
as the actors significantly reconfigured the worldly complexes it was taken to show. MI 
shifts from being a downward deviation of the north pole of a magnetic compass needle 
(Norman), to being part of a rotation (Gilbert), to being a positioning relative to moving 
poles (Bond), and so on. With shifts in the pattern of the world come shifts in the way MI is 
specified and in what its measurement is actually taken to measure. If this is so, then it is 
not the case that there is one, objective phenomenon (whose description or manner of 
investigation changes in time as we learn more about correlated subjects) that MI refers to. 
At no point throughout its history is there an objective state of affairs that is uniquely 
picked out by MI, independent of the practices of intervention which are used to make 
sense of and account for MI. 
1 There has been some variation in the terms used: Robert Norman refers to“dip” or “declination”, as 
does Gilbert, while it is Bond who introduces the term “magnetic inclination”. These terms were used 
interchangeably in the period. More importantly for my purposes here, the literature on the history of 
magnetism takes these terms to describe the same thing (Zilsel 1941, Henry 2001). I will also use the 
terms interchangeably (unless specified otherwise) – the point being that differences in the terms do 
not reliably track differences in MI itself. 
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It is my contention here, then, that different actors use MI, or one of its cognate terms (e.g., 
dip), to pick out different worldly complexes. My claim is not, however, that the different 
complexes are unrelated – there is something holding them together: the separation of the 
movement of a magnetised needle into two distinct motions, on a horizontal plane and a 
vertical plane, respectively. I address the different ways in which the movement of a 
perfectly balanced magnetised needle within a vertical plane was made relevant for the 
study of magnetism. It looks at how something not-yet-determinate (the vertical plane of 
magnetic movement) is made determinate (i.e. MI).2 It shows that, as far as the concept of 
MI was an object of research with scientific salience, it was an indeterminate concept, and 
necessarily so: what it showed about magnetism, how it was best described, and what its 
corresponding representational unit was were all questions pursued in the research context. 
It is only retrospectively and with hindsight that we attribute a fixed, well-determined 
account of what MI is to past actors. I look at some of the ways in which investigators into 
magnetism attempted to make the vertical movement of a perfectly balanced magnetised 
needle show something about magnetism: what is at stake is not simply what the vertical 
plane shows, but also what this vertical plane is—which direction it points towards, how 
best to represent it (geometrically), what it is that is being measured. 
My argument is that the vertical plane starts out as not-yet-determinate because of the need 
to specify, through research, in relation to what the needle moves within the plane, towards 
which direction it points, whether (and if so, how and why) the vertical movement varies, 
how best to represent it (geometrically), and what it is that is measured. These are questions 
whose answers are neither given nor settled once and for all, but are instead open to 
specification (and contestation) in the investigation itself. MI is not reducible to the claim 
that the needle tilts downwards from the horizontal; it is instead the specification of this 
tilting downwards specified relative to the questions above, such that the vertical plane 
becomes productive in research on magnetism. I also show that MI itself, rather than being 
just a passive phenomenon in need of explanation, is instrumental in the attempts to 
formulate explanations of magnetism. MI was not simply corroborated to a specific theory 
about magnetism, but rather, in some cases, fleshing out the MI is what informed the 
specification of the theory of magnetism: how it did so depended on the details of its 
specification. Or so I shall argue in this chapter. 
The case of MI shows (a) how new salient aspects of the world are conceptualised when 
investigators know little or nothing about them, and (b) how (and to what extent) 
2 I discuss what I understand by making something not-yet-determinate determinate in the last section 
of this chapter. 
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investigative practices3 contribute to the gradual specification of the event in question. It is 
through the particular moves in the investigative practices that elements of MI are 
specified, and it is through charting the changes in the practices that we can make these 
elements manifest, as well as explain their role in the conceptual specification of MI. As we 
will see, MI was not just simply discovered as a result of some laboratory activity, or 
recognised ostensively in an act of perceptual observation. Nor was MI introduced to solve 
a well-defined problem, nor did it gain its specificity through problem solving. It was 
individuated as an anomaly in the practice of compass construction, and its 
conceptualisation came in steps. 
To have a fully formed concept, one has to determine that the concept used is appropriate 
for the phenomenon it (allegedly) denotes, to specify the relevant conditions by which the 
phenomenon is individuated, but also to have an account of what the phenomenon is. Such 
goals are not at all easy to accomplish, and a great deal of the investigative research process 
is concerned with their accomplishment – as the case of MI shows. This means, then, that 
the articulation of the concept develops over time as a function of the practices through 
which the description and explanation is carried through. The process is mainly one through 
which differentiators of the concept are established: for example, while MI was initially 
understood as involving the tilting downwards of the northern magnetic pole, through 
changes in the practices of investigation, the northern magnetic pole eventually drops out 
as a signalling feature of MI events.
It is, however, through this process of the conceptual specification and development of MI 
that new venues of conceptualising magnetism were opened up. The investigation of MI 
extended beyond inclination itself and gave new insights into magnetism as a whole, while, 
at the same time, these insights fed back into the articulation and specification of the 
concept of inclination. It is this process that I trace in the present chapter, in order to 
identify its steps and show how it contributed to the study of magnetism more generally. 
1. Magnetic inclination in the history of science
Studies of the early theories of (geo)magnetism have, for the most part, focused on its use 
in navigation, particularly either on the developments of concepts such as magnetic poles 
(e.g., Steinle: 2012) or on the geomagnetic effect of magnetic variation – that is, the 
horizontal angle that a compass needle makes between geographic north and magnetic 
north – and its use as a tool for the determination of longitude (e.g., Pumfrey 1987a, 1989). 
By contrast, MI has been almost entirely sidelined from the historical narrative, presumably 
at least partly because those attempting to solve problems of navigation only rarely 
3 I take a practice of investigation to amount to the strategies used in dealing with a particular domain 
or object of investigation.
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attempted to make use of MI; given the focus on navigation in the literature, the assumption 
has been that the historical actors investigating magnetism did not show much interest in 
MI. 
This dismissal of MI from our historical narratives about the formation and the unfolding of 
the discipline of magnetical philosophy is, however, unwarranted. While it is correct to note 
that (especially throughout the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) only few 
measurements of MI were available, investigators had – as we will see – both theoretical 
and practical reasons for being less concerned with the global scale measurements of MI. 
Lack of interest in global scale measurement of MI does not entail lack of interest in what 
the magnetic compass was showing (on the vertical plane, the MI plane) and how it 
mattered for magnetism. In fact, over a period in excess of a century, questions about what 
MI tells us about the magnetism in general, and about the earth’s magnetism in particular, 
were a running theme in investigations related to magnetism: in some cases, MI became the 
core magnetic phenomenon to be accounted for.
In the following, I show that the attempts to make sense of and explain MI also involved a 
(re)conceptualisation, and a (re)classification, of magnetic phenomena more broadly. 
Moreover, MI opened up new avenues for extending magnetism to domains such as 
navigation or cosmology. In the first half of the seventeenth century, MI was sometimes 
used as a problem-solving device in navigation (being initially used to chart latitude, but 
later on being also proposed as a model for finding longitude), in Gilbertian natural 
philosophy (as one of the fundamental movements displayed by (magnetic) matter), in 
geography, among other areas. Thus, alongside defending a position on conceptual 
dynamics through the example of MI, this chapter also shows that the latter should be 
recovered as a salient object of research at the time – on an equal footing with magnetic 
variation.
To the extent that historians of science addressed MI, they treated it as an uncontroversial 
case of a scientific discovery, where what is discovered is a specific effect about which 
there is some objective, unchanging matter of fact (e.g., Crombie 1994: 635; Pumfrey 2002: 
151). The effect of MI was discovered and, consequently, its corresponding concept was 
formed. On this understanding, the changes (from Norman to Gilbert to Bond, and so on) in 
the worldly complex that MI was taken to have pick out are interpreted as merely changes 
in description, rather than changes in the worldly complex itself. The history of MI has 
therefore been given a linear progressive narrative about how our descriptions of MI have 
changed (or improved) as our theories of magnetism have gained precision and more 
explanatory scope. What informs such a history is a commitment to a fundamental gap 
between the phenomenon as part of the world and our conceptualisation of it.4 In this 
4 This, and related issues, are covered in detail in chapter 7.
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picture, even if we are willing to allow our changing conception of a phenomenon to 
continue to approximate the phenomenon, we tend to be unwilling to allow similar changes 
to the worldly complex of the phenomenon itself. It is the commitment to the 
unchangingness of the phenomenon that secures, from the point of view of the history of 
science, a continuous progressive narrative about MI. On a standard narrative, the reference 
of MI would stay the same, while our description of it would improve (and thereby change) 
with scientific developments. I challenge that narrative. My focus on MI here is intended to 
show that it involves no observational content that simply manifests – that it takes work to 
make something observational available, and that it takes active employment of criteria of 
relevance, along with previous background knowledge, to establish which aspects of the 
observational situation matter. What a given phenomenon is, it turns out, is also specified 
relative to these features.
2. Another history of the magnetic inclination
2.1. Norman’s magnetic inclination: the determination of the vertical direction 
relative to a respective point
Most historians take Robert Norman to have discovered MI, as recorded in The New 
Attractive (1581), a baffling short treatise on magnetism that not only recounts the story of 
how Norman came to identify MI, but that also gives an experimental criticism of accounts 
of magnetism in terms of attraction.5 In this section, I focus on the details of Norman’s 
5 If we were to treat MI as the story of an original discovery, we might claim that our record shows 
that MI was independently discovered by (at least) two people. In 1544, some forty years before 
Norman’s publication of his discovery, Hartmann writes to Duke Albert of Prussia: “I also find this in 
the magnet: […] it also shows a downward inclination.” The context in which Hartmann found MI is 
experimental: “I make a needle a finger’s length, that stands level on a pointed rod, or level with a 
water-surface, so that it in no way inclines earthward, but both ends stand level in exact balance; but 
when  I  once  stroke  its  ends,  no  matter  which,  then  the  needle  no  longer  stands  level,  but  dips 
downwards by 9 degrees more or less (Hartmann 1943 [1544]:  128).”  It  is  frequently noted that 
Hartmann’s description is undoubtedly an account of MI. However, because the letter was only found 
in the nineteenth century and seems to not have been known (at  least,  in England) prior to that, 
historians are happy to confer the title of discoverer of MI to Norman. The treatment of MI that I 
propose here is  indifferent to questions about who should be credited with the “discovery”,  as it 
challenges the very idea that what was discovered was the phenomenon of MI itself. But I would like 
however to point out some things about Hartmann’s account. If we are willing to claim that Hartmann 
discovered magnetic inclination, then we should at least notice that the inclination he describes is not 
simply observable. First, we need a specific experimental arrangement: a needle needs to be placed in 
perfect equilibrium on “a pointed rod” and then magnetised. If these conditions are met, following 
magnetisation, the needle “dips downwards”. Active intervention is required to make the MI manifest; 
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discovery and conceptualisation of MI. I show here how Norman articulated MI. More 
specifically, I claim that the worldly complex that MI was supposed to denote, for Norman, 
was an alignment of the north pole of the needle relative to what he identified as the 
“respective point”. Norman’s retrospective account of the discovery of MI turns out to be a 
personal account not so much of a “discovery” per se, but about what the de-coupling of a 
vertical movement of the magnetised needle from a horizontal movement tells us about 
magnetism.
Norman was a nautical instrument maker and was often commissioned to make magnetic 
compasses. Building a compass at the time involved the manufacture of a suitably long, 
thin iron needle and its subsequent magnetisation. Prior to magnetisation, the needle’s 
centre of gravity would be found by balancing it on a pivot. Once magnetised, the needle 
would be returned to the pivot, whereupon it would start to move. As expected, it would 
rotate around its axis until one end pointed north. What was not expected was that the 
needle would also, without fail, dip a little below the horizontal at its north end, as if it were 
no longer balanced:
Having made many and divers compasses [...] I found continually, that after I had 
touched the yrons with the Stone, that presently the north point thereof would bend or 
Decline under the Horizon in some quantitie. (Norman 1581: 13)
The effect was incorporated in the very technology of compass-construction: the needle 
could not have been balanced on the pivot without altering its weight (or its position). 
Norman saw himself obliged either to add a counter-weight (a bit of wax) to the south end 
of the needle, or to shorten the northern half of the needle to counteract the tendency of the 
needle to dip at the northern end. Norman’s initial assumption was that the imbalance of the 
needle had to be a result of either his lack of skill or of imperfections in the materials used; 
put otherwise, he believed the tilting was caused by not being able to perfectly stabilise the 
needle's centre of gravity. Initially, he did not treat it as an independent phenomenon, much 
less a magnetic phenomenon. One could have easily explained the dipping motion of the 
needle as an effect of gravity. 
Norman’s interest in the tilting effect was the result of frustration at having spoiled a six-
inch compass needle in trying to correct for its dip. According to his account, Norman’s 
investigation of the effect begins with the construction of an instrument with which to 
or, differently put, it requires work to generate a regularity such as “when a perfectly balanced needle 
is  magnetized,  it  dips”.  The  MI  is  not  just  given,  or  discovered:  its  existence  depends  on  the 
instantiation of specific physical arrangements. 
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measure it – the dip circle6. The device is built by using a magnetised steel needle with a 
horizontal axis fixed at its centre of gravity, which was mounted on a graduated disc. What 
he obtains is a horizontally mounted needle free to move in a vertical plane, somewhat like 
a compass turned on its side. Thus mounted, the needle is then magnetised to register the 
MI value at that location. Obstacles to accurate measurement were already present in the 
construction of the instrument: it was difficult to make sure that the axis of the needle was 
indeed at the centre of the graduated circle, that the friction at the pivot was as close to zero 
as possible, and that the centre of gravity of the needle really coincided with the axis of the 
needle’s rotation.
These problems in the construction of the instrument continued to mark the investigative 
practices of MI for several centuries. Solutions, whether technical or having to do with 
alterations in the methodology of experimentation, were attempted. For example, one 
attempted methodological solution was to take a dip measurement as follows: take readings 
at both ends of the needle, then reverse the needle, take readings at both ends again, and 
then average the readings (see section 3.4, on Gilpin, for more on this). Many such artifices 
were necessary to consider the instrument reliable: it should be observed, however, that 
even just in the process of improving the instrument, much knowledge about what it means 
to properly isolate MI was also obtained. 
Going back to Norman, however, he used his dip circle to take the first recorded 
measurement of MI at a specific location, London, where, in 1576, the dip was 71° 50’. 
This is the first recorded inclination measurement, and it was frequently used as a reliable 
data point throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries whenever a map of the 
global distribution of MI was needed. Norman repeats the measurement a few times and 
concludes that the dip is constant at London and that it should be constant at different 
locations as well.
Notice, however, that a conception of MI is required in order for the behaviour of the 
instrument to be treated as a measurement of MI: in effect, the instrument works as an 
instrument for measuring inclination only if one already takes MI to be a possibility – if MI 
is already salient in some way. The dipping circle does not detect inclination: it reads off an 
angular deviation from a pre-established horizon (at a specific location) of a magnetic 
needle. It is a piece of equipment generating data. One needs more investigation in order to 
determine what the data is about and how (or if) it matters. It might appear obvious to us, 
from our perspective, that the data was about magnetism, because, after all, a magnetised 
needle behaves this way. But “obviousness” already involves some background knowledge 
(or some mapping out of what is salient within the discipline): why not assume, for 
6 Norman claims that the construction of the instrument was suggested to him by “certayne learned 
and expert men”, but as far as I know it is unknown who these experts are (Norman 1581: 14). 
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instance, that it was caused by transfer of matter? As we will see, this is an option that 
Norman does consider. In addition, the instrument’s design already has the decoupling of 
the horizontal and the vertical aspects of the needle’s movement built into it, insofar as the 
movement in the horizontal plane is neutralised, and the movement in the vertical plane is 
treated as a separate significant variable. (There is no warrant to assume their 
independency: the horizontal and vertical angular values might have been coordinated.) 
Thirdly, while the angular value is determined, what is being measured is underspecified 
(the direction of the angular measurement is unknown, as are the planes that the angular 
value represents, etc.).
Norman experimentally pursues two possible explanations: a) either the needle gained/lost 
weight at one end during magnetisation, or b) there must be a magnetic source to which the 
needle is attracted (i.e., one below the horizon). Notice that hypothesis (a) treats inclination 
as non-magnetic, but gravitational7, and takes it to be a result of the exchange of matter 
during the magnetisation process, while hypothesis (b) classifies inclination as magnetic. To 
verify whether or not (a) is the case, Norman proposed the following experiment: using a 
very “fine balance” he weighed three or four pieces of iron, before and after magnetisation, 
against a piece of lead. He concluded that there was no change of weight, and adds that 
anyway addition of surplus of matter should have affected both ends of the needle, rather 
than consistently favouring one. He thus refutes his first hypothesis (Norman 1581: 16–8). 
His refutation, however, depends on the reliability of his weighing methods: given the 
experimental setup, the refutation is rather likely given everything else (i.e. all of the other 
results), rather than proved.
Hypothesis (a) being refuted, Norman went on to verify experimentally the second possible 
scenario (b) (i.e attractive magnetic source). Assuming that, if there were an attractive 
point, it would draw a magnetic body towards itself, Norman constructed an experimental 
setup that allows for the investigation of the magnetised needle’s behaviour while other 
variables are kept in check. The experiment is devised in order to verify the empirical 
adequacy of the theories of attractive points. The setup is simple: a magnetised needle is 
7 That the downward movement of a magnetised needle is caused by gravity remained a plausible 
possibility even in the eighteenth century. Temple Henry Croker in the late eighteenth century argued 
in his Experimental magnetism (1761) that magnetism produced only polarity and attraction in 
needles, and not the vertical dipping of the needle, the latter being caused by gravity(Croker 1761: 
15). Croker devised his account of magnetism to block theories according to which there is a central 
magnetic core in the earth (i.e. Halley’s internal globe hypothesis). According to Croker the “vis 
magnetica (whatever that Occult Power may be) caries and directs the needles, to the horizon only”. 
Croker’s view is that magnetism is a force which only acts towards the horizon. What matters for my 
point here is to show that it is not easy to block the plausibility of the claim that MI is not caused by 
gravity. It seems to me that a defender of an Aristotelian account of gravity, for instance, would have 
found the conceptual resources to block Norman’s experimental results. 
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placed in a bowl filled with water, and its buoyancy is made neutral by a piece of carefully 
trimmed cork. His aim is to create an isolated, closed system to verify specific predictions, 
and the setup is adjusted to this end. By immersing the needle in water, gravity is 
eliminated, and the friction of the needle is considerably reduced. Currents of air are also 
eliminated, and Norman suggests the avoidance of any kind of perturbations in the water 
for the same reason (aided by the use of a closed container). By using a piece of cork and 
adjusting it accordingly, the needle becomes neutrally buoyant, neither rising nor sinking. 
He makes a series of variations of this experimental setup by trimming the cork more or 
less depending on where he wanted to place the needle, and then records how the needle 
behaves when magnetised. The reliability of the experimental observation lies, then, in the 
correct construction of the experimental setup.
Norman’s reasoning is straightforward once we notice that he makes use of attraction as the 
marker of an asymmetric causal relation, with one body being the causally active source, 
and the other being a receiver, and thus causally passive. If this is the conception of 
attraction we have in mind, the attractive source – the causal agent – has to be located 
somewhere, and it is responsible for drawing the needle towards it. In his experiments, 
Norman is attempting to locate the attractive source of geomagnetism. The possibilities, 
then, are the following. If the attractive point is in the earth, the needle will sink. If the 
attractive point is in the heavens, it will rise. Were there a source of attraction, Norman’s 
prediction is that the needle carefully placed “two or three inches” under the water, “both 
ends of the wyre lying levell with the superficies of the water”, would move (at least 
slightly) downwards. What happens, quite to the contrary, is that the needle will
presentlie turne itself upon his own center, shewing the aforesay’d Declining propertie, 
without descending to the bottom, as by reason it should, if there were any Attraction 
downewards, the lower part of the water being nearer that point, than the superficies 
thereof. (Norman 1581: 21)
This means that the needle tilted, but there was no linear movement downwards. The same 
experimental technique is used to verify the prediction derived from assuming the existence 
of an attractive point in the heavens: that is, if there were an attractive point, a sunken 
magnetized needle would be pulled upwards. Norman describes this experimental variation 
in the following way
[…] the Corke being so made, that it may sinke very slowly to the bottome, and then 
taken out and touched with the Stone, and put in againe downe to the bottome with your 
finger, if any Attractive drawing were upwards, it would ascend, and come up to the 
superficies of the water, being nearer to that point than the bottome. (Norman 1581: 22)
Norman “by diligent and exact tryall” concludes that no effect of pulling or drawing is 
observed when the needle sits “levell in the superficies of the water” (Norman 1581: 22). 
His experimental variations showed that none of the predictions implied by attraction 
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obtains – the needle positions itself, but it is drawn neither up nor down, so he concludes 
that there is no magnetic source to be found that regulates the behaviour of magnetic 
needles. Notice, however, that in this setup again, the movement of the needle is in both the 
horizontal and the vertical plane. The assumption is that, since the vertical plane matters, 
then, if there is anything like a magnetic source of attraction, the needle will be drawn up or 
down depending on where the source is.
Since he observed no attraction, and since magnetism was taken to be attractive, Norman 
could have also concluded not only that there is no source of attraction, but also that the 
vertical movement (the dipping) is (magnetically) irrelevant. He did not. Instead, he 
maintained the relevancy and reliability of the dipping downwards and explained it as 
follows: the needle is not attracted towards some magnetic source, but respects a 
“respective poynt,” that is:
a certayne point, which the touched Needle does always Respect or shew, and is found 
by the declining of the Needle, to be a pricke in some one parte of a straight Line [...] 
which must be imagined to proceede from the Center of the Needle, into the Globe of 
the Earth, Extending, and going Directly foorth, both wayes infinitely. (Norman 1581: 
26)
This “respective point” is his own novel introduction to the study of magnetic phenomena.8 
The theoretical move of positing a “respective point” is not an immediate result of the 
experiments Norman conducted. There is nothing in the experiments to suggest that the 
inclination “respects” any particular point, or that this property is imparted to the needle 
from the lodestone. Norman’s contrived experiment was devised to verify an anticipated 
behaviour, and this verification is the result it secured. The positive hypothesis of the 
“respective point” was not “secured” (or proved) experimentally. But Norman proposes a 
terminological shift, as a result of having experimentally shown that there are no 
“attractive” points: from magnetic needles being “attracted” to specific locations, to 
magnetic needles “respecting” specific locations. The shift, then, is mostly negatively 
motivated: to move magnetism away from the attractive framework. But it has a positive 
impact, as it suggests that the definite directions that magnetised needles take on both 
horizontal and vertical planes matter by themselves; it suggests that they are genuine 
components of magnetic effects. If one thinks that magnetism is fundamentally attractional, 
then one takes the fact that magnetic bodies unite as the paradigmatic instantiation of 
magnetism: on that conception, magnetic bodies do not get “attracted” to the source of 
magnetism only because of other impediments, and thus anything other than unition is 
some kind of perversion of a magnetic effect. With the respective point conception in place, 
8 For a similar treatment of the respective point see Harre (1970: 28–9).
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however, magnetic bodies need not ultimately unite; they respect (point to, are oriented) in 
a direction.9
Given all of this, we are now in a position to specify what precisely MI amounts to for 
Norman. It is the “declination of the north point of the touched needle” from the horizon 
relative to the respective point (Norman 1581: 17). The reference positions for MI are thus 
(1) the horizon from which the deviation proceeds (which although unspecified we assume 
to be a tangent to the earth’s surface); (2) the north pole, which gives the (horizontal) 
angular direction of deviation (since it is the north end of the needle that points 
downwards); and (3) the respective point, which regulates the amount of deviation. The 
respective point is posited as a physical location somewhere, and MI happens only relative 
to this respective point.10 It is not a general property of any two magnetic bodies in 
interaction (Norman 1581:19). It is also not a positioning of the whole magnetic body 
relative to something else, but is, in effect, an orientation of the north pole of the body 
towards the respective point, since when we “touch the needle with what part of the Stone 
you want, that end of the needle that shows the north will alwaies decline” (Norman 1581: 
19). The difference is important because it indicates that, for Norman, magnetism gives the 
north pole centrality and explanatory weight: he holds a conceptual difference between the 
north pole and the whole magnetic body11, since the magnetic action is specifically of the 
north end.
There is another component that is relevant for Norman’s take on MI: as MI is, for him, a 
local positioning of the north pole of a magnetic needle relative to the respective point, its 
values at every location are constant. All of these considerations about MI feed back into 
the determination of the relevant questions to be asked about magnetism, and how one 
should go about investigating it. If the source of the magnetic effects is now posited to be a 
respective point, the physical magnetical cause is “located”, and this location can be found 
by triangulation. On this understanding of magnetism, a few measurements of MI would 
suffice to determine the location of the “respective point”. The account renders the global 
9 As I show in chapter 2, the conceptual shift from attraction to directions matters in the history of the 
investigation of magnetism. Norman does not make much of it, nor is it clear that he notices the shift 
itself  or  its  implications.  It  is  is  Gilbert,  in  De  magnete  (1600),  who  takes  this  conceptual 
development  seriously  and  show the  various  ways  in  which  it  shapes  the  magnetic  phenomena 
themselves, as well as their investigation. 
10 Norman’s  account  of  MI as  relative  to  a  particular  point  is  not  the  only one;  see  for  instance 
Nathaniel Carpenter (1625) and his take that MI is relative to the centre of the earth.
11 NB: Norman, unlike Gilbert and those who have come after him, does not consider the earth itself to 
be a magnetic body.
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distribution of the MI entirely regular, as it will all be determined by the position of the 
needle on the globe and the position of the respective point.
Given the reconstruction of Norman’s account of MI I proposed here, before moving on to 
a different way of specifying the MI, I want to answer to the following worry. It might be 
objected that what I have provided here is still very much an account of a description of MI, 
rather than MI itself12—and if this is all that is at stake, then it is hardly worth mentioning, 
since it is not at all surprising that Norman’s description of the phenomenon is different 
from Gilbert’s or our modern account. However, the description is highly significant both 
from the point of view of the local explanations (since the explanations themselves make 
use of the descriptions we employ13), and from the point of view of the research practice as 
a whole. Research is future oriented; it constantly pushes ahead into new problems. What 
this future looks like depends on how we slice up the relevant variables. In Norman’s 
world, the south magnetic pole loses significance; its behaviour is subordinated to the 
privileged location that is accorded to both the north pole and the respective point. 
The critic might push further and suggest that what I am alluding to is simply a species of 
underdetermination of a theory by data. Cashing out the narrative in these terms, however, 
cannot be done without a loss. My point in analysing accounts of MI is precisely to show 
that the very concept of empirical data needs to be altered. Faced with the same 
experimental setup, different data can be generated: the data is entrenched into the larger 
investigative structure. Data is data only against a specific investigative research situation. 
While Norman takes the declination of the north point of the needle as well specified and 
reliable data, Gilbert, as we will see, denies exactly this. A critic might also argue that the 
conundrums I am raising here are superseded once we obtain mature scientific theories. A 
necessary condition for a mature theory is that it provide systematic explanations, which in 
magnetism was hardly the case until the nineteenth century. To this, I want to suggest that 
the static character of our best theories is once again the result of the fact that our 
philosophical considerations take an uncritical retrospective outlook.
2.2. Gilbert’s magnetic inclination: the determination of the vertical direction 
relative to interactions of magnetised bodies
Historians of science see continuity between Norman’s magnetic inclination and Gilbert’s 
(Zilsel 1941; Henry 2001; Pumfrey 2002). There is a tacit commitment that the two are 
fundamentally talking about the same thing. I disagree. It is undeniable that Norman’s 
12 I believe however that such worries are quite often prompted by assent to a conception of empirical 
phenomena as given. And this seems completely unwarranted to me in this case, where no clearcut 
distinction can be made between MI in the world and MI under description. 
13 For a discussion of the relation between descriptions and explanations and how the former matter to 
the latter see Miller: 2014, chapter 1. 
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experimental practice and conceptualisation of MI influenced Gilbert. But Norman’s 
influence on Gilbert does not imply that Gilbert’s conceptualisation of MI follows 
Norman’s, or that, for Gilbert, MI picks out the same aspects of magnetism as it did for 
Norman. In what follows, I argue that Gilbert’s take on MI is substantially different from 
Norman’s, to the point that what each takes MI to be, and to show about the world, is 
distinct. 
In De magnete, Gilbert transforms Norman’s MI in substantial ways. My claim is not that 
Gilbert simply rejected the causal mechanism that Norman posited to explain inclination 
(the respective point), but that what MI itself is in Gilbert’s magnetic physics is altogether 
something different. Gilbert does not simply give a better (or a different) description of the 
MI than Norman did. Gilbert changes the effect: what MI is, and what it shows about 
magnetism in general, has shifted in Gilbert’s proposal. Norman’s and Gilbert’s versions of 
MI differ both in what they take to be the appropriate conditions to show the phenomenon 
and in what the discernible pattern of it is. 
Gilbert writes appreciatively of Norman as an “ingenious artificier, who first discovered the 
dip of the magnetic needle” and who has shown that the directive property of the needle is 
not caused by attraction, but he explicitly challenged Norman’s account of inclination, in 
terms of both the kind of effect that it should be taken to be, and the mechanism that 
explains it. Gilbert explicitly rejected Norman’s respective point:
he [i.e. Norman] imagined a point respective, toward which the iron touched by a 
loadstone would ever turn, not a point attractive; but in this he erred greatly, although he 
effaced the former error about attraction. (DM: 162) 
Gilbert is not too clear here why he takes Norman to have been in error. On my reading, 
Gilbert’s problem with Norman’s concept is that it presupposes a source-based account of 
magnetism. That is, it presupposes that there is some body, located somewhere, that 
magnetical bodies tend towards. Differently put, while Norman managed to change the 
conceptualisation of magnetism as attraction, he did not do the same for a physical source-
based account of magnetism.14 To Gilbert, the latter is a mistake, because magnetism is an 
essential property that all magnetic bodies have (i.e. the vis magnetica): to locate the source 
of any magnetic effect within something entirely outside the compass needle is simply to 
get the metaphysics wrong, for Gilbert.
14 Recall  that,  in the period, there were many who posited magnetic islands, magnetic mountains, 
magnetic poles in the heavens and so on.
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Gilbert himself takes MI to be caused by the disponent power of a magnet – the power by 
which magnetic bodies arrange themselves into position.15 We are also told that the 
disponent power is not of the magnetic pole, but of the whole magnetic body (DM: 163) 
This is the first departure from what constitutes Norman’s MI. While the north pole is a 
relevant feature of Norman’s take on MI – after all, his MI is a dipping of the north pole, 
Gilbert considers the whole of each magnetic body to participate in MI. There is no 
privileged location at the surface or inside the body in which the magnetic response can be 
located. 
Gilbert also departs from the claim that MI is a dipping as such: MI is, for Gilbert, part of a 
rotation and not a deviation from a plane (DM: 198). MI is thus a “real” motion that any 
magnetic body can display by a “turning of a whole magnetick body” to the whole body of 
another (if placed at appropriate distances) (DM: 185). Gilbert does not understand the 
inclination as a specifically geomagnetic property, but as one manifested by any two 
magnetic bodies. It is taken to have two components rather than just one: not just (a) the 
actual angle of inclination but also (b) the direction of the dipping needle in relation to the 
terrella and/or the space around it – that is, where the needle points. Component (b) is a 
consequence of conceiving of MI as fundamentally a movement of a rotation into an 
orientation. Gilbert puts more weight on the relevance of (b) than (a), using the latter as a 
means to find the former: the direction of the dipping needle (what a magnetic body points 
towards) is more important than the angle of declination itself. The latter is used as a means 
to find the former (through practices of experimentation and diagram construction as it has 
already been discussed in Chapter 4).
The move from deviation to rotation shows a further difference. For Norman, in MI, the 
needle deviates from the plane of the horizon in order to point towards the respective point. 
The respective point, then, is the source against which one can specify the orientations and 
positions of magnetic bodies. It is an absolute frame of reference for MI. For Gilbert, each 
and every single position of MI is specified relative to another body’s position. Every single 
point of MI is an interaction between two magnetic bodies and their respective orbs of 
virtues16, and it is only against these interactions that the positions and orientations of the 
magnetic bodies can be specified (DM: 185). If this is the case, then MI happens, given the 
appropriate conditions, in any collection of magnetic bodies. Magnetic inclination is, for 
Gilbert, a general property of the interactions of magnetic bodies; for him, it is not 
restricted to how the needle or the compass positions itself relative to a magnetic source (as 
Norman treats inclination). Observe that, while Norman conceptualised MI as being 
15 On what this disponent power is, what role it plays epistemologically in De magnete, see Georgescu 
(forthcoming). See also section 3 of Chapter 2.
16 On orbs of virtue/spheres of activity, see Chapter 3.
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completely separated from the magnetic poles of the second body, Gilbert (as a result of his 
experiments with the terrella as a model of the earth) explained MI by direct reference to 
the magnetic poles and the equators of the bodies interacting. Taking MI as a result of the 
interaction of magnetic bodies also changes the expectation about the kind of practice 
necessary to measure it: on this conception, it can be measured entirely in a contrived 
context.17 
Gilbert uses model experiments involving a (spherical) lodestone (a “terrella”) and a 
versorium (recall: an instrument consisting of a magnetised needle suspended on a pivot 
that is fixed so as to move only within a vertical plane). His experimental work shows that 
the account of the inclination downwards has built-in information from a few variations of 
the experimental situation18: it involves the compression of several lessons learned 
experimentally into one single result; it is not a result drawn out of one particular 
experimental setup.19 The result does not just show itself; it is posited after a series of 
lessons from the actual experimental situation are drawn. In this way, Gilbert finds stable 
positions of inclination, since 
but in whatever way the iron has been excited or rubbed, it settles in the declination 
instrument precisely along the plane of the horizon, if it were properly balanced 
before(DM: 188). 
The positions are: 1) perpendicular at the magnetic poles; 2) the null (horizontal) position at 
the magnetic equator; and 3) in between the poles and the equator, an oblique position that 
ranges from 0° to 90°. Note also that, while for Norman there is virtually no room for 
magnetic poles in his explanations, Gilbert’s account of inclination depends on accounting 
17 That is, without reference to the outside world – Norman's measurements may have been taken in 
something akin to a lab (his workshop), but they were in reference to something outside it (the earth, 
its poles, the respective point).
18 In this case, at least 3 series of experiments: with unmagnetised needles, magnetised on one end, 
magnetised at the other end. 
19 Compression of experiments is recurrent throughout the history of MI: what an experimental result 
is is not “derived” out of experimental context, but it is “extracted” out through compression out of 
one or multiple series of experiments. The salient result does not just show itself; it is determined 
after a series of lessons from the actual experimental situation are drawn. Moreover, recall that most 
experimental instances will be (almost as part of the definition of what it means to experiment) “failed 
instances”–insofar as much can go wrong, such that the experiment has to be repeated not to check the 
result, but to construct a propitious experimental situation. However experimental repetitions (as with 
any learning process) are not blind, simple repetitions: with each repetition, and especially with 
repetitions that involved tweaking into the system, new things are learned about the experimental 
context. They are not in vain and they are not unimportant: insights are sometimes made possible 
precisely through such repetitions. 
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for it by direct reference to the magnetic poles and the equator. It is against this 
instrumental and model-based practice of investigation that Gilbert concludes that MI has a 
time-invariant and uniform distribution. 
Given Gilbert’s conceptualisation, the appropriate practice for measuring MI also changes: 
while, for Norman, MI is measured at a few locations around the earth, and then 
triangulation is supposed to give us the location of the respective point, for Gilbert 
(mistakenly from our vantage point20), the measurements can be done at various points 
around the model experiment. Gilbert’s account of MI and the positing of a geocentric axial 
dipole (i.e., that the earth's axis of rotation and its magnetic axis coincide), prompted him to 
conclude that, on earth, there is a correlation between inclination and latitude. As already 
discussed extensively in the previous chapter, to determine the correlation and generate 
inclination values for all points of latitude, Briggs constructs a nomograph which in itself 
becomes a new way of investigating and dealing with geomagnetic effects throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.21
Another difference to be noted between Norman and Gilbert is how the two treat the 
compass’s orientation. While both upheld the de-coupling of the vertical and horizontal 
planes of the compass’ movement, and took it to be salient, they treat the planes differently. 
For Norman, both the MI, expressing a magnetic phenomenon on the vertical plane, and 
magnetic variation, happening on the horizontal plane, are magnetic phenomena. Gilbert 
goes to great lengths to show that magnetic variation (the east–west deflection of the needle 
from true north) is not in fact a genuine magnetic phenomenon at all, but rather an 
epiphenomenon22, while MI is the local exemplification of the magnetic movement of 
rotation.
In conclusion, then, what Gilbert prompts is a shift in how to treat magnetic bodies as 
causally relevant: from a focus on either the centre of a body or a privileged location 
(usually, the earth’s North Pole) to the localisation of the causal relevancy within a system 
of magnetic bodies with all bodies contributing. Gilbert’s version of MI is not restricted to a 
specific source of magnetism that happens to be located in some respective point, or 
20 Notice the inappropriateness of this retrospective judgment. The research situation Gilbert was in 
and the values and metaphysics he upheld would not have suggested him he is in error. 
21 On the role that the nomograph plays in Gilbert’s theory, see chapter 4, where I show that the 
translation of the empirical situation into a geometrical diagram to produce the nomograph of the 
inclination–latitude correlation leads to diverse ways of representing MI, which in turn changes the 
geometrical pattern of the nomograph altogether.
22 On why that is so, see for instance Pumfrey (1989). In a nutshell, the magnetic variation at the 
surface of the earth is caused by the differences in landmass. 
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anywhere else; instead, given the right conditions, MI will be shown by any two (or more) 
magnetic bodies interacting. The phenomenon also adds an additional relevant parameter 
(on top of the angle of inclination): the direction of the dipping needle in relation to the 
terrella and/or the space around it – that is, where the needle points. He takes it, however, 
that there is a stable regularity of these interactions that can be trigonometrically found.
2.3. Bond on magnetic inclination: determination of the vertical plane relative 
to moving poles
So far, we have looked at a conceptualisation of MI relative to a respective point (with 
Norman) and one in which each MI value is part of a rotation (Gilbert). In what follows, I 
examine a conceptualisation of MI relative to moving magnetic poles. Throughout the 
second part of the seventeenth century and the first decades of the eighteenth century, 
physicists such as Henry Bond (1639, 1676), Robert Hooke (1674), Edward Harrison 
(1696), Edmond Halley (1683, 1692), and William Whiston (1721) posit moving poles to 
explain geomagnetic effects. They disagree, however, about how many magnetic poles 
there are, how the magnetic poles move, where they are located, which are magnetic effects 
are salient, how one should go about investigating them, and how to use magnetic 
measurement instruments reliably. 
Bond’s theory of the moving poles, and its corresponding account of MI, have received 
little attention in the literature. In this section, I discuss the details of this account, and show 
that the vertical magnetic plane is specified relative to the dynamics of the dipole recessing 
around the earth’s axis. Thus, MI is not only location-dependent but also time-dependent, 
and its global distribution depends on the specific motion of the poles. Bond’s approach is 
to translate the relevant physical values to spherical geometry and then use the geometrical 
models produced for determining the inclination and longitude. What Bond constructs is 
ultimately a nomograph23 that models longitude–inclination correlations.
2.3.1. Henry Bond’s Longitude Found 
In The Sea-Mans Kalendar (1636 [1638?]), Bond argued that magnetic declination (which, 
for him, is the difference between magnetic and geographical north, or “variation”) would 
be 0° in 1657, and would then increase westerly for at least 30 years.24 In 1668, Bond 
23 Nomographs are geometrical instruments frequently used in investigations of magnetism, starting 
with Gilbert’s De magnete. I discuss the details of the roles nomographs play in magnetical contexts 
in chapter 4. 
24 The value of 0° is made use of by Halley (1683, 1692) amongst others. According to Howarth 
(2002: 391), John Pell claimed that the July measurements of 1657 had indeed confirmed Bond’s 
prediction. 
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published yet another table of predictions of magnetic declination, this time up to 1695. The 
predictions were not exact, but would turn out to be relatively accurate. It is in this context 
that, in The Longitude Found (1676), he finally presents his method for determining 
longitude, based not on magnetic declination, but on MI.25 Despite an overall negative 
assessment of Bond’s technique because of its reliance on the reliability of the dipping 
needle (as a measuring instrument), until (roughly) 1674, the members of the Royal Society 
paid attention to Bond’s work.26 The overall criticism is well-founded: if the dipping needle 
is unreliable then MI cannot be accurately found, so Bond’s technique for finding longitude 
will necessarily have inbuilt errors. Hobbes also assessed Bond’s solution for longitude 
negatively because of its reliance on reducing physical motions to spherical trigonometry, 
and for improper translation of a physical situation to a mathematical diagram (see 
Decameron physiologicum: 110–122). 
For the purposes of this chapter, however, the reception of Bond’s treatise is of little 
consequence: what matters here is what Bond’s concept of MI picks out, and how it 
features in his theory of magnetism. Moreover, its negative reception, and the obscure 
demonstrations in the text itself, do not change the fact that Bond’s approach to MI and its 
geometrical handling, and his considerations about dipping needle instruments are picked 
up and developed and criticised by numerous other natural philosophers and physicists 
throughout the seventeenth century (e.g., Hooke, Halley). There are two aspects to Bond’s 
approach to how the dipping needle can be used to find longitude at sea that are relevant to 
our concerns here: the first deals with Bond’s natural-philosophical explanation of 
magnetism, and the second with how Bond translates his natural philosophy and the 
measurements of inclination into a geometrical model. 
25 Full title: The Longitude Found:Or, A Treatise Shewing An Easie and Speedy way, as well by Night 
as by Day, to find the Longitude, having but the Latitude of the Place, and the Inclination of the 
Magnetical Inclinatorie Needle. Henry Bond’s theory of longitude is understudied. A notable 
exception is Howarth (2002), who gives a conceptual reconstruction of the mathematics that appears 
to have informed Bond’s method for longitude determination. Brief treatments of Bond’s work on 
magnetism are found in Jonkers (2003: 83–100).
26 The main concern is that dipping needles are unreliable, especially at sea. Securing their proper 
balance was a challenge because of the difficulty of making the needle’s centre of gravity coincide 
with the centre of its axis of rotation. This was required to avoid wobbling and errors in measurement. 
Attempts to account for the errors of the instrument show distinct approaches to the problem. Edward 
Nairne’s and Henry Cavendish’s approaches involved taking multiple readings with the same 
instrument by changing variables within the instrument itself. Nairne removed the needle from its 
apparatus and reversed its poles, and then replaced it, taking a new set of measurements. The mean of 
these values was given as the value of “true inclination”. Cavendish focused on ways of diminishing 
friction between the needle and its pivot, and attempted to eliminate the errors that ironwork in the 
ship around him could have generated. On similar issues see Chapman (1943), Johnston (2004), Yost 
(2014).
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2.3.2 Henry Bond’s rotating dipole theory
From the beginning, Bond denies the Gilbertian view according to which there is a 
correlation between MI and latitude. Instead, he claims that the inclinatory needle can be 
used as an instrument in finding longitude:
the inclinatory needle cannot show the latitude (because there is one and the same 
inclination in a hundred several latitudes) yet it shews something else, which is a means 
to find the longitude. (Bond 1676: 2)
MI cannot be used to determine the geographical latitude because a magnetic body aligns 
itself with the magnetic poles, and not with the poles of the earth (Bond 1676: 1). In 
accepting that inclination shows latitude, Gilbert, Wright, Briggs etc posited an axial 
dipole–that is a coincidence between the magnetic poles and the poles of the earth’s axial 
rotation. Bond begins with a tilted dipole: the location of the magnetic poles is different 
than the one of the geographical poles. Bond proposes what we might call a theory of 
atmospheric magnetism. To Bond, the magnetic poles are not locatable on earth, but “in or 
above in the air”, in a magnetic sphere that circumscribes the earth itself:
the magnetick sphere that compasseth the Earth, being a substance that hath not solidity 
to keep pace with the motion of the Earth, but loseth in its motion; and […] their motion 
is the cause of the alteration of the Inclination of the Inclinatory needle. (Bond 1676: 6–
7)
In order to account for the purported change in difference between the apparent locations of 
the magnetic poles and the locations of the geographical poles over time (a phenomenon 
discovered subsequent to the publication of De magnete), Bond's magnetic sphere moves as 
well, but with a motion slower than that of the earth’s, because the sphere is “a substance 
that hath not solidity to keep pace with the motion of the Earth, but loseth in its 
motion” (Bond 1676: 7). Its direction is also different: if the axial rotation of the earth is 
from west to east, the rotation of this magnetic sphere is taken to be from east to west. Bond 
moves quickly from talking about the motion of the magnetic sphere to talking about the 
motion of magnetic poles, and claims that the latter is the mechanism responsible for 
geomagnetic effects:
[…] which motion of theirs [i.e. the magnetic poles] is the cause of the Variating of the 
Variation of the Magnetical needle or Compass, and the cause of the Alteration of the 
Inclinatory Needle. (Bond 1676: 3)27
27 Bond claims that “the horizontal motion of the needle although it be of admirable use in the world” 
is “a forced motion” (Bond 1676: 11). Bond seems to agree here with Gilbert, who also takes the 
east–west deviation of the magnetic needle not to be a natural magnetic movement. While Gilbert’s 
argument relies on the geocentric axial dipole and his supposition that the variation of the magnetic 
needle is caused merely by irregularities in the earth’s topography, Bond’s rationale for claiming that 
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What remains unclear in Bond’s proposal is whether the difference in speed between the 
two rotations remains constant or not. The magnetic poles rotate from east to west with a 
period of 600 years, and an yearly motion of “six tenth of a degree, that is, thirty six 
minutes” (Bond 1676: 7), along a parallel at a co-latitude of 8° 30' relative to the 
geographical pole. The latter appears to have been calculated by using Burrows’s table of 
variations from 1570.28 8° 30' is the value that Bond uses in devising the nomograph 
predicting the inclination–longitude correlation at various geographical locations. This is, 
then, the mechanism by which the motions of the magnetic compass are produced. To 
Bond, a magnetic compass aligns itself with magnetic meridians both in horizontal and 
vertical planes. This entails that the magnetic declination is the same at each point of 
geographical latitude.
Edmond Halley sees this implication as the biggest weakness of Bond’s treatise since the 
variation showed in actual measurements of geomagnetic declination (that is, on the 
horizontal plane) cannot be reconciled with Bond’s theory (Halley 1683: 214). Halley’s 
criticism is the following: if magnetic direction and inclination (the movements of the 
needle on the horizontal and the vertical planes, respectively) depend only on the rotation of 
the magnetic poles from east to west on the same axis, then, on the same meridian (that is, 
the same line of longitude), the variation registered by the magnetic needle should be the 
same. The measurements at locations on the same meridian indicate otherwise. Therefore, 
Bond’s theory cannot be true. Bond is, however, aware of this limitation to his proposal, but 
does not see it as a fatal argument against his account, since he denies that the variation of 
declination (as registered by the horizontal needle) is a genuine magnetic phenomenon, but 
that it is the result of some “accidental cause in the Earth” (Bond 1676: 16).
Despite the criticism, Halley’s account of magnetism has much in common with Bond’s. 
Halley posits what is known as the internal globe hypothesis, according to which the earth 
contains an internal magnetic globe that is rotating independently of the earth’s rotation is 
one of the better studied versions of the theories of magnetic rotating poles. Halley, like 
Bond did attempt to save the magnetic phenomena by positing sets of dynamic poles. 
Unlike Bond, however, Halley is ready to move away from a dipole to a multipole account. 
Halley is not too preoccupied with MI in the context of his theory, but Newton’s successor 
at Cambridge, William Whiston, in The Longitude and Latitude Found by the Inclinatory or 
Dipping needle (1721) makes use of Halley’s internal globe hypothesis in the attempt to 
find longitude and latitude with the use of MI. Whiston experimented with dipping needles 
between 1718 and 1723: his dip circles were sent out on ships in order to record dip 
measurements at different locations. Whiston believed that magnetic dip could be used for 
the horizontal needle is not natural to the needle remains obscure to me. 
28 Bond determines the position of the magnetic poles (at the time) based on some observations of 
variation made by Burrows in The variation of the compass. See Bond (1676: 7).
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determining both latitude and longitude. He used these measurements to produce a map of 
the distribution of the isogonic lines (Whiston 1721: 52–53) around the English channel by 
using Halley’s four pole theory, and the values of angular inclination he obtained between 
1718 and 1723 when his dip circles were sent out on ships in order to record inclination 
measurements at different locations.
What Whiston proposes then is that magnetic inclination is a phenomenon whose 
predictable pattern varies over time and is expressed relative to an internal globe spinning 
within the earth. Because of the multipole account and the poles moving, Whiston’s account 
of MI is dynamic, but the reasoning of how MI is supposed to be found and used to find 
longitude is very much in line with Bond’s account. The trigonometry involved in 
generating the angular values becomes more complicated, but, despite this complication, 
what is still at stake is how exactly one interprets the axes in which the vertical movement 
was supposed to be given. Convinced that there is a rule of distribution of inclination which 
his treatise aims at articulating, Whiston ventures into predictions of the angular values of 
inclination up to 2040 (Whiston 1721: 76). What is important in Whiston’s and Halley’s 
cases is that what magnetic inclination was taken to show was relative to precessing dipoles 
or multipoles and that the acceptance of the time dependency of magnetic inclination made 
redundant the articulations of how the vertical plane of movement of the needle mattered 
relative to static conceptions of magnetic poles.
2.3.3 Henry Bond’s technique for longitude determination by the use of the dipping 
needle
Practically, according to Bond, the longitude of any place could be found by “the Needles 
Inclination, and that Table [i.e. of inclination], and the latitude of the place” (Phil. Trans. 
1673/8: 6066).29 Bond’s magnetic technique for finding longitude is built around 
suppositions as the following: 1) a tilted dipole; 2) that the magnetic poles move by an 
unique motion, i.e. a rotation; 3) that the variations in the records of inclination follow 
some pattern – which amounts to saying that MI is an effect of a motion of sorts. The 
details about how the magnetic poles move are argued for based on observations about 
magnetic declination, not inclination (Bond 1676: 3–6). (1) to (3) are not hypotheses proved 
by empirical research but assumptions bred from the belief that the global distribution of 
MI follows a pattern and that the MI is a genuine magnetic effect. Given these beliefs and 
the recorded values, Bond reasons, what best explains the facts is a rotating dipole theory. 
With the benefit of hindsight, Bond’s hasty assent to the regularity of the MI distribution 
might appear unwarranted, but, without any such assumed regularity, MI would hardly 
appear to be a genuine magnetic effect. This was the analogous case in Gilbert's treatment 
of magnetic variation. For Gilbert, magnetic variation was produced by differences in 
29 For summaries of Bond’s views at the time see Seller, Practical Navigation (1689), Atkinson, 
Epitome of the Art of Navigation (1707; but also the revised edition of 1790).
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landmass, that is, by a non-magnetic accidental cause. Given this, he took it that little can 
be learned about magnetism from the study of magnetic variation.30 Assuming regularity 
(and a simplified structure of that regularity) of a phenomenon was in this case necessary 
for actively taking MI to be a research object that shows something relevant about 
magnetism. That what this regularity is and what MI shows about magnetism are contested, 
and that the explanations change as new empirical measurements are obtained, are strengths 
of the research into MI and not limitations of it. 
Bond’s narrative about rotating magnetic poles is posited because he had accepted that MI 
(and the magnetic movement of the needle more generally) varies with time. But this belief 
was, at the time, not empirically warranted. By 1676, very few recordings of MI were 
available.31 Norman’s 1576 measurement of 71° 50’; those of Wright and Ridley (1613), 
measuring the angular value of inclination at 72°; and Bond’s own measurement of 73° 47'. 
The differences in value are small.32 All sorts of factors could have been posited to explain 
the differences: the unreliability of the dipping instrument (especially at sea), changes of the 
location at which the measurements were taken, changes in temperature, atmospheric 
changes, and so on. For instance, Bond’s contemporaries found the unreliability of the 
dipping needle to be a major shortcoming of Bond’s proposal.33 There are many technical 
concerns regarding the dipping needle, but the insurmountable technical problem seemed at 
the time to be securing its proper balance: this is challenging because it is difficult to make 
the needle’s centre of gravity coincide with the centre of its axis of rotation so that 
wobbling and measurement errors are avoided – especially at sea, where the motion of the 
ship would constantly move the instrument away from the horizontal.34 Bond, I suspect, has 
some theoretical (and methodological) reasons to set aside these concerns. From his 
30 For more on this, see chapters 1 and 2 here.
31 Measurement of MI was almost never recommended during sea expeditions. For instance Chapman 
notes: “One may lament, however, an astonishing gap in Halley’s geomagnetic work, his apparent 
total neglect of the magnetic dip—a fact most surprising in view of his great geometrical knowledge 
and insight, and of the importance given by Gilbert to the dip in his demonstration that the earth is a 
great magnet. The dip-circle is a more difficult and less accurate instrument than the compass, but its 
reference-direction, the horizontal, is much more easily obtained than the meridian needed in 
observing the declination” (Chapman, 1943: 143).
32 For a study of the available magnetic measurements at London from the sixteenth to the twentieth 
centuries, see Malin & Bullard (1981).
33 See Bryden (1993) for responses of Bond’s contemporaries. The dipping needle is so unreliable that 
even in the twentieth century, local MI was not measured empirically, but was deduced from the total 
magnetic intensity of the earth’s magnetic field. 
34 Attempts to account for the errors of the instrument show distinct approaches to the problem. See n. 
4 above.
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published material, it seems Bond only uses a few inclination values to construct his 
geometrical nomograph. Once it is constructed, Bond would be able to predict inclination 
values: the values would, of course, be amenable to empirical rectification, but the 
misreadings of the dipping needle would be correctable from the table as well (eventually). 
What matters to Bond is to have a way to geometrically determine either the inclination or 
the longitude under the assumption of magnetic poles rotating at a speed of “thirty six 
minutes” a year. 
The scarcity of the data that needs to be fed into the model in the beginning – especially 
given its unreliability – remains an issue, however, insofar as Bond takes the claim that MI 
varies with time to be established. That MI varies with time might appear obvious if one 
posits that the magnetic effects are produced by moving poles, but what suggests the 
necessity to posit moving poles to Bond is precisely that time appears to be a significant 
parameter in investigations of magnetism. The status of the time-dependency of MI is 
important because it is constitutive of his theory of the magnetic poles, which in turn is 
used to determine the global distribution of MI. We can speculate that Bond was inspired in 
this assumption by Henry Gellibrand’s claim that magnetic variation varies with time, 
which Bond then extended to MI, but he had little empirical support to go on.35
2.4. Time variation of MI
If the hypothesis that magnetic declination is time-dependent became increasingly likely as 
new measurements were made available, the case for MI is not as simple. As already 
mentioned, only very few measurements of dip were available as the dipping needle was 
too unreliable an instrument to be used for investigative purposes. This was especially the 
case throughout the seventeenth century. A sustained experimental investigation to check 
whether or not MI shifts with time was made by Georges Gilpin (Phil. Trans 1806/96: 385–
419). Gilpin’s impressive series of experiments, however, was motivated by a series of 
previous measurements done in the past, which showed some inconsistencies of values. It 
seemed (as Gilpin puts it) “to be doubtful” that these inconsistencies were merely the result 
of errors in the construction of the dip instrument. Those measurements suggested that time 
might be an important variable, but this needed to be shown systematically.
35 On a discussion of how Gellibrand’s claim that magnetic variation varies with time see Pumfrey 
(1989). It should be noted that Gellibrand himself explains the changes in the measurement of 
magnetic declination in London not by positing time, per se, as the relevant variable, but temperature 
changes. This aspect of Gellibrand’s proposal became obscured by contemporary reconstructions of 
Gellibrand (which would have influenced Bond) as defending the westerly drift hypothesis. Either 
way, with Gellibrand’s discovery Gilbert’s conflation of the geographical and the magnetic poles 
seemed unlikely, so that after 1635 the hypotheses of a tilted dipole or of a multipole structure began 
to be explored. 
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Consequently, between 1786 and 1805, Gilpin measured the value of MI at a single location 
(one of the “apartments at the Royal Society”) at regularly-spaced intervals (morning and 
evening). He reports that he made his experimental observation “with care, and with good 
instruments, carefully registered, and properly arranged” (Gilpin 1806: 388–9). To account 
for the errors in his measurements due to the iron work in the room where the dipping 
needle was placed, Gilpin also took measurements outside,
at two different times, after an interval of ten years, differently situated each time, and 
the observations made at both times out of the doors, compared with the observations 
made in the room, giving for the error of 20’ more than the dip was found in the room, 
and both agreeing to one minute. (Gilpin 1806: 389)
Comparing indoors and outdoors readings of dip was already an established practice: Henry 
Cavendish had already shown that in order to account for how the ironwork indoors 
influences the compass readings, indoors and outdoors readings were needed. The strive 
(and belief) in the possibility of accurate readings was ongoing. Improving the 
measurement instrument – the technique of constructing dipping needles was not 
sufficient– the very practice of measuring has to be improved. To secure accurate 
measurement, the method that Cavendish proposed was: a first recording of the dip was 
made, the instrument was then rotated to 180, observations were repeated, the poles of the 
needle were reversed and then a new set of observations was taken. This was how “true 
dip” was measured. Gilpin uses this practice of measurement for recording the dip values.
Gilpin’s table (Fig. 9) contains monthly means and the number of “sets” of observation that 
contributed to each mean. Each set had four measurements: needle pointing first to the east, 
then to the west, and measurements were related with after the poles of the needle were 
reversed. We see, in Gilpin’s case, a different practice of measuring: the initial presumption 
is that the instruments are not highly reliable, which means that design decisions have to be 
made to control for their unreliability, as far as possible, the values are determined by 
means of multiple measurements. I have found no similar attempt to measure MI in this 
systematic way during Bond’s time.
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Fig. 9
In investigating the time-dependency itself of MI at the same place, Gilpin manages to 
evade the theories about the magnetic poles that accompanied previous accounts of 
magnetic inclination. We also see a change in the investigative practice itself: systematic 
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observations become the norm. In fact, by the nineteenth century, it was known that three 
basic geomagnetic phenomena – variation, dip and intensity – altered with time and 
location, and often with the instrument used to measure them. These increasingly complex 
observations naturally lent themselves to long-term, global-scale investigations.
2.5. Conclusion
Bond explains magnetic effects by polar attractions: with poles that are not fixed, but 
rotating. MI is the central magnetic phenomenon. Its global pattern of distribution of 
inclination will be dynamic, and because it is determinable relative to the motions of the 
moving poles, he can calculate that it will require 600 years to complete – this is the 
duration of a full magnetic polar revolution. Bond’s specification of MI differs from 
Norman’s insofar as there is no one source that the north end of the magnetic needle 
respects, but rather the whole body of the magnetic needle positions itself relative to the 
dynamic poles, and it differs from Gilbert’s since it is treated as a geomagnetic property, not 
mappable in the laboratory. The acceptance of moving poles puts pressure on what is 
involved in having a complete map of the values of MI. Measurements at given locations 
are not enough; measurements across time are needed. Bond provides a table of calculated 
values of inclination in over ninety locations across the globe. The values are not measured 
empirically, but are predictions drawn out of his proposed nomograph.
3. One plane, multiple phenomena
Today, MI is used for practical purposes (in aviation, for instance), but it seems to have 
little role to play as a problem-solving device; it does not feature in quantitative analyses or 
in mathematical models of (geo)magnetism, and it does not seem to enhance clarity or 
understanding in (geo)magnetism (e.g., Malin & Bullard 1981). At best, MI is now, in 
Rheinberger’s terms, a technical object, and not an epistemic object.36 This was not always 
the case. In the early stages of the investigation of magnetism, MI was simultaneously a 
fundamental aspect of magnetism and a heuristic for extending magnetism to other domains 
(e.g., navigation, astronomy). It was epistemically productive. At the same time, I have 
shown that MI was also not one thing. MI underwent several changes from Norman’s 
formulation through its adoption as a part of the study of geomagnetism in the nineteenth 
century: the changes were prompted by a conjunction between how MI was investigated 
and what functions it was taken to have in dealing with specific problems. The presumption 
36 For Rheinberger, epistemic objects are, in a nutshell, those which are productive in research as they 
can be used to generate surprising results, whereas a technical object is one that can be used as an 
instrument of research, but it will not by itself be an object of research, as it has been made redundant 
in non-trivial ways, or its capacity as a surprise-generator has worn out. On this, see section 6.2 here, 
and section 5 in chapter 7.
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that MI was unproblematically given as an empirical instance, an unproblematic, well-
delineated aspect of the world, but whose description scientists needed to improve is 
mistaken. Different actors handled (a) the components of MI (which will tell us exactly 
what pattern within a worldly complex it designates) and (b) the corresponding research 
practices (from how to experiment with it to how it can be used for solving practical 
problems) differently. 
For Norman, the relevant components of MI are (1) the horizon (2) the respective point and 
(3) the north end of the needle, which gives directionality to MI and suggests that the 
location of the respective point is somewhere either within or outside the earth itself. MI 
picks out of the deviation of a needle’s north end from the horizon towards the respective 
point. Norman’s conceptualisation of MI involved at least one significant investigative 
consequence for future research: geomagnetic measurements of MI at various locations 
were needed in order to triangulate the location of the respective point. Suddenly, on this 
conceptualisation, MI becomes a central element of magnetism itself, and taking 
measurements of MI becomes central to the study of magnetism. Once the location of the 
respective point is known, the latter can be used to predict the values of dip at other 
locations. How the model necessary for the triangulation would look is not specified by 
Norman. 
Gilbert disagreed with Norman: MI is not restricted to how bodies position themselves 
relative to a respective point; any interaction between any magnetic bodies shows 
inclination. The relevant components change: it is the plane of the magnetic equator and the 
axis of the magnetic poles of a magnet, rather than those of the earth, that matter for 
mapping out MI. The vertical plane of needle movement is specified relative to the body of 
the magnet (for Gilbert’s spherical terrella, it is perpendicular to a tangent at the surface of 
the magnet), and the exact positioning between two magnetic bodies on the vertical plane is 
significant. Latitude matters here too: there is a non-linear relation between MI and latitude, 
on Gilbert's account. Its specification is not simply an application of inclination to find 
latitude, but also a specification of the inclination itself. The relation is modelled with the 
help of spherical trigonometry, and, in the process, the dip pattern around a spherical 
magnet is specified. Once generated, it is stable, however. MI is not specified relative to an 
arrangement within the world itself, but relative to the experimental arrangement in which 
the relevance of the magnetic equator, the axis of the poles and the latitude was specified, 
and the ways these were translated in a geometrical model. The extrapolation from the 
model to the world itself is not straightforward, although Gilbert (and his followers) take it 
to be. 
Bond’s specification of MI is done relative to moving poles: it is time-dependent. And it is 
so because Bond’s account of magnetism is based on rotating poles. The specification of MI 
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is done relative to the model of the magnetic poles such that here again we see that in a 
substantial sense the pattern associated with MI is not of the world but of the associated 
model which posits moving tilted poles. 
What we see in these cases it is not only that the relevant components that pick out MI shift, 
and thus that the pattern of the world that MI is supposed to show changes as well, but also 
that the relevant components of MI are not given, but have to be uncovered, through both 
the investigative practices and the conceptualisations in play. They are specified by a 
combination of experimental, measuring and (usually) spherical trigonometry techniques. 
What matters most is the specification of the relevant physical variables and their 
translation into a workable geometrical model. These physical variables are what is at stake 
in specifying how the vertical plane matters for magnetism. It is also important to observe 
that while each actor uses the same kind of measuring instrument, what it is that they 
measure changes (because the components of what is measured change). In Gilbert and 
Bond’s case it is within these models that the global distribution of MI is obtained – and the 
details of the model mattered for how MI was tabulated. I did not devote much discussion 
to this latter point here, but I have argued for it extensively in Chapter 2. The reconstruction 
offered here showed that while the same type of measuring instrument is being used – from 
Norman to Gilpin – without extraordinary improvement to the instrument’s technical 
limitations, what it is that each actor takes himself to measure is not always the same thing. 
In each account, MI shows something distinctly different about magnetism. 
4. From discontinuity back to continuity
I have argued that MI is not one thing. On different accounts, MI picks out different 
patterns in the world. As the concept shifted from a simple declining of a compass needle, 
to an inherent power of a magnetised needle to “respect” some particular point in the earth 
or in the heavens, to a motion of rotation with respect to an “orb of virtue” around any 
magnet, to a property specific to geomagnetism that varies in time, to alignment with local 
lines of geomagnetic flux, the object being investigated itself shifted with the concept. It 
might look as if these end up being disparate, unconnected events, trapped into their 
corresponding approaches. But the analysis here does not stop at showing that MI was 
constituted as a scientific effect in various ways. All these accounts hang together because 
what they do is to flesh out what the vertical plane of magnetic movement is and what it 
shows about magnetism. The two issues are intertwined, and are difficult to separate in 
practice. By providing answers to these questions, practitioners constitute (flesh out) MI 
itself.37 In turn, the identification of a vertical plane is based on a differentiation. 
37 Understanding the conceptual shifts I have pointed to here through a Wittgensteinian appeal to a list 
of family resemblances is too unprincipled: it is a black box that can hold almost any set of claims to 
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The differentiation consists in a decoupling of the vertical and the horizontal planes of a 
magnetised needle’s movement: the vertical plane gets picked out in contrast to the 
horizontal plane on which the familiar north–east–south–west compass movement takes 
place. With the decoupling, the vertical plane becomes a variable of interest for 
investigations of magnetism in its own right. Once this decoupling is achieved, how to 
specify what this vertical plane actually is remains open to debate. By looking at Norman, 
Gilbert, Bond, and Gilpin, we saw that its specification is consistently at stake: the 
existence and nature of the vertical plane is not a given. This does not mean, however, that 
each transformation starts de novo. Not at all. In the case of MI, we have seen that the same 
instrument of measurement was used (the dipping needle), that experimental designs for 
investigating MI remained relevant, and the data were preserved. At the same time, the 
specification of what those interconnected achievements showed was continuously 
transformed. In doing so, what the actors took the actual effect they were dealing with to be 
also transformed. 
We could justify the decoupling of planes as salient for magnetism through our prior 
commitments to a tridimensional system of coordinates. The latter would form the set of a 
conditions that made the decoupling possible in the first place. But, tridimensionality by 
itself, although a necessary condition for the decoupling, is not sufficient to dictate a 
separation of magnetic movements into planes as salient for the study of magnetism. The 
decoupling of the vertical from the horizontal planes of movement is a byproduct of the 
productive use to which the magnetic compass was put. The compass separates out a 
horizontal plane of movement for a magnetised needle (such that the needle can rotate and 
point towards the North Pole). 
In separating out this plane, a differentiation between the movement on the horizontal plane 
is introduced: the horizontal deviation that we want for navigation purposes and the 
inclination from the horizontal that we don’t want. It is only by trying to isolate the 
horizontal plane that movement on the vertical plane becomes a salient, separate movement 
in its own right. Thus, the byproduct of the compass’s horizontal plane was the positing of 
the salience of the vertical plane. It is against this differentiation that MI presents itself as a 
phenomenon whose pattern can be discerned and investigated. Although necessary for the 
articulation of MI, the differentiation is not itself the phenomenon of MI. Rather, the 
differentiation is a condition that makes MI possible both as an aspect of the world and as a 
meaningful aspect of the practice of the investigation of magnetism. It is also this 
differentiation that provides the source of continuity in historical narratives about MI. On 
my interpretation here, then, these histories are not about the discovery of MI, but about the 
resemblance; in this way, it can hardly be a satisfactory solution. I posit here that if we can find 
reasons to explain the continuities and resemblances that do not risk the ad-hocness of family 
resemblance then we are in a better position.
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production of a worldly differentiation that is the backdrop against which investigators 
constitute various accounts of MI.
From our vantage point, it might seem an obvious move to describe an event in the world – 
the movement of a compass needle – as separated out into two distinct events, a movement 
on the horizontal plane and a movement on the vertical. Its obviousness, however, can be 
explained by our retrospective outlook into what has happened and our embedment in a 
world that has scientifically and practically put this differentiation to use. Abstracting all 
these features, however, we notice that there were initially not enough constraints (be they 
experimental or not) that demanded the positing of the differentiation between the planes. 
In addition, insofar as there is a practical possibility of differentiating between the vertical 
and the horizontal planes as significant in investigations of magnetism, this possibility is 
secured by the instrumental use of compasses. It is no way a straightforward brute 
observable. What makes the differentiation real and salient is based on the agent’s 
interested intervention in the motion of the compass needle.
5. Differentiation and determination
5.1 Differentiations
I began by positing that MI did not come a ready-made, well delineated phenomenon. What 
MI is and what it shows about magnetism is at stake throughout its scientific life. Making 
MI operational for magnetism was an achievement, rather than a given. It is in this sense 
that I began by treating MI as a not-yet-determined thing whose fleshing out, or 
constitution, is at stake. This analysis of MI can be extended to other scientific concepts or 
phenomena when treated diachronically. In the approach I adopt here, the starting point is 
the presumption that it takes work to pick out the scientific relevance that investigators 
search for at a given point. Such a starting point already allows for the possibility of 
competing “constitutions” of a phenomenon without discounting some such constitutions 
from the start as irrelevant or erroneous (given the historian’s vantage point of knowing 
how things turned out).
My claim has been that different constitutions gave different phenomena. MI was many 
things: as we have seen, there were at least four different patterns (or regularities) in the 
world that were picked out as MI. This might seem to risk arbitrariness in the constitution 
of phenomena. I hope to have shown that this is not really a problem to be concerned about, 
not least because these different constitutions have something holding them together: a 
consistent differentiation. Although distinct, these various phenomena of MI were all 
“fleshings out” of the differentiation of the vertical plane of magnetic movement from the 
horizontal. There are two aspects to a fleshing out: determining what the differentiation is 
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qua scientific, and determining what its relevance is given its research context. I talk about 
a differentiation qua scientific because I want to emphasise that the differentiation in 
question has to be “specified” in accordance with criteria that make it meaningful and 
useful in a given scientific context.
A differentiation, as the name suggests, entails moving from the undifferentiated to 
something differentiated: it entails the production of separations, which in the scientific 
context get treated as distinct, individual items. Now, these separations are neither 
arbitrarily made nor unconstrained. Constraints on what and how something can be 
separated will be set by the world itself, and by the structure of the research situation. With 
the world providing constraints, pure arbitrariness is avoided – concepts, such as MI, are 
not “mere putty in our hands” (Pickering 1995: 113).38 Any arbitrariness in making 
differentiations that have scientific significance is also avoided through the questions that 
are addressed, and because each scientific situation builds on and respects previous research 
results. (Each research context is already situated in another ongoing research context. 
There is no literal de novo in research.39)
The differentiation also entails salience. It is only insofar as it matters in some way that it 
comes into view. Indeed, in a sense, making explicit why and how some things are relevant 
is precisely what is at stake in scientific research. But, for instance, establishing that a 
particular experimental variable should be separated out as relevant does not necessarily 
entail that we know why it is relevant. To establish the latter new research setups might be 
in order. Some of them might even retrospectively turn out to have been dead ends, as was 
the case with Bond’s use of MI to find longitude. But one cannot know beforehand which 
will result in dead ends and which not. Even though, given the data, some directions might 
be more likely than others, and some research questions more easy to handle than others, 
the final outcome cannot be established beforehand.
The differentiation is of the world. Qualifications are in order. Firstly, while one might be 
able to make metaphysical commitments to differentiations in general, metaphysical claims 
to this or that particular differentiation are risky. And this is because this or that 
differentiation is always already meaningful qua something or other. In a sense, a specific 
differentiation is already an irreducible physical differentiation. One way is to think of a 
differentiation as brought to the fore experimentally: it is obtained by active interventions 
made by agents with an interest in a specific context, making use of a given set of 
38 See Chapter 7, section 4.2. See also the rest of the chapter for an extended discussion of the 
relations between concepts and the world.
39 This holds also for the opening of new research domains, as these branch out from others. The move 
from magnetism as attraction to magnetism as disponent with Gilbert can be considered as such 
branching. 
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instruments under more or less specific protocols of action and so on. In experimentation, 
we can see that the embeddedness of specific differentiations within physical contexts 
makes them of the world in that they are experimental. Experimentation, unlike other 
practices, has an inbuilt capacity to generate order, or to create patterns. This allows 
differentiations to be picked up, but insofar as not all experiments are possible, through the 
limits of experimentation, one can also learn what differentiations cannot be obtained. This 
is another reason why I claim here that the differentiation is of the world. Secondly, a 
differentiation is a feature of the world only insofar as one takes the particular arrangement 
that allows the differentiation to manifest to be of the world. There is no such thing as the 
ontological status of this particular differentiation in the absence of those arrangements; no 
sense of it can be made once the arrangement manifesting it is removed.
Hopefully, these considerations will help respond to some worries that the analysis in this 
chapter leads to an anti-realism of some sort. In fact, the appeal to differentiations provides 
a realist anchor for the various fleshings out of a phenomenon. In other words, a 
phenomenon is a fleshed out version of what the differentiation shows. Diverse fleshings 
out (constitutions) are possible at different historical points. Given this, then, although 
several different constitutions are possible (through different scientific procedures 
(experimental, diagrammatic, discursive, etc.) or different scientific values (that warrant the 
assent to one account or another)), what holds all these different constitutions of 
phenomena together is that each and every one is an attempt to extract what it is that a 
particular differentiation tells us about the world. It is at the level of these differentiations 
that I take our ontological commitments to be. 
I mentioned that what is at stake in MI is making the not-yet-determinate into something 
determinate, but I have not yet explained what I take the determination to be. To take a 
thing as not-yet-determinate is to admit that (1) there are many things that are not-yet-
known about it and (2) that it nevertheless come to attention as something salient. (1) and 
(2) are, of course, related. We can only start to know things about something if that 
something has already come to our attention. If the thing remains undisclosed, we cannot 
even attribute it existence, much less know things about it. Something not-yet-determined is 
something that has shown itself, so to speak, in some way. But it remains not-yet-
determined because the way in which it has shown itself is not yet clear. Making it 
determinate entails giving an account about how it showed itself and why it matters 
(relative to its context). 
5.2 From the not-yet-determinate to the determinate. 
If a previously indeterminate effect/phenomenon/etc. becomes determinate, it does not 
follow that there is a complete or correct account of it. In reality, it seems to be meaningless 
to talk about a complete/incomplete account, or a correct/incorrect account, outside of a set 
MAGNETIC INCLINATION 195
of criteria that allow for such evaluations. And these criteria are developed in the research 
context itself, rather than imposed from outside – the evaluation of an account is thus made 
relative to the local criteria. Additionally, rules for good practice and methodological 
guidelines are always open for revision and update, and always oriented beyond themselves 
towards future changes, such that they cannot be used (outside the contexts in which they 
operate) to evaluate other practices. 
The account presented here of making the not-yet-determinate into something determinate 
has a few things in common with Rheinberger’s concept of epistemic things (see chapter 7, 
section 5). For Rheinberger, what makes something epistemic is not any truth-bearing 
capacity, but its participation in knowledge-seeking processes. This is the sense in which 
“epistemic” is used in this chapter. On Rheinberger’s account, what matters about epistemic 
things is that what we know about them is in question – they are what the research is 
directed towards. Once our knowledge of them is no longer in question, they either become 
obsolete for research purposed, or they become “technological objects” (objects that can be 
instrumentally used in future research, but not objects of research).
The not-yet-determinate that I mention here has in common with Rheinberger’s epistemic 
objects the emphasis on what we do not yet know. But it departs from Rheinberger in not 
accepting the neat distinction between the epistemic and the technological status of objects 
of investigations. As I have tried to show, MI was simultaneously employed as a research 
object (to be investigated and be made determinate) and a technology for other problems. 
Through its technological use much was learned and specified (i.e., made determinate) 
about MI (and the vertical magnetical plane). In addition, while Rheinberger seems to take 
it that there is a unique determination for each epistemic object available through its 
practical embeddedness in an experimental system, it appears from the analysis here that 
there can be multiple, even competing, determinations of an epistemic object – and that its 
practical embeddedness is not sufficient to reach a unique determination.
6. Conclusion
My investigation of MI gives rise to some general observations. First, it shows that changes 
in the particular practices of investigation contribute to changes in the concepts themselves, 
insofar as such practices are capable of picking out certain features as salient (while leaving 
others covered up), or of directing conceptualisations by ruling out alternatives. Second, the 
investigation of MI shows that concepts are also shaped by the functions they perform in 
specific research contexts, and that their successes or failures also affect or change such 
functions. We can see this latter point in the erosion of the idea that MI could be used as a 
tool for finding out longitude and latitude at sea: the irregularity of geomagnetic MI 
prevented it from carrying out the location-finding function. Ultimately, MI came to be 
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taken as a mere effect of the earth’s magnetic field, and not as a fundamental property of 
magnetism itself, with practical applications. Given current conceptualisation, MI is 
uninteresting from the perspective of investigations of magnetism or geomagnetism. The 
concept fell outside the set of the scientific concepts that actively shape our theories and 
contribute to our explanations.
With changes in the concept of MI, the very object that the concept was taken to refer to 
also changed. It does not seem to be the case that a single object of investigation has 
remained stable over that time. Rather, as the concept shifted from a simple declining of a 
compass needle, to an inherent power of a magnetised needle to “respect” some particular 
point in the earth or in the heavens, to a motion of rotation with respect to an “orb of virtue” 
around any magnet, to a property specific to geomagnetism that varies over time, to 
alignment with local lines of geomagnetic flux, the object being investigated itself shifted 
with the concept. Through practices of investigation and the functions they play, concepts 
and their associated referents undergo mutation. At least in the case of MI, that mutation is 
underpinned by a consistent differentiation – one that made possible both certain 
conceptualisations and certain investigative paths, while ruling out others. The 
differentiation of the vertical plane set boundaries within which MI mutated over the course 
of the roughly two centuries of its investigation.
Part 2
The Philosophical Practices of 
Scientific Practices

Chapter 6
A New Image of Science: 
The Practice Turn
1. Introduction: the practice turn in philosophy of science
As mentioned in the introduction to the dissertation, two levels of research practices are 
central to my approach here – there are the practices of the historical actors performing 
scientific research, and then there are the practices of studying that scientific research. Part 
1 of this dissertation addressed the first level. This chapter moves to the second. It 
addresses the network of practices for the study of science in which my analysis in Part 1 is 
itself situated. My analysis does not start from scratch and without presuppositions – it does 
not, that is, attempt to provide objective description of historical events. The present chapter 
establishes what it means to take the situatedness of the study of science seriously. I 
understand my own investigation as part of a practice-based approach to the study of 
sciences – that is, the so-called “practice turn”. This chapter gives a reading of what is at 
stake in the practice turn when treated as a philosophy of science. The implications of the 
practice turn are still somewhat underdeveloped in the literature: the practice turn, like 
science itself, is, after all, an ongoing research project. It is common to see the practice turn 
as a call to consider what scientists actually do. I argue that the practice turn is far more 
than that – what is at stake in the practice turn is the formulation of a philosophical 
perspective about science that establishes a metaphysics of practices as constituting 
scientific inquiry and bridges the dualism of practice and theory. On this account, science is 
no longer thought of as primarily a body of statements but as a body of disparate activities – 
science is now conceived in terms of its research activity. 
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I begin by setting out the overall project and context of the practice turn (Sections 2.1–2.3), 
before considering, and critiquing, a recent, extensive account of what the practice turn is 
(Section 2.4). Section 3 historicises the approach through its predecessors. Then, Section 4 
critically assesses two of the most developed accounts of scientific practices (Chang and 
Rouse), focusing on what they can tell us about how a practice-based approach to the 
history and philosophy of science can work and, crucially, on where they fall down. Finally, 
the chapter concludes by putting together the account of practices built up throughout.
2. The research project of the practice turn
2.1. The ongoing project of the practice turn
It might, at first glance, seem as though the practice turn in the philosophy of science is a 
movement that is reducible to the retrieval of various aspects of the day-to-day activity of 
practicing scientists – aspects which have been largely ignored or underplayed in (at least) 
the positivist tradition in philosophy of science, which, supposedly, takes them to be 
epistemologically irrelevant. It is not. This is not to deny that practitioners of the practice 
turn do not focus their analyses on questions about laboratory practices, about the norms 
and standards guiding the production of the results, or about the interactions between fellow 
scientists and the organisational structures of research labs. For a comprehensive account of 
the scientific activities and knowledge production, these elements are salient; they are not 
eliminable. They are indeed active participants, influencing in non-trivial ways what local 
pieces of knowledge are produced, why and how.
However, there is more at stake in the practice turn than the mere recovery of the salience 
of the day-to-day activities of scientists. The ongoing project of studying science in terms 
of practices aims to provide philosophical grounds for the scientific practices themselves. It 
is fundamental to the project of the practice turn to question what makes for a practice to 
begin with, what makes for a scientific practice in particular, how scientific practices are 
individuated, and so on.1 In my understanding of the project, the practice turn is far more 
than just a call to take into account what scientists actually do. It is – at least, in its most 
1 Salanski (2014) and Chang (2014) propose to ground scientific practices in action theory, although in 
differing ways. Pickering (1995) replaces the conception of science as knowledge with one of science 
as practice, where practice (or, as he puts it, the “mangle of practice”) is a “topology” of relations 
(material, agential) characterised by patchinesss, disunity and heterogeneity, which have to be made 
to work together somehow. “Science”, for Pickering, is ultimately a term that captures the dynamics 
by which patchiness is locally, and for a limited time, stabilised and made productive. For an extended 
discussion of Pickering’s mangle of practice see Chapter 7, section 4. Rouse (2002, 2015) develops a 
philosophy of scientific practices wherein practice itself is a primitive, and the subject/object 
distinction is derivable from practices in terms of “intra-actions”.
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developed form – the attempt to understand how scientists can go about doing those things 
that they actually do, and to understand what that tells us about knowledge and about the 
world itself. 
This chapter defends the claim that the shift in our understanding of science that comes 
with the practice turn is radical: it involves replacing a conception of science as a body of 
statements with a conception of science as a body of activities. According to the practice 
turn, scientific practices are not just a starting point in the analysis of science; rather, the 
enterprise of science itself (as a totality) is scientific activities first and foremost. Not only 
are scientifically salient statements formulated in and through such activities, but they are 
not (easily) separable from them. The practical conditions by which an object of knowledge 
is produced (irrespective of whether the object in question is a physical technical object, a 
mathematical object, or a theoretical object) matter in significant ways to its production, to 
the functions it plays, and – to put it generally, metaphorically – to the individual life it 
leads as part of the institution of science, in whatever role(s) it takes on, and however it 
develops. The practice turn is an ongoing project harbouring a cluster of views on science 
which ultimately strives for (and is regulated by) the articulation of a new image of science, 
one in which scientific understanding itself is grounded in scientific activities.
2.2. Prehistories of the practice turn 
My interest here is in the practice turn of the last few decades, and especially in the context 
within which it situates itself – the history of the philosophy of science that it takes itself to 
oppose. But appealing to practices as a means of understanding science is nothing new, of 
course. Arguments that scientific practices matter to philosophy of science have a long 
history. In this section, I give a very brief overview of some earlier calls to incorporate 
practices into the study of science. I do not intend to press this particular point very far 
here, but the following discussion gives a further glimpse of the reticularity of the subject – 
the present-day practice turn, and its reaction to what went before, is folded up with a 
history that repeats similar moves and similar oppositions.
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As practitioners of the “experimental philosophy”2, natural philosophers in seventeenth-
century England actively and attentively reflected on their own practice; they developed 
accounts not only of the natural world itself, but also of the best methods of investigation to 
gain knowledge of that world. Throughout the seventeenth century, we see increased 
concerns with questions about how and why experiments bring about knowledge3, about the 
therapeutic function of experimentation4 about the role of instrumentation in sciences and 
how those instruments work5 and other related issues about scientific practices. What we 
can retrospectively reconstruct as a philosophy of scientific disciplines (or, more broadly, a 
philosophy of the investigation of nature) was often articulated, revised and advanced in 
tight connection with what is usually called the “practice” (or the “doing”) of science. The 
life of much of the philosophical jargon used and abused in history of science and 
philosophy of science begins here. 
2 For philosophers and historians of early modern natural philosophy and science, the term 
“experimental philosophy” is currently a matter of controversy. See Feingold (2016), Anstey (2005), 
Anstey & Vanzo (2012). For my purposes here, it is not important to attend to the details of the 
debate, but I would like to point out, with Feingold (2016: 2), that no presumption about the fixed 
meaning of the phrase should be assumed. I employ the term here without claiming that it 
exhaustively captures the vast range of practices and reflections about investigations of the natural 
world. At the same time, however, I take the term to capture both the increased interest in 
interventionist practices into nature and the beliefs that experimentation should be the foundation of 
the investigation of nature, as well as one of the checks and balances of speculations about nature. 
This being said, it is reasonable to expect that even in the English context, where the term was heavily 
made use of and the practice of the experimental philosophers was institutionalised, natural 
philosophers (including Hooke, Boyle, Newton, amongst others) would have had subtly different 
understandings of their own practice and would have defended distinctly different philosophies of 
experimentation. 
3 For instance, in the preface to De magnete (1600), Gilbert explicitly places the foundations of natural 
philosophy in experimentation because, “[c]learer proofs, in the discovery of secrets, and in the 
investigation of the hidden causes of things, [are] afforded by trustworthy experiments and by 
demonstrated arguments, than by the probable guesses and opinions of the ordinary professors of 
philosophy” (DM: ij), and because “daily during our experimenting, new and unexpected properties 
came to light” (DM: ij). In the latter, Gilbert is explicit about the function that experimentation plays 
in discovery, while the former shows that experimentation is also involved in the formulation of 
proofs. 
4 The role of experiments in the project today known as medicina mentis is an ongoing topic of 
concern for scholars of the early modern period. For discussions on the topic, see, e.g., Jalobeanu 
(2010), Lewis (2014). 
5 Bennett (2002, 2003, 2011) discusses various kinds of instruments (astronomical, mathematical, etc.) 
and their contribution to the development of natural knowledge. 
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These concerns can be seen in the beginnings of the Royal Society, and are found in an 
especially rich form in the work of Francis Bacon. In the last decade or so, scholarship on 
Francis Bacon’s natural philosophy has increasingly showed that Bacon was interested in in 
the study of experimentation both for his own practical concerns and because he takes it to 
constitute the core means of gaining natural knowledge. Bacon’s array of theoretical 
concepts for dealing with experimentation ranges from the “prerogative instances” (to 
which he dedicates much of the second book of the New Organon6), to the better-known 
classification of experiments into “luciferous” and “fructiferous” introduced in the first part 
of the New Organon, to experientia literata, which appears to be his proposal for a 
developed methodology of experimentation. Additionally, much of the Baconian natural 
histories, and his conception thereof, are closely tied to his philosophy of experimentation – 
that philosophy influencing his (at least partly practical) work on the natural histories, as 
well as developing out of them.7
Another example is the debate between William Whewell and John Stuart Mill concerning 
the place that history of science and scientific practices should have in the construction of a 
philosophy of science. As Snyder has showed, it is not a coincidence that Whewell 
published the History of the Inductive Sciences, a systematic survey of the history of 
physical sciences, before going on to articulate his philosophy of science. For Whewell, a 
philosophy of science has to be constructed through a careful assessment of the history of 
science and of current scientific practice. As Snyder puts it, what mattered for Whewell 
was,
not whether a philosophy of science is, in fact, inferred from knowledge of past and 
present scientific practice, but rather, whether a philosophy of science is inferable from 
such knowledge. Any valid philosophy of science must be shown to be exemplified in 
actual scientific practice throughout the history of science. (Snyder 2006: 153)
Whewell’s philosophy of science, then, is not in any way independent of, but rather utterly 
dependent on, the history of science, and of scientific practices specifically: in principle, a 
philosophy of science can be articulated independent of the scientific practice, but it has to 
be enacted through scientific practice (past or current). The claims of a philosophy of 
6 The prerogative instances, or “instances of special powers”, comprise a list of experiments that 
provide some shortcuts to research. A cursory overview of the prerogative instances suggests the 
following ways in which experiments can be salient: 1) if they advance the enquiry in a substantial 
way, for instance by establishing which is the appropriate direction of research in cases in which 
conflicting interpretations are on the table; 2) if they open a new domain of research or a natural 
history; 3) instruments around which one can investigate a whole range of questions about a domain 
(Bacon’s examples are, for instance, telescopes, prisms, the mariner’s compass, etc.).
7 On Bacon’s experimentation as experientia literata, see the following: Jardine (1990); Weeks (2008); 
Pastorino (2011); Georgescu (2011); Giglioni (2013); Jalobeanu (2015).
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science are not norms for regulating the scientific practice. Rather, they appear to be 
something akin to general rules that account for how science works – and for its success. 
Many other similar examples can be added.
2.3. Philosophical sources 
The practice turn, however, does not set itself up in relation to the early modern treatment 
of the issue, although it does draw inspiration from an extensive number of other sources – 
many of which are to be found in general philosophy, rather than in philosophy of science 
as such. Hasok Chang, for instance, explicitly draws on the pragmatist philosopher John 
Dewey’s conception of knowledge and truth to ground his own account of systems of 
practices (see section 4.1.). In general, insights from pragmatism do tend to pervade 
practice-based accounts of science. In addition to pragmatist influence, Joseph Rouse’s 
normative account of scientific practices8 is very much indebted to Martin Heidegger – not 
so much the latter’s philosophy of technology, but his notion of Dasein, or “being–in–the–
world”, elaborated in Being and Time (1927) and his take on the scientific phenomenon as 
an essential aspect of modernity in the essay The Age of the World Picture.9 Another source 
of influence is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1958): practitioners of 
the practice turn make use of “language games” and “meaning is use” in order to account 
for conceptual practices by practitioners of the practice turn. Michael Polanyi’s work on 
tacit knowledge and (what we might call) embodied epistemology, along with Ludwik 
Fleck’s account of a transindividual, cultural and history-bound conception of science are 
philosophical sources for the claims about contextualisation and embodied accounts of the 
scientific practices. Lastly (but no less importantly), in terms of prior influences, there are 
the French historical epistemologists, a movement begun by Gaston Bachelard (whose 
concept of phenomena-techniques gets reconstructed by Rheinberger (e.g., 2010b) as 
central to our current understanding of the role experimentation plays in science), and 
continued by Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault. Foucauldian episteme, and talk 
about dynamics of change in human sciences in terms of “regimens of practice”, are also 
frequently used and adapted within the practice turn. What holds such positions together is 
a concern with dynamic accounts, with process, and with history. These are also the 
dimensions that the practice turn wants to reintroduce in the current treatment of science; 
but in introducing them, adherents of the practice turn ought to also investigate what 
philosophical commitments underpins a processual and historical image of science (or, 
more appropriately, sciences).
8 See Rouse (2002, 2015). 
9 For Rouse’s assessment of Heidegger’s philosophy of science, see Rouse (2005). 
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2.4. The positive tenets of the practice turn
It is (relatively) easy and common to describe the practice turn purely negatively, in terms 
of its rejection of previous approaches. It is a somewhat more difficult task to produce a 
positive characterisation. The cross-disciplinary self-constructed identity of the practice 
turn is defended in a recent volume, Science after the Practice Turn in the Philosophy, 
History, and Social Studies of Science (Soler et al. 2014). The authors take the practice turn 
in science to be primarily a turn to how science actually works (as opposed to how science 
has been represented) and to what scientists actually do. To define a positive identity for the 
practice turn in this way is to misconstrue what is at stake in the practice turn through 
misunderstanding what a practice is. The practice turn entails more than simply stipulating 
that scientific practices (conceptualised as the “doings” of science) have to feature in our 
studies of science (whether philosophical, sociological, cultural or otherwise).10 It entails 
reconceptualising science in terms of its practices – it entails taking science to consist 
primarily in practices. For the practice turn to work, scientific practice must be the locus of 
the examination of science(s), because science is practice. An account of the practice turn 
needs to unpack the implications of taking science to consist in practice and articulate a 
philosophical framework for scientific practices. Part of this requires treating the practice 
turn itself as a set of practices (a set of practices concerned with scientific practices).
Consequently, the articulation of what the practice turn is, and what account of science it 
can give, has to take this into account. It has to become reflexive (about its own practices). 
To do otherwise would be to assume that there is an objective stance from which scientific 
practices can be “picked out” of research contexts and described. Taking such an objective 
stance is a significant part of what those working within the practice turn (and their 
predecessors, in the historical turn and the new experimentalism11) saw as problematic 
within the received view of philosophy of science to begin with. Therefore, any formulation 
of the goal of the practice turn only in terms of the description of scientific practices (of 
“what scientists actually do”) is undermined from within. The practice turn should be 
understood as a reflective (and constantly self-reconfiguring) approach to what is at stake 
(both for the historical actors and for the scholar studying them) in the multifarious ways in 
which science engages with the world. It should be understood not as the attempt to merely 
describe the events of “actual science”, but as the attempt to account for taking science as 
scientific practices.
10 The practice turn extends beyond philosophy of science – parts of the cultural studies of science and 
STS, for instance, are compatible with the practice turn, and sociologists of science have shifted 
towards scientific practices in the ways advocated by the practice turn. My focus here will, however, 
be restricted to its reception within the philosophy of science. 
11 I discuss these approaches to science in Section 3.
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2.5. The positive identity of the practice turn in terms of shifts
This chapter is concerned with the practices of the practice turn. If we are interested in what 
the practice turn is, and what one does when one studies scientific research through it, it is 
worth looking at what it takes itself to be. The introduction to Soler et al.’s volume, 
Philosophy of Science after the Practice Turn, proposes a programmatic assessment of the 
main tenets of the practice turn. The authors assess the practice turn in terms of shifts (by 
reference to the previous models of science). They propose six such shifts (Soler et al. 
2014: 14–24), which I reconstruct and analyse briefly in what follows (labelled below from 
(S1) to (S6)). As we will see, whether taken separately or together, these shifts appear to be 
more akin to regulative methodological ideals than to actual views upheld by actual actors 
in the philosophy of science or science studies. 
(S1) Soler et al. title the first shift they note “From A Priori and ‘Too’ Idealised to 
Empirically Based and Empirically Adequate Accounts of Science” (Soler et al. 2014: 14). 
The shift starts from traditional philosophy of science and its tendency to rely on rational 
reconstructions of scientific episodes as if they were faithful accounts of what scientists 
actually did.12 This was a mistake, the argument goes, because it created an account of 
science “too disconnected from empirical reality (i.e., they just do not seem to resist 
analyses grounded in detailed case studies)” and too idealised in the sense “of being 
‘embellished’ (i.e., the a priori conception of science in which they are based is largely 
illusory)” (Soler et al. 2014: 14). Given this diagnosis, the practice turn pleads for a return 
to “empirically based and empirically adequate accounts of science” (Soler et al. 2014: 15). 
This plea is not novel with the practice turn itself: it is, for instance, a core tenet of post-
Kuhnian history and philosophy of science. Soler et al. take this to be the “most general 
formulation of the criticism directed by the practice turn against traditional philosophy of 
science” (Soler et al. 2014: 15), and see all the other shifts they describe as more specific 
variations of the shift from idealisation to empirical adequacy.
The potential trouble with this, however, is that an appeal to empirical adequacy appears to 
be an appeal to better description – Soler et al. seem to suggest that what was wrong with 
traditional philosophy of science was that, by privileging idealisations, it got the actual 
science wrong. Practice turn accounts, then, return to empirical adequacy by basing 
themselves on better descriptions of the actual science. But what this misses out is that 
12 Strictly speaking, pre-Kuhnian philosophical accounts of science did not conflate their normative 
prescriptions with descriptions of research practice. Rather, the proposed philosophical theories were 
explanations of particular problems (e.g., the demarcation problem, formulating a theory about what a 
scientific theory is, and so on) formulated under the belief that science was an unusual enterprise 
operating with a distinctive method. Finding and theorising the method was an important part of what 
was at stake in the pre-Kuhnian research program for a philosophy of science. But this does not mean 
that it was believed that the actual research practice was reducible to the method of science – it was 
more a question of what was privileged as both salient and amenable to analysis.
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empirical adequacy (or even the “better” in “better description”) is not a descriptive notion. 
Adequacy is normative, in that whether or not something is adequate is established relative 
to norms of satisfaction. There are, of course, no objective, universally shared criteria of 
satisfaction for assessments of episodes in the history of science. Thus, a practice turn 
account will need to establish norms of adequacy in order to obtain its empirical adequacy 
in addressing historical episodes. In other words, a practice turn account does not get better 
descriptions for free: it has to work from within the situatedness of its historical 
reconstructions to establish what a better description consists in.
(S2) The second shift, titled “From Normative to Descriptive Perspectives on 
Science” (Soler et al. 2014: 15) consists in a departure from characterisations of science as 
it should be to characterisations of science as it actually is. According to Soler et al., the 
shift was necessary because, traditionally, the repertoire of philosophical questions about 
science (e.g., the demarcation problem, the formulation of overarching general rules for 
theory choice, etc.) led to the formulation of normative methodological rules which were 
then prescribed to natural-scientific practices. In this context, the shift is from prescription 
to the advocation of the abandonment of normative accounts of science in favour of 
descriptions of actual scientific practices. On the reading of Soler et al., a “purely 
descriptive” account entailed damaging philosophical consequences, which led to ongoing 
debates about how to reintroduce the normative dimension such that it would remain 
compatible with the practice turn and its goals. Soler et al. provide little detail on how the 
normative might be brought back. Regardless, they seem to hold the view that, despite any 
problems with the normative dimension, descriptions of actual science as it is are both 
desirable and possible. This brings us back to the problem above: attending to the very 
notion of practice and its “internal temporality”13 raises serious challenges to any 
understanding of descriptions as non-normative, uninterested, non-situated, objective 
accounts.
(S3) This brings us to the third shift listed by Soler et al.: “From Present-Centered 
Reconstructions of Past Science, to Historically Adequate Reconstitutions of Past Science 
‘From Inside’” (Soler et al. 2014: 16). The shift here is away from rational reconstructions 
of past science, or “present-centred” history of science14, to accounts of past historical 
13 The term is from Rheinberger (1997).
14 Present-centrism is a historical reconstruction of the past in light of the present, in which the past is 
reconstructed such that its pivotal points are those that directly contribute to our present. Chang 
distinguishes between two forms of present-centrism: whiggism and triumphalism. According to 
Chang, whiggism is “a particular form of presentism that is based on the notion that the present is 
better than the past, and that the past constitutes a progressive lead-up to the present” (Chang 2009a: 
252). Triumphalism is an attitude towards the past in which one “would celebrate anybody who won 
(at the time), regardless of whether he was right (by today’s standards)” (Chang 2009a: 251). From 
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episodes in which what was known, valued and possible for the actors within the context 
they are already situated in is divulged – that is, broadly speaking, via the privileging of 
actor’s categories (over our own). Soler et al. make no mention of the issue, but this seems 
to raise another variant of the problem of description: to claim to divulge the past as it was 
is to ignore the influence of the norms of empirical adequacy necessary to such a 
description.
(S4) Soler et al. name their fourth shift “From Decontextualized, Intellectual, Explicit, 
Individual, and ‘Purely Cognitive’ to Contextualized, Material, Tacit, Collective, and 
Psycho-Social Characterizations of Science” (Soler et al. 2014: 17). The goal is to put 
“agency back into practice”15, where “practice” refers to interactions with the world, in 
which the world substantially contributes by determining what can and cannot be done. 
Practice-based explanations are not formulated solely in sociological terms, because the 
natural world presents itself in laboratory contexts, and it places material constraints on 
what the agent can and cannot do. Much knowledge is produced at the boundaries of these 
constraints, and by shifting them. The practice turn strives to account for the situatedness of 
the agent, or practitioner. An objective, god-like, perspective is denied because the 
investigator cannot remove himself from the research context of his training, skill, 
background knowledge, and choice-making capacities, which are always actively 
intervening in the production of knowledge.16 If this is the case, then examinations of 
science have to take into account: (a) the material aspects of scientific practices (from 
experimental setups and protocols to the formats in which scientific products are delivered, 
such as tables, diagrams, images, and so on); (b) various forms of know-how; (c) tacit 
knowledge, etc. (for more detailed treatment see Soler et al. 2014: 18–20). 
(S5) The fifth shift, “From Scientific Products to Scientific Processes” (Soler et al. 2014: 
21), entails changing the focus of analyses of scientific episodes from stabilised outcomes 
(be they theories, experimental facts, etc.) to scientific activities as processual, dynamic, 
and unfolding. Criticism of the focus on scientific products has been explicitly formulated 
by the New Experimentalists17, who showed that the assumption of the reducibility of 
experimentation to experimental results – usually in the form of observational statements – 
Chang’s perspective, the problem is not whiggism, which can in many ways be productive, but 
triumphalism. 
15 The phrase comes from Gooding (1990). 
16 This is not to say that from this it follows that the agent’s (social or individual) attributes on their 
own determine the results, or the assent to or refusal of these results. These are causally relevant to 
the result, but not causally sufficient. 
17 See sections 3.3. and 3.4 below.
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relies on an inadequate understanding of both how experimentation works and what its 
relevance is. This is because, in a nutshell, the details of the experimentation itself matter in 
non-trivial ways to the results, to such extent that the results are not easily separable from 
their context of production.18 The practice turn radicalises this approach, to the point that it 
treats everything as a process, from the processes of experimentation to diagram 
construction and theorising to measurement and calibration, and so on. 
(S6) Soler et al.’s final shift is “From Science as Contemplation of the World to Science as 
Transformation of the World” (Soler et al. 2014: 22): a move away from an understanding 
of practices as associated with perceiving, observing, and theory construction to practices 
conceived as interventionist at all levels19. This means that all investigative practices, and 
not only the experimental ones, ought to be treated as interventions in the world. For 
instance, theories are not conceptualised as structure of statements that somehow represent 
the world, but are conceptualised as “tools for action with respect to specific cognitive 
tasks”20 (Soler et al. 2014: 23), while representations are considered to be material artefacts 
for transforming the world. Taking into account the materiality of the representation entails 
that representational (visual and verbal) formats are not to be treated as simple vehicles of 
delivery for the relevant information, but should be considered to have “impact on the 
specificity, significance, pragmatic import, and success” (Soler et al. 2014: 24) of both the 
formats and the scientific content conveyed.
These six shifts are ultimately presented by Soler et al. as subservient to the overall goal of 
the practice turn – providing faithful accounts of what scientists actually do. They make this 
explicit: 
18 For many authors, experimental results are not straightforwardly separable from the context that 
produces and sustains them. Any such separation ends up in the loss of the scientific salience of the 
result in question: it is either forgotten or replaced or becomes a technological object. See, for 
example, Rheinberger’s distinction between epistemic objects and technological objects – the move 
from the former to latter is based on stabilisation. An object is stable when its epistemic weight is 
exhausted. The latter is tightly connected with an objects’s salience, i.e. the roles it plays within an 
experimental system. If its resources as an epistemic object to be investigated or to be instrumentally 
used in the investigation are exhausted, the object is classified as technological. 
19 I ought to point out that I know of almost no philosophical treatment of what an intervention is and 
what it entails articulated by supporters of the practice turn. It seems to me important to have such an 
account if only with the goal of either preserving the intuition that the practice of colliding particles is 
in important ways different than the practice of observing how a magnetic needle moves or 
dismantling it. 
20 For a treatment of theories as artefacts used for stabilising scientific claims, see Woody 2014. 
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They [i.e. those working within the practice turn] nevertheless converge, however, on 
roughly the same aim of giving faithful accounts of science: that is, the aim to provide 
empirically based, historically adequate (for past science), descriptively adequate (for 
present and past science), and ‘more realistic’ (contrasting with ‘too idealized’) 
characterizations of science. […] This has encouraged a move from types to tokens and 
from decontextualized-global-panoramic to contextualized-local-microscopic accounts 
of science. (Soler et al. 2014: 17–8)
As I have set out throughout the preceding analysis of Soler et al.’s shifts, to locate a 
positive identity for the practice turn in a demand for empirical adequacy about what 
scientists actually do undermines rather than strengthens the project. There are several 
reasons for this. Firstly, there is nothing novel about this ideal – the call to look at what 
scientists actually do predates the practice turn by far. Moreover, this ideal has long 
received extended criticism from philosophers of science on a wide range of grounds.
Secondly, many of these tenets are not particular to the practice turn: proponents of the 
historical turn, for instance, would accept most of them, and the same goes for the new 
experimentalists and social constructivists. The historical turn had imposed a shift from 
products to scientific processes because it denied that knowledge is atemporal and extracted 
through the application of logic to observational statements. Many historians and 
philosophers of science working under the umbrella of the historical turn recognised that 
understanding the conditions by which the stabilisation of scientific results obtained is a 
necessary prerequisite to understanding of why the result in question is the way it is, and 
why it occupies the position it does, within, for instance, a theoretical structure.21 Knowing 
that most (if not all) of the shifts introduced are not novel, Soler et al. emphasise that, 
following the practice turn (as opposed to its predecessors), the targets of the approach have 
diversified such that the focus is not only theory change, but also instrumentation, model 
construction, the analysis of scientific discourses, visualisation, etc. However, Kuhn’s 
account of paradigms as disciplinary matrices, for instance, already takes such elements 
into account (Kuhn 1970: 181–204). If we identify the practice turn with Soler et al.’s six 
shifts, then what it ends up being is nothing more than a continuation of the historical turn – 
it appears to “deviate” from the historical turn only in demanding more contextualisation 
and localisation. 
Thirdly, the suggestion in the passage quoted above is that the shift to practice would, 
somehow, generate accounts that are more faithful to the actual history of science. Just why 
this should be the case is something that Soler et al. do not address. Just because it is known 
that scientists perform activities, it does not follow that attending to those activities makes 
an account more accurate (more inclusive, perhaps, but not more accurate). 
21 For example, see Nersessian (2008), Holmes (2004), Rheinberger (1997). 
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Fourthly, and most importantly, upholding the ideal of providing accurate descriptions of 
what scientists actually do – thereby treating the act of description as non-normative – is 
undermined by philosophical analysis of what scientific practices are and how they work 
(see the last section of this chapter). It turns out that taking practices seriously involves 
reflexivity about the study of science itself – in order to work, the account of science as 
practice must extend, reflexively, to treating the study of science as practice. If the practice 
turn itself is not a theoretical explanation of science but an ongoing research program about 
science, which should primarily be analysed as a cluster of activities whose proximate aim 
is the examination of science, then the very practices of the practice turn and their 
situatedness and goals will actively contribute to the accounts of science formulated. In this 
way, any description of what a scientist “actually does” is broken down and reconstituted 
through what I (as a practitioner within the ongoing project of the practice turn) take to be 
salient in the assessment of the scientific episode in question such that my contribution is 
reflected in the project I have stakes in (i.e. the project of the practice turn itself). 
Divorced from the ideal that the practice turn is about the description of what scientists 
actually do, what follows as the positive identity of the practice turn is precisely the claim 
that science is practice. What is at stake in the practice turn, then, is the articulation of what 
conception of science is available once we turn away from an understanding of science that 
takes it to be the representation of the natural world (primarily and mostly) through 
propositional content, rather than taking it to consist in its practices.
3. Historicisation of the practice turn
If the practice turn were to be reflexive about its own approach, any positive account would 
have to historicise the practice turn itself. It will need to address the situatedness of its own 
claims to knowledge with respect to many facets, but most of all with respect to the 
network of practices in which it finds itself – that is, the network of practices for the study 
of science. In order to set out a practice turn account of science that does not have the 
problems of Soler et al.’s positive characterisation, we will need to understand how the 
practices of the practice turn are shaped by what, specifically, the movement of the practice 
turn is responding to – we will need to look at the history of the practice turn in terms of 
what it reacts to, and how its own practices developed.22 In the present section, we will start 
from the mid-twentieth-century crisis in traditional philosophy of science, and the historical 
turn that was both the catalyst for and response to that crisis (section 3.1 and section 3.2.). 
Then we will look at the New Experimentalism, and its focuses on practices of intervention, 
as a reaction to the shortcomings of the historical turn (section 3.3 and section 3.4).
22 Soler et al. do offer a historicisation, but not as a reflexive analysis of the practices of the practice 
term.
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3.1. HOPOS and the practice turn
In positioning itself in relation to the history of philosophy of science what is at stake for 
the practice turn movement is not to provide an objective, accurate account of that history, 
but the articulation of the project of the practice turn itself and of its relevance in the 
context of the larger philosophical project of making sense of, and accounting for, scientific 
understanding and scientific activity (i.e., the sciences as a whole).
The history of the philosophy of science is neither linear nor straightforward. It is recursive 
and reticular.23 It is recursive because what matters about a particular philosophical tradition 
can change in light of future traditions and their own criteria of salience. What matters and 
what will matter about any particular philosophical tradition is not pre-determined by what 
the actors themselves take to be relevant: its relevance extends past itself and it can be 
reconfigured with future developments within philosophy of science, such that different 
traditions of philosophical thinking might pick up or distort different aspects as salient.24 
Something reticular has the structure of a complex network, convoluted and folded within 
itself, and which – and this is perhaps what matters most here – is a continuous entity, 
rather than a collection of discrete parts. The history in question is reticular because it is 
continuously folding itself within itself. This is not to claim that historical episodes cannot 
be sliced up on way or another – after all, separating out the history of the philosophy of 
science out of the history of the sciences and the history of philosophy is just one such 
slicing. But any such slicing up is not a carving at the joints: what any slicing up follows is 
not some fully-independent structure of nature, but a structure of salience, determined by a 
wide variety of possible elements. To give a very simple example, various edible plants 
may be (differently) divided up into fruits and vegetables on the basis of the presence or 
absence of seeds, or on the basis of their culinary uses. This is not to deny that “irrelevant” 
data features in historical accounts; it does. But it features as precisely that: irrelevance, 
identified in relation to salience. It is through its reticularity and recursiveness that the 
history informs different traditions, in distinct ways. When the history of the philosophy of 
science is made use of by one theoretical position or another, the reconstruction of that 
history is, and cannot be, strictly objective; rather, it is a reconstruction through which the 
historical salience of that particular theoretical position is articulated. This is, of course, not 
23 On the recursive character of scientific knowledge claims see Nickles (1997) but also Gooding 
(1990). On the recursiveness as an essential feature of experimental systems and of history, see 
Rheinberger (1997, 2015). Chang’s account of epistemic iteration (Chang 2004) also makes use of 
something akin to recursiveness, as it takes the iteration to be a repetition with difference. On the 
reticular aspect of thinking, see Gooding (1990). 
24 Rheinberger (2010b) offers a nice self-aware exercise of the recursive feature of history. His account 
of the pivotal moments in the history of philosophy of science which converged into the 
historicisation of epistemology does not aspire to be an accurate narrative of what had happened. 
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to say that interpretations of history are unconstrained or arbitrary: reticularity and 
recursiveness do not amount to excessive relativism. 
I am offering this rough outline of a philosophy of history here in order to support the 
following claim: the aim of the practice turn in relation to the history – as opposed to that of 
more traditional analytic philosophy of science – is not objective accuracy about that 
history, but the very articulation of the project of the practice turn itself, and of its relevance 
in the context of the larger philosophical project of making sense of, and accounting for, 
scientific understanding and scientific activity (i.e., the sciences as a whole). It is from 
within this perspective that the positioning of the practice turn within the history of the 
philosophy of science needs to be addressed. 
3.2. From unified science to radical breaks
Sometimes more explicitly, and sometimes less, those working within the practice turn see 
their project as “emerging” from the criticism of traditional philosophy of science (Soler et 
all 2014: 1–44). This is not too surprising: various traditions of philosophical thought about 
science from the 1960s onwards used (and abused) this strategy. But the concept of 
“traditional philosophy of science” is itself contested and subject to mutations: rather than 
an easily accessible, well defined historical product, it is the springboard against which later 
projects can define themselves. The boundaries and content of traditional philosophy of 
science are meandering and constantly shifting depending on the questions at stake. One of 
its metaphorical descriptions (which does not necessarily capture the specificities or goals 
of those views reconstructed as traditional philosophy of science, but diagnoses pretty well 
the “construct” of such traditional philosophy of science to which most programmes in 
philosophy of science in the last half century or so oppose) is given by Ian Hacking in the 
opening paragraph of his complex, and highly influential, Representing and Intervening:
Philosophers long made a mummy of science. When they finally unwrapped the cadaver 
and saw the remnants of an historical process of becoming and discovering, they created 
for themselves a crisis of rationality. That happened around 1960. (Hacking 1983: 1)
Hacking suggests that what brought about the crisis of rationality was a historical 
engagement with the sciences themselves. This historical engagement revived history of 
science as central to the understanding of science, but it also showed that science itself is a 
historical process of “becoming and discovering”, and not the rigid edifice of timelessly 
right or wrong theories that philosophy (at least on Hacking’s analysis) had, for a while, 
taken science to consist in. What Hacking has in mind here is one of the most identifiable 
turning points for the philosophy of science of the 20th century –the publication of Thomas 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). The impact that Kuhn’s project had 
on the philosophy and history of science continues even today.25 Kuhn made use of the 
25 The claim is not that earlier works had not articulated dissatisfaction with the received philosophy 
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history of science to overthrow a philosophical understanding that took science to progress 
linearly and cumulatively in its quest to “decipher” the natural world. Kuhn argued that, 
instead of cumulative progress, science works with radical breaks. On his reading, science 
is characterised by periods of normal science, in which a consistent paradigm dictates the 
conceptual relations, procedures and methodologies of a scientific community for a while, 
only then to reach moments of severe crisis that lead to scientific revolutions, the eventual 
result of which is an overthrowing and replacement of the previous paradigm.
Kuhn’s account brought with it a criticism of scientific rationality – which many 
philosophers of science struggled to oppose (e.g., Imre Lakatos and Larry Laudan26) – and, 
ultimately, of the “crowning” position that science occupied in the project of modernity. 
The project of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) made use of Kuhn’s account of 
radical breaks precisely to question the privileged position of science. Kuhn resisted the 
SSK project and explicitly argued against its compatibility with his own project, as the 
latter defended a social determination of truth, while Kuhn understood his own work as 
preserving, and not excluding, the constraints nature itself placed on the production of 
knowledge (Kuhn 2000: 317).27 For instance, in the autobiographical interview attached at 
the end of The Road to Structure, while critically discussing Leviathan and the Air Pump 
(Kuhn complains that Shapin and Schaffer misunderstood the science that informed the 
debate between Boyle and Hobbes, and that it was on basis of this misunderstanding that 
they substantiated their SSK argument), he states: 
of science as articulated in the works of Popper and his falsificationist method, or Hempel’s 
hypothetico-deductivism. Koyre’s work on the history of ideas, Neurath’s take on the social sciences 
and the social aspect of knowledge claims, Polanyi’s work on tacit knowledge, and so on, can all be 
reconstructed as reactions to the positivist vein of philosophy of science. However, many historians of 
the philosophy of science see Kuhn’s Structure as the turning point for the later developments of the 
philosophy of science as a programme of research into science, and as an academic discipline. 
26 Lakatos’s and Laudan’s responses to Kuhn are motivated by the same concern to reclaim the 
rationality of scientific knowledge that they believed to have been severely undercut by Kuhn’s 
account of scientific revolutions. Neither Lakatos nor Laudan aimed to return to the philosophical 
conception of science prior to Kuhn’s Revolutions, but rather aimed to understand scientific progress 
through scientific revolutions itself as the mark of rational progress, and not as what Lakatos sees in 
Kuhn’s account as “religious conversion”. To some extent, it can be claimed that both Laudan and 
Lakatos exaggerated the psychological and social dimensions of Kuhn’s account so as to counter them 
and then introduce new models of scientific rationality. Their proposal is, ultimately, to look to 
rational reconstructions of the history of science. Lakatos’s proposal is in terms of research 
programmes, while Laudan’s is in terms of research traditions. See Lakatos (1978) and Laudan 
(1977). 
27 An explicit example of such shaken belief is Barnes 1982. 
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It isn’t that I think it’s all wrong, I said to you that the term "negotiation" seems to me 
just right, except that when I say «letting Nature in;» it’s clearly that that’s an aspect of 
it to which the term “negotiation” applies only metaphorically, whereas it’s fairly literal 
in the other cases. But you are not talking about anything worth calling science if you 
leave out the role of [Nature]. Some of these people simply claim that it doesn’t have 
any, that nobody has shown that it makes any difference. Kuhn (2000: 317).28
Intentionally or not, Kuhn’s project had seriously shaken the belief in scientific knowledge 
as the “crowning achievement of scientific reason” (Hacking 1983: 1), while his account of 
paradigms and radical breaks ended up being pushed in directions that Kuhn himself would 
have rescinded from.
On the other hand, to many historians of philosophy of science, Kuhn’s project was not 
radical enough. Kuhn’s paradigm account of science has been read not as an overthrowing 
of the traditional image of science itself, but as simply the cause of an internal crises within 
that image. That is, on this reading, Kuhn never gets out of the traditional image. Take the 
following comment from Rheinberger:
However, [common to] both the revolutionary [i.e. Kuhn] and the gradual conception of 
scientific change, is that they assume a global epistemic structure, called “science”, that 
as a whole either continuously grows—toward truth—or is periodically reconstructed 
according to a new paradigm. Although there is a heavy dose of relativism in the second 
view, a paradigm, at a given time, is assumed to have enough power to coordinate and 
make coherent the activity of a whole—and potentially the whole scientific community. 
But even in the denial of a continuum of rationality there remains an element of 
“totalisation.” […] And there remains the general view of an overarching chronological 
coherence to the process of gaining scientific knowledge. (Rheinberger 1994: 67)
Here, Rheinberger sees Kuhn’s project in continuation of earlier projects within philosophy 
of science, on the basis that it assumes a unified, coherent epistemological domain for 
which a general theory of rationality or knowledge needs to be articulated. To Rheinberger, 
then, the Kuhnian model is one that also strives for unity (or totalisation). We see this in the 
way that a paradigm is presumed to have the power of coordinating the “whole” of the 
scientific community. Rheinberger’s interpretation on this point can, of course, be resisted, 
if we take it that Kuhn’s examples in The Structure of Scientific Revolution and The 
Copernican Revolution are domain dependent: it is not straightforwardly clear that Kuhn 
would hold the view that the conceptual shift from the Aristotelian notion of motion to the 
Newtonian brought about revolutions in how research was conducted in biology or 
medicine, for instance. Judging by the study cases Kuhn discusses and his later claims 
about the “speciation” of science29, it is at least possible (if not probable) that Kuhn can be 
28 On Kuhn’s later philosophy see Marcum (2015).
29 As Marcum (2015) discusses, Kuhn was working in the last years of his life on an evolutionary 
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reconstructed as a pluralist (of one sort of another)30, capable of denying epistemic relations 
across and between fields of research. Whether or not Kuhn himself still hoped to articulate 
a unified theory of science, through the project of Structure, he opened the conceptual space 
for accounts of science that aim to capture its contextualised and messier aspects.
If one accepts Rheinberger’s claims about the totalising consequences of Kuhnian 
paradigms, then it would follow that the practice turn pushes against the Kuhnian account 
as well (at least with respect to those totalising consequences). And this is because the 
image of science that the practice turn puts forward is one (as we will see in section 3) that 
denies the possibility of a unified account of science.
3.3. From theory to experimental intervention
In discussing the relation between history of science and philosophy of science, Zammito 
(2011) characterises the philosophical work of the last few decades as having demolished 
the “grand-scale ‘normative’ prepossessions of the ‘Received View’ in philosophy of 
science” because they “have proven ultimately incongruous with any effective descriptive 
or explanatory investigations of concrete areas or problems”; according to Zammito, they 
have been replaced with “a far more disunified, situated, and contingent theory of empirical 
inquiry” (Zammito 2011: 391). Zammito is right that many programmes in the philosophy 
of science have long opposed “the received view”, namely the theory of science developed 
by logical empiricists such as Carnap and Hempel, according to which scientific theories 
must be formalisable, and the relevant scientific vocabulary, itself separated out into 
observational and theoretical terms.31 But different programmes oppose the received view in 
quite distinct ways. In Kuhn’s case what prompted dissatisfaction was the logic of scientific 
progress. In the passage cited above, it was the stripping away of “becoming and 
discovery” from science, in favour of its “mummification” – that is, as Hacking makes clear 
throughout Representing and Intervening, is the reduction of the scientific enterprise to 
philosophy of science. These views were supposed to be published as part of a book, yet unpublished, 
entitled Words and Worlds: An Evolutionary View of Scientific Development. The goal of this book, 
Smith argues, was to place the authority of sciences on new foundations. Because of this, the book 
would have propounded Kuhn’s theory of truth, meaning and scientific progress (G.E. Smith, 
lectures).
30 I would argue that Rouse take on Kuhn’s philosophy of scientific practices makes room for 
precisely such a pluralist reading (see, e.g., Rouse 2013).
31 For criticism of the received view, see Richardson (2007) and Lutz (2012), who propose a revival of 
the Carnapian project of using predicate logic for the analysis of scientific theories. 
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(timeless) scientific theories, a position that he takes to ultimately result in “an idealist cul-
de-sac.”32
 For instance, while discussing the spectator theory of knowledge33, Hacking claims that,
Yet I do not think that the idea of knowledge as representation of the world is in itself 
the source of that evil [i.e the idealist cul-de-sac]. The harm comes from a single-
minded obsession with representation and thinking and theory, at the expense of 
intervention, and action and experiment. (Hacking 1983: 130–1)
The mummification problem lies in an obsession with representation, that is with a 
privileging of thinking about and theory of the world, to the detriment of intervention, and 
action and experiment in the world. Intervention, action and experiment are dynamic and 
temporally extended, and it is around their conceptualisation that Hacking’s account of 
science is articulated. The “becoming and discovery” of science is to be accounted for by 
reconceptualising the concepts of experiment and intervention. This is in contrast to 
representation and thought, which are conceptualised as ahistorical. What generates 
insurmountable philosophical problems (such as idealism) is an attitude in which these 
ahistorical concepts obsessively occupy the forefront of studies of science. From Hacking’s 
perspective, the label “traditional philosophy of science” does not apply to a well-
determined theory about science, but to a cluster of views that aim to solve the problem of 
“the connection between theory and the world” (Hacking 1983: 130), by taking the theory 
side (and correlated concepts, such as models, hypotheses, laws, etc.) as the starting point 
for inquiry.
32 According to Hacking, once we take on board the view that knowledge is fundamentally 
representation of nature, then the sole internally consistent philosophical position is Berkelian 
idealism, since we can only give philosophical grounding to our representations, but not to how our 
representations hook onto the world. On Hacking’s reading of Berkeley, see Hacking (1975).
33 The spectator theory of knowledge is Dewey’s account of what he thought to have been the 
dominant model of approaching knowledge in western philosophy since the seventeenth century. The 
claim is not that every philosopher embraces the spectator theory, but rather that even those who did 
not respond it to it from within the same conceptual framework. According to Dewey, spectator 
theories of knowledge are a cluster of epistemological positions that aim to answer the question of 
how a knowing subject (its ideas, cognitions, concepts, etc.) aligns with the world, and which, in 
offering an answer this question, takes the knowing subject to be a spectator to the pre-made, 
objective world, with observation having no influence on the world. The knower and the world are 
taken to be independent, self-sufficient entities that in no way contribute to each other’s constitution. 
This is why, in discussing Dewey’s proposal, Hacking claims that Dewey “attempted to destroy the 
conception of knowledge and reality as a matter of thought and representation” (Hacking 1983: 62). 
Having rejected this epistemological model, Dewey proposes one in which the knowing subject is 
first and foremost an agent of action, of producing effects in the world both through knowledge 
already acquired and through knowledge in the making. 
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Traditional philosophy of science’s obsession with representation in theories is a recurrent 
theme throughout Representing and Intervening, not only in order to show that it is 
necessary to resist the obsession, but also to show how idealism (in Hacking’s sense) breaks 
down when philosophical accounts of science actually engage with the history of science. 
To understand how Hacking meshes the concepts of intervention, action and experiment to 
develop one of the first of the modern accounts of science centred around a specific form of 
scientific practice (i.e., experimental practices), let’s unpack what is at stake when Hacking 
claims that “science is a historical process of becoming and discovery”, because, of course, 
Hacking does not choose these words arbitrarily: the phrase is a snapshot description of his 
account. 
For Hacking, science, properly understood, is not in the business of representing the world 
– that is, of capturing the preexisting structure of the world and then presenting it (clearly 
and methodically) to our minds. What sciences do, on his account, is discover. What 
Hacking means by “discovery” requires specification: he argues that scientific discoveries 
are, in a sense, “created” through experimental (laboratory) interventions. When discussing 
the Hall effect, Hacking claims,
the Hall effect does not exist outside of certain kinds of apparatus. […] The effect, at 
least in a pure state, can only be embodied by such devices. That sounds paradoxical. 
Does not a current passing through a conductor, at right angles to a magnetic field, 
produce a potential, anywhere in nature? Yes and no. If anywhere in nature there is such 
an arrangement, with no intervening causes, then the Hall effect occurs. But nowhere 
outside the laboratory is there such a pure arrangement. (Hacking 1983: 226)
In order for the Hall effect to be “discovered” the right setup – with the appropriate causal 
interventions – had to occur. Given the right interventions, the Hall effect necessarily 
follows. In this sense, the Hall effect is agent-independent. But the effect exists only as part 
of – only as instantiated in – a certain kind of apparatus (i.e., specific interventions). 
Without that, the effect does not exist. Insofar as the devising of the particular apparatus, its 
proper calibration and its proper use require an agent performing these activities, the Hall 
effect is also (in this sense) agent-dependent. This is discovery in Hacking’s sense.
Ultimately, Hacking’s criticism looms over those philosophies of science that operate under 
the assumptions of the representational account of knowledge. Hacking’s replacement for 
the latter is what we might call an “interventionist account” of knowledge, in which local 
patches of the world are “made-up” by agent intervention. As we have already seen in the 
case of the Hall effect, Hacking’s position should not be conflated with a social 
constructivist one, in which the only constraints to knowledge claims are dictated by a 
community of practitioners and their socio-cultural context of knowledge production. What 
a local patch of the world is depends on how agents intervene – but which interventions are 
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possible and which not, along with the limits of specific interventions, are constraints that 
nature itself puts to the interventionist. Hacking claims,
In nature there is just complexity, which we are remarkably able to analyse. We do so by 
distinguishing, in the mind, numerous different laws. We also do so, by presenting, in 
the laboratory, pure, isolated, phenomena. (Hacking 1983: 226)34
For Hacking, the world, if left to its own devices, is nothing but some kind of 
undifferentiated , un-patterned complexity. It is only through our activities – ultimately, our 
interventions in the world – that it becomes variegated into distinct phenomena. For 
Hacking, creating a “noteworthy discernible regularity” in this complexity is what entails 
making a phenomenon.
3.4. The stakes of the new experimentalism
Hacking, then, proposes a shift of focus in philosophy of science, from a theory-centred 
account of science to an interventionist account of science. Others followed him in this.35 
Hacking (1983) was the launching board for a movement that crystallised in the late 1980s 
under the label of “the new experimentalism”. Hacking’s slogan, “experimentation has a 
life of its own” (Hacking 1983: xiii, 215; sometimes misunderstood36), became the claim 
adopted, debated and developed by the new experimentalists. There are at least two 
interrelated ways of understanding what the slogan amounts to. Firstly, it opposes 
34 Rouse makes extensive use of this passage to emphasise Hacking’s conception of phenomena as 
“events in the world rather than appearances to the mind” (Rouse 2011: 245). 
35 The works of Hacking, Franklin, and Galison, along with Steinle’s and Burian’s almost 
simultaneous, yet independent, development of the concept of exploratory experimentation fit within 
this category. See Franklin (1986, 2005); Hacking (1983, 1992); Gooding, Pinch, and Schaffer’s 
(1989); Galison (1987). 
36 Anstey reconstructs the Baconian model of experimentation as “an instance of experiment taking on 
a life of its own in the seventeenth century”, and immediately after continues, “And yet I have 
suggested above that this was in part the cause of the demise. It was too dislocated from both general 
theories and topical hypotheses to have adequate explanatory power.” (Anstey 2014: 126) Hacking on 
the other hand sees Bacon as a philosopher of experiment and praises the fact that Bacon attended to 
what Hacking calls a weak version of the relation between experiment and theory. The weak version 
“says only that you must have some ideas about nature and your apparatus before you conduct your 
experiment.” (Hacking 1983: 153) Hacking also praises the fact that Bacon underrates observation 
(Hacking 1983: 168, 182), the fact that crucial experiments are not test experiments for Bacon, but 
experiments that guide research in particular direction (Hacking 1983: 249). Simply put, to Hacking, 
Bacon’s philosophy of experiment is not weak, but instead is an account of experimentation that was 
going in the right direction, as it was more interested in interventionism and learning about nature 
through experimentation, rather than testing theories through experimentation and staying too close to 
theories. 
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philosophical accounts in which the practice of experimentation is “black boxed”37 such 
that only the experimental results (whether in the form of observational statements, data, or 
otherwise) matter philosophically. Hacking’s response to such traditions is to show that the 
details of the operation of the process of experimentation itself contribute in non-trivial 
ways to experimental results. The content of experimental results is determined by and 
through the particularities of the experimental contexts – the effects exist only with specific 
interventions. This position has been taken on board and further substantiated and refined in 
many recent studies on the history of experimentation – from Gooding’s detailed 
examination of Faraday’s practices of experimentation, to Chang’s work on the chemistry 
of H2O, to Rheinberger’s work on experimental systems in biology, to Baird’s work on 
instrumentation. 
Secondly, the new experimentalism advocated for a shift from an understanding of the 
function of experimentation as hypothesis- (or theory-) testing, thereby making 
experimentation necessarily subsidiary to theory, to a reversal of the relation, such that it is 
experimentation that takes priority. For Hacking, experiments have priority because the 
phenomena we are supposed to explain exist through experimentation. More generally 
philosophically, experimentation is central because our belief in entities can only be 
secured, on Hacking’s account, through the experimental manipulation of said phenomena: 
“If you can spray them, they are real” (Hacking 1983: 22).
For Steinle, exploratory experiments, as opposed to testing experiments, are used to 
generate empirical regularities; moreover, the practice of exploratory experimentation takes 
priority when it brings about conceptual innovation – e.g., the two concepts of electricity – 
which in turn is an integral part in theory construction (Steinle 1997, 2002, 2005). In short, 
to the new experimentalists, experimental practices are both the locus of scientific 
knowledge production and the starting point for philosophical examinations of science. 
In addition to situating experimentation itself as a departure point, the new experimentalists 
share a few other, related, views about what makes experiments relevant to knowledge 
production, and about how a philosophy of science should be developed on the basis of 
experimental practice. Mayo (1994) identifies three correlated claims that the new 
experimentalists hold: (1) the aims of experimental inquiry can frequently be independent 
of theoretical goals, such as testing or confirmation; (2) the experimental evidence can be 
justified independent of the theory such that the experimental arguments are not invalidated 
37 This phrasing, in relation to Hacking, is borrowed from Soler 2014: 21.
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even if the theory fails38 and (3), based on (2) that the experimental knowledge can be 
retained independent of what happens with the theory. (3) states clearly why experimental 
knowledge itself is a basis of progress in science (Mayo 1994: 271).
A third view common to the new experimentalists is that experiments themselves – and not 
just their results – are relevant for knowledge production. Traditional philosophies of 
science tend to reduce the activity of experimentation to the experimental results 
themselves, recounted in terms of data, observational reports, etc. What matters is that such 
accounts operate with a clear-cut distinction between the activity of experimentation and its 
results, taking the two as distinct entities. Moreover, the results are taken to be well 
determined and relevant to the theory (or hypothesis) in question, while the experiments in 
themselves are taken to be almost irrelevant – the actual activity of experimentation, 
including checking instruments, eliminating noise, establishing whether or not the design is 
appropriate, purifying substances, and so on, are deemed superfluous in a philosophy 
concerned with the theory-experiment relation. Traditionally, it is the just results that 
matter. The new experimentalists argue instead that the local tasks of the experimental 
practices are integral to knowledge production. For instance, Schickore (2010) argues that 
the frequently used practice of the repetition of experiments throughout the seventeenth 
century had a productive role in the generation and stabilisation of knowledge claims.39
Ultimately, the new experimentalists were successful in showing why a philosophy of 
science also has to attend to what scientists do and not just to what the products of these 
activities are. The new experimentalist project shares much in common with the practice 
turn. However, as Woody points out, in opposing experimentation and practice to theory,
the new experimentalists re-entrenched the dualism between theory and empirical 
methods—that is, fundamentally, the duality of the conceptual and linguistic realm 
versus the practical/action realm—which effectively perpetuated a high level of 
abstraction with respect to theoretical science, despite the fact that the turn to practice 
aimed to reject such abstraction. (Woody 2014: 124)
The new experimentalists compartmentalise experimental practices, separating them from 
other scientific activities. This results in the philosophical significance of experimentation 
being articulated in isolation from the wider scientific context in which they are 
nevertheless embedded. On a new experimentalist approach, then, experimentation 
38 This, however, does not amount to claiming that experimentation is theory-free (i.e., non-theory-
laden), but rather that whatever theoretical assumptions inform the experimental design (and the 
description of the experimental results) are not of the theory in question.
39 For different accounts of the role of repetition and repeatability in early modern experimentation, 
see Dear (1995) and Garber (2001).
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becomes epistemically autonomous from the wider context.40 Consequently, the theory/
practice dualism returns through the back door – this is what Woody sees as the major 
problem with the new experimentalism. Her criticism is not purely negative, however – it is 
also an affirmation of the crucial feature of the practice turn: that science consists in 
multifarious practices, and that there is no dualism of theory and practice.
Philosophy of science had operated (whether inadvertently or not) under the assumption 
that scientific practice and scientific theory belong to separate and dichotomous domains. 
On this understanding, practice is what scientists do, whereas theories are the independent 
products of what scientists have done. It is this theory/practice dualism that the practice turn 
aims to dismantle. Its goal is to replace the dualism with a conceptualisation of sciences in 
which theorising, conceptualising and so on are on a par with experimenting and 
measuring. Rejecting the dualism brings a significant shift not just in focus from theories to 
scientific activities, but also in how science is approached from a philosophical perspective. 
This is the topic of the following section.
4. Philosophies of scientific practices 
In this section, I deal with two recent and highly developed philosophical accounts of 
scientific practices. Both place scientific practices at the core of their respective 
philosophies of science and aim to provide dynamic, processual accounts of science rooted 
in the history of the sciences. Hasok Chang’s notion of systems of practice is formulated as 
a framework to be used in the analysis of historical (as well as contemporary) scientific 
episodes. His account relies heavily on philosophical concepts (action, aim and coherence) 
that require more teasing out than he provides. I conclude that his account of systems of 
practices relies on retrospective reconstruction, something that, as we have seen, the 
practice turn has to denounce. Joseph Rouse’s account manages to salvage the prospective 
dimension of scientific research and its openness to surprising results, but does so by 
entrenching the philosophy of scientific practices into a philosophical system that is not 
only somewhat obscure, but also too self-contained to make the concept exportable as a 
conceptual tool for philosophers and historians of science. An overview of these two 
40 It is a common position to take it that a philosophy of experimentation should be able to defend a 
philosophical account of the relation between experimentation and theory, as if each side necessarily 
instantiated a separate domain. See, e.g., the introduction to Radder (2003). The move seems natural 
if one takes experimentation to be concerned with the material, and theory to be concerned with the 
conceptual. By shifting the conceptualisation of what science consists in from statements to activities, 
the practice turn places itself in a better position to either bridge the gap between the two apparently 
distinct domains, or to completely reject the material/conceptual framework by relocating the relevant 
philosophical concepts to the domain of practices and action. I address this in detail in the next 
chapter of this dissertation.
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perspectives shows what sort of philosophical changes are required to provide an account of 
scientific practices that aligns with the tenets of the practice turn. 
4.1. Chang’s systems of practice
Chang’s recent work conceptualises science as primarily made up of scientific activities 
clustered into systems of practices. In this section, I offer a critical examination of Chang’s 
theory of systems of scientific practice. I make more of its philosophical foundations here 
than Chang himself does (at least explicitly), with the intention of teasing out its 
metaphysics, particularly through an implicit philosophy of action. I then show how the 
over-reliance on aims in the underlying philosophy of Chang's approach undermines its 
applicability to the understanding of scientific practices.
In Inventing Temperature (2014), Chang sees scientific research as a process of epistemic 
iteration,“in which successive stages of knowledge, each building on the preceding one, are 
created in order to enhance the achievement of certain epistemic goals” (Chang 2004: 
226).41 Iteration is a process in which a final solution is never reached because it is “a 
process in which we throw very imperfect ingredients together and manufacture something 
just a bit less imperfect” (Chang 2004: 226). The scientific progress is secured by the 
refinement or self correction of a previous stage by a new stage– refinement and/or self 
corrections which can be judged against the enhancement (or lack thereof) of certain 
epistemic goals and standards. For Chang, the scientific research moves with a double 
orientation: a respect for previous and current standards and an imperative of progress that 
regulates the improvement of these epistemic standards. (Chang, 2004: 44)
While Chang’s later work retains much of the position set out in Inventing Temperature, 
what has changed is a shift from a focus on knowledge claims and systems of knowledge 
(Chang 2004: 213) to a focus on scientific practices. In Chang’s subsequent work, science 
is primarily its practices, and studying it requires “a structured and precise philosophical 
framework for thinking and talking about scientific practices” (Chang 2014: 67). Starting 
with a 2011 paper, Chang’s philosophical project became the articulation of a 
41 Chang’s epistemic iteration is, in many ways, similar to Nickles' multi-pass progression, which also 
emphasises repetition with difference as part of the scientific research process (Nickles 1997). 
Whereas, for Chang, the repetition with difference is ultimately based on respect for previous work, 
for Nickles, the reworking of past science in light of current problems is a necessary step to advance 
research. Chang and Nickles are not alone in constructively examining the roles of iteration in 
sciences. For a cursory overview of some accounts of science that make explicit or implicit use of 
iterative processes, see Elliott (2012). 
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“philosophical grammar” of scientific practice.42 Chang (2012) develops and tests the 
fruitfulness of his philosophical grammar in the context of a well-known episode in the 
history of chemistry, episode known as the “Chemical Revolution”, which centres around 
the debate between Priestley’s phlogiston-based chemistry and Lavoisier’s opposition to it. 
While Chang (2014) does not go much beyond Chang (2012) in terms of the development 
of the philosophical grammar itself, only cementing the concept of a system of practice, 
Chang (2014) suggests a pragmatist conceptualisation of coherence and knowledge to 
further ground philosophically his approach.
4.1.1. Systems of practice and epistemic activities 
Chang’s take on the shift from science-as-a-body-of-propositions to science-as-activities is 
that “all scientific work, including pure theorizing, consists of actions” (Chang 2011a: 205; 
Chang 2012: 15; Chang 2014: 67) and it is centred around the concepts of system of 
practice and epistemic activity as highly operational “units of analysis for framing 
discussions about science” (Chang 2014: 67), independent of the scientific domain or types 
of practices involved (Chang 2012: 15). A system of practice is defined as a coherent set of 
epistemic activities performed with the goal of achieving certain aims, while an epistemic 
activity is defined as a 
more-or-less coherent set of mental or physical actions (or operations) that are intended 
to contribute to the production or improvement of knowledge in a particular way, in 
accordance with some discernible rules (though the rules may be unarticulated) (Chang 
2012: 15–6; Chang 2014: 72; my emphasis). 
The relation between systems of practices and epistemic activities – as well as the relation 
between epistemic activities and operations – is not that of a simple composition of atomic 
parts. That is, a system of practice strictu sensu is not made up of activities, and activities 
are not made up of operations. Slicing of the system of practice into distinct units has to be 
done for the purposes of analysis, and the bringing about of “distinct activities” entails – to 
use Chang’s word – abstraction (Chang 2008: 131). This implies that each carving up of a 
whole can only be done with some loss.43 The classification is not independent of the 
overarching aims of whoever is doing the analysis, such that the decision in carving up the 
activities depends on and can be evaluated only relative to those aims:
The structure of actions and processes are not atomistic in a reductive way, unlike the 
structure of things and statements. […] The relation between various epistemic activities 
42 Chang states that he uses “grammar” in the Wittgensteinian sense, which he takes to be the “(often 
hidden) rules for the use of concept” (Chang 2011a: 206) – what Chang is after are the hidden rules of 
scientific practices.
43 I believe that this how Chang’s somewhat cursory claim that “it would be a mistake to build up a 
whole universe of activities from basic activities” (Chang 2008: 131) should be understood. 
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is ultimately non-reductive and reticular, although in many situations we can gain useful 
insight from analysing an activity into its apparent components. (Chang 2017: 8–9)
What matters in tracking the relations between activities is not parthood, but something 
more akin to dependency relations. Chang’s characterisation of the relation goes as follows:
If an act that qualifies as an instance of activity A always qualifies as an instance of 
activity B as well, but not vice versa, we can say that activity B is more basic than 
activity A. (Chang 2009b: 79)
If action is the most basic unit of analysis, Chang’s philosophy of systems of practice needs 
to be grounded in a philosophy of action. Chang is mostly silent about the latter, however. 
This is a problem – even more so given how difficult the subject of action has proved to be 
in philosophy. By not delving into the philosophy of action, Chang’s account is left open for 
criticism. However, a certain amount of a philosophy of action implicit in Chang’s work 
can be unpacked from within his account of systems of practices. He operates with a 
distinction between activities and actions. Activities, for Chang, are necessarily goal-
directed (even if the goal is not explicitly articulated by the actors, and even if it is not well-
formed). On the other hand, “mere happenings involving human bodies” are actions, but 
not activities. Given this, purposiveness is the necessary and sufficient condition for 
classifying something as an activity. Operations, epistemic activities, and practices are 
activities and are therefore necessarily goal-directed. An action has an inherent aim that 
makes that particular action the action that it is. Consequently, it seems that no action is a 
metaphysical atom for Chang, but is always already part of a larger system, as a part of 
which, actions can also be characterised relative to more distant goals (or “ultimate 
desiderata” (Chang 2014: 70)). It seems, then, that epistemic activities and, by extension, 
systems of practice are therefore inherently teleological. Relatedly, while some actions 
might be non-normative (i.e., “mere happenings”), Chang takes the concept of epistemic 
activity to be inherently normative – not because activities are “rule bound systems of 
actions” but because “the actions within an activity are continually evaluated in terms of 
their conformity to the rules” (Chang 2011a: 209), which means that standards of 
appropriate and inappropriate use of rules always have to be in place. 
4.1.2. Ontological principles
For complex epistemic activities, the individuation of said activities appears to be done by 
tracing the aims behind them. The situation appears to be somewhat different for what 
Chang calls “basic epistemic activity”, although he does not go into much detail about what 
precisely makes a particular activity basic, or the sense in which it can be basic, given the 
considerations about how activities compose systems of practices discussed above. 
According to Chang,
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to each well defined, basic epistemic activity, there is an associated ontological principle 
that enables it and makes it intelligible. (Chang 2009b: 71)
An ontological44 principle (OP) is “the mark of intelligibility”45 in that its denial “would 
strike us as nonsensical rather than false” (Chang 2009b: 68). OPs are not beliefs about the 
world itself, but about the conditions for activities, such that an unintelligible action is one 
that cannot be performed because it goes against an OP. For example, take the epistemic 
activity of counting. Chang observes that counting necessarily requires the OP of 
discreteness because the possibility of performing the activity of counting depends on the 
discreteness of things to be counted: with an undifferentiated continuum, counting is 
impossible. Discreteness is necessary (as long as we continue the counting activity) as a 
condition for performing the activity of counting. OPs, then, are conditions of possibility 
for performing activities. The necessity of an OP is derived from pragmatic impossibility 
(Chang 2009b: 70). Pragmatic impossibility is a primitive for Chang – it is not analysable 
through further notions. If an action can be performed, then the negation of an OP on which 
it depends is a pragmatic impossibility. Chang claims that OPs are not universal, but are 
conditional on certain situations. In the case of discreteness, its necessity is conditional on 
our commitment to count (Chang 2009b: 70). Notice that the necessity of any given OP tells 
us something about the conditions for an activity, but tells us nothing about the structure of 
the world itself. Discreteness is solely a condition of possibility for the activity of counting; 
it is not necessarily a property of the world. The world might or might not be discrete, but 
our counting activity does not have the resources to settle that question.
There is, perhaps, a problem in Chang’s locating the conditionality of the necessity of 
discreteness on an agent’s commitment to continuing the counting activity. This suggests 
that an agent can opt out of discreteness. It is not clear that this is possible. Any self-
identification of a subject (i.e., as distinct from its environment) depends on discreteness. 
Discreteness is familiar and fundamental to almost all human activity (it is the notion of a 
continuum that is harder to grasp). Of course, counting also presupposes discreteness; but 
whatever its conditionality (whether it depends on the structure of our cognition or whether 
our cognition is aligned with the environment) it seems more basic than an agent’s 
commitment to continuing to perform an activity from which otherwise it seems (at least) 
possible to opt out (i.e., counting). Based on these or similar considerations, it appears to 
me both that discreteness could be taken as more basic than Chang’s treatment allows it, 
and that it might be grounded on a source of necessity closest to home (e.g., constitution of 
the human mind, structure of the environment, co-constitution of agent and environment, 
44 Chang uses “ontological” not to refer to the existence of things but rather to the nature of a thing.
45 Intelligibility is, for Chang, the “performability of an epistemic activity” (Chang 2009b: 75). I 
assume Chang’s point is modal: if it is possible to perform it, then it is intelligible. It does not 
necessarily entail the materialisation of this possibility. Intelligibility is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for understanding (see Chang 2009b: 75–6).
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etc.), such that what is at stake is our very possibility to be humans and agents, and not just 
a pragmatic decision about whether or not to perform the action of counting.
4.1.3. Coherence in systems of practice
Alongside action and aim, there is another concept central in Chang’s account: coherence. 
Chang makes it explicit that, to him, coherence is not a logical notion; it does not refer to 
the internal logical consistency of a set of statements. He displaces the concept of 
coherence from its traditional concern with connections between propositions to a concern 
with the coordination of activities:
When we consider activities (rather than acts) there are, then, two further aspects to 
coherence: the various rules (spoken or unspoken) governing the activity should exhibit 
good synergy, at least not counteract each other; and there should be a harmonious 
relation of learning and adjustment between earlier and later instances of the activity. 
(Chang 2014: 72)
Coherence refers to the process by which the fit between activities (and actions) and goals 
is obtained such that the respective goal is achieved. To be coherent in your actions is, for 
Chang, to be successful in your goals.
4.1.4. Aims and systems of practice 
Even if we take on board the entire cluster of revamped concepts that Chang proposes, his 
account of systems of practice raises difficulties, especially for those committed to the 
conceptualisation of science as research activity – that is, as future oriented. As Soler and 
Catinaud point out in their commentary on Chang (Soler & Catinaud 2014), scientific 
research consists of “bound-to-be-open, flexible, evolving and creative activities (such as 
knowledge production)” (86), and it is unclear whether or not Chang’s proposal is 
compatible with this conception of science, especially when what is at stake is the 
identification of the inherent aims of the system of practice and a “reasonably fixed set of 
rules governing the attempts to achieve the aim of the activity” (Chang 2014: 73; quoted in 
Soler & Catinaud 2014: 86; my emphasis). This fixity seems to be at odds with a 
conception of science as open and flexible, where the rules of the research are constantly 
reconfiguring and evolving.
To illustrate how his account is supposed to work, Chang gives the example of lighting a 
match. He breaks down the match-lighting action (a whole) into a series of coordinated 
activities that bring about the lighting of the match. However, the determination of the 
relevant activities needed to successfully bring about the aim of lighting of a match are, in 
reality, context sensitive: it matters, for instance, whether one tries to light up a match 
inside or outside on a windy and rainy day. In contexts where what is at stake is making 
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sense of which actions are salient in a laboratory setting, it seems that the determination of 
the aim and of the relevant context becomes more important than detailing what sorts of 
activities compose the system of practice. 
Moreover, even in Chang’s match-lighting example, the aim (lighting a match) is 
determined retrospectively. In his own practice (i.e., of history and philosophy of science), 
Chang appeals to examples from the history of science (e.g., Lavoisier’s chemistry) and 
makes use of the historical episode to specify the aims and activities relevant to the case. 
But this is done retrospectively – and doubly so. According to Chang, Lavoisier’s practice 
(or at least a substantial part of it) was guided by the goal of providing accurate 
measurements of the weight of gases. But Chang’s account appears to be a reconstruction of 
what is already a reconstruction: Lavoisier’s neat account of what he was doing and the 
community own’s account of why what Lavoisier was doing mattered are already 
reconstructions after the fact. They are reconstructions in that it was only after Lavoisier 
had come to the realisation that particular activities can effectively be used for the purpose 
of the measurement of weight that he tidied up his activities to fit the goal. It was only after 
understanding how his system of practice worked that the goal for which it is a reliable 
practice became clear (it cohered to achieve the goal, as Chang would put it). But this is 
already a reconstruction of the actual practice. And, in any reconstruction, the practice is 
already curated and edited to remove what is retrospectively identified as error or 
irrelevance (as much as possible), and to bring some sort of coherence to the fore – the kind 
of coherence that is exactly what Chang is looking for. 
We see this reticulation of reconstruction dealt with more explicitly in Rheinberger’s work. 
While discussing Bachelard’s non-Cartesian epistemology, Rheinberger claims,
The new, in this [i.e., Bachelard’s] conception, does not come into the world as a clear 
and distinct idea, but rather brings itself into relief ex post facto, as it were. It results 
from a recursive process. Clarity is a historical product of the purifying work of the 
scientific mind. (Rheinberger 2010b: 63)
Rheinberger’s interpretation is concerned with ideas rather than activities, but a similar 
assessment can be given to activities as well. Recall Chang’s example of lighting a match. I 
have already suggested that establishing the relevant (and even necessary) activities to be 
performed in order to successfully light the match depends on the context. Imagine that the 
activity of lighting a match is supposed to be performed by an unexperienced two-year-old: 
it is reasonable to expect that many irrelevant activities – tinkering, confusion and the sort – 
will be performed until the infant successfully coordinates his movements and those of the 
relevant objects and lights up the match (which is hopefully then immediately extinguished 
by a responsible adult). When dealing with un-known technologies and un-perfected 
experiments, or when designing techniques or new practices of measurement, and so on, a 
scientist has much more in common with the situation the un-experienced infant is in than 
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with the situation in which an adult who already has mastered the skill of lighting a match 
finds herself in. It is not only the case that getting to coherence with a (new) system of 
practice entail tinkering and mistakes. It is also quite possible that the aims of the process 
change throughout the development process, such that a coherent account of the aims of a 
practice can only be articulated retrospectively. Given this, building one’s historical 
analyses on the basis of aims commits one to reconstruction-based accounts.
Chang’s approach relies on prior reconstructions. But one of the most important tenets of 
the practice turn is precisely to avoid accounts of science based on such neat 
reconstructions – it is about the practices themselves, rather than their post-hoc 
“mummification”. Moreover, as Rheinberger’s (1997) investigations of scientific research 
on genetics, and Holmes’ (2004) detailed studies of the laboratory practices of Lavoisier, 
Bernard, Krebs, Meselson, Stahl, and Benzer show, much is also learned by failing to 
achieve proposed aims, and sometimes it is only because, and through, such lessons that the 
ultimate salience of the activities emerges. All of this is not to deny that actions should not 
be treated as goal oriented, or that aims should not matter. But it seems that we might be on 
more productive grounds if we can formulate an account of scientific practices without 
being heavily dependent on the aims of such practices. This is the concern of the following 
section – philosophical concepts for scientific practices that allow for surprise and scientific 
novelty without making local aims central.
4.2. Normative accounts of scientific practices: Joseph Rouse 
In this section, I discuss Rouse’s philosophy of scientific practices. I show that Rouse 
manages to articulate an account of scientific practices which takes their dynamic, 
processual and historical (features that are at stake within the practice turn) character 
seriously. Unlike Chang, Rouse makes no appeal to “epistemic aims” and avoids relying on 
retrospectiveness. In fact, part of what is salient for a philosophy of scientific practices, 
Rouse claims, is making it accountable to the prospective dimension of scientific research. 
At the same time, Rouse’s formulation of his philosophy of scientific practices entails the 
displacement of an entire repertoire of philosophical concepts, to the extent that his 
conception of scientific practices becomes too entrenched in, and non-exportable outside, 
his general philosophical system. 
4.2.1. Rousian normative naturalism
In order to understand Rouse’s account of scientific practices, we need to clarify his 
conceptual toolkit. Rouse’s overall philosophical goal is to “reclaim naturalism” from those 
who take it to require the reduction (or even elimination) of normativity, intentionality, 
concepts, etc. to some supposedly norm-free causal domain of nature. By not placing the 
normative dimension within the naturalist framework, Rouse points out, naturalists created 
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insurmountable problems for themselves. No viable solution can be formulated as long as 
the domain of the normativity remains unaccounted for from within the naturalist 
framework. What characterises Rouse’s overall project is the attempt to defend, on 
philosophical grounds, a more robust naturalism, based on the following principles: (1) the 
rejection of transcendentalism46 (i.e. appeal to anything supernatural) and (2) the rejection 
of philosophical imposition on scientific practices. 
It turns out that, according to Rouse, the only robust and philosophically tenable version of 
naturalism is one that denies nature–norm dualism (which he also refers to as the distinction 
between the “space of causes” and the “space of reasons”).47 Instead of the nature–norm 
dualism, Rouse argues for a metaphysics in which nature is already endowed with an 
ineliminable normativity – that is, in which normativity itself is natural. Rouse does not 
reduce nature to normativity, but admits that – at least from the human perspective – nature 
and normativity are mutually constituting through “intra-actions”.48 Not much more beyond 
this can be said about the nature of Nature in itself because we49 are already within nature 
and there is no transcending of it such that an objective assessment of nature be made 
possible. Through rejecting norm–nature dualism, Rouse displaces a few other (correlated) 
distinctions that characterised the philosophical approach to science: theory/practice, 
material/conceptual, internal/external history of science, and so on. As we will see, Rouse’s 
project is not one of bridging the distinctions, or proposing some mechanism of 
reconnection, but one in which the distinctions completely break down. 
Rouse (2002) offers a vast array of arguments against the dualism of nature and norm. But 
probably the one argument that is closest to how Rouse understands the very project of 
philosophy (as a whole50) is based on a historicisation of what he takes to be the various 
manifestations of the nature–norm dualism in the philosophical/intellectual context 
46 Given Rouse’s naturalist ideal, he will end up rejecting philosophical grounding through formal 
logical relations or transcendental conditions for meaning, thought, and normativity.
47 Rouse defends this position in Rouse (2003: 28–77) and Rouse (2015: 39–131). 
48 “Intra-action” is a technical term, which I explain in some depth below. 
49 Now, “we” can also be considered a technical term. I use it here to stand in for the human 
perspective, but the human is not an essentialised concept in Rouse. What it is to be human is always 
already a matter of contestation and reconfiguration through the participation in an intra-action with 
the world – an intra-action, which can be explained (from within the naturalistic framework that 
Rouse embraces) as the natural-biological phenomenon of niche construction, which I explain in 
greater detail below. 
50 In the sense of across traditions of philosophical argumentation and across philosophical subjects.
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spanning from the beginning of the twentieth century to today.51 Rouse’s conclusion is that, 
independent of the philosophical tradition,52 upholding the dualism leads philosophy into 
roadblocks: 
once the normative and the causal dimensions of the world have been conceived 
incommensurably as self-enclosed domains, they can never effectively be brought back 
together. Causality must be understood as always already normative, and normativity as 
always already causally efficacious. (Rouse 2002: 183)
Rouse is denying that the normative and the causal domains can be effectively brought back 
together through some kind of “gluing”53 of the two domains: once what is at stake is 
conceptualised in the dualistic terms of nature vs norm, such that what is to be explained is 
how norms latch on to, and how normative beings are meaningfully engaged with, a non-
normative nature, then there is no viable naturalist solution. A deflationist response that opts 
out of reconnecting the domains of the natural and the normative is not an option for Rouse 
because such a move would never be able to guarantee that human actions would ever be 
able to hook onto or be held accountable to nature.54 Having said this, for our purposes here, 
it matters little whether or not one agrees with Rouse’s reconstruction of the history of 
twentieth century philosophy, or with his proposed solution, i.e. that nature is already 
normative. My interest here is on how he takes this philosophical context and extends it to a 
reconceptualisation of scientific practices. 
4.2.2. Intra-action
Causal intra-action is a basic ontological unit in Rouse’s ontology. It is more fundamental 
than what might, in a more traditional ontology, be assumed to be its “components” – 
agents and things. That is, humans and their environment, along with the objects of the 
51 Rouse’s detailed account of the historicisation of norm–nature dualism and the phenomenological, 
logical positivist, social science studies and feminist studies responses is mostly developed in the first 
five chapters of Rouse 2002. 
52 In fact, Rouse appears to intentionally bridge the analytic–continental divide by showing that 
philosophical problems, worries, and approaches often have more in common than the institutional 
divides show. 
53 Rouse does not use this term. I borrow it from Wilson (2006), who uses the term in his discussion of 
what he calls "the classical gluing problem” within the philosophy of language. Wilson is using it as 
an umbrella term for a tradition he will eventually reject as alien to “conceptual behaviour”.
54 Here we can see how Rouse goes about criticising a social constructivist position. As we have 
already seen in Kuhn, social constructivism is not “letting nature in” and thus opens the door for 
excessive relativism. Rouse’s position is not in line with social constructivism, but critical thereof. 
For Rouse, nature both enables and constrains an agent’s practices; giving a philosophical defence of 
this is what is at stake in Rouse’s project to begin with. 
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natural world, exist not prior to but within and through intra-action for Rouse (e.g., 2002: 
359).
Rouse takes the term “intra-action” from Karen Barad’s theory of agential realism (1996, 
2007). Barad posits a metaphysics of intra-actions which directly challenges 
“individualistic” metaphysics, according to which independently existing individuals 
(entities, objects, etc.) precede the interactions in which such objects participate. Barad 
rejects any independent existence: “individuals” (Barad’s term) exist only within 
phenomena. Phenomena are “the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting 
components” (Barad 2007: 33), or, in other words, phenomena are materialised intra-
actions. By “intra-actions”, she means the “mutual constitution of entangled 
agencies” (Barad 2007: 33; emphasis removed) (or individuals), such that individuals 
always exist only within and through such intra-actions.55 In this light, we should also 
observe that the causality of an intra-action is one that eliminates any temporal or 
ontological precedence of the cause over the effect. Everything involved in an intra-action, 
exists mutually and in co-dependence, constantly affecting each other through iterative 
processes.56 While, for Barad, individuals do not exist as distinct individual elements, 
phenomena do, such that phenomena are the basic separable ontological units of reality, 
grounded in intra-actions.57 It should also be observed that, in claiming that phenomena are 
materialised intra-actions, Barad distinguishes between the intra-action (as a potentiality, as 
it were) and its enactment (or actualisation)58: the distinction has to be made to allow for the 
ability of intra-actions to be enacted in various distinct ways.59 
Interaction presupposes the separability of the elements involved – it is action inter 
(between) elements. Even if the interaction is causally efficacious for all interacting 
elements, such that all alter (in some way), the elements nevertheless remain ontologically 
55 Here is a quote from an interview with Barad (2012: 77) discussing this issue: “agency is an 
enactment, not something someone has, or something instantiated in the form of an individual agent.
[…] A specific intra-action enacts an ‘agential cut’ (in contrast to the Cartesian cut—an inherent 
distinction—between subject and object), effecting a separation between ‘subject’ and ‘object’ within 
the phenomenon.”
56 Iterative processes are not mere repetitions, but repetitions with some alterations, modifications, 
changes. 
57 The ontological relationship between phenomena and intra-actions seems not to be one of priority – 
Barad’s phenomena and intra-actions are two sides of the same ontological coin, with neither being 
prior to the other.
58 Barad herself of course does not speak in terms of potentiality and actuality. 
59 In Barad’s terminology, these ways are what she calls “agential cuts”.
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separable from the interaction. Intra-actions, on the other hand, involve no such separability 
– they are actions within rather than between. I am mentioning this as a way of further 
clarifying one of Rouse’s starting points – a human agent is always already in the world 
and, crucially, is not separable from that world. From this inseparability, it follows that no 
outside, privileged perspective is available. On my reading, this is a consequence of 
Rouse’s position: human agents are in continuous causal intra-action with the world and 
thus cannot be (or be conceived as) separable from the world. This means that no possible/
conceivable thought experiment could adequately strip a human agent from its 
environment; at most, it could carry the agent from one local environment to another – 
there is, however, no meaningful outside available.60 No human agent can be abstracted as 
non-situated. 
4.2.3. Normativity and niche construction
As I understand Rouse’s position, there are two distinct yet related ways in which we can 
talk about the place of normativity in nature. One is ontological: nature and normativity 
come into existence and mutually constitute each other through intra-action. The other is 
naturalistic or scientific: normativity is explainable as part of the biological “becoming” of 
humans through the process of niche construction. There are at least two reasons for which 
Rouse shifts the framework from causal intra-action to niche-construction: firstly the 
phenomenon of co-constitution of nature and normativity is already disclosed to us (we are 
parts within the causal intra-action), and if it disclosed, then we should be able to account 
for it from within the naturalistic framework. This leads us to the second reason, which is 
the double situatedness of Rouse’s project: he is working within a general philosophy and 
also within a naturalistic philosophy of science. As Rouse puts it,
As a naturalist, I am committed to understanding the normativity of scientific practice 
from within the horizons of the natural world disclosed within scientific research. One 
manifestation of this commitment has been the recognition of conceptual understanding 
in science as niche construction, a material transformation of the world that allows it to 
show itself in new ways. (Rouse 2016: 39)
Rouse rejects those neo-Darwinian interpretations of ecological niches that uphold the view 
that an organism’s affordances61 are determined by its selective environment, because such 
60 As is always the case with thought experiments further specifications are needed: the intra-action 
metaphysics is already naturalistic; in the sense, that it denies anything supernatural. Given this, it 
also denies that the mental processes are outside the natural (i.e. it denies from the get go a dualistic 
metaphysics.) The Cartesian thought experiment would be resisted because the processes would not 
be a stripping of the natural world, but a part of it. 
61 Whenever I use the term affordance, I use it in its Gibsonian meaning, that is the set of possible 
actions latent on the environment which an organism can in principle perform (whether she does so or 
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accounts imply that the causal relation goes one way: the environment determines the 
organism. For Rouse, niche construction entails causal symmetry: the environment causally 
affects the organism, but the organism also modifies its environment and, in this way, 
reconfigures the selection pressures that the environment places on it. There are many 
dimensions to human niche construction, but, on Rouse’s account, the dimension that is 
distinctively human is conceptual intentionality (or, on another level, “human 
normativity”).62 Conceptual intentionality as niche construction is Rouse’s answer to the 
question of how human normativity can be natural (Rouse 2015: 1–170). It separates 
humans from non-humans: while some dimensions of human niche construction might be 
shared with other organisms, conceptual intentionality remains distinctly human. Rouse 
does not deny intentionality to other organisms: (some) animals and humans have 
operational intentionality, in the sense of “taking up” the environment and responding to its 
cues accordingly. Conceptual intentionality, however, is the capacity to “take up” the 
environment as something. That is, human experience is of a world that is already 
conceptual – the world is experienced through concepts, as mattering (in some way). 
Rouse thus holds the view that the specific (and unique) situatedness of human agents is 
conceptual. A human agent cannot get outside her conceptual intentionality – that is, from 
outside a world that is already conceptual. By denying the possibility of a human agent to 
extricate herself from the already-conceptual world, Rouse denies the possibility of a pre-
conceptual connection between the human agent and the world that we can intelligibly 
access. Intelligibility and meaning is always conceptual, for any human agent. On Rouse’s 
account, an agent’s interaction with the world is not mediated by anything – there is no 
thought, representation, or language providing an interface between the agent and the 
world. The world is already conceptual, and the agent is already embedded within it: the 
agent does not interact with the world; rather, world and agent intra-act. 
not) because of the organisms’ capacities (See Gibson (1979)). This means that for each organism, the 
environment harbours the conditions for determining which actions are possible and which 
impossible. A niche encompasses those which an organism can in principle perform.
62 In discussing human normativity, Rouse focuses on intentionality, as he takes the latter to be the 
human mode of being in contact with the world. What Rouse is after is an account of intentionality 
that simultaneously explains whether and in what circumstances an entity is acting intentionally as 
well as having the theoretical resources to evaluate the intentional behaviour – that is, to hold it 
accountable in some way to some relevant standards (such that the account of intentionality becomes 
normative and not operative; see for instance Rouse 2015: 56–7). Intentionality, or, as Rouse also puts 
it, intentional compartment, consists in the following features: “First, intentional comportments are 
not self-contained but are directed toward or ‘about’ an intended object. Second, this directedness is 
guided, mediated, or governed by an ‘aspect’, a description, or some other partial mode of 
presentation or representation. Third, this directedness is also intensional, such that in many contexts, 
one cannot straightforwardly replace the mode of presentation/representation with another mode of 
directedness toward the same object” (Rouse 2015: 51).
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4.2.4. The normative conception of practices 
The foundational position of normativity in Rouse’s system is reflected in his account of 
practices: practices are always already normative. A normative conception of practices 
opposes a regularist conception, according to which if practices are to be explanatory, then 
they have to be objective and identifiable. Given this constraint, a practice –for a regularist– 
is an objectively identifiable regular pattern of doings and/or sayings, such that the 
identification of a practice reduces to the identification of the respective regularity. Talk in 
terms of practices is in effect talk in terms of regularities, such that the latter can constitute 
an explanans of sorts. Rouse explicitly denies the regularist account of practice. Instead, he 
proposes a normative conception which takes a practice to be “a pattern of interaction 
among them [i.e., amongst constituent performances] that expresses their mutual normative 
accountability” (Rouse 2007: 531). A performance belongs to a practice,
if it is appropriate to hold it accountable as a correct or incorrect performance of that 
practice. Such holding to account is itself integral to the practice and can likewise be 
done correctly or incorrectly. If incorrectly, then it would appropriately be accountable 
in turn, by responding to it as would be appropriate to a mistaken holding-accountable. 
And so forth. (Rouse 2007: 530) 
Practices are constituted by the mutual accountability of constituent performances. In turn, 
each performance is an evaluative response to another performance. On Rouse’s account, 
the response is qualifiable in normative terms: it is correct/incorrect, appropriate/
inappropriate, etc. Given the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a preceding 
performance, the succeeding performance sanctions it, rewards it, improves it, etc. Given 
the mutual accountability of the performances of a practice, such that each performance is a 
response to another, it appears that “the performances that contribute to a practice at least 
implicitly already express an interpretation of what is at issue and at stake in the 
practice” (Rouse 2007: 533). This is the basic conception of normativity that Rouse is 
interested in: one in which at any point there is always something at stake – and what is at 
stake is not objectively determined, but established through a “narrative” (interpretation) of 
what is at stake and why it matters63. 
Scientific knowledge is situated within such narratives – narratives that are always in 
construction, and whose construction entails continual re-construction. What characterises 
the situatedness of an agent is what we might call the a narrative stance, such that the agent 
is always already in a field of interrelated interpretations. The actions of the agent are 
meaningful in the context of these interrelated narratives. The meaningfulness and 
63 It is worth mentioning that Rouse’s account of narratives and the type of historical structure his 
account entails has much in common with Rheinberger’s account of the temporal structure of 
experimental systems. See Rheinberger (1997, 2015). For a discussion of Rheinberger’s experimental 
systems and how they contribute to concept formation, see Chapter 7 here. 
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mattering in the intra-action of agent and world is situated within narratives that are 
continuously being altered, such that the configuration of meaning and action in which both 
agent and world intra-act is continuously transforming. Because of this constant 
reconfiguring, narratives are never complete. Relatedly, because they are situated within an 
intra-action, they cannot be extracted from their context and evaluated as objective, 
independent, or a-historical pieces of knowledge. That is, any practice (scientific or 
otherwise) always remains an interpretation64, always remains incomplete, and always 
remains embedded in a situation. All this makes any treatment of science along the lines of 
the received view quixotic at best.
Narratives, for Rouse, are what make actions possibles. And narratives are internalised by 
agents, such that their performances are meaningful and matter (only) from within those 
narratives. In turn, the narratives are not separable from the practices about which they are 
“written” (so to speak), such that each performance is already a performance within one 
practice or another. This means that there is no de novo formation of a practice: this is 
another way in which each practice or performance is already situated. There is no 
“outside” of this reticular interplay of accountability between performances within 
practices. In this sense, each practice is situated relative both to its ongoing engagement 
with the world (which, in this context, means with other practices), but also relative to how 
the constituent performances are continually engaging in mutual accountability. As 
performers of performances within practices, agents are also always already situated. And, 
given the normativity of (both) performances and practices, agents are always already 
situated in the normative stance. 
4.2.5. Time in practices 
Rouse’s take on the role that narratives play in scientific practices as the locus of the 
intelligibility and significance of scientific knowledge is also a denial of linear history: no 
historical account can be a description of objective facts; in can only be an interpretation – 
an interpretation that only exists situated within a field of interpretations. Historical facts 
are not fixed, bounded entities that can be picked out through a historical methodology, like 
lobsters from a tank: historical facts become the historical facts they are taken to be through 
their participation on fields of interrelated narratives which are constantly contested. The 
past is neither fixed nor static; instead, the past can only ever be appropriated through 
64 This does not mean that interpretations (or narratives) are unconstrained. The disclosed possibilities 
within intra-actions act as constraints upon interpretations. Conceptual understanding is already 
engaged in the world through intra-actions so it cannot but be constrained. The interpretative stance 
entails reworking and reconfiguring how such constraints matter in light of a present that is oriented 
towards the future. Indeed, although Rouse would presumably reject such categories, we could say 
that what he articulates is a realist philosophy about intra-actions (and what the intra-actions bring 
about). 
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partial reconstructions, such that the reconstruction matters in some way in to the present 
which is future oriented. Indeed, the temporality here is even more reticular than that: for 
Rouse, what it is to matter in the present also depends on the future:
Their [i.e. conceptually articulated practices] normative accountability is an essentially 
temporal phenomenon, a mutual interactive accountability toward an unsettled future 
continuation. That future would nevertheless encompass its past and present 
performances as iteratively interrelated and reinterpret them in terms of their place in 
this reconfigured pattern of practice. (Rouse 2015: 167)
Any conception we can have of the past is already situated in the narratives to which we 
belong. Rouse blocks the possibility of exhausting the historical past: the past will always 
be salient only in the context of the present in action towards the future. The past influences 
the present insofar as a future-oriented action in the present takes the past into account. This 
is not only the temporal structure of our relation to history, for Rouse, but also of any 
action. One may ask at this point whether the cost of preserving the salience of history does 
not come at too high a cost: Rouse’s approach might seem to imply relativism. It does not. 
It does not because the relation between past and present is no different from that between 
agent and world. Anything does not go, with respect to history, because the past is not inert: 
on Rouse’s account, in the study of history, past and present are involved in an intra-action.
4.3. Reclaiming a philosophy of scientific practices
The starting point of Rouse’s philosophy of scientific practice, like that of the rest of his 
philosophy, is that scientific practices are already embedded in the world. Through their 
engagement with the world (i.e., the intra-action of scientific practices and nature), they 
disclose phenomena: 
Scientific practices disclose natural phenomena as patterns of causal intra-action, 
through their own causal intra-action with nature. (Rouse 2002: 351)
Relative to scientific practices, phenomena are secondary, but they take primacy relative to 
individual objects, which only “subsist65” as embedded in the causal intra-actions of 
phenomena (Rouse 2002: 314). Given that Rouse takes phenomena to be patterns of causal 
intra-action, we might conclude that phenomena are non-normative regularities. This is not 
the case. Rouse reinterprets Hacking as having already formulated a normative account of 
phenomena – normative because they are “noteworthy” (Hacking 1983: 221). They are also 
“public, regular, possible, law-like” (Hacking 1983: 222) and occur “under definite 
circumstances”, many of which require the use of apparatus (Hacking 1983: 226). Rouse 
reconstructs Hacking’s account of phenomena as normative because, through their 
65 Rouse does not make use of this term, but I introduced it to mark of the ontological dependency 
between the categories of intra-actions we are navigating. 
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noteworthiness, phenomena become salient patterns of causal intra-action expected to make 
some contribution to whatever is at stake in the scientific context at hand.
Scientific practices are not directly situated in the entirety of the world, but in a niche, in a 
localised spatiotemporal environment which is salient to scientific practices, and to which 
the practices themselves are salient. Scientific practices are means by which humans 
continuously reconfigure, expand, or alter the niches they occupy. Here is how Rouse 
characterises it:
Scientific niche construction involves coordinated shifts that create new material 
phenomena, new patterns of talk and skillful performance, the opening of new domains 
of inquiry and understanding, and transformations in what is at issue and at stake in how 
we live our lives and understand ourselves. The sciences thereby transform the world we 
live in and our place and possibilities within it. (Rouse 2015: 217)
Through scientific niche construction, the human niche is amplified, diversified, and 
reconfigured. With this reconfiguration and diversification, it is not just our material 
possibilities that change – in the sense that we diversify our technologies or possibilities of 
intervening in the world; our own sense of self (individual) or selves (communitarian) also 
suffer alterations. What Rouse suggests is that, once scientific practices have “disclosed” an 
aspect of nature, the disclosure will eventually reverberate outside the restricted niche of its 
scientific domain to the overarching niche that humans occupy. The same is the case for 
most activities: activities are future oriented and extend beyond themselves.
The list of properties that Rouse characterises as pertaining to scientific niche construction, 
in the passage quoted above, does not seem to be especially specific to science. Many 
human practices – from painting to playing games – reconfigure the niche we occupy and 
our understanding within it. In other words, what Rouse does not provide is a criterion for 
separating specifically scientific practices from non-scientific practices. Recalling the 
demarcation problem (which is particularly acute in the issue of the separation of science 
from pseudo-science), it is easy to anticipate objections to Rouse’s notion of scientific 
practices on such grounds. Along these lines, Slowik (2001) raises concerns about Rouse’s 
philosophical project on the grounds that it cannot solve the demarcation problem:
Rouse’s theory […] suffers from a crippling relativistic outlook which renders it, 
contrary to his stated intentions, powerless to demarcate cases of pseudo-scientific 
practice from legitimate scientific practice. (Slowik 2001: 172)
Whether or not Rouse’s account is powerless to this end is disputable; what is certain is that 
he does not show much interest in the demarcation problem to begin with. There appear to 
be a few reasons for why this is the case.
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Firstly, moving to scientific practices (as I have already argued in section 2 of this chapter) 
is to move away from an understanding of science through its products (i.e., statements). 
What is at stake in scientific activities is not so much whether a specific claim is correct, 
but rather whether a specific set of activities (e.g., using a dip circle as an instrument) is 
productive. The correctness or incorrectness of specific claims is ultimately settled through 
such productivity (or the lack thereof). To Rouse, the productivity of scientific practices 
entails bringing about new disclosures – making unknowns known. 
In an article on Kuhn’s philosophy of science, Rouse discusses the problem of the status of 
creationism and claims,
Scientists’ primary concern is not whether present beliefs are likely to be true, but 
instead whether available models of inquiry can effectively guide further research. If 
creationists claimed to offer not merely an internally consistent set of beliefs but an 
ongoing research program that promises to advance beyond its current understanding, 
only then would they have begun to contest evolutionary biology on its own terrain. 
(Rouse 2003: 115)
Rouse’s position is thus that the difference between the science of evolutionary theory and 
the pseudo-science of creationism rests in the former’s ongoing programme of productive 
research practices and the latter’s lack thereof.66 For Rouse, what it is to be “scientific”, or 
to pertain to science, is always at stake and in constant reconfiguration. Whatever 
boundaries scientific practices are taken to have at any given point, they are a matter of 
contestation:
The sciences, I claim, are caught up within historically significant, contested 
configurations of the world as a field of practical activity. (Rouse 2002: 262)
The boundaries are contested because they matter relative to, and are always at stake in, 
specific practices. This is the case for any situation that is salient in some way. This 
contestation, along with the temporal structure of scientific practices (that is, constantly 
reworking the scientific understanding in the present but oriented towards the future), is the 
philosophical ground through which Rouse secures the claim that scientific practices (and 
scientific understanding) is patchy and heterogeneous (see, e.g., Rouse 2015: 341). But 
these features – future-orientation and contestation – are features of all forms of practices. 
They are not specific to scientific practices. This is not yet too surprising, for Rouse. Unlike 
many philosophers of science who want to locate the authority of science in some essential 
feature of the scientific enterprise (such as a rational method, unique interventionist 
capabilities, etc.), on Rouse’s account, from an ontological perspective, scientific practices 
66 Slowik’s criticism of Rouse suffers from a similar problem, insofar as he does not take on board the 
prospective dimension of scientific practices. 
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are co-extensive with the rest of the human practices. Their specificity is historically 
contingent, rather than essential:
My aspiration is to show how science matters, and makes authoritative claims upon us, 
because of rather than despite its historical and cultural specificity. Science, as a 
powerful but historically specific extension of the conceptually articulated way of life 
that is our biological heritage is […] a precarious and risky possibility that only emerged 
in specific circumstances, and could disappear. (Rouse 2016: 40)
For Rouse, there is nothing intrinsically special to scientific practices. They gain their 
specificity from their development and entrenchment as a set of practices with a certain 
history and culture – an alien culture could not be said to be engaging in science proper 
even if it happened to produce a particular set of actions in the same way as a human 
scientist, just as a Western florist (acting within that tradition) is not engaging in ikebana, 
even if he happens to produce the same arrangement as an ikebana practitioner. The 
philosophical attempt to understand scientific practices is thus continuous with the attempt 
to understand the human practices more generally.
5. Conclusion 
In section 4.1. we saw Chang articulating a philosophy of scientific practices based on the 
coherence of the system of practice, with particular emphasis on the aims of the system. 
Rouse proposes a philosophy of scientific practices centred on natural normativity and 
intra-action. Although there are similarities between the two approaches, they differ in 
significant ways. Chang avoids normativity, and consequently sees himself obliged to 
account for the coherence of the system of practice (the fitting together of the activities of 
the system) in terms of the aim of the system. In doing this, he “mummifies”, at least to 
some extent, the dynamics and perpetual rearrangements and reworkings of the practice in 
something stable and retrospectively reconstructed (i.e., the aim of the system). In treating 
practices as intra-actions that extend beyond themselves, Rouse’s philosophy of scientific 
practices captures the processual and historical aspects, and the future-orientation, of 
practices. The cost for this, however, is a peculiar metaphysics and a controversial account 
of scientific understanding, knowledge and scientific meaning. These issues will recur in 
the next chapter, which gives an account of how scientific practices are bound to conceptual 
formation.
The turn to practice, then, is not and cannot be a turn to what scientists actually do – at 
least, not if that involves objective description of the actions of scientists. Analysing things 
in terms of practices necessitates reflexivity about the practices of analysis themselves. 
Practices, it seems, exist in networks with other practices, as well as with agents and with 
the world. They are multiply situated, and, while they might be moved from one situation to 
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another, they cannot be extricated from situatedness altogether – they cannot, that is, be 
mummified. This requires an understanding of the study of scientific practices on the same 
level as the practices being studied. Consequently, if scientific practices should be dealt 
with as something like intra-actions, then, equally, any analysis within the practice turn 
should itself be understood as an intra-action. By its very nature, a practice-based account 
requires reflexivity both about its own practices and about the situation in which it finds 
itself. This means that the practice turn itself cannot be mummified as a set of 
methodological precepts; rather, it must be – and must be understood as – an ongoing, 
mutating network of ongoing, mutating practices.

Chapter 7
Merging the Material and the Conceptual: 
Conceptual Innovation through Scientific Practices
1. Introduction
If the practice turn is to be reflexive, as Chapter 6 argued it has to be, it must take account 
of the situatedness of its own study of science. Part of what this entails is to question the 
practices for the study of science that it inherits – any new work within the practice turn is 
already situated within existing sets (or, perhaps better, networks) of practices that provide 
it with certain possibilities for studying science as well as setting certain limits on that 
study. If we are to be in control of our own approaches, those practices require critical 
attention. Thus, an attempt to understand how scientific concepts are generated and how 
they develop has to come out of a study of the existing practices of concept formation and 
development.1 This is the purpose of the current chapter. As such, it makes its case through 
a study of the existing practices for the study of conceptual innovation and their 
development.
A study of this kind will be partial and incomplete, of course – besides the time and space 
constraints of addressing the subject exhaustively, part of recognising situatedness is to give 
up on completeness, as what Bacon would call an “idol of the mind”. Consequently, this 
chapter is by no means attempting a complete overview of practices related to the study of 
1 As well as out of the study of concept-generating practices in some area of scientific investigation, of 
course – which is the concern of Part 1 of this dissertation.
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conceptual innovation as presented in the literature. Rather, it identifies a differentiation2 
underlying existing practices. That is, the differentiation of the conceptual from the 
material, both taken to be autonomous, which underlies both the problems and their 
attempted solutions with respect to the study of scientific concepts and practices. This 
differentiation develops and mutates throughout, but it nevertheless continues to ground the 
practices of studying conceptual generation and development, shaping its possibilities and 
limitations. The chapter investigates the conceptual–physical differentiation through five 
disparate treatments as found in the works of Hasok Chang, David Gooding, Andrew 
Pickering, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, and Karen Barad. 
What the chapter does, then, is to show the ways in which this differentiation shapes the 
possibilities for, and limitations of, practices for studying science. Its ultimate aim, 
however, is to show what is needed in order to create new, different possibilities for such 
practices – possibilities that allow us to better account for conceptual formation and 
development through scientific practices. I will conclude that a fairly radical shift in 
metaphysics is required in order to overcome the material–conceptual differentiation and its 
implications for practices of studying science. If we want a practice-based approach to 
conceptual dynamics, it turns out that we need to adopt a metaphysics in which the material 
and the conceptual are continuous and in which scientific practices and concepts have a 
complex, reticular relationship with time.
Let’s start, however, with the practices for analysing concepts that have been inherited by 
the practice turn. In particular, let’s start with what Mark Wilson calls the “classical view of 
concepts”. In Wandering Significance (2006), Wilson writes:
The most salient feature of a classical universal is that it is conceived as living in two 
realms simultaneously […]. The twin phrases central to this “operate in two spheres 
simultaneously” conception of universals exemplify (indicating whether the trait is 
manifested in the snake’s physical behaviour or not) and grasp […]. This ‘living in two 
worlds’ behavior allows the classicist to frame a simple and appealing story of how a 
range of basic predicates align themselves with worldly conditions: we merely grasp the 
appropriate concept and conventionally associate it with suitable linguistic noises and 
inscriptions. (Wilson 2006: 90–1)
Wilson’s target here is the classical view of concepts, inherited from traditional philosophy 
of language, according to which concepts have necessary and sufficient defining conditions, 
which are known to competent users. According to Wilson, once we explain the conceptual 
grasp of concept users in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, the concepts 
themselves are taken to be largely invariant over time. These necessary and sufficient 
conditions specify both what the concept is and how it should be applied. This means that I 
2 Chapter 5 takes a similar approach to the development of the concept of magnetic inclination.
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know, for example, the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a cat, and it is because 
I know these conditions that I can both reason successfully about cats and make practical 
use of statements about cats. This is what Wilson calls “semantic fixity” (Wilson 2006: 85). 
Semantic fixity, according to Wilson, entails “tropospheric complacency”, the phenomenon 
through which we extend the application of familiar concepts across significantly different 
conditions:
it represents our native inclination to picture the distribution of properties everywhere 
across the multifarious universe as if they represented simple transfers of what we 
experience while roaming the comfortable confines of a temperate and pleasantly 
illuminated terrestrial crust. In such a vein, we readily fancy that we already “know 
what it is like” to be red or solid or icy everywhere, even in alien circumstances subject 
to violent gravitational tides or unimaginable temperatures, deep within the ground 
under extreme pressures, or at size scales much smaller or grander than our own, and so 
forth. But the substantive discoveries of those who have actually probed these 
environments quickly reveals how shallow and hapless our complacent expectations are 
likely to prove. (Wilson 2006: 55)
Wilson does not deny the usefulness of the phenomenon of tropospheric complacency for 
our daily use of concepts, but he denies its import as a philosophical presumption about 
how concepts operate. 
In giving the example of my conceptual grasp of cats, I employed a distinction between 
reasoning about cats and making practical use of the concept “cat”: while the former might 
be considered strictly a cognitive activity (with no causal impact in the world outside of 
me), the latter involves some activity in the world (even if it is only the simple utterance of 
words). What is important is that my utterances of statements about cats, at least in some 
contexts, also have to track some worldly cat-related states. It has to be the case that 
concepts live “in two realms simultaneously”, as Wilson puts it, because, if the concepts I 
make use of as a concept user in my reasoning about them are not in some way accountable 
to the world, we could not explain my practical grasp of, in this case, the concept “cat”. For 
Wilson, then, the classical view of concepts operates on the presumption of an alignment 
between the structure of the world and our concepts about the world, such that the latter can 
be informative about the former and vice versa. The conceptual content is taken to be 
somehow salient both in the realm of the world itself and the realm of concepts: the concept 
stands for some object, we have knowledge of the object by grasping its concept, and we 
use signs (usually linguistic, but also mathematical or logical) to express the concept that 
stands for the thing in question. Without the presumption of such an “alignment”, which is 
accounted for by characterising the relation between the conceptual and the “worldly” 
realms as a referential relation, the two would remain completely isolated and disjointed. 
This would lead to a kind of idealism of concepts, wherein our knowledge is self-contained, 
separate from, and not answerable to, the world. This is not a comfortable outcome, 
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especially for anyone who wants to uphold that science(s) access the world (in some way). 
Therefore, the relation between a concept and a piece of the world might remain mysterious 
and intractable – but that there is such a relation has to be presumed, the argument goes, in 
order that the concepts be about something in the world. Ultimately, on the classical view, 
the basic relation between concepts and things is a referential one – concepts refer to things.
The appeal to reference or aboutness within the classical view is predicated on the 
distinction between what Wilson tellingly describes above as two “realms” or “worlds”. 
There is yet another presumption informing the claim that there is a referential relation 
between our concepts and the world: the presumption that the material domain and the 
conceptual domain are autonomous. It is in fact only under the assumption of such 
autonomy that the severance of the aboutness relation becomes worrying. If the material 
and conceptual domains are taken to be separate and causally closed, then severing the 
aboutness relation would make the conceptual domain unresponsive to the material domain. 
The reverse would hold as well. But day-to-day experience shows no indication of a 
genuine and constant severance of this sort, so it seems safe to presume that, despite its 
mystery, there is a relation between the two domains. Furthermore, it is only under the 
assumption of autonomy that it makes sense to take the relation between the two domains 
either as a brute fact or as a phenomenon in need of explanation. As far as I can tell, Wilson 
remains faithful to this latter assumption of the autonomy (or causal self-enclosure) of the 
two domains whilst challenging the nature and features of the relation between the 
conceptual and the material. What is ultimately at stake for Wilson is to show that the 
conceptual domain is too unruly and too messy to be put in an apparently simple referential 
relation with the material. His is an account that wants to preserve the autonomy of the 
conceptual domain whilst explaining its workings non-referentially.
But the autonomy of the material and the conceptual, I argue in what follows, is challenged 
by many philosophers of science who have accepted that science should be primarily 
conceptualised in terms of scientific practices, and not as a body of propositions. On this 
understanding, the distinction between the material and the conceptual breaks down in 
research practices such that the practice of investigation and the scientific concepts are 
interwoven. What is problematic for this position is not the reference relation per se – as we 
will see, each account accepts, and even defends, a version of reference (of sorts). Rather, 
what becomes problematic is the attempt to analyse the material domain and the conceptual 
domain separately. I say “analyse” here because the rationale for denying the separation of 
the material and the conceptual differs between approaches. For some, the denial of the 
separation is simply a matter of epistemology, while for others it is an ontological matter. 
Either way, in the following, given the constraints of a practice-based conceptualisation of 
science, I will argue that those who hold this position are obliged to defend the claim that 
investigative research practices matter in significant ways to conceptual practices – and 
especially so in the case of conceptual innovation.
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But the nature of the relation between the world and the production of new concepts – and 
the place of scientific practices within that relation – cannot be taken for granted; it needs to 
be explained. If one wants to claim that research practices contribute in significant ways to 
the bringing about of new scientific concepts (and thus to the making of scientific 
meaning), one has to explain how and on what philosophical grounds this happens. This 
chapter makes a case for how and on what grounds, through a reading of the practices used 
by certain philosophers working within the practice turn. What I show here is that the 
answer to the question of conceptual innovation in research contexts greatly depends on the 
position one takes on the relation between the material and the conceptual. This position 
shapes the possibilities for the account, both in terms of what the salient problem is taken to 
be and in terms of the specific ways the research context is taken to get us from world to 
concept (and back). My approach here is to examine how these issues are dealt with in the 
context of several very disparate approaches, in order to show how accounting for the 
relation between the material and the conceptual is especially pressing in practice-based 
treatments of science. This is because the materiality of the practices involved rules out any 
retreat to an image of science purely in terms of its concepts – to, that is, what we might 
call a kind of propositional idealism. Indeed, in the absence of a workable account of how 
material practices can lead to conceptual innovations, propositional idealism is a constant 
danger for this approach to the study of science. It is vital, then, that a practice-based 
philosophy of science shows why and how investigative practices matter to conceptual 
innovation, and why and how they are capable of mattering. 
Consequently, in what follows, I address a highly heterogeneous selection of practice-based 
approaches to concept formation. Chang’s account of practice (section 2) is primarily 
pragmatist, while Pickering and Gooding propose their accounts (sections 3 and 4, 
respectively) as responses to the limitations of the tradition of sociology of scientific 
knowledge. Rheinberger (section 5) addresses the problem from within the tradition of 
historical epistemology. And Barad (section 6) works with a postmodernist and 
posthumanist approach that is very much alien to the frameworks that have dominated 
analytical philosophy of science. And yet, despite their profound disparities, they share 
much in common when it comes to the question of conceptual innovation in science. 
Crucially, each perspective is articulated as a response to the differentiation (and 
consequent autonomy) of the conceptual and the material – as an attempt to bridge the gap 
or, in the case of Barad, to provide metaphysical grounds for abandoning it entirely. It is 
only by overcoming the fundamental differentiation of conceptual and material that 
practice-based accounts of science can hope to account for conceptual innovation through 
scientific practices. Finally (section 7), the chapter will address the context-dependency and 
the historicism of such concepts.
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2. Concept formation and scientific practices 
To state that scientific practices matter in the processes of concept formation (and 
conceptual development) is not, in itself, controversial. And yet, depending on exactly how 
the point is formulated, things get muddier. How the claim is specified will turn out to 
matter greatly in unearthing the philosophical assumptions one has. There is an entirely 
benign specification of the claim. It amounts to (going no further than) saying that new 
scientific concepts are formed in the research contexts of the laboratory. Formulated in this 
way, the claim is fairly trivial. I also suspect that most philosophers would agree, for 
instance, that experimental practices bring about unexpected, surprising results whose 
accommodation can bring about conceptual innovation. In the last few decades, we have 
seen an increasing number of studies on how experimental practices contribute to the 
formation, development, stabilisation and destabilisation of scientific concepts.3 But the 
general acceptance of claims of this kind is not disconnected from their triviality: we do not 
say much if we say that the work scientists do in laboratories leads to new concepts.
There are, however, other specifications of the claim that attempt to say more and which, 
not incidentally, turn out to be more problematic. In the introductory paragraph to an article 
on epistemic objects and scientific change, Hasok Chang writes,
The world as we know it is populated by epistemic objects, by which I mean entities 
that we identify as constituent parts of reality. I use the designation “epistemic” as 
relating to the human process of seeking knowledge, as an indication that I wish to 
3 For instance, Steinle (1997, 2002, 2005) argues that exploratory experimentation brings about data 
which might lead to conceptual innovation in order to accommodate such data. Chang 2004 shows 
that, in order to determine a reliable scale for the measurement of temperature differences and thus to 
specify the conceptual content of temperature in a trackable and reliable way, extensive laboratory 
work to determine the phenomena of freezing and boiling was needed. Chang 2012 looks at the role 
of distinct traditions of experimentation in influencing the development of chemistry during the 
period known as the Chemical Revolution. Nerssesian (2008) develops what she calls a cognitive 
historical method for studying the processes of concept formation. She ends up articulating a different 
account of concepts altogether. She rejects an account of concepts in terms of definitions that provide 
a list of sufficient and necessary conditions for the identification of a concept, because she takes such 
approaches to concepts to obscure the evolving character of scientific concepts. Instead, based on 
accounts of model-based reasoning (where she addresses analogical practices, diagrammatic 
practices, etc.) she takes concepts to “specify constraints for generating members of a class of 
models" (Nersessian 2008: 187), models which facilitate further conceptual change. She articulates 
her views through the concept of a meaning-schema in order to capture both the synchronic and the 
diachronic dimension of concept formation. Closer to the period the majority of this thesis is 
concerned with, Jalobeanu (2015b) presents various case studies of how both Bacon’s philosophy of 
experimentation and his experimental practice played a role in the articulation of many of his natural-
philosophical categories, and Jalobeanu (manuscript) insists on taking an operationalist reading of the 
Baconian concept of “perception”.
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discuss objects as we conceive them in our interaction with them, without a presumption 
that our conceptions correspond in some intractable sense to the shape of an “external” 
world that is entirely divorced from ourselves. […] Along vaguely Kantian lines, we 
may say that metaphysical objects-in-themselves are forever out of our reach, while 
epistemic objects constitute nature-as-phenomena, or nature as we know it. (Chang 
2011b: 414–5; my emphasis)4
Initially at least, Chang’s claim in this passage seems entirely clear: he is concerned with 
epistemic objects as parts of reality when seen as we humans conceive it, since “epistemic 
objects are objects as existing in our conceptions” (Chang 2011b: 414). But there are 
significant complexities just beneath the surface. Such a stance commits one to an anti-
propositionalist view: knowledge is not (at least not primarily5) about true, justified beliefs 
in the form of propositions, since
we do not have a method of determining which propositions are true, which is where we 
are stuck if we have a correspondence theory of truth and we want to know the truth of 
statements concerning unobservables. (Chang 2017: 6) 
Chang’s position here is, of course, one that scholars embracing the practice turn will take 
on board (in some version or another). Such criticism bolsters support for the possibility of 
an account of science as scientific practices that might turn out to be more productive than 
what has gone before (even if only because it can avoid seemingly untenable philosophical 
conundrums). What Chang suggests is that conceptualisation is often entangled with the 
development of technological devices and procedural practices by which such interactions 
with the epistemic things are guaranteed. This seems to follow since an epistemic object is 
already a conceptualised object. Chang makes this clear:
If I simply said “concepts” instead of “epistemic objects”, many of the arguments made 
in this paper would still go through. However, it is important to recognize epistemic 
objects as objects; what we presume to be real functions as such, not only in our 
reasoning, but also in our material practices. (Chang 2011b: 414)
This would mean that the dynamic of the processes of formation and change of (empirical) 
concepts, at the least, is grounded in the investigative practices through which interaction 
with the epistemic object takes place. Interaction here includes those epistemic activities 
through which the epistemic object is made operational. Chang’s position appears to be 
4 Chang understands his concept of epistemic objects to be continuous with Rheinberger’s concept of 
epistemic things (see section 5). There are, however, important discontinuities between the two 
concepts. I will return to these later on. 
5 Chang is not of course denying that there is propositional knowledge. However, he subordinates 
propositional knowledge (or knowledge that) to the function such propositions play in epistemic 
activities (that is, when the subject under discussion is scientific practices).
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precisely this, since he is arguing that the continuity of an epistemic object is secured 
through a continuation of the practices in which the epistemic object is entrenched:
The continuity about the meaning of “oxygen gas” exists at the operational level, or in 
the realm of epistemic activities […]. And what we have here is not merely (presumed) 
referential continuity, but semantic continuity of a broader, more tangible and more 
secure kind. All of the procedures that Lavoisier had used for producing and identifying 
oxygen gas are still repeatable and valid; that is also to say, most of the observable 
properties of oxygen gas noted by Lavoisier are also still recognized today. (Chang 
2011b: 419)6
Chang advocates a primarily non-referential answer to the question of how to articulate the 
relation between the object (whatever it might be) and the concept of the object. He wants 
to bypass the problem of the referent by arguing that the meaning of a concept is caught up 
in what we can do operationally, for instance with oxygen gas, on the one hand, and in the 
specific investigative context through which the already conceptualised object “oxygen 
gas” was brought about, on the other. At the same time, though, Chang is aware that such 
epistemic objects do not come immediately with a fixed meaning, and that the process of 
tracking, detecting, separating out and showing how and why an epistemic object matters 
takes time and is historical (Chang 2011b: 415). In other words, he knows that, since 
“oxygen gas” was itself the object of inquiry, how its meaning was determined did not 
follow the exact path by which the already meaningful “oxygen gas” object was made use 
of in practices. The differences are subtle, but they are there, and they depend on the 
metaphysics that informs one’s account about such epistemic objects. But to do this 
ultimately means not to explain how epistemic objects get conceptualised. 
Chang is explicit about wanting to remain agnostic about the underlying metaphysics of 
these epistemic objects – in the first passage quoted above, he makes his points “without a 
presumption that [...]”; he tells us “we may say that [...]”. Specifically, he wants to give an 
account of how we interact with things while bypassing the question of the nature of that 
interaction altogether. He wants to remain agnostic about how humans interact conceptually 
with the world. But Chang’s agnosticism itself seems to be determined by the very 
questions he wants to disregard – it is an agnosticism in opposition to some metaphysical 
framework, the framework that sets up the possibilities and limitations for what it is, in 
particular, that he ignores. What motivates his agnosticism is a resistance to a metaphysics 
in which our conceptions are supposed to correspond to an external world entirely 
6 Since it falls outside the scope of the present discussion, I will not go into detail about an obvious 
objection here: a position such as Chang’s here ends up articulating an overly restrictive conception of 
meaning, since it would appear that the meaning of the concept of “oxygen gas” cannot be dragged to 
other contexts. And I can surely formulate a meaningful, though false, statement about “oxygen gas” 
that extends beyond such procedural commitments. Chang is of course aware of such objections and 
answers to them in Chang (2004, 2012). 
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independent of us. However, it turns out that, in the way Chang phrases it, this external 
world is filled with objects-in-themselves.7 In this way, he presumes that there is a pre-
existing structure to the world that he posits in order to put aside. And presuming such 
structure is precisely what makes the question of correspondence possible – especially 
when that structure is conceived in terms of individual objects.
Even if one were to accept that Chang is successful in his agnosticism, the precise 
articulation of his position shows the possible metaphysical routes someone who does not 
wish to remain agnostic might take. In the following, I will unpack these possibilities, 
starting from Chang’s own claim, as a way of showing what is at stake in this chapter. 
Let’s call the first possibility “concept–world correspondence”. It starts with the assumption 
that there are two independent entities – the world and the conception thereof – which stand 
in a relation of correspondence. There are, of course, many formulations of the relation, but 
the one Chang blocks is the one in which the conceptions of the constituents of this world 
(i.e., epistemic objects) correspond “in some intractable way” (in Chang’s terms) to that 
world itself. Of course much depends on what Chang takes to be intractable here and on 
what an account of such a relation should look like; either way, Chang intends to remain 
agnostic about the nature of the interaction. At the same time, however, he sees himself 
obliged to make the assumption that, somehow, our conceptions are about the world. If this 
assumption were not in place, and if the epistemic objects (that is, the “objects as existing 
in our conceptions” (Chang 2011b: 414)) did not track something in the world, the 
epistemic objects would become “mere conceptions”. Chang appears to be clear about the 
requirement for this assumption. He states:
Rather, what I have in mind is the epistemic decisions we make about what we presume 
to be real in our dealings with the world. […] what we presume to be real functions as 
such, not only in our reasoning, but also in our material practices. (Chang 2011b: 414)
Hence, epistemic objects are such that they are simultaneously in the material practices and 
in our reasoning practices. We have to presume their reality, Chang appears to claim, 
because they work. It is clear from their definition that Chang takes epistemic objects to be 
somehow located within both domains, since he defines them as “objects as we conceive 
them in our interaction with them”. But here is where it becomes a little less clear as to 
what exactly the philosophical assumptions informing Chang’s position are. 
7 My point here is not that Chang is committed to this view. I am using the first passage quoted from 
Chang (2011b) as a way of showing (1) that there are several alternatives possible for articulating the 
relation between the material and the conceptual, and (2) that how one deals with the question of a 
substantive relation between scientific practices and concept formation depends on this lower level of 
the articulation of (1), such that (2) is dependent on (1). 
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There are at least two possible ways to interpret Chang’s claims about epistemic objects: (1) 
the existence of epistemic objects is independent of our conceptualising them (even if they 
exist in a different form), but we do have access to them via conceptualisation; or (2) the 
existence of the epistemic objects depends on the interaction between the material and the 
conceptual, such that, prior to the interaction, the epistemic object had not come into 
existence. (1) and (2) are not claims of the same kind, and do not entail the same 
commitments. (1) commits one epistemologically, with the ontology forever out of reach, 
while (2) commits one to an ontology about these epistemic objects8, since an epistemic 
object comes into existence already conceptualised – it comes into existence as a (material-
conceptual) thing. There are no objects in themselves to talk about: the epistemic objects 
are themselves (material-conceptual) things.
Chang, however, seems to hold (1). I understand his position as follows: there is a reality 
out there, which might even be independent of us, and it comes already structured, since it 
is populated by such things as “metaphysical objects-in-themselves” (Chang 2011b: 415). 
We cannot reach those objects in their “pure” state. Our encounter, then, is not with the 
objects in themselves, but with these objects as already conceptualised: that is, with 
epistemic objects. If this is so, the actual ontology of the world is forever out of reach. But 
all of this also entails that the world comes pre-articulated, and that our epistemic objects 
either cut it at its joints (where accurate) or do not (where inaccurate). We are (and will 
always be) caught in such conceptualisation. If one holds (1) – i.e., an epistemological 
position –, then one has to explain why these epistemic objects are not “mere putty in our 
hands” (to paraphrase Pickering – see section 4) and what it is about our practices of 
conceptualisation that ensures that they reliably track reality.
Chang’s answer to this problem goes back to a version of pragmatism: when epistemic 
objects function well enough in our practices, and when we can reliably employ them to 
pursue various goals with them, we can safely commit to their existence, even if we might 
never formulate a metaphysical grounding for such a commitment.9 But in relying entirely 
on the functions of epistemic objects, Chang moves away from an account of the internal 
structure of the process of conceptual innovation (be it successful or not). We only have an 
account of how an already known (in Chang’s sense, already conceptualised) epistemic 
entity functions (at a given time and in a particular context) within scientific practices.10 
8 I will ignore the discussion of the ontological reading at this point. I will deal with it more 
thoroughly in section 6.
9 Recall here Chang’s account of systems of practice and his notion of coherence as a fitting together 
of actions to make sense of what reliability is in context (see Chapter 6). 
10 The distinction between the functions of an epistemic object and the “discovery” of an epistemic 
object will be discussed in the section on Rheinberger.
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Philosophical accounts of how conceptual innovation in science happens in the context of 
scientific practices will take (either implicitly or explicitly) a position on the relation 
between the material and the conceptual. It cannot be circumvented without losing grip on 
the process of conceptual innovation itself.
3. Packaging human agency into practice: David Gooding’s 
construals
As we saw in the previous section, it is possible to discuss conceptual formation and 
development through practices without committing to a metaphysics of the relation between 
the two, at least to a certain extent – but doing so tells us very little about the irreducible 
ways in which scientific research contributes to the generation of new concepts. Worse, it 
risks tacitly replicating metaphysical presuppositions that turn science back into 
propositional content. If the conceptual domain can be isolated from the material without 
loss, then treating scientific knowledge as primarily propositional can hardly be precluded 
on philosophical grounds. David Gooding proposes an account of conceptual innovation 
aimed at combining the conceptual and the material in order to bring the material 
investigative practices back into the philosophical discussion of knowledge production, 
transmission and justification.
Gooding’s Experiment and the Making of Meaning (1990) is explicitly concerned with how 
new discoveries acquire their meaning. In setting out his approach, Gooding tells us:
how do observers ascend from the world to talk, thought and argument about that 
world? (Gooding 1990: 3);
I shall look at the procedural and often pre-linguistic stage-setting they use to get their 
concepts off the laboratory bench and into the language. (Gooding 1990: 4; my 
emphasis)
Gooding examines how scientists go from material practical contexts, in which new 
discoveries are made (be they experimental facts, new phenomena, new apparatuses and so 
forth), to establishing meaning that is shared by a community of experts. Novelty in 
experimentation is the crucial phenomenon that Gooding is interested in.11 
11 If a philosopher wants to show that any philosophical account of science which operates under the 
assumption of a clear-cut separation between the context of discovery and the context of justification 
is bound to run into difficulties, a sure way to go is to show that discovery and justification go 
together. Gooding shows that this is the case in the specific way in which he locates and discusses 
conceptual content. For several reasons as to why discovery and justification go together, see also 
Steinle (2005).
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Gooding examines experimental novelty in the context of investigations of 
electromagnetism in the early nineteenth century, with a special focus on Faraday’s 
experimental practice and how, through it, Faraday managed to “construct” concepts such 
as magnetic rotations, lines of force, and so on. What is at stake for Gooding is not to show 
that the meaning novel discoveries acquire is established through social negotiation (as 
Baird 1999 claims), but rather to show that, in the transition from the material stage to the 
formation of a concept accepted by the larger community, human agency matters. At the 
same time, an agent is not entirely free within a research context. His freedom-space (to put 
it this way) is bounded from two directions. The first is nature’s recalcitrance, as shown 
through the research context, and the second is the agent’s embeddedness in a knowledge 
context with its own internal criteria of intelligibility and meaningfulness. What counts as 
an intelligible response to nature’s recalcitrance in, e.g., a Cartesian world of mechanical 
constraints and efficient causation differs from what counts as intelligible in an Aristotelian 
world of final causes. The response to an experimental novelty will depend on both 
directions of constraint. Given this, what Gooding is after is two transitions. The first is (1) 
from the pre-linguistic stage of the material investigative context, in which a novel aspect 
presents itself, to a stage in which the novel aspect is made sense of (or, in Gooding’s 
words, becomes “intelligible” for the scientist). Gooding’s insight here is that, in a research 
situation, the researcher does not immediately, or at once, understand her research situation: 
getting there takes time, it is a process – and what is at stake in this process is making sense 
of the situation. Gooding wants to explain the internal structure of this situation. Simply 
put, what Gooding is after is the internal structure of the process in which the researcher 
moves from an unfamiliar, unknown situation to a familiar and known situation that she can 
grasp.12 
The second transition that interests Gooding is (2) from the private account that the scientist 
formulates for herself to a reconstruction of her account that accords with certain socially 
established criteria of meaningfulness and intelligibility. For (2), the claim is not that the 
researcher has to negotiate with the rest of the community as to how to make sense of the 
research context she finds herself in, or that what she says about the research context is 
supposed to take account of what is at stake for the larger community (although this might 
matter as well), but rather that the conditions of intelligibility in which the researcher finds 
herself are already social, and that, insofar as this is the case, these conditions are salient for 
determining the meaningfulness she attaches to the situation. In Gooding’s own words, 
12 I should note here that these types of situation are indeed far more present in cases in which new 
domains of research slowly come into being. Once a well-developed theory gets off the ground, 
similar situations are rarer, because one could expect that the already established and accepted 
theoretical vocabulary can mediate such novel situations. However, even in such cases, events of the 
type Gooding examines are present.
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“observation is an inherently social activity” (Gooding 1990: 76)13 – that is, what appears to 
the researcher as self-evident is so only to the extent to which the researcher is already 
embedded within a field of observational, experimental, procedural and representational 
techniques that she has already mastered and that are inherited from her knowledge 
situation.
To give an example of the inherited sociality of observation: magnetic phenomena in early 
studies of magnetism (especially, but not exclusively, in geomagnetism) in the seventeenth 
century, and continuing into the eighteenth century, made use of descriptive techniques that 
involved a system of coordinates expressed in terms of magnetic meridians, latitude, 
longitude, equator, axis, poles, etc. This way of describing magnetic phenomena was 
commonplace and mediated not only the description of the phenomena, but also their 
explanation. Much research develops precisely around how to entrench these modes of 
description into the phenomenon and its explanation. But that these are the ways in which 
one describes magnetic bodies becomes self-evident and commonplace as practice only 
after the system gets transferred from cartographical and astronomical practices into 
magnetism. Nevertheless, in studies of magnetism at the time, observations are made, for 
the most part, only with respect to these techniques of description – to observe the 
behaviour of a magnetic body just is to observe its motion with respect to poles, meridians, 
equator, etc.
(1) and (2) are two sets of constraints – one from the recalcitrance of nature within the local 
experimental situation, and one from the “field of intelligibility” the researcher finds herself 
already in – that Gooding considers in order to explain how conceptual meaning is attached 
to the investigative (in his case, mostly experimental) situation. That is, although Gooding 
is trying to determine how the alignment of the world of concepts and the world of things 
happens, he takes such alignment to be already mediated in significant ways by multiple 
13 Gooding (1990) might perhaps be best understood as a response to social constructivist principle of 
symmetry. The principle of symmetry stipulates that any account of nature (a theory, a system of 
beliefs), irrespective of whether it is true or false, should be judged in the same way, because what 
ultimately explains the attribution of truthfulness or falsity depends on social constraints and social 
consensus, since the causal interaction of human agency with nature is always everywhere the same. 
There is nothing substantial to be said about the interaction between human agency and nature, 
because, given a similar situation, nature always generates the same result. If this is so, then differing 
responses to similar observational contexts, for instance, are prompted by social, cultural, and 
individual differences, and such differences are ultimately what explains the assent (or not) to a 
theory. Gooding agrees that the shared repertoire of practices plays an important role in the 
observational content and that, therefore, the observation is itself a social phenomenon, but he denies 
that this means that reality, or nature, should not be invoked in the actual observational result. Nature 
plays a role in experimentation through recalcitrance – and practices of experimentation matter 
because it is through them that meaning gets articulated.
256 CHAPTER SEVEN
factors, factors which are, however, traceable and which make the assent from the world to 
concepts (what he, following Quine, calls “semantic assent”) more than simple causal 
responses on the part of the agent. The determination of a meaning is not entirely linguistic 
or cognitive: it happens at this intermediary stage (the procedural and pre-linguistic stage), 
it is temporally extended, it is constrained, and it entails agency. It entails agency because, 
despite such constraints, the meaningfulness attached to the research situation is also a 
creative moment, a moment of invention on the part of the researcher. Human agency is, for 
Gooding, always – and irreducibly so – entailed in the experimental and observational 
practices.14 What he means by this is best understood as follows: no experiment (or 
experimental series, one might one add here) can “compel assent” to a specific 
interpretation of the experimental result. In other words, for any experimental situation, 
more than one interpretation can be seen as appropriate, such that what makes the 
experimental situation meaningful (so to speak) is a combination of how nature showed 
recalcitrance (in the form of the experimental result) with some conceptual contribution 
from the scientist.
3.1. Construals
One of the concepts Gooding uses to denote this procedural and pre-linguistic stage (which 
is better described as a process), in which the researcher grapples with her own situation in 
the attempt to make sense of it, is that of the “construal”: 
Construals are a means of interpreting unfamiliar experience and communicating one’s 
trial interpretations. Construals are practical, situational and often concrete. They belong 
to the pre-verbal context of ostensive practices. (Gooding 1990: 23)
Construals are all of those visual and verbal descriptions of what is happening in research 
on a day-to-day basis before settling on a final model or explanation, which is then to be 
communicated to the larger society. Construals denote the process by which a researcher (or 
14 On my reading of Gooding, what he claims is that experimental situations always have more 
“potential”, so to speak, for meaning (semantic assent) than gets initially exploited. If we take this 
interpretation on board, then we notice here yet another way in which repetition of experiments 
matters: the repetition does not matter exclusively for verification of the result, but also for the 
potential of the experimental situation to lead research into a new direction. Take, for example, 
Newton’s letters on optics. Newton’s first experiment is one that was popular in the period: that of 
refracting sunlight through a prism in a darkened room. Many of those performing the experiment 
before Newton, such as Descartes, were interested in the order of colours produced through the prism. 
Newton, however, notices yet another salient feature of the experimental situation: the shape of the 
spectrum. The spectrum does not have a circular shape as predicted by a corpuscularian theory of 
light, but an oblong shape five times longer than it is wide, which takes Newton on a different 
“investigative path” than that pursued by Descartes. See here Newton’s optical letters in 
Philosophical Transactions (1671/2). 
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a community of researchers) goes from interactions with the world – mediated by 
experimental contexts – to publicly accessible phenomena15. It is, thus, an attempt to make 
meaningful what is taken to be novel and unknown in the experimental situation. To be 
explained and justified, first the novelty has to be established: what the novelty is has to be 
specified (conceptually and linguistically). On Gooding’s account, it does not come with 
meaning already attached; meaning has to be attached to it. As I understand Gooding’s 
position, he claims that, in the process through which meaning is attached to the novelty, 
the material and the conceptual end up entangled. What is communicated as the result of the 
research is conveyed in a vocabulary which expresses what is salient about the setup and 
which procedures show what is salient, while the procedures themselves are used to give 
meaning (and make intelligible) the relevant content.16 The relation between the 
experimental situation and the formulation of a result is not one of passive receptivity of the 
observational situation or a simple transition from the material to the conceptual situation. 
Given an experimental situation, magnetic inclination is not simply “seen” or “detected” in 
a one-stage process. Much work is required to determine what matters in the experimental 
situation, how to determine it and, most importantly, what it is taken to be.17 Construals are 
also taken to “construe” meaning through continuous retrospective moves. That is, the 
experimental result is not an atemporal entity: its conceptual content is always determined 
through a series of reconstructions of past moves. Experimental results are not simple 
derivations of a perfectly well constructed and perfectly well controlled experimental or 
laboratory situation. Results involve multiple elements of reconstruction.18 Gooding’s claim 
15 Notice here that the concept of phenomenon here is Hacking’s. A scientific phenomenon is 
“something public, regular, possible, law-like” (Hacking 1983: 222), which occurs “under definite 
circumstances” since—most of them—cannot exist “outside of certain kinds of apparatus” (Hacking 
1983: 226). In short, a phenomenon is a pattern against an experimentally created background 
(Hacking 1983: 226). It is not any sort of pattern, but one that can show something scientifically 
relevant (Hacking 1983: 230).
16 A way to understand this is to recall that many definitions of phenomena and experimental results 
already incorporate the experimental conditions of their production. 
17 These issues are addressed, through the case of magnetic inclination, in Chapter 5.
18 In ch. 2 and 5, Gooding identifies five types of reconstruction: cognitive, demonstrative, 
methodological, didactic, and philosophical. He goes on to explain the productive roles such 
reconstructions (the first three in particular) had in nineteenth-century studies of electromagnetism. 
For a discussion of this point, see also Thomas Nickles’ ‘one pass fallacy’ (Nickles 1997). To commit 
the one pass fallacy is to take the scientist’s own narrative as a realistic account of a single, linear 
“pass” or sequence of operations, ignoring the extent to which scientists’ accounts are reconstructions 
rather than recordings (Gooding, 1990: 5). This mistake opens up the path to the genetic fallacy 
(according to Nickles). Nickles, like Gooding, argues that reconstructions are inevitable in scientific 
accounts. There is, however, an important distinction between the two accounts. Nickles is more 
interested in reconstructions that scientists need to make of past results, whereas Gooding is interested 
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is that such reconstructions (retrospectively oriented) are necessary in establishing what the 
experimental novelty actually is.
In the process of construal, the scientific concept that is a sign for the salient experimental 
novelty is dependent on the research context (the context of experimentation, in his terms): 
“a construal cannot be grasped independently of the exploratory behaviour that produces it 
or the ostensive practices whereby an observer tries to convey it” (Gooding 1990: 87). 
When the novelty is taken to have been properly “construed” (that is, given conceptual 
meaning), the novelty becomes a fact:
Construing on the other hand, creates communicable representations of new experience 
and at the same time integrates these into an existing system of experimental and 
linguistic practices. Successful construing creates “givenness” in experience. (Gooding 
1990: 87)
Construals are taken to occupy a space that bridges the material and the conceptual in such 
a way that the processes of detecting scientific novelty and stabilisation of the experimental 
contexts go hand in hand with the processes of concept formation.19 Such construals will be 
eliminated from what is being communicated as the result. However, Gooding argues, the 
elimination is not a complete one. This is because the conceptual structure of the 
experimental situation has inbuilt embodied agency. For Gooding, the experimenter is an 
embodied and directed agent whose embodiment will in significant ways determine what 
conceptual content is attached to new experimental results (and so on), such that the 
meaning of the concepts that are supposed to stand for experimental data, experimental 
phenomena, and so on, have the agency built into them. In a review article on the 
philosophy of experimentation (including Gooding’s), Davis Baird makes the point as 
follows: 
in reconstructions needed in the making of a new result. 
19 It is precisely because Gooding takes construals to occupy the middle space between the 
experimental situation and the conceptual formation in a way that the two hang together and mutually 
reinforce each other within construals that Gooding’s construal is not an account of models as 
mediators. Morgan and Morrison 1999 proposes treating models as mediators between the world and 
our theories such that scientific phenomena are patterns within the model, and not of the world. This 
means that theories are not directly about the world, but apply instead to the models, which are treated 
as relatively independent from the world. However, Gooding’s construals enter the equation earlier, at 
the point at which what is relevant within the experimental situation has not yet been understood such 
that it can be modelled. Also, despite the fact that Morgan &Morrison’s account of models is 
proposed as a way to explain the mediation between the world and the theory, they are more 
interested in understanding the relation between theories and models, rather than models and the 
world, as Rouse is (2015: 225).
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Beyond depending on skill knowledge—“knowhow”20—(e.g., for confirmation and/or 
justification) theoretical or propositional knowledge—“knowledge that . . . ”—has 
knowhow built into the very meanings of the words used in its expression. Knowhow 
may become invisible, but it remains essential for the very sense of knowledge that. 
(Baird 1999: 391)
Baird captures here the strongest version of Gooding’s claim that he puts agency back into 
experimentation. Agency is inbuilt in knowledge claims because it is inbuilt in the meaning 
of the newly introduced concepts. There is, however, another dimension to the story: the 
meaning of a new concept is, according to Gooding, construed by specifying the 
experimental conditions and the procedures themselves into the definition.21 Another 
concept that Gooding proposes as a tool for tracking such construals and the way the 
researcher moves from the world of things to the world of words are experimental maps, 
which are models of experimental practices meant to track the moves between the material 
and the conceptual realms. Their structure might be somewhat confusing, but they are, 
again, telling of what is at stake in Gooding’s approach: articulating how the material and 
the conceptual relate in a way that allows for meaningfulness to be obtained. 
Gooding’s position includes both a negative claim and a positive claim. The negative claim 
is that, in contrast to the traditional view, the relation between the conceptual and the 
material is not one of correspondence. It is one mediated by construals which reconfigure 
both ends: 
what is perceived as correspondence is based upon a made convergence of construals of 
objects and processes to representations of these more rudimentary representations. 
(Gooding 1990: 217)
Additionally, because of such construals, Gooding denies any neat separation between the 
material and the conceptual in practice – he takes the two realms to be ontologically 
separate, but we only ever encounter them mixed together. Ultimately, the research process 
infuses parts of each domain into the other. This is why Gooding claims that the “dualistic 
20 I refrain from using this concept to describe what Gooding understands through embodiment 
because it is, in a sense, too narrow. The development of skill and learning of procedures such that a 
scientist becomes an expert with knowhow is not necessary for claims of embodiment. Often, learning 
how to develop a procedure can happen at the same time as the formation of new concepts.
21 One might notice here some relation to an operational theory of meaning. Bridgman originally 
suggested operationalism in relation to determinations of measurement procedures (Bridgman 1927). 
If one is willing to extend the notion of operations beyond measurements, the relation becomes more 
noticeable. Gooding, however, denies an overly strong correlation with operationalism on grounds 
that operationalism attempts to ground “meaning in operations that tie observation terms to 
experiences or quantities”, and the notion of an observation term breaks down in Gooding’s account. 
For the account of operationalism endorsed here see Chang (2004, 2009c).
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ontology underlying the distinction” of the material vs. the conceptual breaks down in 
practice (Gooding 1990: 11–2).22 From the perspective of the problem of concept formation, 
this claim entails that the processes of concept formation should not be thought of as purely 
cognitive, or be seen in terms of definitions. Concepts simultaneously occupy both the 
material and the conceptual realm. What matters, then, is articulating an account of the 
relation between the material world and the conceptual domain that supports the claims 
about concepts and successfully explains in what sense the distinction between material and 
conceptual breaks down in practice, such that accounts of conceptual formation in science 
have to be located (somehow) in the interaction between the material and the conceptual. 
What the investigation of scientific practices shows, then, is what precisely the nature of 
this interaction is and how it is supposed to operate. Once one goes down this road of 
asking the question about the relation between scientific practices and the formation of 
concepts (or meaning), the salient questions become concerned with the contribution of 
human agency and the contribution of the material.
Nevertheless, the same differentiation of conceptual from material that lurked beneath 
Chang’s approach underlies also Gooding’s. His strategy is to re-introduce the conceptual 
dimension (i.e., human agency) back into the material realm, such that relevant conceptual 
innovation happens through the “translation”23 of the material into the conceptual, but with 
the newly obtained conceptual content constrained by the material. Gooding’s goal is, of 
course, to offer a “glue” that explains how the material and the conceptual come together, 
such that their autonomy is overcome through practice. By focusing on human agency 
much more than on the dynamic interplay between agency and the recalcitrance of nature, 
however, Gooding’s account remains too unspecific about precisely how the recalcitrance 
of nature constrains. In the following section, I assess an account that takes scientific 
practices to be the “glue” between material and conceptual, and which aims to provide a 
better grip on the material side, whilst still preserving an ontological autonomy of the two 
domains. 
22 Gooding is not explicit about it, but appears to take himself to articulate a new ontology of scientific 
objects, although he does not develop this point extensively. My reasoning for making this claim is 
related to his defence of an asymptotic realism, according to which the only thing that needs to be 
secured is that the “trajectories of material and conceptual aspects of practice come sufficiently close 
to satisfy competent observers that their talk and thought has engaged the world” (Gooding 1990: xvi, 
my emphasis). 
23 My concept, not Gooding’s.
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4. Mangling the conceptual and the material: a new mechanism of 
“gluing”
This section discusses Andrew Pickering’s response to the problem as to how, working 
from within a conceptualisation of science as practice, one can make sense of the relation 
between the material domain and the conceptual domain – that is, what bearing scientific 
conceptual practices have on the world, and vice versa. What Pickering aims to show is 
how the material bears on the conceptual and how the conceptual bears on the material. 
What is at stake is to show that the material world itself is crucial in our conceptualisation 
of it, and to explain, in particular, how that can work.24 On my reading, Pickering treats 
practices as a kind of interface between the material and the conceptual. I show here that 
the advantage of his approach is that the material realm – and therefore material practice – 
does not get divorced from the conceptual realm. The two get, in some sense, combined.
4.1. Pickering’s treatment of science as the “mangle of practice” 
Pickering's account of science as practice is presented in his 1995 book, The Mangle of 
Practice: Time, Agency, Science. As the title suggests, he makes use of the metaphor of the 
mangle to characterise the role of practice in science – scientific practice is, broadly 
speaking, what squeezes the material world into the conceptual. Given that he conceives of 
science as practice, Pickering’s image of science is not a representational but a performative 
one – and in shifting from an (established) representational to a (novel) performative image 
of science, an important first step is to unpack exactly what that shift entails.25 One primary 
change lies in relocating the issue of the relation between the material world and the 
conceptualisation of it away from correspondence (and its correlates) and to local 
articulations of the ways in which “the connections between knowledge and the world are 
made, and what of those connections, as made in practice, consist” (Pickering 1995: 182). 
24 It might seem trivial to appeal to the role of the world in our conceptualisation of it, but that is far 
from being the case – given Pickering’s context, this is motivated by the dismissal of social 
constructivism. 
25 Pickering’s concept of performativity should not be conflated with the poststructuralist one. The 
latter is a shift away from linguistic practices to a Foucauldian account (or interpretations thereof) of 
discursive practices which Pickering eludes. Moreover, in the poststructuralist account, performativity 
is crucial to both the formation of identity and the constitution of the subject and the object through 
engaging in performativity, dimensions which also escape Pickering’s notion. Pickering’s idiom of 
performativity remains closer to the idiom of performances as doings of a causal agent. I believe that 
the distinction between Pickering’s account of the performative idiom and the poststructuralist ones 
boils down to different theories of causality (and through the latter to different accounts of identity 
construction), but this is a hunch that I do not plan to delve in here further. I will hint more in this 
direction in the next section. For the poststructuralist notion of performativity see, e.g., Barad (2003). 
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What is ultimately at stake in Pickering’s performative account is an examination of science 
in terms of the conceptual results of scientific “doings” (Pickering 1995: 21, 144).26
There are few non-incidental reasons why Pickering uses the mangle metaphor to 
characterise scientific practices. The mangle is a machine for squeezing the water of 
washed clothes by passing them (typically) through two rotating rollers. The metaphor 
captures many of the elements that Pickering takes to be constitutive of his position. First, 
he analyses how empirical and material scientific practices, on the one hand, and scientific 
conceptualisations, on the other, (i.e., what he takes to be two autonomous yet related 
domains) are developed and revised such that their interaction produces robust scientific 
results (be those results ultimately in the form of a theory, a phenomenon, a law, or so on). 
Second, one of the central features of science is that scientists make sense of the world via 
machines of one kind or another – so a machine metaphor seems more than appropriate 
(Pickering 1995: 6–7).27 In the mangle, both rollers participate in squeezing the water from 
the fabric, and they do so by pushing against each other in constant rotation (for as long as 
the handle is moved). This is supposed to capture the feedback loop effect of the mangled 
practice. 
Importantly, for Pickering, it is not just humans who have agency, but the material world 
does so as well.28 However, in their interaction, neither world nor humans are agents 
simultaneously, so to speak: the agency is distributed relative to who performs what 
activities. In a sense, in his account of the mangle as an interaction between passive 
agency29 and active agency,30 Pickering relies here on a well-known account of causation: in 
26 Pickering here builds again on Latour’s idea of science in action and calls for accounts of science in 
real time (and irreducible non-anachronistic) for which he also discusses what such a perspective 
entails from a historiographical point of view. For a harsh criticism of Pickering’s take on objectivist 
accounts of science in real time see Hacking (1999: 72–4). 
27 It should be noted that for Pickering scientific practices are continuous with other cultural practices 
by which humans attempt to cope with the world. There is nothing epistemically distinct about 
science.
28 Pickering follows Bruno Latour in attributing agency directly to the world itself. However, unlike 
Latour, Pickering does not develop a theory of agency. As far as I understand Pickering, the necessary 
and sufficient condition for being an agent is to effect causal changes. If so, then the world has agency 
because it does things: “One can start from the idea that the world is filled not, in the first instance, 
with facts and observations, but with agency. The world, I want to say, is continually doing things, 
things that bear upon us not as observation statements upon disembodied intellects but as forces upon 
material beings. Think of the weather. Winds, storms, droughts, floods, heat and cold – all of these 
engage with our bodies as well as our minds, often in life-threatening ways” (Pickering 1995: 6).
29 See below for a discussion of the concept “passive agency”.
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the interaction, one part is always thought of as the cause (and is active) and the other as the 
effect (and is passive). In the dynamics of practice, the material and the human occupy their 
positions as cause and effect alternately. Skilled researchers enact their agency by 
developing procedures, machines, concepts, and hypotheses to interact with the material 
agency. The world responds by resisting, in one way or another. The world does not simply 
bend to the wishes or intentions of the scientists, of course. The world’s resistance is quite 
often an unexpected, unanticipated response. The researcher’s next move is an attempt to 
accommodate that resistance within the ongoing practices.
In this light, Pickering characterises the interaction between the non-human, material 
agency and the human agency as a “dialectic of resistance and accommodation” (Pickering 
1995: xi). It is a dialectic because the product of the interaction – the experimental fact, the 
theory, the scientific result is “created” through the back and forth between the agencies in 
the process of resistance and accommodation. The continuing practice of accommodation to 
resistance destabilises practices and scientific conceptualisations. Conceptual changes, 
theoretical revisions, and revisions of beliefs happen because of the need of such 
accommodation. What characterises the work of the scientist is the fine tuning of the 
research practices to the resistance of the world. This accommodation can happen in many 
ways: by reconsidering the material procedures (e.g., altering the experimental setup, 
improving the measuring instrument), by tweaking the models with which the scientists are 
working, or by making changes within the conceptual apparatus. Given that the 
accommodation of resistance can always be done in various ways, Pickering argues that 
scientific claims are always contingent. Once formulated and accepted, they become 
binding for the researcher in her future practice, but the way in which they claim what they 
claim could always have been otherwise. Research is, furthermore, unpredictable insofar as 
one cannot foresee what an apparatus will show; if one knew, the apparatus would become 
uninteresting – it would not produce anything new (this is an idea that, as we will see in the 
next section, Rheinberger puts at the centre of his account of experimental systems).
Importantly, on Pickering’s account, the dialectic of resistance and accommodation is 
traceable. If a researcher is calibrating an instrument to take a measurement, the 
performance of the activity depends on the researcher’s goals, intentions, reactions, etc. 
Once the instrument is calibrated, whatever is measured is dictated by the world, and it is 
not in the control of the human agent. For example, a dip compass properly set up on the 
Greenwich meridian will measure geomagnetic inclination at its latitude in the complete 
absence of further human input; and it will also measure the variation in that inclination 
over time. Nature itself, then, becomes the agent, and the researcher, at this point, is taken 
by Pickering to be a mere witness who stands back and sees what happens (Pickering 2012: 
30 Pickering’s favoured metaphor for this is the “dance of agency” (see, e.g., Pickering 1995: 21, 22, 
24, 51, 52, et al.).
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318).31 An already contrived world performs (I say ‘already contrived’ because the material 
agency depends on the interventions already made – the apparatus had to be set up, 
calibrated, etc.32): the world does something, and some aspects of that something are salient 
in the research context. But something else happens at this point: whatever is salient about 
the situation has to be conceptualised, but how it should be conceptualised could not have 
been known beforehand, because what turns out to be relevant was not known beforehand. 
If the research situation in question is not one in which what is at stake is testing, such that 
the experimental situation is tailored with too little wiggle room (it respects the ceteris 
paribus clause), a characteristic feature of it is that one cannot know beforehand what it 
will bring about. As Pickering notes: “while scientists can certainly assemble cultural 
resources however they like, they cannot know how they will then perform” (Pickering 
2012: 322). This is one way in which we can make sense of Pickering’s claim that the 
“contours” of the conceptual (the human) and non-conceptual (the material) agencies are 
never fully determined, but are constantly determining themselves in a “dance of agency”.33 
Given this constant determination of the contours of both the material and the human, the 
image of science that Pickering’s mangle of practice articulates is one of fragmentation, 
disunity, patchiness. Pickering is not denying that there are robust results in science: there 
are, and those robust results indicate that there is a “fit” between a given physical 
arrangement and the human element (Pickering 2012). But, in all likelihood, any robust 
result will be tossed back into the mangle of practice, rather than being placed in some 
repository of static scientific facts and results. By being tossed back into the practice, there 
is a (logical) possibility that the result in question will be reconfigured, altered, changed, or 
31 The assumption in this example is of course that the increased reliability and robustness of results 
can be obtained by removing the human element from the situation. This procedure of removal of 
agency as a relevant factor in determining measurement values is tracked by Chang (2004, especially 
ch. 1 and 2). 
32 In a sense Pickering does not make the distinction between the world in its totality (or in itself to 
paraphrase a Kantian category) and the already contrived worldly setup that enters into any distinct 
research moment. Strictly speaking, it is not the world that contributes, but a specific worldly 
arrangement. The contribution should be evaluated against the respective physical arrangements and 
the possibilities the latter harbours, and not against the world as a whole.
33 Pickering does not use the distinction between the non-conceptual and the conceptual. He frequently 
talks about the nonhuman and human interaction or the material and conceptual interaction. I think 
both pairs are in fact not doing justice to what is at stake, because both seem to suggest the non-
situatedness of the human agent. Pickering takes the latter seriously, and he aims to reinforce the non-
conceptual and conceptual realms while also taking the situatedness of the researcher’s body amidst 
the practices seriously. This being said, however, it should be mentioned that for Pickering the 
situatedness of the researcher is limited to the research context itself and does not take into account 
other dimensions of situatedness that might be at play, e.g., political, institutional, etc. 
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even rejected, and so on34. Given that the production of stable experimental results entails 
much back and forth between human agency and material agency, Pickering emphasises 
that such “construction” of scientific products is of necessity a diachronic activity, and that, 
consequently, analyses of science have to take this dimension seriously. I talk here in terms 
of construction because Pickering is a constructivist of sorts – he is what we might call a 
“worldy” constructivist (so to speak). His position is “worldly” because, on his account, the 
world is relevant with repect to how a knowledge claim looks. And it is constructivist 
because the specific situatedness of the researcher in her material, conceptual, disciplinary, 
institutional context is also determinative. The relevant result is obtained at the “negotiated” 
confluence between the human and the material.
Pickering is explicit about the reasons for his choice of the word “resistance” in preference 
to “constraint”: 
though resistance and constraint have an evident conceptual affinity, they are 
perpendicular to one another in time: constraint is synchronic, preexisting practice and 
enduring through it, while resistance is diachronic, constitutively indexed by time. 
Furthermore, while constraint resides in a distinctively human realm, resistance, as I 
have stressed, exists only in the crosscutting of the realms of human and material 
agency […] this displacement from constraint as a characteristic of human agency to 
resistances on the boundary of human and material agency-serves to foreground the 
emergent posthumanist decentering implicit in the mangle. (Pickering 1995: 66–7)35
We see here once again Pickering articulating the need for a dynamic, synchronic account 
of science, in which resistances themselves can be reconfigured and shifted by new 
practices of intervention. Resistance (and accommodation) track the responsiveness of the 
causal relations between the material and the human realm. What the world (or nature) does 
in the contrived setups of research practice (recall that for Pickering the interactions are 
mediated by machines) is to resist, while the human agent accommodates. Pickering’s 
treatment of the interaction between the material and the human as responsiveness in the 
form of resistance and accommodation shows that Pickering operates with a dualistic 
ontology–of the material interacting with the human–with responsiveness being trackable 
epistemologically. When mangled in practice, there is mutual responsiveness of the material 
and the human, such that the “contours” get reconfigured, but this does not amount to 
ontological dependency of the one to the other, but rather to a sort of plasticity of responses 
that both realms are built for. 
34 Every scientific claim and every scientific result is open for revision and transformation, such that 
for Pickering they are not stable, atemporal entities. The extension of knowledge will put pressure on 
how such results were accommodated within the mangle. 
35 Pickering’s account is post humanist in the sense that it extends attribution of (non-intentional) 
agency to nature as well.
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4.2. Conceptual practices and their hold on material practices 
If the mangle of practice is a dialectic of accommodation and resistance, conceptual 
practices pose a serious challenge to Pickering’s model: 
machines are located in a field of agency but concepts are not. Thus, while it is easy to 
appreciate that dialectics of resistance and accommodation can arise in our dealings with 
machines—I have argued already that the contours of material agency emerge only in 
practice—it is hard to see how the same could be said of our dealings with concepts. 
And this being the case, the question arises of why concepts are not mere putty in our 
hands. (Pickering 1995: 113)
There are two correlated challenges which should be disentangled: the first is that it is 
unclear what constrains conceptual practices such that concepts are not and cannot be 
merely moulded and remoulded any way we like. The second is that it is unclear how to 
justify the existence and operation of the constraints that the material practices place upon 
conceptual practices themselves, such that conceptual practices are in significant and 
meaningful ways about the material, non-human agency. Pickering denies the social 
constructivist response according to which scientific knowledge is tailored such that it fits 
in with the social structure and is in no way constrained by the world itself (i.e., the world is 
unresisting). But he also denies that science is a body of propositions about how the world 
truthfully is. To Pickering, then, what is needed is an account that simultaneously allows for 
the world’s resistance, such that it constrains the conceptual practices, and the human 
agent’s freedom to creatively accommodate such constraints. Material performance and 
agency is Pickering’s starting point because what is ultimately at stake is explaining how 
the non-conceptual world interacts with the conceptual world.
Pickering raises precisely the question of how the world of machines and material agency 
constrain the conceptual realm, which is taken to be already separated and causally closed 
off from the material. The question is broken down by Pickering into two distinct 
situations: (1) when conceptual content is already in use (that is, conceptual content is 
already known) and (2) conceptual innovation (or what Pickering calls “cultural 
extension”). For (1), Pickering defends an account of passive or disciplinary agency, where 
the moves of the agency are already constrained by the routinised practice. The idea here is 
that the standards of what constitutes an appropriate or inappropriate conceptual response to 
the world (i.e., the sanctioning and rewarding of the conceptual practice) is not left to the 
human agent, but is dictated by the routinisation of the performances involved. Conceptual 
practice, for Pickering, simply goes along in a sort of mirroring relation with the material 
performances. What is specific to routinised practices, and what is of interest for our 
purposes here, is that any sign that is in use is in use against the backdrop of a practice, and 
as such it is already meaningful as part of that practice. In Pickering’s words, “To know 
algebra is to recognise a set of characteristic symbols and how to use them” (Pickering 
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1995: 115). Pickering analyses this in terms of “discipline”36: any response in doing 
algebra, for example, is already disciplined by the internal rules and standards that the 
routinised practice follows, such that the human agent shows only passive agency (or 
“disciplinary agency”). Passive agency does not mean lack of activity, but rather (for the 
most part) a lack of freedom in the conceptual performance due to its being part of the 
routinised practice. If given the objective of solving the problem “1+1=?”, I have the 
freedom not to reply, or to write any other number than “2”. However, the routinised 
practice of arithmetics sanctions my response as an outsider to the practice if I misuse the 
rule. It is in this sense that the human agent as practitioner of arithmetics is not free. 
Pickering notices, however, that this Wittgensteinian response works only for conceptual 
manipulations that are already part of an established practice. The question regarding 
conceptual innovation (“cultural extension”) remains very much at issue.
Pickering takes practices of conceptual innovation to involve a kind of modelling, in that 
“new conceptual structures are modelled on their forebears”, just “as new machines are 
modelled on old ones” (Pickering 1995: 115). Conceptual practices are also open-ended, 
involving what he calls “free moves” (Pickering 1995: 116). We have said that Pickering 
takes both the human and the non-human (the material) to have agency, but there is a sense 
in which their respective agencies differ: the world does things, indeed, but it always does 
things in a pre-determined way. Its agency is always, in a sense, disciplined agency. As we 
have seen, the human realm involves disciplined agency too. But it also has intentional 
agency, a state that has no counterpart in the agency of the material world. Due to 
intentional agency, Pickering claims, humans have freedom of choice. This is why the 
dialectics of resistance and accommodation have an internal degree of freedom. A 
researcher can accommodate the resistance of the world in various ways precisely because 
of this intentional stance. As one might expect, the intentional stance will also have a role to 
play in the conceptual practices of cultural extension. 
Pickering ascribes three stages to practices of conceptual innovation: bridging, transcription 
and filling (Pickering 1995: 115–16). Bridging is the activity by which a tentative proposal 
is made for extending a set of accepted concepts (and practices) – it aims to establish a 
“bridgehead” from existing concepts into new conceptual territory (Pickering 1995: 115). 
Transcription is the activity of accommodating the new conceptual proposal to the pre-
existing set of concepts that the new concept is attempting to extend. In the transcription 
stage, the conceptual performances are constrained because the rules and connections of the 
conceptual structures are already established and accepted and thus can only be navigated 
through the disciplined agency of a researcher (Pickering 1995: 116). Presumably, it is at 
the transcription stage that the situatedness of the researchers (specifically, their 
situatedness relative to their research context) directs both the conceptual innovation itself 
36 See especially Pickering 1995, ch. 5.
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and the intention of the conceptual innovation37. Because, on Pickering’s account, 
transcription is rarely sufficient to complete the conceptual extension process, he also 
specifies a third stage: filling. Filling involves “completing the new system in the absence 
of any clear guidance from the base model” (Pickering 1995: 116). Bridging and filling are 
not constrained; they are free moves, in which scientists have the freedom to “play around” 
with their practices. These are the stages at which analogical reasoning, diagrammatical 
reasoning, and other forms of scientific creativity enter to tweak the existing system so that 
it fits with the new state of things that comes out of the mangle of practice.
Thus, Pickering does have a model for conceptual innovation via practices – and he 
presents this model as if it is characteristic of all conceptual practices of such “cultural 
extension”. His example, however, is mathematical modelling, and it is unclear how it is 
supposed to extend to cases of empirical novelty. Moreover, as the next section will show, 
his account upholds the autonomy of the material and the conceptual, without showing how 
that autonomy is to be overcome.
4.3. Autonomy of realms 
There are two significant ways in which Pickering’s approach maintains, rather than 
overcomes, the autonomy of the conceptual and the material. Firstly, in his account of 
conceptual innovation, Pickering ends up prioritising the conceptual, theoretical component 
over the material one. It might seem as if this could not be the case, since his mangle is a 
dialectics of accommodation and resistance. But the details of the dialectics show that the 
material, non-human element enters in order to “test” the appropriateness of the conceptual 
structure. The material agency’s resistance indicates whether further accommodation is 
needed or whether everything fits well together. The three stages of conceptual extension 
are theory driven, since they all proceed within the context of an already disciplined 
agency. The scientist asks a question, and nature resists in some way – which the scientist 
accommodates. The question is theoretically driven and the accommodation process, as we 
have seen in the discussion of conceptual practices, is directed in such a manner that it can 
preserve as much as possible from the pre-existing theoretical content: the translation and 
filling stages do exactly this. The bridging stage appears to be of the human agent. In the 
back and forth between the material agency and the human agency, the material agency’s 
response is restricted to an evidential role – that is, it is instrumental in determining whether 
the newly proposed concept (or concept cluster, etc.) is appropriate or not. The conceptual 
37 Although not using Pickering’s terminology, my study of the transition from attraction to disponent 
in magnetism and specifically the fact that the articulation of the disponent comes as a response to 
attraction, while not overthrowing the attractive framework but reworking it to new goals, shares 
similarities with Pickering’s proposal. 
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and the material domains remain autonomous from each other, with the conceptual being 
merely “contoured” by the material via the mangle of practice. 
Secondly, although Pickering’s epistemological prioritisation of the mangle of practice is 
meant to show how conceptual assent happens because of the interactions between the 
human agency and nature, such that nature itself plays a significant role in the formation of 
scientific claims about it, his actual solution is somewhat underwhelming. The role that 
nature has in practices of conceptual innovation and of attaching meaning to concepts is 
guaranteed through the performative account of science: the account of the world that 
scientists provide is obtained through causal interactions with the world. And yet, 
Pickering treats the conceptual practices as self-enclosed: the three stages, bridging, filing, 
and transcription, refer back to the conceptual practices themselves. None of it is – to put it 
this way for lack of a better phrase – in causal interaction with the world. When it comes to 
conceptual extension, to accommodate the resistance, there is a retreat of the human agency 
within its own practice and only after a fully formed concept is articulated, or placed within 
the theory, does the material re-enter into the picture to indicate to the scientists whether 
further tweaking is necessary or not.
4.4. Conclusion
As we have seen, Pickering’s mangle metaphor treats scientific practices as a means 
of forcing two disparate realms – the material and the conceptual – together, such 
that the latter gets “contoured” by the former. This provides a very material image 
of an attempt to overcome the problematic separation of realms that so tenaciously 
besets any attempt to understand conceptual formation through scientific practices. 
The metaphor is also revealing with regards to Pickering’s underlying assumptions, 
however: he takes the material and conceptual to be so distinct that they can only 
connect when squeezed together in the graphic manner of the mangle. As such, he 
recapitulates the differentiation between, and autonomy of, the two realms – for all 
its mangling, his account maintains precisely such a separation between material 
and conceptual. On Pickering's account, conceptual practices tend to remain 
enclosed within the conceptual realm, and the conceptual is privileged over the 
material. This might nevertheless be sufficient, if he provided an account of the 
metaphysics of combination and contouring – but where Pickering's approach falls 
short, on the reading proposed here, is precisely in the opacity of his account of the 
practical interface between the realms: in the absence of a metaphysics proper for 
the combination of material and conceptual through practices, Pickering risks 
blackboxing the very problem that concerns us.
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5. The material and conceptual meet in the vagueness of epistemic 
things
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s work in the history and philosophy of biology has centred around 
introducing, developing and regimenting the concept of ‘epistemic things’.38 He develops 
an account “for a history and epistemology of experimentation” (Rheinberger 1997: 183) 
around a few central concepts – epistemic things, experimental systems, technological 
objects, and experimental cultures –, a project that, unfortunately, has received somewhat 
less attention from philosophy of science than it deserves. Despite the book’s relatively 
limited impact, the concept of epistemic things has done important conceptual work for 
several philosophers of science, including Hasok Chang (e.g., Chang 2011b), Joseph Rouse 
(e.g., Rouse 2015), Theodore Arabatzis (2011), and others. Rheinberger’s clusters of 
concepts concerning scientific research have not, though, become common amongst 
philosophers of science.39 However, from the perspective of the problem this chapter is 
tracking – the developmental relationship between the material and the conceptual within 
scientific practices – Rheinberger provides one of the most sophisticated treatments 
available in the literature, which makes for a productive springboard for further research. 
On Rheinberger’s account, epistemic things (sometimes also referred to as “epistemic 
objects”) are produced and investigated in the context of experimental systems. 
Experimental systems40, the smallest working units of research practices, are “systems of 
38 Given that Rheinberger is an historical epistemologist (of sorts), one might wonder why I have 
decided to treat him as a practitioner of the practice turn. Firstly, the two approaches do not exclude 
each other: on the contrary, the practice turn would benefit from a historical epistemology turn of 
sorts (if only to eventually undermine it!), since such a move would allow it to begin to articulate the 
historical dimension of scientific activities that it takes for granted. Secondly, what I am interested 
here is how he discusses concept formation in the context of experimental systems. Rheinberger sees 
his own project as continuous with or part of a conception of science which takes science to be 
primarily research, which is also what I have taken to be the main lesson of the practice turn. These 
are then my two reasons behind my decision of treating Rheinberger’s experimental systems project 
as part of, or at least continuous with, the practice turn within philosophy and history of science. See 
the introduction to Rheinberger 2010a for similar issues. 
39 I use the idiom of research and not of experimentation, because I do not believe that Rheinberger’s 
account should be understood as continuous with projects within philosophy of experimentation such 
as those articulated by the new experimentalists. It is crucial to him that the experimental system – as 
a unit of analysis – encompasses material, social, theoretical, instrumental, and cognitive dimensions. 
It starts off as a system in which these elements come entangled. As part of the research, they will 
always be entangled; they form an intricate interweaving of elements, which Rheinberger calls “the 
concrete” (Rheinberger 2010a). It is only within their analysis that they can be disentangled and their 
inter-relations established on a local (case by case) basis. 
40 Rheinberger does not see himself as introducing the philosophical concept of “experimental system” 
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manipulation designed to give unknown answers to questions that the experimenters 
themselves are not yet able clearly to ask”, and they provide the conditions for the 
emergence of epistemic things (Rheinberger 1997: 28). That is, epistemic things are what 
experimental systems generate: this is as far as the teleology takes the researchers. Their 
investigations are aimed at something that is not yet known and cannot but be 
unforeseeable: the epistemic things41. Epistemic things are “material entities or processes 
that constitute the objects of inquiry” (Rheinberger 1997: 28). So far, Rheinberger’s claims 
appear fairly commonsensical and uncontroversial. But once the reader digs deeper into his 
account of epistemic things, it becomes clearer and clearer that the concept is not only 
precise, but to many also uncomfortably alien.
A large part of what Rheinberger emphasises is the irreducible vagueness of epistemic 
things. This vagueness “is inevitable, because, paradoxically, epistemic things embody what 
one does not know yet” (Rheinberger 1997: 23). It might perhaps appear that what 
Rheinberger is suggesting is that, in research, given an experimental system and through 
some interventions within that system, the researcher is tracking something, but does not 
yet know precisely what she is tracking – and that what is at stake in this situation is 
precisely to get rid of the object’s vagueness by specifying its properties and salience in this 
context. But this is not quite what Rheinberger suggests; on his account, this vagueness of 
the object is irreducible. It cannot be, then, that the aim of research is to determine 
epistemic things out of their vagueness. Is Rheinberger suggesting, then, that epistemic 
things are ontologically vague, rather than just being epistemologically vague? The 
irreducibility of their vagueness seems to suggest the former. But, while the question 
appears to be warranted, it seems that Rheinberger would challenge it. He articulates his 
account of epistemic things by building on a paradoxical concept of the new: the new is not 
to account for science in the making, but rather unpacking the “historiographical and epistemological 
potential” (Rheinberger 2011: 309) of the concept of experimental system, which was already in use 
in the life sciences from the very beginning of the 20th century. That is, experimental systems are the 
smallest units of research in science and can also be the units of research within research about 
science. Rheinberger’s project is to offer a justification for the concept as part of an epistemology of 
scientific research. 
41 Notice that Rheinberger’s account is not intended to be exhaustive of what happens in science. He is 
not denying that there are no test experiments in science, or that researchers do not attempt to repeat 
their experiments and make sure to provide detailed methodologies for the conditions of robustness of 
scientific products. These activities matter for Rheinberger only insofar as they are part of the 
research process. And as part of the research process, these activities have the potential of being 
altered themselves: of being reconfigured. If we compare Rheinberger’s account with writing a 
research paper, for Rheinberger, the activity of doing the preliminary reading research and the writing 
up of the paper are part of the same process. The final published version of a research paper is not, I 
believe, the analog of obtaining a stable result, but rather an exhaustion of the inherent possibilities of 
the experimental system; it is the closing off of the respective experimental system as research. 
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yet known, and when known it is already not new. (Rheinberger 1997: 177). The paradox is 
inbuilt in the very definition of the concept. The other confusing aspect about the concept of 
newness is that its definition allows us to attach the predicate “being new” both to 
something that was already existing but was not previously known and to something that 
had not previously come into existence. These aspects, derived from the very definition of 
the concept “new”, operate at the very core of Rheinberger’s understanding of what it 
means to grapple with scientific novelty (i.e. with epistemic things). The vagueness of an 
epistemic thing lies precisely in its newness, rather than in any inexactness. If something is 
an epistemic thing (something new sought for), it remains irreducibly vague.
5.1.Reference and epistemic things.
In a 2005 critical review of Rheinberger’s account of experimental systems and epistemic 
things, the sociologist of science, David Bloor, concludes that “Rheinberger confronts a 
general problem about the nature of scientific discourse, namely the problem of 
reference” (Bloor 2005: 285). It is telling that Bloor characterises what we have been 
calling the differentiation of the material from the conceptual purely in terms of reference – 
a term that is at most tangentially present in Rheinberger’s work. On Bloor’s interpretation, 
Rheinberger severs the connection between language and the world, replacing it with what 
Bloor sees as a kind of linguistic idealism:
The two-part relation, the link between language and the world, seems to have given 
away to a picture in which the important links and, indeed, the only links, are between 
linguistic items. Drawing the quotations together, we are being told that language does 
not describe the world; scientists deal with traces, which are not signs for objects or 
representations of natural entities. Rather, signifiers are endlessly replaced by further 
signifiers. Try to grasp the world and it slips through our fingers; the things to which we 
apparently refer turn out to be other signs and as a result the sign “loses its referential 
meaning.” We are being offered a non-referential account of scientific discourse. (Bloor 
2005: 288)
For Bloor, then, Rheinberger’s account of epistemic objects renders them without a 
referent. And, de-contextualised from his own account, some of Rheinberger’s claims do 
appear to support Bloor’s complaints. In talking about epistemic things, Rheinberger states,
These significant units, or epistemic things, do not stand for immutable referents. In this 
respect, they are not signs for given objects, representations of natural entities. They 
mean what they mean as far as they can be concatenated in spaces of representation. 
(Rheinberger 1997: 225)
And, in replying to Bloor on exactly the accusation that his account of epistemic things can 
be interpreted as linguistic idealism, Rheinberger writes: 
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The fact that referentiality is not what characterises their essence does not, by any 
means, as I see it, catapult them into the realm of the ideal. (Rheinberger 2005: 406)
At the same time, you do not have to read far in Rheinberger’s work to realise that he takes 
the material conditions within the laboratory to be of importance. He advocates attention to 
the details of experimentation (or laboratory work more generally) and to the relevance of 
the material aspects for knowledge production. In the same reply to Bloor, Rheinberger 
reminds us that the goal of his account is to “provide an object-centered, materially founded 
account of knowledge production. According to my position, scientific or epistemic objects 
are clearly material things” (Rheinberger 2005: 406).
Before going back to the debate between Bloor and Rheinberger, we should note one of the 
operational distinctions in Rheinberger’s account. In addition to epistemic things, 
Rheinberger holds that there is another class of objects in scientific research, namely 
technical objects. Technical objects are experimental conditions through which “the objects 
of investigation become entrenched and articulate themselves” (Rheinberger 1995: 29). 
Technical objects are determined and articulated epistemic objects. In other words, the 
technical object is a “precisified” epistemic object. Notice here the word play between 
“epistemic” and “technical”. The latter denotes the possibility of making use of the object 
of inquiry as a tool: it can be made use of as a tool of research because (at least) some 
things are known about the object in question. A technical object (being a piece of 
technology) comes with a manual of instructions for use, assembly and maintenance42, so to 
speak. This is the sense in which a technical object has a well-determined conceptual 
content. Referentiality is possible at this stage: the technical object can be “pointed” at 
(even if only indirectly).43 The use of the word “epistemic” denotes the unknown, or more 
specifically that which is not yet known. For Rheinberger, the epistemic thing is an as-yet-
unknown, that is, something whose conceptual content and material differentiation is vague 
and imprecise. If we read Rheinberger’s position in this way, then we are in a better 
position to understand why he claims that epistemic objects are inherently vague. Epistemic 
objects cannot be used as tools, even though they might participate instrumentally in 
research.
What is underlying Bloor’s objections is not, I suspect, reference as such, but the 
differentiation of conceptual and material – the debate between Rheinberger and Bloor boils 
down to precisely the problem pursued here. For Bloor, the material domain (where 
experimentation, measuring, observing, calibrating and correlated activities happen) and the 
conceptual domain (where theories, concepts, and hypothesis lie) are self-contained, 
42 For theoretical entities this simply means knowing where they stand within the larger theoretical 
structure. 
43 See for this point Rheinberger (1997: 225–6).
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autonomous realms. He assumes an ontological distinction of some kind between them. Of 
course, Bloor takes them to be connected (how could we conceptualise material things if 
they were not?) – and this is where reference comes in. Bloor’s presupposition is that the 
only way the conceptual can connect to the material is through reference, which is why he 
insists on framing Rheinberger’s approach in terms of reference.
So, Bloor takes the material and the conceptual to constitute realms that are connected 
through reference but that are nevertheless fully independent of each other and autonomous. 
What Rheinberger does, though, is to denounce such autonomy, on the grounds that it 
would make scientific research intractable. This is the source of the miscommunication 
between Rheinberger and Bloor – Bloor assumes that Rheinberger needs reference to 
overcome the autonomy of realms, while Rheinberger repudiates the very differentiation 
that drives Bloor’s objection. Thus, on Rheinberger’s account, the language for describing 
how the researcher navigates the material and the conceptual changes radically: concepts, 
for Rheinberger, are embodied in material entities such that, as we have already noted, 
“epistemic things embody what one does not know yet”. According to Rheinberger, 
experimental systems “inextricably co-generate phenomena and the corresponding concepts 
that these phenomena come to embody in the process of their techno-epistemic 
constitution” (Rheinberger 1997: 28). The phenomena obtained from the experimental 
system are already simultaneously material and conceptual. It is thus nonsensical to ask (as 
Bloor takes to be necessary) how a concept is attached to some object or event that the 
experimentally produced phenomenon denotes. Notice, however, that the phenomenon – in 
its techno-epistemic constitution – is different from epistemic and technological objects. 
The phenomenon is that which is already determined.
To grasp intuitively the distinction between these three “types” of entities (each already 
material and conceptual), I propose to make use of the following metaphor. Imagine you are 
at a conference and hear a somewhat confusing paper. You know you have a question to 
ask, but you are not quite sure what exactly that question is. You rerun the paper quickly in 
your head – the re-run is constrained (to a greater or lesser extent) by the content you just 
heard, but some things might be emphasised a little more in your memory, some a little less, 
some get pushed one way, some another (you cannot help but put some kind of spin on it) – 
and now that you have an understanding of what you have to say, you ask your question 
and (maybe more likely, maybe less) your question gets its answer (that is, there is an 
answer to your question in particular, rather than to a different one). The three relevant 
components of this story – the question asked, the question addressed and the quest for 
question formulation – capture, I think, the differences between the Rheinbergerian 
categories: the phenomenon is the question already answered. It is determined; we might 
call it a scientific fact. The question asked parallels Rheinberger’s take on technological 
objects: a technological object is that of which we have an operational definition. And the 
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quest for the question formulation captures some of the features of the epistemic object: it is 
temporally extended, and it is not yet specified. 
In his reply to Bloor, Rheinberger suggests the preliminarity of epistemic things as their 
characteristic feature, because their epistemic value lies in what it is not yet known, but 
which will be made available through the running of the system (Rheinberger 2005: 407). 
Despite their vagueness and incomplete articulation, epistemic things are “things 
embodying concepts” (Rheinberger 1997: 8), since “they lie, so to speak, at the interface 
between the material and the conceptual side of science” (Rheinberger 2003: 623; my 
emphasis). But the relation between the epistemic things and the conceptual content is 
problematic; it is not yet determinate. I take it that Rheinberger claims that an encounter 
with a not-yet-determined epistemic thing in an experimental system entails that the 
epistemic thing is always already invested (Rheinberger’s own word) with conceptual 
content (i.e., meaning). But the conceptual content with which we invest it – and which we 
constantly refine and rework as an epistemic thing that is the subject of investigation within 
an experimental system – elides aspects of the material situation created by the 
experimental system. To be epistemic, for Rheinberger, is not to have conceptual closure. 
Once conceptually closed (once made determinate), either the epistemic concept becomes 
obsolete or it becomes a technical object to be employed in further research as part of the 
experimental conditions of the experimental system.
5.2. Conclusion
What is at stake in the dynamics of the Rheinbergerian experimental system – from the 
conceptual point of view – is moving from the irreducible vagueness of something that is 
not yet materially differentiated, but is in the process of being so, to the transparent 
meaning it gets when the process of material differentiation is complete44 – a process of 
“making one’s way through a complex experimental landscape”, through which 
“scientifically meaningful things get delineated” (Rheinberger 1997: 28). What Rheinberger 
is after is a process that precedes both knowing how to use the epistemic thing and having 
beliefs about the epistemic thing. If we attempt to interpret his account in terms of the 
relation between the conceptual and the material (or the conceptual and the practical), we 
can only conclude that it is neither the one nor the other. The experimental system does not 
simply diversify, improve or correct conceptual and practical grasping: it generates 
“entanglements” of material and conceptual novelty.45 What is new in research does not 
44 At least for some time. Technical objects can always regain their epistemic status, if they once again 
come under question. Also notice that what is at stake for Rheinberger is the processual nature of the 
phenomenon of conceptual innovation.
45 It is in this sense that I understand Rheinberger’s claim that experimental systems are surprise 
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come pre-packaged or pre-determined: scientists in research contexts tinker, via an 
experimental system, to get a handle on the new. This, I take it, is what Rheinberger’s 
notion of epistemic things aims to capture.46 And Rheinberger’s methodological insight is 
that approaching the problem from either a Wittgensteinian pragmatics of use or theories of 
reference simply will not allow one to grasp the dynamics of practice at the level of 
absolute novelty.47
Given the treatment of how epistemic things are produced through experimental systems, 
Rheinberger seems to transfer much of the structure of experimental novelty to the internal 
possibilities of the experimental system qua physico-material arrangement (that is, he 
leaves little room for human agency). His general strategy – somewhat broadly put – is to 
reduce the conceptual to the material. What we might typically attribute to human agency, 
Rheinberger attributes to fairly autonomous experimental systems – the content of the 
epistemic thing is determined through and by the experimental systems. Human agency 
participates in the making of epistemic things only instrumentally. Perhaps it is highly non-
intuitive, but it is the experimental system which determines and constrains the conceptual 
content of the epistemic thing. In Rheinberger’s proposal, humans are spectators of the 
unfolding of the experimental systems, not active participants within them. 
6. Karen Barad’s agential realism 
While other attempts to address conceptual innovation through scientific practices focus on 
means of combining what they assume to be two separate realms (or they pass over the 
issue altogether), Barad offers something different. Others attempt to bridge the gap or to 
squeeze two incompatible things together by sheer force, but Barad offers a rejection of the 
fundamental differentiation that shapes the possibilities of material–conceptual dualist 
treatments of scientific research. This rejection takes the form of an alternative metaphysics 
generator machines. It is not simply about outrunning the expectations of the researcher in the 
research context, but it is about the “disclosure” of new things. Novelty for Rheinberger is tightly 
connected with surprise, that is, something novel could not have been anticipated. The strength of 
experimentation comes exactly from this capacity of generating unexpected results, and it is an 
objective of scientific research projects to cultivate such contexts that generate novelty.
46 Maybe somewhat surprisingly, Rheinberger’s account reinforces the belief that there is no recipe for 
how to produce novelty in research. Yet, despite this, the process of discovery is not completely 
random: resistances enter into the research process at every stage, and what matters for the researcher 
is both to take heed of what these resistances show and how to make meaningful sense of what they 
show. 
47 This is – on my reading, and besides, of course, the personal and sociological reasons – why 
Rheinberger ventures into the philosophical territory of Derridean deconstruction.
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– one in which the material and the conceptual are taken to be ontologically subsequent to a 
more basic ontological category. Barad (2007) articulates a metaphysics of what she calls 
“agential realism”, whose fundamental tenet is that entities do not pre-date the intra-actions 
they belong to – intra-action is the locus in which what a more traditional ontology would 
describe as subject and object, or agent and entity, are co-constituting and mutually 
determining.48 A radical departure from a metaphysics of entities, and movement towards a 
metaphysics of co-constitution, such as the one she proposes, will drag along with it 
significant reconceptualisations of large swathes of philosophy. As she puts it,
This shift in ontology also entails a reconceptualization of other core philosophical 
concepts such as space, time, matter, dynamics, agency, structure, subjectivity, 
objectivity, knowing, intentionality, discursivity, performativity, entanglement, and 
ethical engagement. (Barad 2007: 33)49
Barad’s strategy is not to first come up with a metaphysics and then measure scientific 
practices and other results against it, but rather to proceed from what she takes to be a 
concrete finding within quantum physics, for which the metaphysical model needs to 
account. In other words, for Barad, the scientific developments drive metaphysical 
innovation. Specifically, Barad argues for the generalisation of Bohr’s philosophy of 
quantum mechanics as to apply to all sciences, as a new metaphysics of science: she builds 
on Bohr’s views about the indeterminacy of nature and his account of quantum concepts as 
specific physical arrangements. Therefore, as we will see below, Barad’s metaphysical 
model is articulated in such a way that it allows for both natural indeterminacy and a 
reconceptualisation of the material–conceptual distinction. The indeterminacy of nature is 
exemplified in the impossibility of simultaneously measuring position and momentum in 
quantum measurements (on the Copenhagen interpretation, at least) (Barad 2007: 109–118). 
Once indeterminacy is accepted, there are no philosophical grounds for defending a 
metaphysics of individual entities as having determinate attributes. A new metaphysics has 
to be articulated: the metaphysics of intra-action.
I take this to be the reason why Barad sees no problem in extending her account beyond the 
realm of quantum physics. In an essay review of Barad (2007), Kukla claims that
48 That this is the crux of her position is already made clear by the subtitle of her book: Quantum 
Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. The latter part of subtitle is quite explicit. She 
takes matter and meaning to be entangled, and when things are entangled, they lose autonomy. They 
depend and co-constitute each other. 
49 But also: causality, agency, scientific practices, apparatus, etc. The conceptual shift is profound and 
widely ramified. However, as I will conclude, what is relevant for my point here is that, ultimately, 
her strategy for bringing in the material and the conceptual is taken over by many other scholars. 
Although radical, the strategy seems to be the most appropriate given the constraints formulated by 
the practice turn. 
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Given Barad’s commitment to naturalized objectivity, her apparent faith that quantum 
mechanics in particular reveals transcendental ontological truths and transcendental 
constraints on our norms of objectivity is baffling. More generally, Barad’s taste for 
unrestricted ontological pronouncements seems often to be at odds with her naturalistic 
commitments (Kukla 2008: 297).
As I understand Barad, her goal is to formulate an ontology that can support such 
indeterminacy of nature and, according to her, a metaphysics of individual objects and 
subjects cannot do so because of their determinate appearance. Intra-actions, however, 
allow for the possibility of such indeterminacy. This being said, Barad is not claiming that 
treating objects as if they are autonomous might not turn out to be productive in some 
domains of knowledge, but that the autonomy of objects and subjects should not be the 
constraining assumption of our scientific (and non-scientific) endeavours to make sense of 
nature.
For Barad, intra-action (as discussed in the previous chapter) is the “mutual constitution of 
entangled agencies” (Barad 2007: 33). It is through such intra-actions that regularities, 
patterns, causality and laws get determined. In other words, there is no meaningful sense to 
be made of any given regularity as an individual, independent piece of nature; there is no 
independent existence, on Barad’s account. An enacted intra-action (one that brings about 
“real consequences, interventions, creative possibilities”, etc. (Barad 2007: 37)) is a 
phenomenon. Phenomena, conceived in this way, take ontological priority over individual 
objects and concepts. That is, each individual object exists within and through phenomena 
(or intra-actions). The same goes for concepts (as we will discuss in detail below). This 
means that the material and the conceptual are determined together. There is no delimitation 
of the world or of conceptual content prior to intra-actions. The notion of anything being 
material in itself or conceptual in itself is unintelligible, because of the priority of intra-
action.
6.1. Intra-actions and concepts
Barad’s metaphysics of intra-actions transforms, resolves and dissolves the problem of the 
relation between the material (i.e., traditionally the non-conceptual) and the conceptual (i.e., 
traditionally the non-material). The problem is dissolved because Barad’s metaphysics of 
causal intra-action secures a solution in which the material and the conceptual hang 
together within the same ontological unit: the intra-action (or, otherwise put, the 
phenomenon). The problem is transformed because, in offering her intra-action-based 
solution, Barad is forced to adopt a non-linguistic frame for the production of meaning 
(Barad 2007: 335). Rather than beginning from pre-existing philosophical categories and 
then attempting to shoehorn the claim that material practices are integral to scientific 
concept formation into them, Barad proposes an ontology that integrates scientific practices 
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with conceptual formation from the start – in this ontology, no ontological difference 
between the material and the conceptual remains.
Concepts exist (and, by extension, are meaningful, and semantically determined) only 
within intra-actions: given Barad’s ontology, the notion of any concept “living” outside of 
an intra-action is unintelligible. It is this sense in which concepts are “specific physical 
arrangements” (Barad 2007: 109) – in that “concepts do not have determinate meanings” in 
the absence of “appropriate experimental arrangements” (Barad 2007: 296). To make sense 
of the claim that concepts are specific physical arrangements, Barad follows closely Bohr’s 
experimental work on how to establish the position and momentum of a photon. While, in 
classical physics, these two variables can both be determined in the same physical 
arrangement, in quantum physics (on the standard interpretation) they cannot. Two separate 
physical arrangements (measuring apparatuses) are needed: a moving detector for 
momentum and a fixed detector for the particle’s position. In each of the two physical 
arrangements, one property is measured while the other remains indeterminate. The 
semantic determination of “momentum” or “position” requires the embodiment of the 
concept within (some) physical arrangement (Barad 2007: 117). In turn, a physical 
arrangement is “determinate” if an apparatus is used, because an apparatus allows for 
pattern manifestation – the apparatus embodies “a particular concept to the exclusion of 
others”, such that “the physical and the conceptual apparatuses form a non-dualistic whole 
marking the subject-object boundary” (Barad 2007: 120).
When quantum measurement is discussed, Barad’s claim that the apparatus embodies “a 
particular concept to the exclusion of others” is quite straightforward: two different types of 
setup are required for determination of position and momentum; embodying one in a 
physical arrangement excludes the other. Barad’s second claim, that “the physical and the 
conceptual apparatuses form a non-dualistic whole marking the subject-object boundary”, is 
built on her notion of causal intra-action. Barad’s account here is ontological: the subject 
and object (or the conceptual and the physical, in our analysis here) are, for her, in a 
relation of mutual determination and co-constitution – and both are ontologically secondary 
to the intra-action itself. The causal intra-action and the phenomena they determine, rather 
than any physical entities or concepts involved, are, for Barad, the fundamental ontological 
units. The physical and conceptual exist only within the intra-action.
Barad’s position is not, then, that there are no such things as physical entities or concepts, 
but that physical entities and concepts exist as analyses of ontologically prior intra-actions; 
all talk of either is already part of some intra-action or another. The same is the case for the 
meaning of a concept. Barad does not necessarily restrict the meaning of a concept to an 
experimental situation. Rather, the view she holds is that concepts are one side of an intra-
action coin, so to speak, with arrangements of physical stuff, in some way, being the other 
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side. Put otherwise, for Barad concepts are inextricably materially embodied.50 What this 
means, at least in part, is that it is only within a particular material context that a particular 
concept is meaningful (not least because it does not exist in isolation from a material 
context). The “definition” or conceptual content of a concept is a specification of a physical 
arrangement. That the conceptual content is the specification of the physical arrangement 
means that it is not an image of it, nor a representation of it, nor a mediated description of 
it.
Barad’s position, then, is not an anti-realist position: physical objects and concepts are on 
her account entirely real; they are just ontologically subsequent to intra-actions. This does, 
however, amount to some kind of denial of object permanence. Intra-actions are, by 
definition, active – if we adopt Barad’s metaphysics here, we have to give up on the notion 
of physical entities as static and unchanging. Physical entities themselves are constituted as 
the entities they are within intra-actions as much as concepts are. The entanglement of the 
components of the intra-action cannot, then, be an entanglement of non-autonomous static 
structures. On the contrary, causal intra-action is an account of agencies in flux.
6.2. The apparatus
The notion of apparatus is a central concept in Barad’s account: she does not use 
“apparatus” strictly to refer to specific (material) research equipment (a research device), 
but to capture the broader context in which matter intra-acts with the researcher’s 
interventionist setups, together with the researcher’s stakes in the situation and the values 
shared by the research community and its correlated power relations. Apparatuses are 
“specific material-discursive practices” (Barad 2007: 335) which act as 
a condition of possibility for determinate meaning of the concept in question, as well as 
the condition of possibility for the existence of determinately bounded and propertied 
(sub)systems, one of which marks the other in the measurement of the property in 
question.” (Barad 2007: 127).
Apparatuses enact agential cuts that produce determinate boundaries and properties of 
“entities” within phenomena, where “phenomena” are the ontological inseparability of 
agentially intra-acting components. That is, agential cuts are at once ontic and 
semantic.” (Barad 2007: 148)
Before discussing Barad’s conceptualisation of what an apparatus is, it is worth covering 
her position on discursive practices. Barad’s take on discursive practices shares much with 
Foucault’s conception, firstly in denying the conceptualisation of discursive practices as 
speech acts or linguistic statements, and secondly in accepting that the discursive practices 
50 Barad’s concern is with scientific concepts, but her ontology is general, and is thus applicable to 
concepts generally.
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are the conditions that establish salience. Where Barad departs from Foucault is in stressing 
that these conditions, and the discursive practices themselves, are material (e.g., Barad 
2007: 62–5, 145–7). Thus, on Barad’s reading, Foucault ends up maintaining what we are 
treating here as the material–conceptual binary without offering a sustainable solution. He 
fails to eliminate the binary because he locates agency only in the human domain (Barad 
2007: 145). For Barad, intra-actions are agential themselves, and so are the components of 
such intra-actions on both sides. Matter and meaning, or the material and the conceptual, 
constitute an entangled agency – or, in Barad’s terms, an enactment (Barad 2007: 214).
Apparatus is that within which the resources for meaning-making are available at a 
particular point in a well-contrived situation. This is why that which is produced through 
such apparatus (i.e., a phenomenon) is not independent of the apparatus and the material-
discursive practices a given apparatus instantiates. Dissolution of the experimental result 
entails dismantling the material discursive practices (i.e., the intra-action) supporting it. The 
phenomenon, then, is the enactment of material-discursive practices. The phenomenon 
exists through and within the apparatus – that is, through and within the material-discursive 
practice. There is no pre-given reality to which the phenomenon belongs. The phenomenon 
in its material and conceptual aspects (which are co-constituting and co-developing) is of an 
intra-action. 
6.3. Conclusion
As we have seen, Barad’s solution to the problem of the gap between material and 
conceptual is not an attempt to find a way to bridge it, but rather to do away with the 
underlying distinction by means of an alternative metaphysics – she dismantles the views 
according to which the material and the conceptual are distinct, autonomous, and primary 
realms in need of being brought together in some way. Barad makes the two domains non-
autonomous subcomponents of something more basic: intra-actions. She, of course, is not 
the only one to go this way. As we have already discussed, Rouse (2002, 2015), drawing on 
Barad, also takes the mutual constitution of the material and the conceptual as the sole 
viable solution.
What this approach does is that it annuls the metaphysical problem of generating new 
concepts from material practices. On Barad’s account, concepts and physical arrangements 
are already in the same realm. In fact, her point even is stronger than that: the conceptual 
and the material are not only in the same realm, but are two sides of the same coin. One 
does not exist without the other, because both are metaphysically subsequent to intra-action. 
This means that there is no representing, translating or gap-jumping needed to generate a 
new concept through material practices, because material practices are already conceptual. 
Conversely, this also means that conceptual innovation and change are always accompanied 
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by material innovation and change. Within Barad’s agential realism, moving from one to 
the other is no longer an issue, because each is always already integrated with the other.
The advantage of this is that it indicates the means to solving a thorny problem in the 
philosophy of scientific practices – and that it goes well beyond the largely trivial appeal to 
“empirically adequate” descriptions of “what scientists actually do”, instead making 
practices fundamental and metaphysically integral to scientific research and the study 
thereof. In other words, unlike the other approaches considered in this chapter, agential 
realism is not at risk of being pulled back into any kind of propositional idealism about 
science. Its disadvantage, of course, is its radicality: it requires commitment to a 
metaphysics that is very different from what is commonsensical and from what tends to be 
assumed in philosophy of science. This might make it a bitter pill to swallow. In the next 
section, I address why a philosophy of scientific practices – especially one concerned with 
conceptual innovation – might nevertheless be compelled to take on such a metaphysics.
7. Contextuality and historicism in new scientific concepts
The shift from conceptualising science as propositions to conceptualising science as 
practice has repercussions for other philosophical questions. I have looked at what such a 
shift entails for the question of conceptual innovation in science, and have argued that the 
articulation of a position on conceptual innovation is not independent of a more 
fundamental question, namely the nature of the relation between the material and the 
conceptual. It was my contention that a defence of a substantial role for scientific practices 
in conceptual innovation entails a merging (in the various forms discussed here) of the 
conceptual and the material. So far, I have assessed this problem by analysing existing 
practices of studying concept formation in scientific research in the context of several 
heterogeneous accounts. Despite their differences, they show several similarities in the 
various treatments of the relationship between scientific practices and the formation of new 
concepts. I draw some conclusions about this in what follows. 
A first thing to note is the focus on a certain sense of novelty that hovers over Barad’s, and 
even more so over Rheinberger’s and Gooding’s, accounts. All show, in varying ways, that 
a novel scientific result is about making accessible that which is not yet accessible (on the 
one side) and “making explicit” that which was only encountered sensorially (on the other 
side). This is not an event (in which a researcher performs an observation and something 
gets observed); rather, it is a process, and in this process the two sides articulate and re-
articulate each other. An “observation” that matters to research – that is, an observation in 
which what is salient is made clear – is not an act itself but a series of acts in which what 
matters and how it matters is eventually specified.
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New conceptual content is specified relative to the physical arrangement that the research 
context either picks up or contributes to. The details of how this is articulated differ 
considerably in the cases considered in this chapter – but what transpired to be a common 
thread is a claim about the dependency of a concept’s meaning on the material and 
procedural conditions in which it was produced. Chang claims that the persistence of an 
epistemic thing (which, in his approach, is an already conceptualised object) depends on 
continuously using the procedures by which the interaction with the epistemic thing in 
question was made possible, while Gooding, for instance, claims that the very meaning of a 
scientific concept (often) entails the invocation of the material setup as part of the concept’s 
definition. For Barad, the context-dependency is already embedded in the metaphysics of 
intra-actions. However expressed, the underlying claim is that the conceptual content is 
context-dependent and that this context presupposes material practices of investigation. One 
might find this position both improbable and uncomfortable – improbable because certainly 
one can make further use of concepts formed in scientific research contexts beyond those 
contexts themselves, and uncomfortable because it goes against the initial intuition that the 
concept simply is something different from its referent such that it can be invoked in the 
absence of its referent (and this latter points seems highly unlikely if concepts are somehow 
taken to be context dependent). But, on the reconstruction here, the following is the context 
dependency implicit in the positions addressed in earlier sections. 
Consider the following two statements: 
1. The earth’s magnetic field extends indefinitely. 
2. Jane stubs her toe on a magnetic field. 
Both statements are false. However, while the first statement is meaningful but false, the 
second is simply meaningless. The falsity of (2) is parasitic on its meaninglessness, while 
the falsity of (1) is based on some kind of background knowledge about magnetic fields. It 
remains to be explained, however, what makes statement (1) meaningful and statement (2) 
meaningless. It is at this point that I take the context dependency that can be recuperated 
from the accounts of, e.g., Gooding or Rheinberger to enter. The meaningfulness of – and 
the background knowledge behind – (1) is based on the extension of a system of practices 
in which the meaning of the concept of magnetic field is established. The earth’s magnetic 
field has magnetic intensity, which is measurable across distances. The same is the case for 
two other phenomenal aspects of the earth’s magnetic field: magnetic inclination and 
declination – all have, simply put, spatial extension. In virtue of knowing these things, all of 
which involve, as part of their basic meaning, practices of measurement, spatial 
representation, and so on, we can claim that statement (1) is false, while admitting that it is 
(at least in some sense) meaningful. It is meaningful because extending indefinitely is 
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compatible with the kinds of practices through which we treat magnetic fields (e.g., we 
measure their extension); the statement is meaningful against a context of scientific 
practices in which the meaning of the earth’s magnetic field is entrenched.
The meaninglessness of the second statement is determined relative to the same context: it 
is because we take it that the earth’s magnetic field does not have solidity that we can say 
that statement (2) is meaningless. This context dependency does not preclude predicability 
of concepts; but, on my understanding, it does provide at least (some) constraints for 
assessing the comprehensibility or incomprehensibility of projections. This being said, the 
accounts addressed above do not dwell on such issues, because their projects are not 
concerned with what happens in our conceptual practices once these practices are stabilised. 
They are more concerned with conceptual formation and dynamics than with the use of 
concepts outside the relevant research contexts. While a concept-user can utter the 
statement “I am made of quarks”, I would claim that whether one takes the sentence to be 
meaningful or not depends on both the philosophical intuitions one might have and the 
concept-user’s embeddedness in the relevant scientific domains and their attendant 
practices.
Another thesis about conceptual innovation shared by these approaches is that they take 
concepts to be historical (that is, broadly speaking, temporally-extended) entities. There are, 
of course, various ways of articulating such a historicism, and many of the complexities of 
the various accounts as well as their different takes on the relation between the material and 
conceptual can be disentangled by looking at how precisely they make sense of the 
historicism of concepts. After all, to say that an object is historical is not to say much 
without articulating the temporal structure that is supposed to be internal to the object in 
question. 
For Chang, epistemic objects are historical just insofar as they are temporally extended: 
“As we continue to learn about nature, various epistemic objects come into being, and they 
change and evolve” (Chang 2011b: 415). Changian temporal extensions depend on 
replicating and keeping in use the practices in which the epistemic object is embedded, 
because the meaning of a concept is ultimately rooted in a set of specific concrete situations 
(where those practices can involve material intervention, but can also involve exclusively 
mental operations). As a consequence, Chang is prepared to say that the conceptual 
meaning of “atom”, for example, is rooted in the practices of decomposing and composing, 
which operate “by means of building blocks” irrespective of whether these operation entail 
“the mental construction of explanatory models of phenomena, or down-and-dirty 
operations of analytic and synthetic chemistry” (Chang 2011b: 425). But here is something 
that Chang does not consider. 
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In the case of the word “atom”, the real differences regarding the operations of such 
composition- and decomposition-practices and what their limitations are, are highly 
dependent on the details of those building blocks: it matters greatly whether they are rigid 
bodies, elastic bodies, bodies with fuzzy edges, or something else entirely. The practices of 
composition and decomposition change drastically precisely because of differing 
precisifications of the conceptual content that the term “atom” is supposed to have.51 What I 
take Chang to be obscuring here is that (more often than not) the relationship between 
concepts and investigative practices can be understood as an ongoing, self-replicating 
process: concepts are articulated through investigative practices, and (some of) those 
concepts, in turn, shape and transform the practices of investigation. Newly articulated 
concepts open up new paths of investigation and provide the criteria against which 
investigative paths are deemed appropriate or inappropriate. In a context of investigation, 
the manner in which the situation is conceptually articulated brings certain paths of 
investigation to the fore, while other paths get closed off.52 
Pickering’s mangle of practice is explicitly historical: the dialectics of resistance and 
accommodation works by a repeated back-and-forth, with each interaction calling for 
alterations. With respect to conceptual practices specifically, recall Pickering’s model of the 
stages of bridging, translation, and fitting: what is crucial about how he describes these 
stages is the relevance of a species of conservationism – what is at stake is the maintenance 
of the preexisting conceptual structure. The extension through conceptual innovation should 
be oriented towards preservation of the preexisting concepts and (affiliated) theories, whilst 
admitting that accommodating a new concept might entail changes within the existing 
structure (that is, after all, what the fitting stage is for). The translation and fitting stages are 
stages of iteration (in the mathematical sense). Given this, “this means that what counts as 
knowledge now is a function of the specific historical trajectory that practice has traced out 
of the past” (Pickering 1996: 33). Pickering’s account of the mangle’s historicism is 
articulated in terms of dialectics of resistance and accommodation, but not at the level of 
explaining precisely how or whether the historical dimension plays into the process of 
accommodation itself when the latter calls for the introduction of a new concept, that is, at 
the bridging stage.53
51 Wilson (2006) offers a detailed treatment of many of the differences that an account of collision in 
terms of rigid versus elastic bodies makes in mechanics. 
52 I discuss a case of this in the context of Gilbert in chapter 2, for instance.
53 There are similarities with Nickles (1988 and 1997): “Science transforms itself by more or less 
continuously reworking its previous results and techniques. To miss the dynamical, self-reconstructive 
nature of scientific work is to miss the extent to which scientific inquiry is a bootstrap affair. […] This 
process of applying/extending previous ‘knowledge’ actually transforms that knowledge, sometimes 
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The latter, however, is something that Gooding does. Gooding is very much interested in 
analysing the temporal structure of new scientific results (irrespective of whether the result 
in question is a piece of data, an event, a phenomenon, a diagram, etc.). Rheinberger’s 
account of epistemic things also gets at their temporal structure. And yet the accounts are 
different in substantial and telling ways. What remains common to both is the claim that 
when an object loses vagueness, then research interest is lost. It is at this point that 
scientific objects and scientific concepts get the property of apparent atemporality. We have 
already seen this in Rheinberger’s treatment of epistemic vs. technical things. Gooding 
expresses a similar thought as follows:
realising [i.e., experimental realisation] is a historical process in which the ontological 
status of observable things is worked out as observational techniques are developed and 
disseminated through the mastery and transfer of skills. As we shall see, once scientists 
reach consensus about the status of a phenomenon, entity, or mechanism and write this 
into experimental narratives, the ontological ambiguity of that phenomenon and the 
temporal dimension of its production are lost. (Gooding 1992: 72)
And yet, the temporal dimension here turns out to be different for Gooding and 
Rheinberger. For Gooding, the temporality is essentially retrospective – it is backwards 
oriented because the determination of the ontological status of an object, and the conceptual 
meaning of its correlated concept, require re-runs of past events such that those events are 
made sense of as the research goes on. Gooding does not stress the prospective orientation 
of research as part of his treatment of the temporality of scientific results. On Gooding’s 
account, the interpretation of a scientific result – the “reading off” of it from the 
experimental situation – takes time. Simplified somewhat, one might say that the structure 
of this process is as follows: an experiment is run; something happens; often, the researcher 
does not yet understand what the salient features of what seems to have happened are; there 
is at this point no grasp of what the experiment shows; all sorts of procedures and 
operations feature at this stage in the untangling and making sense of what the experiment 
shows; each step towards understanding entails reconstructing the previous steps in light of 
the current situation; and so on, until the researchers have an understanding of what they 
are being shown. This, then, is the experimental result that gets to be communicated and 
entrenched in future practices. In a sense, the research process itself, with respect to that 
particular result, stops at this point.
beyond recognition. The process also ‘delocalizes’ previous knowledge, to a greater or lesser extent, 
even if the result of the reconstruction is only to relocate it elsewhere” (Nickles 1988: 33-4). Recall 
also Chang (2004) on epistemic iteration: Chang studies precisely how practices of thermometry have 
self-replicated with differences from the seventeenth century onwards and, in doing so, have changed 
dramatically, until they eventually articulated a reliable concept of temperature (where reliable means 
entrenched in a consistent practice of measurement). 
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Principally, what Rheinberger modifies in this structure is the orientation in the 
interpretative stages: for Rheinberger, the interpretation of a current situation does in fact 
entail a reworking of the past, although not in light of a current state, but rather in view of a 
future state.54 The character of this future state is paradoxical: it is unknown and cannot be 
anticipated, but it is sought after precisely because epistemic things are objects of inquiry 
and because research has a rather unorthodox temporal structure. For Rheinberger, the 
salience of anything new learned about epistemic things does not lie in having found the 
thing in question, but in what research questions it opens up. On my reading, this is what 
Rheinberger understands experimental systems, as “machines for making the 
future” (Rheinberger 1997: 28), to be. If this is correct, then Rheinberger’s epistemic things 
are entities of a past always orienting itself to the future, which can be made determinate 
through the future orientation of research, precisely because its determination (i.e., its 
identity) is depends on such prospectiveness.
All this suggests that, in order for a philosophy of scientific practices and concepts to work, 
those practices and concepts require a complex form of temporality. Both are always 
already historical objects existing in historical contexts. Their salience comes in part from 
inherited practices and concepts stretching back further than the institution of new concepts 
(or practice). But part of their historicism is also related to future – the determination and 
salience of any scientific concept or practice depends on the future orientation of research. 
Indeed, the salience of the contexts in which concepts and practices are embedded is 
equally dependent on future research. This is what we might call the reticular temporality of 
research – context, concept, and practice are all embedded not only within each other, but 
within each other’s past and future as well. This reticularity no doubt makes a practice-
based approach far more complicated than more traditional approaches tend to be. But this 
appears to be one cost of avoiding propositional idealism.
8. Conclusion
This chapter has defended the claim that the approach to the question of the relation 
between scientific practices and conceptual innovation depends on a more fundamental 
question: that of how, precisely, the relation between the material and the conceptual is 
specified. The argument began by showing that, in trying to bypass the question altogether, 
Chang ends up implicating more than one possible relation in his approach. I suggested that 
his agnosticism on the issue, coupled with his pragmatic orientations, are not sufficient to 
satisfactorily show how scientific practices contribute to conceptual innovation – and 
indeed that, if no metaphysics is supplied for conceptual innovation, his account is at risk of 
falling into propositional idealism. I then moved on to Gooding, who places the question of 
54 I will ignore Barad’s take on the historical dimension of concepts because it follows Rheinberger’s 
insofar as the latter builds on Derrida. See Barad 2007: 382–3 and 438. 
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practices and concept formation at the heart of his 1990 book. Gooding offers a rationale 
for why scientific practices matter to conceptual innovation by arguing that the meaning of 
a new scientific concept is dependent on the scientific practices themselves. The section 
discussed the details of such dependency through Gooding’s concept of construals. It 
concluded, however, that although Gooding was successful in showing the role the 
conceptual plays in the material, he left the recalcitrance of nature unexplained.
Pickering’s mangle of practice was the subject of the next section. I have claimed that it is 
precisely the relation between the conceptual and the material (or, in Pickering’s terms, the 
human and the non-human) that is at stake in his account of science as mangled. What his 
mangle metaphor sets out is a dialectic of resistance (or recalcitrance) and accommodation. 
However, the details of how Pickering articulates both the concept of accommodation and 
that of resistance show that he takes the conceptual and the material to be autonomous and 
intersecting only in an instrumental way. This is not satisfactory from the perspective of the 
practice turn for two reasons: (1) the primacy of the evidentiary role on the material side 
and (2) because it does not overcome the conceptual-material distinction. Given the self-
reflexivity of the study of scientific practices that I argued for in chapter 6, a practice-based 
account of science cannot even get off the ground if it maintains a distinction between 
material and conceptual (at least without specifying an effective means of bridging the gap). 
It cannot get off the ground because its own conceptualisations are results of (at least 
partially material) practices themselves; thus, as a discipline, it relies on there being no 
(effective) gap between the material and the conceptual.
Both Rheinberger’s and Barad’s accounts do provide means to get past this gap, although in 
different ways. For Rheinberger, the material-conceptual distinction breaks down in the 
experimental system: epistemic things are both material and conceptual entities. Outside 
experimental systems, the conceptual and the material are (still) related referentially. 
However, not all scientific practices and not all scientific domains develop around 
experimental systems. One might argue that zoology, for instance, does not proceed through 
Rheinbergerian experimental systems. If this is the case, then it becomes unclear how 
Rheinberger’s approach to the problem of the relation between the material and conceptual 
can extend across various domains of knowledge generation. And I believe that it in fact 
cannot. Rheinberger’s solution through the introduction of epistemic things is entrenched 
not into the empirical sciences as such, but only in some forms of experimental practices. 
Unlike Rheinberger, who articulates a local response, Barad articulates a metaphysics 
capable of avoiding the material-conceptual distinction. Her response is to subordinate their 
ontological status to the ontology of intra-actions: on her account, the material and 
conceptual are co-constitutive within intra-actions. In taking on this radical metaphysics, 
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Barad’s response to the question of how scientific practices contribute to the conceptual is 
inbuilt within her metaphysics.
A shift in metaphysics turns out to be necessary if we are to have practices for the study of 
science that do away with the differentiation between the material and the conceptual (and 
the associated autonomy of each), which underlies so many extant practices in philosophy 
of science and science studies. There is another metaphysical shift (section 7) that is also 
required once one takes a practice-based approach to conceptual innovation – scientific 
concepts and practices both turn out to require a reticular temporality. What this chapter has 
shown is that these metaphysical shifts are necessary for a philosophy of scientific 
practices. This does not mean, however, that any practice-based approach that does not 
explicitly address the metaphysics involved necessarily fails. Rather, it means that these are 
the metaphysical implications of successful practice-based approaches, which seemingly 
cannot be avoided – but they can do perfectly well simply lying tacitly beneath ongoing 
practices for studying scientific research.

Conclusion
My purpose, in this dissertation, has been to examine the interplay between practices of 
investigating the natural world (in this case, investigating magnetism), and the devising of 
concepts to denote and talk about the world. In the repeated interaction with the historical 
material throughout the research for this dissertation, my own thoughts about it have 
mutated in many different ways. Many of these “mutations” seemed significant along the 
way, but turned out not to be particularly salient – at least, they “turned out” non-salient in 
relation to the situation I find myself in now, concluding this dissertation, and ostensibly at 
the end of the research. Those mutations are not included here (except, perhaps, in vestigial 
form): what ended up being the criteria of salience here excluded them, although perhaps 
they will turn out to drive other research in the future – such, I have argued throughout, is 
the nature of research.
The “mutations” that are included constitute the results of this dissertation. In addition, 
because my approach here is reticular and reflexive, these mutations also constitute the 
basis of the approach. The second part of the dissertation discussed such mutations not at 
the level of the study of scientific research (i.e., the history of magnetism) but at the level of 
the study of the study of scientific research. In this way the approach is reflexive, a 
commitment I defended in chapter 6 as necessary when practices are the research object. 
The second part, then, showed the mutations of my philosophical commitments through 
historicisation of practices for addressing the problem dealt with by this dissertation: the 
mutual interaction between practices and concepts, with a particular focus on conceptual 
innovation, or those practices through which the world is “devised” conceptually. 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that conceptual innovation and development are the 
lifeblood of scientific research. It is no surprise, then, that ever since the heyday of logical 
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positivism, problems associated with the formation of new concepts and conceptual change 
have taken centre stage in philosophy of science. And ever since the historicist turn in 
philosophy of science of the 1960s, the conceptual dimensions of scientific research have 
been used instrumentally in debates about the nature of scientific rationality and scientific 
change. This was at least partly in reaction to the thesis of semantic incommensurability1, 
which cast doubt on the cumulative progress of science, its objectivity, and the rationality 
of scientific change. Whether trying to defend, to dissolve, or to show the (un)tenability of 
the semantic incommensurability thesis, the answers that followers of mainstream 
philosophy of science offered to the problem of scientific conceptual innovation have 
operated within a classical view of concepts2, which takes concepts to be fully-fledged, 
autonomous, ideational entities, with well-defined and objectively assessable boundaries. 
This conception of concepts gives good grounds for treating the conceptual as an 
independent realm of philosophical analysis.
The problem with this, as Hacking noted3, is that it leads to a kind of conceptual, or 
propositional, idealism, in which the conceptual is taken to be (1) what matters about 
scientific research, (2) what we should (and can) assess with respect to scientific research, 
and (3) autonomous. Recent work in the practice turn in philosophy of science and science 
studies4 has provided considerable reason to reject (1) and (2). It also tends to reject (3) – 
but how that rejection is supposed to work is less clear. This was the concern of the second 
part of this dissertation. An account of scientific research (a philosophical account of 
scientific research, especially) that wants to connect concepts with the material practices of 
experimenting, observing, instrument-building, diagramming, etc., that make up the day-to-
day activities of research will need to find a way to overcome the apparent isolation of the 
conceptual and material realms. At first glance, this ought to be simple – we ought to be 
able to simply deny that there is any such separation of conceptual and material. After all, 
this differentiation is inherited from (Platonic and Cartesian) metaphysical traditions that a 
philosophy of science has no immediately apparent need to uphold.
The trouble, however, is that the practices we have for addressing, analysing, and talking 
about concepts are practices we have inherited from prior traditions. And, as Chapter 7 
showed, it turns out that the possibilities for and limitations of these practices is shaped (at 
1 There are, as is well known, many versions of the semantic incommensurability thesis. Simply put, 
however, it is the claim that concepts of different theoretical schemes cannot be fully translated into 
each other. 
2 As discussed Chapter 7, section 1. 
3 See Chapter 6, section 3.3.
4 As argued for in Chapter 6.
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least in part) by the inherited underlying metaphysical differentiation between material and 
conceptual – these are practices that attempt to account for conceptual innovation by trying 
to bridge an assumed gap. In light of this, simply rejecting the distinction is insufficient – 
regardless of any explicit rejection, the distinction remains implicit within the practices. 
What is needed, I conjectured, is a somewhat radical change in the metaphysics that 
underlies the study of scientific practices in order to shape different possibilities for (and 
limitations of) our practices for studying science. Simply put, the view I tried to defend by 
historicising the ways in which the problem was dealt with is that a successful account of 
how the material forms and constrains the conceptual has to openly embrace a metaphysics 
which breaks down the autonomies of the conceptual and the material. Without such a 
radical shift, worries similar to those raised by Bloor about Rheinberger’s account of 
epistemic things (as discussed in Chapter 7, section 5) will always rear up, and will always 
have to be fended off. Showing how the practicalities of scientific research, and all those 
material interventions, matter will never constitute an argument for why it can be the case 
that the conceptual is developed through the material (and vice versa). The apparent 
autonomy of conceptual and material realms has to be completely broken down.
We saw some ways of effecting such a breakdown in Barad’s approach. By introducing a 
metaphysics of intra-actions, in which the material and the conceptual are co-constituted, 
her approach evades the problem of (apparent) autonomy. My proposal here is not that we 
should simply adopt Barad’s approach. Joseph Rouse’s philosophy of scientific practices, 
briefly discussed in Chapter 6 section 4.2. also pushes in a productive direction for these 
ends. My contribution here has been to defend the need for such a project, and to indicate at 
least some of the constraints it ought to have. Given this, I have also suggested that, 
whatever the metaphysics underpinning the practice of the practice turn, it requires another 
component. It requires a non-linear, reticular metaphysics of time – neither practices nor 
concepts can be understood in “mummified” (Hacking 1983: 1) form. They cannot, that is, 
be addressed in atemporal, propositional form. Instead, it turns out, practices and concepts 
are determined only retrospectively, but always in terms of both their inherited past 
(through prior practices and concepts) and their projected future use.
In the study of the history of magnetism I have made use of this latter commitment to a 
certain temporal structure of practices and concepts. I took a diachronic yet reticular 
approach to the analysis of the magnetical philosophy and its aftermath. The results (or 
bases) of Part 1 are, then, as follows. Most generally, it seems that early modern practices 
of investigation into magnetism are by no means homogeneous, but are made up of various, 
tightly integrated elements. There are no well delineated categories of the “experiment”, 
“the observation”, the “representation” and so on. These and other elements are lashed 
together into an interwoven structure of practices of investigation. For the purposes of 
analysis, one can indeed disentangle them – but, in the context of the investigation itself 
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(and even in the context of the reporting of that investigation in natural philosophical 
treatises), they remain closely entangled. They remain messily embedded with each other.
Conceptual innovation is not, then, simply the result of experimental work, or observational 
work, or rational work, or any singular method. Any particular conceptual innovation is tied 
into the investigative situations in which it was generated, and in which it is to be used. It is 
no simple matter to disentangle all these and decide which specific practice made this 
specific concept possible. Chapters 2 through 5 speak to this entanglement of practices 
within research situations from various angles. This, of course, does not mean that I have 
not written about experiments, representations, observational practices, matter-theoretical 
considerations, etc. as if they were isolated units. I certainly have – our existing practices 
for talking about science presuppose such isolation of units, rendering any discussion of 
entangled research situations a rather awkward prospect. Even though I could not 
reasonably avoid, at times, writing as if experiments were autonomous from diagrams, and 
diagrams from concepts, and so on, what is important here is that we need not let the 
existing presuppositions implicit in our practices for studying science restrict what we take 
scientific research to be. What each chapter here – Chapters 2–5 especially – has tried to 
show is precisely the entanglement of these practices of scientific research.
Chapter 2, for instance, argued that Gilbert proposed a new conceptualisation of magnetism 
as a disponent power (as a power that primarily places bodies in alignment) rather than in 
terms of attraction. That reconceptualisation was, it turned out, the result of various types of 
practices. There were certainly experimental and observational considerations (the 
observation of the peculiarities of repulsion in the floating magnets setup, for instance). But 
there were also matter-theoretical considerations, alongside considerations about general 
metaphysical issues (e.g., causality). It was the cluster of many such things that, when taken 
together, guided Gilbert’s conceptualisation of his investigative context such that what 
magnetism was understood to be primarily about the alignment and organisation of 
magnetic bodies.
This approach was inverted in Chapter 3. There, I showed how the concept of spheres of 
activity shaped the possibilities for and limitations of networks of practices – and how it 
continued to do so even when new metaphysical commitments should have entirely ruled it 
out. Specifically, mechanical philosophies rejected much of the ontology of the magnetical 
philosophy, but the concept of spheres of activity continued to influence not only their 
material practices of investigation, but also their explanatory practices. Next, Chapter 4 
focused on a particular case of the interplay of practices, by showing how both 
experimental and diagrammatic practices (along with mathematical practices of spherical 
trigonometry) facilitated the devising of concepts such as arcs of declination and rotation, 
the rule and of alignment, and the orb of virtue.
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What those first few chapters show, then, is that conceptual innovation does not obtain (as 
we might expect it to) by simply observing a new thing. It takes work – work of various 
sorts – to devise a new concept. And this work is not, by any means, purely cognitive. What 
is going on in a research context does not consist of separate (or even fully separable) 
events, in which observational and experimental practices present something or other, and 
then the researcher proposes a theoretical model or a hypothesis or a concept to account for 
what is seen. What experimental and observational situations show is never 
straightforwardly clear – at least not in isolation from the larger network of practices. The 
determination of what is shown takes work through a variety of practices that are 
simultaneously both material and conceptual. It turns out – at least in the cases considered 
here – that there is no clear cut distinction between the empirical finding and the 
conceptualisation of the empirical finding. This is particularly evident in the case 
considered in Chapter 5, which looked at the investigations of a single phenomenon, 
magnetic inclination, over a period of roughly two centuries. We tend to think of 
phenomena as relatively stable entities – we might well think that there just is such a thing 
as magnetic inclination that was discovered, by Norman in the late sixteenth century, and 
then investigated in a variety of ways. But, instead, the differences in investigations over 
time turned out to change the phenomenon itself – differences in investigative practices 
entailed mutations of magnetic inclination itself. The continuity of magnetic inclination was 
in an underlying differentiation between the planes of movement of a needle in a certain 
instruments (the compass, versorium, and dip compass) – it was never at the phenomenal 
level.
This dissertation, then, has analysed the interplay between scientific practices and 
conceptual innovation on two levels. In Part 1, it assessed the multitude of ways in which 
practices shaped concepts, and in which concepts shaped practices, through a little over two 
hundred years of the investigation of magnetism. In Part 2, it assessed the practices we have 
for doing the kind of research undertaken in Part 1 – that is, practices for the study of 
scientific practices. In the latter case, too, the concepts are shaped by the practices, just as 
the practices are shaped by the concepts. There are multiple, complex facets to the interplay 
between practices and concepts, and not just because of this bi-directionality of recursive, 
mutual constitution between the two sides of the scientific-research coin. We end up in this 
reticularity also because of the mutual embeddedness of not only practices within concepts 
and vice versa, but of practices within practices, and concepts within concepts. There is no 
pre-conceptual stage is our investigations of the world – and there is also no stage free of 
prior, established practices.
There is yet another reason why tracking this interplay becomes so complicated: neither the 
investigative practices nor the concepts constitute permanent, well-delineated entities that 
are easily picked out in our study of them. They mutate at impressive rate. And most of 
what we see in treatises and reports, and even lab notes, are just the tips of the practical–
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conceptual icebergs involved. Much of how the processes of conceptual innovation, 
learning and advancement happen is caught in the details of the research context itself, in 
its dynamics and its history. And it is here that the research in this dissertation took place – 
in taking some (more or less) almost forgotten texts and finding within them a network of 
salience that stretches from their creation to now (as well as back into their past, and 
forward into our future). If this dissertation has, to some extent, managed to make those 
texts speak to those of us interested in understanding how we go about understanding the 
world, it will have fulfilled its purpose.
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